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The dissertation is divided into six chapters, there is also an 
introduction, a conclusion, and an appendix which consists of short 
biographical notes on the personalities mentioned in the narrative. 
The Introduction outlines the main themes of the study, it includes 
a discussion of the sources used, and lists acknowledgements. 
Chapter I examines the character of the decision-making process. III 
the early part of the First World War, wak aims were decided in very much 
the same way as had been foreign policy before the war. Authority was 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of men surrounding the Foreign 
Secretary Sir Edward Grey. At the same timof the executive eras able to 
use the overwhelming popular enthusiasm for the war to assert its 
independence from external influences. 
Chapter II concerns Prussian militarism. Grey and his colleagues 
believed that the military advisers of the German Government had deliberately 
precipitated the war$ and that they were the iie Cato rulers of Germany. 
The Foreign Secretary refused to consider making any peace which left the 
*Prussian military caste" in control of German policy and free to repeat 
its aggression. 
Chapter III is about British war aims with regard to Western Europe. 
Britain went to war to -. tP-ot her strategic interest in the independence 
of the North-West of Europe and to safeguard the naval position in Home Waters. 
The peace settlement was to ensure that in yearn to come Western Europe would 
be free from the danger of further German attack. Germany was to evacuate 
and compensate Belgium; Alsace-Lorraine was to be restored to France; 
German naval power was to be greatly weakened. 
Chapter IT explains British war aims with regard to Lustrie-41ungary. 
British interests are seen to lie in securing the safety of the i! est of 
Europe. Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe was entirely pragmatic: 
the future of the Habsburg Empire vas used as a pawn to secure more 
immediate interests. 
Chapter V is centred on the question of Constantinople and the Straits. 
Britain and Rassia had few common interestsf Grey tried to buy Russian 
co-operation and minimise Anglo-Ruaaien differences with the offer of 
territorial expansion at the expense of Turkey. 
Chapter VI explores British policy tovsxds the German colonies. 
Britain-neither wanted nor needed territorial aggrandisement, but there were 
strong arguments - mainly strategic - for retaining German colonies-after 
the war. Moreover, Frances Japan, New Zealand, Australia and the Union of 
South Africa laid claims to large parts of Germanyfs overseas Empire. 
These claims Britain could not refuse. b)here Britain had a reasonably 
tree band, in German East Africa, policy tended to fluctuate according to 
the fortunes of war. 
The main conclusion of this dissertation is that Britain fought for 
securityt above all to prevent Germany from dominating Western Trope. 
However, the enormity of British interests the diversity of her friendships* 
and the dislocating effects of war itself caused her to widen her objectives 
as the war went on. 
c 
(i) 
The appearance of Professor Fisoher! s mas3ive and controversial 
volume on the war aims of Imperial Germany' has done rauch to renew 
interest in the political issues of the First World W'er. Three years 
ago 14r#( now Professor) Jolly in drawing the attention of English-speaking 
historians to Fitbher's works observed, that there were no similar studies 
of British war aims. He suggested that students insearch of 
Interesting and fruitful subjects for research could Usefully turn 
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their attention and energies to this neglected topic,, 
Professor Jollis suggestion was as tim3ly as, it was encouraging, for 
it roughly coincided with the half-centenary of the outbreak of war in 
1914. An anniversary doubly significant for historians for it was 
marked - albeit quite fortuitously - by the opening of the public archives. 
At the saws times many important collections of private papersp_also tied 
to a fifty-year-rule, became generally available for the first time. It 
is largely on these primary materiala, that I have drawn in the preparation 
of this dissertation. 
(ii) 
The relevant documents at the public Record Office falz into two 
categories: official papers] private papors. 
1 Fischer, F., Griff nach der Weltmacht 3rd Edition 1963). 
2 Joil, J., , FMvi zuiiber 34, PP"100-113. 
Pßß, ' rr; ste 
L 
The official records of the various departments of State - the 
Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and so on - 
are virtually complete, and those very rare cases where documents are 
missing are almost certainly the result of some administrative oversight 
at the time. 
Before the formation of Lloyd George's Government there were no 
Cabinet minutes taken. The historian has to rely on the Prime Minister's 
letters to the King - CAB. 41. There are, however, minutes of the War 
Council - CAB. 22. The War Council was a body of a rather chameleon-like 
nature; ' it stood mid-way between the Committee of Imperial Defence and 
the War Cabinet as it existed under Lloyd George. Cabinet memoranda are 
tobe found under various classifications, but especially, CAB. 24, 'CAB. 29 
and CAB. 37. 
The bulk of official Foreign Office correspondence Is to be found 
in the political series - F. 0.371., These' ffles are absolutely 
indispensable sources for any study, of the development of British foreign 
policy and. attitudes towards the peace settlement., They contain amine 
of information, and their sheer volume enables the student to form a very 
clear image of how the Foreign Office worked and of'the various 
personalities involved. In footnoting ,. 0.371 references I have 
included jacket numbers but excluded file numbers. In their admirably 
edited volumes of British Documents on the Origins of-the War, Professors 
Gooch and Temperley included file numbers. Since Gooch and Temperley 
performed their labours the Foreign Office files have been bound into 
ýT 
volumes, and the file number is now superfluous. Similarly, I have 
not included telegram numbers; given the volume number, the jacket 
number and the date of the telegram, the addition of a telegram number 
serves no useful purpose. The same method of footnoting has been 
adopted for the corresponding Colonial office series - C. 0.616. 
The Public Record Office also houses several collections of 
private papers. " She precise nature of distinction between private and 
official documents was often of political significance, and the question 
is'considered Inndetail in the body of this dissertation. The 
important collections of private papers are those of ministers and 
diplomats connected with the Foreign Office. These are all under the 
F. 0.800 classification. By far the most useful of these collections 
is the Grey Papers; they constitute an invaluable complement to the 
F. 0.371 series. The Carnock Papers contain a good deal of interesting 
information on Grey's rather sad and sickly Permanent Under Secretary. 
The Spring-Rice Papers and the Bertie Papers have little correapondence 
that cannot be found in the Grey Papers. Bartle was, however, in the 
habit of making personal memoranda on conversations with the Foreign 
Seceetary, and was a compulsive chronicler of Foreign office gossips his 
records of both are of interest. 
There are also some Kitchener Papers at 
Public 
Record Office. These 
were extensively and efficiently used'by Sir Philip Magnus in his 
brilliant biography of Kitchener, and have little-fore to yield that is 
Magnus, Sir. P. KitchenerI Portrait of an Imperialist (Penguin 1968). 
All references to Magnus refer to this volume and this edition. 
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Private collections of papers outside the Public Record Office may 
aIso be divided into two categories those of men inside Government; 
these of men on the periphery - journalists, Members of Parliament, and 
radXaal critics of official policy. 
,, The private papers of Cabinet ministers are for the most part 
disappointing. In tartime ministers spent a much greater proportion of 
their time in London and met very frequently; consequently there was 
less need to correspond. Moreover, it would bean that certain 
collections - Asquith Papers and the Lloyd George Papers - have been 
weeded. The only minister's papers which are not depressingly short of 
enlightening material are the Samuel Papers. Samuel's wife was in the 
country during the Sarajevo Crisis. Samuel wrote to her giving her 
lengthy daily accounts of Cabinet meetings. These letters (curiously 
overlooked by Snmuel'a biographer)Tenable us to pinpoint far more closely 
than hereto the reasons for the Cabinet's decision to go to war. 
of greater interest than the papers of Cabinet ministers are the 
records of those who had accessto official information but who were not 
members of Government. In this respect journalists are particularly 
h4ptul. As trained reporters and observera, tbey took down what man 
in the Foreign O tfioe and the Cabinet thought so obvious that it was 
not worth recording. C. P. Scott made extensive records of his 
conversations with his friends on the radical wing of the Cabinet - 
Simon, Lloyd George, Loreburus, Morley. The papers of St. Loe Strachey 
I. Bowle, J. E., Samuel(1957) 
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and d. A. Spender, and the letters of Sir Valentine Chirol tell us a 
good deal about the Foreign Office in this period. 
The fery extensive'oolleotions of pspern of E. D. Moral end-Arthur 
Ponsouby throw much light on the differences between the Government and 
11 
its radical critics. 1b'bile the former have been quite voll vorked, they 
still contain such undigested material. 
The volume of publisbed'material is enormous. It maybe considered 
under three headings; , published-documents; memoirs; secondary sources. 
ill the Great Powere avid some of the leaser ones published aeries of 
documents on'the 'origins of the . isr. Volumes X (in two parts) and XI 
of British Documents on theQriains of the War give a lengthy record 
of British foreign policy on the eve of the were only once or twice have 
I found documents that ought to, have been included but-Were left out. 
It is a great pity that these excellent- volumes have not yet been fully 
researched. On one point the ritish Doausent8 are misleading) they 
exaggerate the importeaae of the anti-German mood in British, foreign 
policy. 
1 
The oY urvbelmiag majority of the minutes are written by the 
anti-German group in the Foreign office. Between 1912 and 1914 the 
anti-German group were out of favour. Greys who wrote few minutes, and 
his most influential adviser, Sir William Tyrrell, who wrote practically 
none, were sympathetic towards Germany in'this period. - The Gerianophobia 
of Nioolson and Grove was by to means indicative of the direction of 
1 Sontag, R"J. # Hili v grticleon firitigh Poll vir in 1213-1914 
vol. 10p pp. 542-553#' is in this author's opinion guilty of pacing 
excessive emphasis on the influence of the anti-German group in 
the Foreign Office. 
t© 
British policy, and this should have been explained in the introductions` 
to these volumes. The French# Russian and German documents are useful 
for elaboration and cross-reference. 
For the wer years there are fewer collections of published documebte. 
The Tsarist archives were published by their Bolshevik suocessors, and 
constitute an, admfTable and# as far'as-one can judge# very complete 
collection. Having no knowledge of Russia, I have drawn on the German 
translations of these documents. The Teariat archives have been 
widely used by students of international and Russian history, and I have 
used them mostly to supplement points of narrative. 
There are a luge giber of political and diplomitia memoirs covering 
the First World War era. NO abort geaeralieation o$L cover teem all. 
In certain cacva tic wirs can be of helps Harold ilicolsont a daacriptiou 
of the 'oreign Office when he use a junior clerk is of exoeptional merit, 
' 
and Lord Hanksyla memoirs are also valuable: )'or the most part I halls 
found memoirs to be treacherous sources of reference. Even when they 
are trot traukly polemical, they ar', as often res z ot# marred by aberrations 
of memory and faulty empbaaim. In many cases documents are printed in 
memoirs. This in itself is not as great a Virtue as it seemsa documents 
can mislead every bit as much as the narrative itself. To take one 
example, the published diaries of Lord Aertie? 
3 these'disxiea are quits 
adaquately edited# but they nogleot_to L1 ration one very important tact, 
Dlia01eon, H*, p Sir bi r migglean, art . Fi* d QpZmgk_. A. 1 
th tthe old 112Weav 1930). pp. 325-334. 
2 Harkey, Viocou1 t, Sbe siinreme Goromerd, 1914-1918o(19611* 
.3 
Berti9, Viacourt Of rba-"* - ,j8. 
(1924), p edited by 
Lady Algernon Gordon Lennox. 
Hertie was out of touch with the iaain stream of thought in the Foreign 
Office and his views$ Far from being indicative of Grey'a# were very 
frequently criticisms of Grey's policies, Certain historians have taken 
Bertia& a views as being representative of official ideas, and in consec ebce 
they misunderctand the general direction and motives of British policy: 
I 
Thera are many secondary sources on topics related to British war 
aims. Until recently scholars have not had access to the archives, and 
it would be in poor taste to level critiäism from the basis of information 
which others have not had the good fortune to see* Where there is an 
accepted interpretation of an event with which I cannot concurs or where a 
writer has made a point which indirectly challenges the validity of my 
narrative, I endeavour to note, either in the text or in a short footnote, 
why I disagree. 
Uli) 
This dissertation examines the development of British war aims in the 
, early part of 
the First World War, roughly up to the Spring of 1915 MW 
researches into the archives have covered'a Lucky broader period. in detail 
trom 1912 to 1916, and an eexndnation of the. various committees on isr 
aims in the cecoDd part of the ver" More there is a clear continuity 
of policy I have carried"my narrative back into the pre-War on or further 
forward into the war, 
The main theme of this study tu that up to the spry of 1915 war. 
aims evolved very much ea had foreign policy before the ware The focus. - 
3. e. g. Gottlieb, W. W. 1 §týein SSec_re_tnDtptoma dL ig the'F{rs 
Wgjjý (1957). 
)2. 
of authority, the framework of the decision--making process, and the 
range of influences bearing on the formulation of policy were not greatly 
modified by the advent of wer. There was a continuum in the conduct of 
Britain's foreign relations. In certain cases - policy towards the 
German Government, and policy towards*Russia - it is impossible to 
understand the direction of British war aims unless one traces events 
through the Serajevo crisis ana into the war. 
This dissertation is centred on Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary. 
It is for ti: o reasons that Grey has bean chosen as the focal personality: 
firstly$'from the point of view of unity; secondly, because Grey was 
the most important figure, in the debate on war aims in the early part of 
the Great. War. But I. have tried, and j hope successfully, to provide a 
balanced view of the several and various shades of opinion inside the 
British Government. 
Policy towards the peace settlement was shaped by four parameters. 
Firstly,. the conviction that the disturbers of the peace had to be 
punished, and that no settlement would'be secure until this had been done. 
This meant that the German military party had tobe removed from a 
posiUion'of power and influence, and their 'ºcýilitarist'° ideals discredited. 
These aims could only be realized by Germany accepting that she had been 
defeated in the field. Secondly, 'the quest of security: by security 
was meant not so much a world in which war could not happens but a world"in 
which, if war did break out, Britain would be free from, danger. From 
this principle certain needs naturally followed. In Europe, Belgium would 
have to be evacuated and France strengthened against the threat of further 
German aggression. At sea, German naval power would hate tobe so 
i3 
reduced that she would not again renew her challenge to British naval 
supremacy. Outside Europe, where Russia, France and Japan were 
potentially as dangerous to the security of the Empire as was Germany, 
Britain planned au much against her friends as against her ensmies. 
Thirdly, Britain fought in coalition with allies end the 1lomZiious. 
She was to a large extent bound to find compensation in the peace 
settlement for Russia, Prancer Japan, Australia, New Zealand, tho 
Union of South Africa, and even Serbia. rourthly, war, aims'were 
influenced by th© military progress of the allies. - Claims tended to 
expand when it was thought that the war would be'brought to a triumphant 
conclusion, and to contract when visions of victory receded. During the 
first eight months of the war there was a rhythmic movement in war aims: 
up to the end of Novembers 1914 they were predicated on the assumption 
that Germany tould"ba decisively defeated: from then onwards Grey 
became ever more pessimistic, and tried to bring the war aims of the 
allies into closer harmony with their capacities. 
After tho Spring at 1915 a whole new range of influences began to 
determine the course of Britain's foreign relations. Military demands 
and necessities became the most significant determinants of foreign policyi 
pre-war ideals, concepts and standards were all subordinated to the single 
end of winning the war. At the same time,, the executive found its privacy 
disturbed by the vulgar clamour of public opinions and its freedom of action 
limited by popular hysteria., Moreover, under the strain of war-the fabric of 
international society was being rent beyond repair; habits of perspective 
It 
were distorted; all traditions of, comity and order, vere being overthrown; 
familiar, centres of power crumbled and_fell; zaw forces, temporal and 
spiritual, often untried and untrusted, rose to replace them. , 
In. the 
face of such dynamic changes, the continuity in Britain's foreign relations 
was broken., War aims. had to embrace not only the problem of Britain's 
immediate interests, but the wider problems brought into being by the 
disturbances of war itself. 
(iv) 
I have received much help in writing this dissertation, and I am 
only sorry that I cannot give full thanks to all those who have been of 
assistance to ma. I would like to thank Mr. M. E. Howard and Dr. W. 
Mendl for thzir patient, wise and kind supervision. Mr. D. C. Watt 
has helped me to clarify my ideas and approach; Professor J. Joll has 
offered much sensitive criticism. I am indebted to Dr. Zara Steiner on 
two counts: I have through conversation benefited from her unrivalled 
knowledge of the Foreign Office in the years before the First World War; 
she was also kind enough to read. through parts of this manuscript for me. 
My friends Mr. John Gooch and Mr. Victor Rothell have advised mo on 
sources. Mrs. McLean typed my manuscript for we. Finally, and most of 
all, my parents have prolidod afteotion and shelter for three years when 
beneficence of the State was too limited to support my independence. 
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This chapter examines the way in which war, aims were decided in the 
early part of the First World War. It has been written with three ideas in 
mind. Firstly: the conviction that war aims were not simply the product 
of a decision-making process they were a reflection of its patterns of 
influence and traits of personality made their mark on the evolution of 
policy. Secondly: though attitudes towards the peace settlement could be 
usefully observed as intellectual history rather than political history, 
this study chooses to see them as the latter. Given this assumption, it 
is necessary to say where power and authority lay. Thirdly, if the historian 
does not precisely define the character of the decision-making system, he is 
opening the way for confusion, error and misunderstanding. Scholars have 
already attached excessive significance to Sir Francis Bertie and Sir Arthur 
Nicolson, and in doing so have misinterpreted the direction of British foreign 
policy in this period. 
l 
The only way of avoiding the repetition of such 
mistakes - and incidentally, of correcting the misconceptions that already 
exist - is'explicitly to define the character of the decision-making process. 
Moreover, the weight of documents does not precisely reflect the weight 
of influence in the executives it iss for examples much easier to 
piece together the views of a Foreign office clerk than it is to 
establish the ideas of the Prime Minister. The student tries to correct this 
imbalance 'in the documentary material in his narrative, but it is not 
1 See introduction and Chapter II. 
ltý 
always possible. To compensate for an inevitable element of distortion 
it is wise to explain patterns of euthority'and influence separately. 
The central theme of this chapter is that a small number of men 
in'the Foreign Office and the Cabinet decided the ends for which Britain 
was waging war. The Foreign Secretary, consulting with trusted friends 
and advisers, was in a position of overwhelming authority within the 
Pxecutive. At the same time the Government sfP@a able to use the wave 
of popular enthusiasm for the war to assert its independence from pressure 
groups and criticism. For the first eight or nine months of the war, 
those who plotted and executed the course of Britain's foreign relations 
found themselves with greater freedom of action than ever before. 
2. The War and the Conduct of Foreign Policy, 
The outbreak of war in August, 1914, though an occurence of quite 
singular drama, was not felt by the British Government to have marked 
a new era in the conduct of Britain's foreign relations. On the one 
hand, war was regarded as legitimate means of protecting and pursuing 
national interests; on the other, war was not'looked upon as an activity, - 
fundamentally different from any other national enterprise. 
In a world without supranational authority, international violence 
was considered, even in a Cabinet that was reluctant to use war as an 
instrument of national policy, to be a final and necessary arbiter when 
the interests and sovereignties of states were irreconcilable" The 
long and intense preparation for war had made it an implicit idea in the 
1-I- 
minds of men, and an accepted characteristic in the affairs of nations. 
A series of international crises had anticipated the events of July,, 
1914; the conduct of war had been rehearsed in the war games of soldiers 
and sailors; the nature of forthcoming conflicts considered in the 
deliberations of the Committee of Imperial Defence. In the Foreign 
Office1 and the Cabinet2 existing military arrangements and long 
cherished strategic principles made the transition from peace to war 
inexorably logical. 
Yet, while war was an integral part of men's ideas, there was no 
complete vision of a total. wart an engine of social and political 
mobility that generated its own values and its own purposes. It was 
hoped, though with varying degrees of optimism, that the ideals of society 
and the existing nature of government would prove equal to the demands 
of war. Liberals, for all their hatred of war, were slow to see its 
wider implications. They were much too bourgeois to imagine a natal. n 
oUaffafts that departed far from the world they knew. War was not 
viewed as an organic reality, but rather as a condition of non_peace. 
Britain had not experienced a large-scale modern warty and there was 
-fit 
an excessive faith in capacity of sea-power to insulate the nation from 
the disturbances of such conflicts. Europeans, with land frontiers, 
could study the grim pages of Clausewitz to their. hearta' contItt, but 
for Englishmen it-was Mahgn who had spelled out the immutable laws which 
regulated the struggles of great naval empires, Britain waged war at 
sea, and only supplemented the lanc orces of her allies with a small 
1 memorandum by Crowe, 31. vii. 1914, B. D. XI, 3691 H"Nicolson, pp. 417-419. 
2 Chapter 3. 
Iy 
expeditionary force. Her enemies, cut off from world markets, would face 
economic strangulation and financial ruin. Britain, whose navy controlled 
the seas, was in no such danger: she was bound to lose much of her 
European trade because the belligerents would have little to buy or to 
sell, but elsewhere commerce would continue as it had done. On 3 
August, 1914, Grey told the Commons: 
"For use with a powerful fleet, which we believe able 
to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and 
to protect our interests, if we engaged in war, we 
shall suffer little more than we shall suffer even 
if we stand aside. "1 
The cry "Business as usual" was more than an adroit piece of propaganda, 
it epitomised an attitude towards war itself. 
Neither was it felt that the cost of fighting the war would be 
ruinously expensive. The financial burden of a war at sea was largely 
a matter of capital expenditure on ships, and this investment had been 
made already. 
"The naval war will be a cheap one#" Churchill assured 
Lloyd George, "not more than twenty five millions a year. "2 
Twenty five millions was only half as much again as a normal year's naval 
estimates. 
Men had no grasp of the sheer size and scale of the adventure upon 
which they had embarked. Even taking into account Rupert Brookels rather 
silly nature, could he have written: "Now God be thanked 'Who matched us 
against His hour" if he had had any idea of the nature of modern war? In 
the same vein, Asquith could also see war as a release from the burdens of 
peace: writing (in March 1 1915): 
1 Speech by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on August 3,1914, 
quoted in Grey, Viscount of Folloden# %wettX-Zjvg-XepFj3 (1925), 
vol. II, p. 3ß6. 
2 Churchill to Lloyd George, undated, c. 2. piii. 1914, Lloyd George Papers, 
C. /13. 
I<i 
Me sane luck uhicb helped you (Asquith himself) in 
external things - in unforeseen opportunities, in 
disappearsU of possible competitors, in the special 
political conditions of your tines above, all (at the 
critical and fateful moment in your career) in the 
sudden outbreak of the Great Wars"1 
Even so-called'visionaries had no inkling of the enormity'and dynamism 
of the var. In the Autumn of 1914, 'Normaa Angell rotes 
"Suppose that'the Allies kill in thii'wer a quarter 
of am4lion German soldiers (which is a very large 
e stimato). "2 
Cuirioiüsly the only 'men who seem to have had some intuitive insight 
into the coming vastness'and destructiveness of the war were Kitohensr3 
and Grey, who were not usually noted 'tor 'their imaination. The former 
saw something of the military dimensions of the warp the latter perceived 
the'politioal, social and economic disintegration that the conflict would 
precipitate. ' 
This 'inability to eee' that Urar wan a condition fundamantafy different 
from peace applied co much to questioaasc; of foreign policy as in other 
areas of state activity. 
The idea that the war waet t. l = in the sous that the distinction 
between friends and one iäs was absolute ': "' was put to the Qävsrnment 
but it wa$' trot aceupted by it. 
4 It was, not, ' held, that all interests 
should be'subordinated to the tingle task of winning the war, The 
Jenkins, xt. Hon. R,, gsaaith (? outava 1967), p 37 The reference is, 
of coursej to Ireland. 
2 Angell, N", Shal_This Wa_: Nnd Gin= Militarism (191%) , p. 4. 
3 Magnus, p. 339. 
4 e. g. on the question of Japan entering the war, Minute by Crowe, 
l0. viii. 1914, and Mimet® by Gray, undated c. 10. viii. 1914, 
?. 0.37]/2168/37529. 
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concepta. ons and attitudes towards foreign policy. There was, a military 
a 
and/political, arm of Britain's foreign relations: the one vaatmoved by 
the simple consideration of defeating the°enemyj, the other was evolved 
from principles at ot}ce more diffuse au9 +somplex. The i ar wet but a 
crude articutation'ot the preoccupations end'subtl. eties of foreign policy. 
Tensions between Britain and her allies continued much as they had 
done before the war. Only, over the necessity of restoring the strategic 
balance to the west of Europe , can, relations between Britain and her allies 
be said to have been signiticantly more in harmony than between Britain 
and her foes. In weny areas Britain still looked to tacit support from 
Germany to ward off threat& from . 
Franoep, Russia, and in Africa even from 
i 
Belgium. When the French, &uggested that the German, and Austrian charges 
dt affaires be expelled from Tangier, it was noted in the Foreign Office 
theta 
"We roust remember-that-to adopt. the French proposal will 
tie our hands in the futures when we may want Germany's 
support to maintain the internationalization of Tangier. "1 
As the coming ot, war brought with it no sudden change in attitudes 
towards the conduct of Britain's foreign relations, there was no immediate 
modification in the institutional framework within which foreign affairs 
were conceived. War was a rational and controllable means of protecting 
and pursuing political interests, and the ends of war teere not held to 
be different from the ends of, foreign policy. War aims evolved 
within the framework of dey-to-day conduct of foreign affairs. Authority 
and influence over war aims was felt to be a matter for those uho had 
1 Miaute by Clerk, 13. viii"1914, F. Q. 37 205t? 38811. 
`-1 
slka7Z chartaä the courts of uritainta foreign relations. 
3* Sir 
, 
F4 -mr1 Grp r. 
Zn the onrly pert oP tbe, war Sir Edward Gray, ci d tb. e in the Foreign 
Office eni Cabinet 1°to wore alone to himp virtually decided British var 
crimp. It Is therefore north pcusiig and con iderizg the cha=cter of 
the central fiere in this hictcry. 
Grey has been harshly treated by historian:, The general conoensua is 
that he vae a we11-intentioned, virtuous, and rather s1ov-witted man« 
Thie vic%r bac been accepted by both his admirer? n his eritio^l though 
that the ode calls honotrablo £tatervanshipj tho other deems to be priggish 
insularity. Recently there has been a new cave of research on the foreign 
policy, of the Grey ere: when these rossarches have b3en digested soholara 
I±11 (no doubt) take stock of Grey'a character =1 career. There will 
probably be some reappreica1. On the moat obvious level, we will kno , 
more about hin foroien policy. on another olevation, it ; i11 emerge , at-, 
" 
Si 
Grey was a -tatosman of greater subtlety, complcr<d. ty# lit' oll. 1.9 ve and 
dev1ousnes3 than. hap hereto been baliaved. 
QrEy' abareater i* bait ut ®rstood b7 3a, ir-g' it as the co tunet of 
two cortc or inf1uonca; the natura of his, bcakaroiiM; th3 idiosyncrasies 
of his on parzonality. 
0. 
Tho va1u :3 inAi11©d, rota Grey. in, hin boyhood youth were formidable 
influenca., In late. life. Soma mcn (and Asquith uao an outtitanitng 
grsýplcl rru; 7 to bury t vss"ua: of their : omat ra year- barwath the 
acquix'a3 taýtaa of maturity. Grey Haver had much oxperieuce; bim faith 
in the idia:. s be had boon brought up to respect Crew moro unshakeable 4th 
1 Trovelyaai G. M. GreX cl Fallode (1937). 
2 &1bo tint, Los , translated by Massey, 
I5®be11s, M. j 195 , vol. II, p. 197. 
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countries or alien cultures., Before the, outbreak of wer, he had only 
been out of the country twice, in his life. Once$ when he was a-young 
man, ha. went to. India.. It would seem, that this adventure was not much 
to, his likings and twenty-five yearn passed before he again venture%he 
abroad,, accompas ring King-George V on his State, Visit to Franca in Spring 
of 1914. There can hardly, have been a statecwan of the modern era (save 
Hitler) who had travelled less than Grey. He passed life from beginning 
to end within the same-society as he had grown up. His knowledge even 
of the English working class was, quite limited, and (unlike Asquith) he 
did not move in the more putre spheres, of upper class wociety. Middle 
age found Grey to be, a true believer in. the values of the English public 
school. He rated integrity and honesty far above intelligence and wit, 
and con6idered that in the long . 
run the activities of won and nations 
would be judged and rewarded according to tier virtues: 
"He dismissed me, " remembered Sir Francis Oppenheimer, 
"with an, impressive warnings. Whatever your work may 
be in Holland, whatever, urgumentti you may 
propose, never forget that we are making history: 
Do not allow yourself to be tempted by any temporary 
advantage. Remember always that what might seem an 
advantage under the oircua, stanoes of the preEent 
war may on, some. future occasion be quoted against us. "1 
He never fully accepted, or even understood, that the conventions which 
ordered relations between English gentlemen were not filly applioable 
in international society. 
, 
"Foreign statesmen, " he once observed, 
nought to receive their education at an English public school. 0 
2 
U ppenheimers, Sir F. # trap er i ith (1960) v p. 240 
2 Quoted is Nicolsou, p. 311. 
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For Grey the man . who, lied in the course of diplomacy and the: mau 
who deceived his friend were the same typosp they were equally morally 
responsible and degenerate. Liter ten years at the Foreign Otfioe, he 
was still capable of axpreccing shock when he found that the Chancelleries 
I 
of Europe were not staffed by men of iiapecaable character. By the same 
token, Grey tended to take the word of a foreign statesman at fade value, 
i in just the seine vay as he would have don'a 
nyone in the ordinary 
intercourse of life#2 
This moralising strain did not meet that Grey was atq less devoted 
to upholding British, Inte. ~ecta than was Salisbury,, Lanodowne or Balfour, 
but it did. give to his personality and to his policy a very diatinotive 
atmosphere. 
"Well enywsyi"' Churchill onze. remarked, "we know if the 
Germans were here and said to Grey, If"you don't sign 
this Treaty, we will shoot you at once, he would 
certainly reply, It would be most improper for an 
English Hiui ter to yield to a threat, that sort of 
thing is not done'! "3 
There was another side of Grey's background that influenced his 
outlook,, Grey was a, Wbiga his grandfather, Sir George Grey, had been 
a colleague of Glad&tanb;.; by virtue of his family's ascendency in 
Northumberland ha had secured a safe Parliamentary seat at the age of 
23, His political attitudes vere those of 
nineteenth 
century Whig, 
and he had little in common with the commercial middle classes. His 
Ideas , were not deduced; Prom, the r$uiäj, prsoeptp of laissez-faire dogma. 
1 irinute by Grey, urdatcd,, c. x6. i. 1915, F. o. 371/2505/9523. 
2 See Chapter 2. 
3 Churchill, It's & Greet Contemaorer1e (1937), pp. 85-6. 
2J 
Woad for Grey trade remained an activity that debased the spirit. 
When Churchill proposed a course of action that he considered dishonourable, 
he replied that the question could not be considered "as a commercial 
bartain". 1 It was the Whig rather'than the imperialist strand in his outlook 
that as the most permanent feature of his attitude towards foreign 
affairs. He looked at problems in a detached and matter-of-faot way: 
his consoicus. thought vas moved by no abstract doctrines. 
Gray wan an immensei shy and private' man* tiargot Asquith# who prided 
herself on her understanding of eminent political characters, (and who 
Gray must have found a'mobt unnerving companion), admitted that ehe was 
a little baffled by him: 
"Thera is something lonely, lofty and even pathetic about 
him which I could not easily explains" 2 
Arthur Ponsonby, one of hie most forthright opponents, noted just the 
same things 
wile is aloof and rather unapproachable which makes a 
certain eatery that attracts*" 
The foreign bccretary had few friends; he had vary little Contact with 
London Society; he zhrinned "Glubland'' and other urban pleasures. His 
ro: idonce in London (during the war he rented Churchill's house on 
Ecoloston s uare) gras modest; be did not even keep a butler. it was 
tho home of a Suburban solicitor, not that of the wealthy offspring of a 
Whig family. His country house - Falloden - though no doubt opulent by 
1 Wer Cav-ncil Meeting, 2-, 4.1.1915,6130 P. M., CAB*22 1. 
2 Asquith, Margot, Au b&ogsghy: edited by hark Bonham Carter (1962) 
p. 253. 
3 Character 3kotch of Greys (1912) by A. Poasonb7,, in possession of Lord 
Pon:. onby. Hereafter all references to papers of Arthur Ponsonby that 
are in the possession, of Lord Ponsonby will be referred to as the Arthur Ponsonby Papers. 
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modern standards, was hardly comparable with the magnificent residences 
of a Harcourt or a Eoseb, ery. It was. a , sober and parochial house of a 
sober and parochial landowner. 
Grey's relaxations were simple and rurale be loved the countryside, 
fishing and bird-watching. ' At times it ýrould ulmoat 60em' that he" 
preferred birds to people. His only substantive stuggeition for'the 
Versailles settlement was a proposal that Heligoland be turned into a 
bird sanctuary. l when other ministers vest äff to country houses for 
the weekend, Grey would go to his cottage, in the New Forest and, as 
Harold Nicolson put its., 
nmurmur k'ordswortb to himself Vhile 6ti dying tqe habit 
of the birds and the fishes. " 
Shyness and aloofness yi* concealing frailty rather thaü strength. 
'Asquith, who as a better Judie of charaoter than hic wile, perceived an 
underlying ueaknese in Greys 
"14cKenna and, I had a walk and". talk about parsons' and 
particularly about courage...... I found io didn't 
differ much, both making ..... Gray too norvy to be 
put really high. "3 
Asquith had uadergtood, the Yoroign secretary; _ý Gray's weaknaes waa not 
a physical, or a coral cowardice, it uac the weakness of an, insecure 
personality. Lloyd Gaorge, who, bad an uncanny instinct tor' other men's 
frailties# also sen. ed Grey's zilent exterior va: the cloak fora very 
ncirvnuq character. Beni ab tedthat Gre -Uck _the' 
'strenrr; h of 
1 Grey tö Balfour,. 3. vi. 1919s Balfour Faper&, add: 49731. 
2 Nicolson, H., LIn George Life apci R t, (Pan, . 196'7), p. 149. 
Unless otherwise statod all footnoteu. referenoes to H. PTicolson refer 
to his Lord Carnock. 
3 Jenkins, p. 377" 
4 Lloyd George, D., 1'sr ýSsmoi 1 (1933), Yo1.1, pp"9O 99" 
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personality to control his own civil servants: 
"Grey is a weak man, and, having refused Nicolson's 
application for Constantinople and Vienna could 
not make up his mind to make a third refusal. "l 
Grey's lack of self-confidence manifested itself in a numbor of wars. 
It produced an excessive dislike of arguments, and a disturbing habit of 
telling people what they wanted to hear and concealing from them what 
they would object to. His systematic failure to confide in the Cabinet 
and the intense confusion over the implications of the inglo-French 
Entente must in part be put down to Greys own prediliction for avoiding 
trouble. It also led to a very distinctive pattern of influence within 
the executives the man who had Grey's confidence wore those who were 
personally eympathatic towards him. In his conduct of foreign policy, 
the Foreign Secretary was extremely sensitive to threats and dangers, 
and he was liable to react exces: ively to theme Moreover, Grey had an 
almost neurotic fear that his aotives t. oui4 be misunderstood, that he 
would be suspected of duplicity and intrigue. 
Grey always found his respoasibilitiea to be a'wezatal and emotional 
strain. Unlike Asquith, who could shut himself off from his work, or 
Churchill, who found that tension released new springs of energy within 
him for Grey duties remained an unremitting burden. He was(throughout 
his life) introverted and eel! -absorbed. His own morbid fascination with 
the miseries of his own situation consumed, an inordinate amount of his 
1 Memorandum by Bertie, 25. vii. 1933, Hertie Papera, F: 0. t)0/163. 
'L7 
time and mental energiest this. may well have been the form of relaxation 
that he most persistently indulged. , 
Shortly before the outbreak of. war, 
he complained of his need for rest and that he had not, been able to visit 
his home, in Northumberland for months, The burdens and demands of 
office grew more exacting during the var, Grey had many noble qualities, 
but cheerfulaass in adversity was not one of them. . 
He had a self- 
pitying streak that, is easy to understand but difficult to admire. His 
mental attitude is, captured in a latter to Bertie,, raritten in March, 1915. 
"I feel I ought to d1o more,, i. n writing to you. and to keep 
you in touch privately with, what is going on here. But 
the work is very heavy in the Foreign Office., With an 
infinity of trouble about Contraband, besides matters 
of Foreign Policy I have, to atteni every Cabinet 
meeting and War, Council, and frequent consultations with 
other Ministore. The result is that it is all I. can 
do to. get through my days work, and as a rule I have not 
an ounce of energy or a minute of time left for anything 
extra. "2 
Little wonder that Asquith could complain; 
"E. Caoy (as usual) was most dolorous and despondent. K3 
All Grey's, problems were dwarfed by his growing blixdr_eas. , 
At. the 
beginning of 191.4 he had learned that his night ioüld deteriorate and 
that he would eventually face near total blindness. Hie doctors 
suggested the rather dubious rounding treatmaut of giving up smoking. 
While this somewhat eevere'regime was üo doubt benofIcial, tor his, lungs, 
1 Memorandum. by Bertie, 16. vii. 1914, Hertie Papers,, F. 0. ý0/161. 
2 Grey to Bertie, 5. iii"1915, Burtie Papers, F, O, BU0/177. 
3 JonkinE, p. 382. 
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its 
it failed in/prime objective, restoring his sight. He made plans to 
go to Germany to be treated by a famous oculist, but for obvious reasons 
1 
these plans never came to maturity. It_is. difficult to say how poor 
Grey's eight was during the war.. One can observe a certain looseness 
in his handwriting, but this author is inclined to suspect that his sight 
was not quite as bed, as either he or his biographer said it was. On the 
other band, the secondary effects of the weakness of his vision were very 
important. It made him depressed and appped his energy: this was 
probably more significant than the failure of his vision. During the 
war years there was a, gradual breakdown in Grey's health. 
In April, 1915 Lord. Bsher, noted: 
2 
"all Ministers look. older, some wrecks. " 
Grey was one of the wrecks. Shortly afterwards, Esher wrote: 
"Edward Grey's appearance shocked and distressed me. 
His eyes grow dimmer and he sleeps only a few hours 
at night. When he wakes he manages to work with a 
strong light and he drops off to sleep early in the 
morning. 1 am afraid his health will not last out 
the war. "3 
The cause of Grey's insomnia seems to have been a sustained dialogue 
with his own conscience about his. part in the events of July, 1914. 
Grev4 himself and Lord Hankey5 have referred to his preoccupation with 
1 Grey, vol. I1, pp. 59-60. 
2 Esher to Hertie, 27. iv. 1915, Hertie Papers, 7.0.800/171. 
.3 dour Als and 
Letters o, f Reginald ii-ecount Eiher (1934-1938), edited 
by M. Y. Brett and Oliver, Viscount Ether, vol. III, pp. 296-299. 
4 Grey, vol. Ii, p. 4?. 
5 Hankey, Viscount, Thy precne Command (1961), vol. I, p. 163. 
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this issue. This uas, as we shall see, not vithout influence on the 
direction of bis war aims. 
There is something very sad about Grey's situation during, the war. 
Day after day spent between the Foreign Office 'and a lonely house on 
Ecoleston S quare# his health worn out by infirmity and the responsibilities 
of office. Perhaps most terrifying of all is an image of a man, tortured 
by conscience and, unable to sleep, peering through powerful lenses at 
Foreign Office documents by his bedside. 
It has frequently been asserted , 
that, Grey was unintelligent, but 
there is no evidence. to. indloate that. this vas. 4o. His mental processes 
were of an intellectual,, almost aesthetic kind. In the best Whig 
tradition he was free from pettiness and took a broad view of events. 
Ilia sensitivity had its, good as, vell as its, damaging features. He was 
often more aware ot, possible_pitfalls and dangers than his colleagues 
and advisers, and he had, a rare capacity for' insight and vision. Few 
men sensed as strongly asdid, Grey that the war would bring in its wake 
political', social and economic upheaval on a scale never before experienced* 
Likewise he saw that peace would bring its own problems. In December, 
1914, he wrote to. Kttohensrs 
"I hear you are concerning. yourself with regard to the 
future of your soldiers when they-are disbanded, after 
the war. I am not surprised., It in-obvious that there 
will be, many'thousänds who will not be content to return 
to the humdrum conditions of their old'life, and unless 
proper provision is made Lot their employment they may 
constitute a social and political menace. "2 
1 Grey to Do Bunsen 23. vii. 1914ý $. D. XIS t6; Monsdorff to erohtold, 
7. vii. 1914* quoted in Grey, III pp. 233-234. 
2 Grey to Kitchener, 19. xii. 1914, Kitchener Papers P. R. 0.30/55/177. 
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Such prescience shows why Grey, while riot, a groat statesman, had 
qualities that raised him above the ordinary, 
4. Aiguit h 
-and 
Greg. 
The political. ties between. Asquith and Grey extended back over a 
quarter of a century. Though, as Haldane, to his cost found out, longevity 
was not the yardstick by which Asquith judged _merit. , 
indeed, Asquith 
and Grey were not close personal, friends, Asquith tended to be irritated 
by Grey's sickly body and brooding mind, and Gray rarely figured amongst 
the guests at'the endlesa'round of festivities at-the Asquith household. 
' 
It can be surmised that Greyp who complained that ii. G. Wells was a "very 
overeexed writer for everythitg presented itself to him from that angle, "2 
uas more than a little puzzled by some of Asquith' a fascinations, and his 
habit of writing to young ladies during Cabinet meetings. 
Iioäa-the-less, the basis of their pRitioal partnership was very 
sound. Asquith knew he could not afford to dispense with Grey in the 
same way as he did with Haldane and Churchill. Grey had a large personal 
following in the coüatryt and could draw on solid support from the Whig 
and the I nperialist wing of the ')arty. In August, 1914, Asquith made 
it quite clear that if Grey. resigned, then he would also, go. 
3 Later, 
in Mays 1915 when he was forming the Coalition Governments and when 
Grey, a sight was so poor, that it vae interfering with his work at the 
Foreign Office,. Asquith could easily have used this as an excuse for 
1 Jenkins, pp. 301 and . B2. 
2 Haldane, Elizabeth, From one Ceüturv to another (1937)., p. 255. 
3 Samuel to bis wife, 2. viii. 1914, Samuel Papers, File A/157. 
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ridding himself of his Foreign'Secretary. " It is hard to believe that 
Asquith; a-butchering Prime Minister'ot a, high order, 
1 
did not consider 
the possibility and reject it. 
Grey and. Asquith. were in agreement on all major issues of foreign 
policy*,, . According to'Hankey, "who at that time-knew Grey and Asquith 
very wells 
"lie " (Grey) - never acted without Consulting the Prime Minister, 
and the closest of liaison was maintained between the 
Foreign Office and 10 Downing 6treat, by a trusted Foreign 
Office official, Eric Drummond. " 
Asquith was the-only member of the Cabinet who was scrupulously 
circulated with all, important despatcbes. 
4 The Prime Minister, for his 
parts had a high regard for Grey's intelligence and capacities, and 
5 
conceiving his okn roleýto be that of a,, fudge and arbiter, he had no 
inclination-to meddle in the everyday, business of the Foreign Office. 
The two men-worked together without discord. 
56 Asgult 0 
Asquith's-ability an-, a Prime Minister is war time has been the subject 
of much'comment and even greater speculation. The controversy has 
revolved around two quite different views of Asquith. The-one has seen 
Asquith as a- great aad honourable Prime Minister in the nineteenth century 
6 
Asauith as qp 
1 Fora new and very interesting account of the fall of the Liberal 
Government in laay, 1915 see S*E. p, 14l Dggtructl2la of ., L, *st LI eral lover eut, J. M. H. vol, 40, ii. Jenkins.. . 
2 e. g. Oxford and Asquith, Earl of, Memories and Reflections (1928), p. 69. 
3 Sankey, vo1. I, pp. 184-185. 
4 The circulation lists-on documents indicate who was being shown what.. 
Whether Asquith read all he was shown is another matter. 
5 Jenkins, p. 382. 
6 Asquith, C., ani Spender, J. A., Life of Lord Oxford and Ac: gftth (1932) . 
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he was ineffectual, lazy and corrupted!, claaaical only in the Olympian 
1 
dimensions of bis vices, There is some truth in both views of Asquith. 
Asquith possesßed, quite extraordinary gifte: he had a capacity for 
quick and, efficient work; for marshalling ordered, considered and 
powerful argument; and exceptional qualities of, Judgement. These 
attributes, and tolerable quantity of good fortune, took Asquith from a 
lowly background to highest office in the land. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that there was a certain decline 
in Asquith's powers in the second half of his political career. His 
marriage to his second wife, the irrepressible Margotl, marked a change in 
both his interests and his conduct-., , 
Asquith became very much the' 
bon vivant, who loved frivolous 'compamy, especially when it was young and 
female. 
_A contemporary, somewhat 
disrespectfully desoribed his aal 
"an old jolly boy run by an ambitious female (his daughter) . 
Lytton Straoheyo after one encounter with the Prime Minister in 1916, 
recorded bis, impresaionst 
"I, studied the old, man with extreme vigour, and he really 
is a corker. He seemed larger than when I last saw him 
(just, two years agog -a fleshy, sanguine, wine-bibbing, 
medieval Abbot of personage -a glutinous, lecherous, 
cynical old fellow - ooght"3 
But It is all too easy to exaggerate; , 
tbere is to noossoary conaeotion 
1 The debate, continues: see Mr. Q. L. C. Hazlehurst's letter to the Times 
Literary Supplemente 19. vi. 1969. 
2 B. Mallet to. Strachey, -8@%i. 1914, amongst; papers of St, Lae Strachey# 
formally in the possession of-Tho Spectator. 
3 Hoiroyd,, M., Lvtton Straohev (1968), Rol. U, p. 197. 
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between men' a int®raats in, private life- and their,;, capacities to ýfultil 
their duty, as servants of theätate., This. . is aspec iaUy so with Asquith, 
who had an unusually orderly ; intelleot. 't UnlikeGre7r who, found the 
burdens. of. office worried bim , 
to the; 'point' oY perrous, collapses Asquith 
haßt no trouble Shutt 
. 
problems , out,, of , 
his mind: 
-, 
In matters of. 
foreign poliayi' tbä, 'vlov, put, forward., by, 'Jazikina° in hia taeaiaating 
biography of , 
Asquith, 'ghat given Asquith's view of his duties he 
remained,, a_ competQnt Prima. Minister, holde good,, On important issues 
he nearly alva4a: gave his aäviceandýthis was sensible and usually 
decisive.:.. 
It is dii't'iault , to . eqtimats Asquith'sinfluence on Grey's policy. 
His äontaets,, with the, Foreign Saoretsryzere, "po close that little went 
down, on. paper*,,, ,. 
It 'would, oeem.. that, idea originated, in the Foreign 
Officer aaä. _were 
then agreed toýby the Prime Minister. 
6,1a1dan. 
Haldaae, was mach closer to Grey than,. -Vas Asquith, Haldane and 
Grey had kuo n pus another at oe;, the middl®, of. the 18800 a, and Grey 
vas a trequQnt,, viaito at, Ualdaaes, s. housAe, ou. Queen Aune! a Gate*, for 
Greyl, a childless vidower, Haldaue! s, borne, run by. -spinster sisters 
Elizabeth, vas the Aearest, thitg.., he. knew to the'' comforts of hone life. 
Between, July ind $eptemb®r, 1914,. Gray, was living with the Haldenes. 1 
There, waa_ a. genuine bond öP 'reendship between the two men. It was to 
1 Haldane#, pß, 270. 
1ý 
Haldane that Groy turned for. comfort. when. hie wife died: 
"I just want. one friend.... with whom I can cry from 
time to time. "1 
Grey found in Haldane a source, of sympathetic support and understanding, 
W the. attacks made upon Haldane, during; the war. caused Grey, real 
un iety. 2 Grey's failure to 'stand by, Haldane in May,, 1915, E . 
is less a 
rofloction of the c iality , of their friendship, than an insight,, into 
Grey's very healthy political-ambition,, 3 
For, paldane9 who was becoming a, rather fussy_ old bachelor, and who 
almost. aartain y realiaec& he commanded little, roepect from the younger 
membara of the. Cabinet' and even leae., in, the., country, his friendship with 
Gray was of , obvious. personal and : politioal, 'value. 
There must. have been 
many occasions when# perhaps after, one ot. Haldane! e fins dianersp the two 
men debated the, issuee and purposes. ot the war. 
At the beginning of their political careers. Haldane and Asquith had-' 
been the closest of comrades,, They very both middle class, ambitious, 





Gray. to Haldane,,, 5. ii. 1906j . Haldane 
'Paper a. M. s 5906. 
Grey to, Lord Derbys 25"1.1915, (copy), Grey Papers, 1.0.500/107. 
Haldane never forgave Grey for deserting., him, in, May,, 1915,, He made 
some typically subtle innuendoai_hinting that Grey's incompetence 
was responsible, for the, war.; "If Germany meant, our destruction, 
it was by a simpler and more legitimate means than, that of fighting..... 
it (the war) arose ý thinki, out of Eastern politioe,, over. which we 
were not too intelligent, " Haldane to Balfour# 8. Yiii. 1918, 
Memortandum bq 
Scöttd 3-471x. 1914, Scott Papers add. 50901. 
%s 
educated at BaU loli ho was very,. much , a, Aa]. o1, man, anti. with Asquith 
shared a common, interdst in the political pbiloaophl of one, of Asquith' 8 
former teaahers1 I B. Green, the-Ba33io3.. philosophsr. 
l 
As their careers 
advanced Haldan3 imm Asquith draw spart! egad by1914 had few social 
oontaota. 
2 
Asquith began to, prefor, more elevatedand, less severe 
soolety, and h3 must have. -found, Haldsne'a unbending urbaaeness a little 
trying. Uhilo. Asguith und'Jialdane had aimilar backgrounds, and, careers, 
their 
, 
intellectual interests , ware. dif 'great., . 
Haldane's bias was to 
German'philoeopbyf 4aquithtd to plassiaal, ptudie2s the one revelled 
in abstraotionaj the other retained a heaolthy, Anglo -axon distrust of 
them, Asquith never reached , 
Campbell- anaermau' a stage of, referring to 
Haldane as '5ahopenhaueri but he got close to, it. ° Haldane was "diffuse" 
and "n3bulous" be complained. altar one, Cabinet m®ating. 
3 
Throughout the autumn, winter and 'sprit of 1914-1915 Grey continued 
to discuss policy with'hic two oldest pgtiticalcomrades. The triumverate 
of the-Aelugas House Compact wa in a metemorphised form still in 
existence.. There vere two main ditforencost it was Grey rather than 
Haldane who . was 
the exia of the. group; . the , group taw constituted the 
more moderate wing of they, Cab1Aet:,.,: DuriIg the war-the former radical- 
,. 
paoitistsýadopted imporialist-attitudeo, while, the former imperialists 
assumed- the rol. s. at, tho, -pacitists.,, Harcourt,, Lloyd George and Churchill 
came out strongly 14 tavpur of-, imprial, expansion and a fir= foreign 
policy; Grey, Haldcua and Asquith did spot want to extend the Empire end 
r 
1 Richter, M.,, The Conscienegs Gr and . (1964) 2 Jenkins $ p. 301. 
3 Jenkins, p. 366, r 
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were more moderte in their vi©ws« 
7,0 - grax R; d jh2 goDjado .-11. - 
While Greye Q position in the. Cebinat, tended,, to weaken as . 
the war 
went on,., it was built on such. secure foundations that, be, remained an 
in4iuen ist, and a1 ao: t dispensable, member of . Asquith' s. Government. He 
was tIa scion, of a powerful Whig famil; rs and was the representative of 
that wizg of. the Party, in the Cabinet', ', He, also commanded, respect on 
both sides of the Houses ant enjoyo! kjn enormous reputation in the country 
and abrortd. Grey's image is perhaps -best ', described by-one of his 
fiercest critics:. - 
"Grey ip. in come., wrays the most.. intereýsting, Yigure in 
the Cabinet. To begin with he is a gentleman in the 
best sense of, the word. ., Personal ambition. and. a desire to advertise himself, I don't suppose he has 
felt for a single instant. This makac him a sharp 
contrast to matey of, his colleagues. Isis House of 
: Commons manner has been e great service to him. . It is very sincere, dignified and correct, " 
Such areputation for honesty -and air pa. icity . was, -a powerful asset in a 
Cabinet noted neither, for its. sobriety nor its. Integrity, 
The Cabinet records are too, slight today with any complete certainty 
how,. mucb Grey did or did . tact, take tba. Cabinet, into... his confidence* From 
that_evideuca which, does exist:. it would appear that Grey told t 4o 
Cabinet. as little as; po$sible. 
It is veil known that Grey did not liki consulting the Cabinet on 
Z Ch&ractsr sketch of Grey, 1912, by*. ponaonby, in the possession of 
'Lord Ponoonby, Arthur Ponsonby Papers. 
1ý4- 
delicate mattcras a, n1 tho cas3 of Anglo-Frcrtuh military talks is 
notorious. After thv Agadir crisis tha situation did improves it was 
aZresd that all ivPartsa« matters would be referred to the Cabiueti1 and 
for a short tim3 a Cabinet comaittea" on foreign affairs was established. 
z 
Vith tha cair1n; of war, Gray reverted, and with r6u3w3d 'vigour to 
all his oldhabits of s3crocy and furtiveness. The most spectacular 
case of Grey actin3 vitb ut th3 sanction of his colleagues was over the 
quostion n-of oZferina Cyprus to Gr3sca. The matter was discussed in 
oomo d3tail in January, 19lx, than it hha: i been hoped to use Greek troops 
in conjunction with the naval expedition against the Dariaaellea. On 
that occasion Xitcbonar had strenuously objected, and Gray promised that 
Do offer would bo made without the prior consent of the Cabinot. 3 In 
October of the sand year, Lord Crawei raporting the, events in the 
Cabinet to the äirg, wrote; 
It war n -"-t e : ked how " it came about that the oasaion of Cyprus to Greece, an integral part of Eis Majesty's 
Dominions had been promised in certain contingencies 
without the previous consent of the Cabinet: "4 
In other matters, elVa117 ainificent though fer more difficult to 
aupsrviso, th3 general drift, direction and objects of policy, 'Grey 
saems to have kept hic on counsel and confided only in Haldane and 
Asquith. 
I. Memiorcrd: by colt, 23-24"x. 1911 Scott Papers, add. 509Q1. 
2 There were no miautes of this Committees there are some records in 
the Grey. Papaw, F. 0.300/1Oo. 
3 Grey to Ki. tchenart 19,149]. 5, Kitchener Papers, P. R. 0.30/55/77. 
Kitchenexla attitude is perhaps understandables he had spent 
two years of his life meeting in Cyprus. 
4 Crewe to King George Vp 22&: 1915, CAB. 41/36. 
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Grey was able to circumvent-the authority of the Cabinet jor`two 
main reasons. Firstly, the very nature of foreign policy a continual 
executive process requiring detailed and expert information, made it 
very difficult to supervise. Ceoondlyi the Foreign Office had a near 
monopoly of ßoreigz: communioations. This monopoly not only meant that 
it could control all messages; it also legitimised what was seat. Grey i 
resorted to a timber of stratagems to reap the maximum advantage from 
his position.. 
In theory# the Cabinet did have a check of the Foreign Secretary'a 
abase of the' Foreign OfficeI'a codmwaioutiona monopoly. 
. 
Ministers had 
the right to. 6ee all official deapatohes. In practices this was not 
tute the advantage that it. a®aroed. 14inisters ., ero teat privy to the 
detailed. 4iscusaion of 'policy in the Foreign Offices 
.= 
did they see 
departmental milutesi nor had thay, the right to soe private correspondence. 
Gray us©d p ivst®, corraspandaa.: a as a meaua of avoidt the Cabinet' a 
ýupervisicn: Private. Ie ttarO ant t 20 'azie -were. to all intents and 
purposes official c, P=unaatiozs. between the. Foreign f Scrstary en1 one 
of Britain' a diplomatio, representatives abroadi they want through the 
diplomatio'bagor tho Foreign Office cypher; there was never so much as 
an anqul77 eigar tho racipiont' a. health or well-beiz .A letter from 
Grey to Asqui. th# Fitten in 1911,1©avas to with a vary clear picture 
of, how Grey was usifj private' cox. ospondono to keep mattero out of the 
hinds of"the Cabinat: 
SI 
glare are the German negotiation papers. I now 
them with mitutes but please bear in mind that tbeße' 
ought not to be shown outside 7. C. I should 19w 
them back as soon as possible. I shaal. dict$$s a 
private letter to Goachen (th3 Ambassador at Berlin) 
when Ireturn to. Loudon and will show that to you 
before it is sent. The whole subject we can discuss 
when we meet and. oventually at the Cabinet. '11 
When Anglo-French military conversationa began, Grey had-told Campbell- 
, 
Bannerman that matters would be discussed with the Cabinet "eventually". 
2 
In that case "eventually" meant an unavoidable breach of secrecy over 
five years later. 
It is testimony to the complexity of Grey's character that äankey, 
who must have known how Grey was conducting foreign affairs, could later 
write: 
"Greyta outstanding characteristic was his honesty 
we atraighttorwardns a,,., « No one could imagine 
bim doing a moan or dishonorable thing#" 3 
Lord Esherj -who know Grey quite weU1 felts 
IHs is like Castlereagh In his truly British 
temperament, and his hatred of shabbiness' and 
trickery. u4 
other ministers were not completely unaware of uhat was going on. 
"All things that mattered, ' Lloyd George later wrote1 were rent 
"in private and confidential letters from Diplomatic 
Representatives abroad to the Foreign Secretary personally. ", 
U' iy did the Cabinet put up with it? The abuse was oni)' the tip of a 
larger political issues the balance of forces inside the Liberal 
Grey to Asquith 21. x. 1910, copy ý, Gray Papers, ß'. O. ß00 100. 
2 Mongerr C. 
(1963), p. 254. 
3 lankeyi vol. T, pp. L81.485. 
4 Eaher# vol. 111, pp. 298.299. 
5 Lloyd George, vol. i., P"48. 
40 
Governments. and Grey's membership ä the Government. 
During the, war ,, Gray vas still using private correspondence as a 
means of bye-passing the Cabinet. Mush of the correspondence conoeraing 
the terms of peace is to be found in Grey' a Private Papers, or, in the 
Political Series and marked private. It is evident from the circulation 
lists on this correspoMenoe that it was seen by only'a few members of' 
the Cabinet. 
Ministers were entitled to see official despatoheei and it was the 
duty of the Foreign Seoretary to see to it that these materials ware 
circulated. But even in this matter Grey was bot sorapulous, 'and there 
were complaints that as insufficient lumber of documents wie being 
l 
circulated. 
The more oiroulition of official, oorre®pondenoe did not in itself 
give ministers a very complete picture of toreigri policy. As any 
diplomatic historian knowas it is extremely difficult to piece together 
gie. 9t±OD! of motive &*4 inteatioa from official diplomatic correspondence. 
Ambassadors vor@ given instructioaa9 xnot explaeatfons of tose instractionss 
in taot, they were sometimes deliberite], y "kept in the dark' so that they 
would not be able to give anything away. A. Grey himself recorded his 
conversations with foreign ambassadors be could easily omit or tons down 
anything that was likely to cause offence in the Cabinet. ' Iti diplomacy, 
where so much depends on overtoaea aM shades of aeaniag, it would have 
taken a man of such less ingenuity than Grey to use this to his `advantage. 
1 Montagu to Grey, 9. iv. 1915, Grey papers, 7.0.800/101. 
q' 
It is never easy to prove whether somebody deliberately falsified an 
account of a 'diplomatic conversation. A great deal depends on one's 
estimation of the characters involved. It would seem that Grey did 
make misleading records in order to deceive-his colleagues. A good 
example is the conversations Grey had with the French Foreign Minister 
in April, 1914. The case in point was whether Britain would aid 
France, were France attacked by Germwy. According to the French 
account, Grey had said: 
"En ce qui concerns la France sucun Gouvernement 
anglaisi je vous en donne Nasstrance, ne lui refuserait 
son aifie militaire et navale si eile `etait injustment 
menac6e et attaqu6e. Le Gouvernment qui hesiterait 
ne pourrait pas resister a is pression de l'opinion 
publique anglaise. "1 
According to Grey, he had only saids 
"1hether we engaged in a continental war or kept aloof 
would depend on public opinion in Great Britain when 
the time came. If there were a really menacing and 
aggressive attack by Germany upon France, it was 
possible the public feeling in Great Britain would 
justify helping France. "2 
Clearly the difference in emphasis, between an assurance that public 
opinion would force Britain into war and the statement that it might 
permit the Government to join the war, is of immense importance. The 
possibility of misunderstanding over language can be ruled outs words 
are chosen very carefully on such issues; furthermore the French account 
records Grey as saying, I$je vous en donne l'assuranee", and this remark 
could not have been a prefix to the statement he records himself as having 
1 Note du Ministre, 24. iv. 1914, D. D. F. (3rd Series-X, p. 269. 
2 Grey to B ertiel l. v. 1914, B. D. X(ii), 541. 
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made. One of the accaunts It false, and it is almost certainly Grey's. 
Grey had every reason to falsify hi c statement; . 
it would satisfy the 
Cabinet. The trench had. no reason to delude themselves. It they bad 
(for some unlcrxw'n reamr. ) ranted to mike it ßeem as if Grey had promised 
to defend France from Germany, then they would have simply written the 
lie categorically. 2: oreoier, Doumerguels account has the ring of truth 
about, it; he reaorda, for example that he thanked Grey for his 
undertaking. Grey's account is uncertain: had he wanted to give the 
sort of non-committal statement that he said be made, he used have done 
no more than refer the French to the Grey-Cambon letters that had carefully 
articulated the extent of British obligations. MW mention public opinion 
at all? 
Unless other finisters, who were themselves very overworked, took the 
trouble to taint down information, or to question Grey and he could be 
wonderfully evasive# there-was practically no way of checking or controlling 
policy. 
Throughout the Autumn, Winter and Spring of 1914-1915, the Foreign 
Secretary discouraged discussion of ter aims in the Cabinet. He claimed 
that there was no point in discussing anything because it would only cause 
trouble between the illies. 
l from the Foreign office archives it is 
evident that he knew perfectly well what sort of settlement, he desired #, 
and was preparing the way through diploruacky: Grey simply did not want to 
open up policy to the influence of perconalities and principles with which 
he wes in little sympathy. 
1 War Council, lO. iii. 1915i CAB. 1. 
ýý 
When iadnietere find that they cannot influence policy sufficiently 
through the tormal channels of government, one resort is to try to gate- 
crash the diplomatic system; Joseph Chamberlain had done just that. 
Grey, kept firm control of the Foreign Office' s comnnaications monopoly, 
and was very efficient in shutting hexe out. Foreign Ambassadors in 
London were on such intimate tome with the Foreign Office as to make it 
impossible for others to make ppproacbes to them. Neither vas it easier 
to go abroad to negotiate. In August, 1914, Churchill, Lloyd George 
and Mastermaa, despairing of Greyte Balkan policy, used Noel Buxton and 
Charles Roden Buxton' as their, personal emissaries in the Balkans. 
The Büxtoa%3a had no means ct communicating back to London except through 
the Foreign'UfZice cypher. - In the Foreign Oftice# no ieee than 
elsewhere, men cannot resist resding other people's correspondence, and the 
3 
Tale of the Buxtona was uncovered and their influence counteracted. 
There is muai . nformation on this intriguer Grey to Churchill; 26. vii1.1914, and minute by Churchill, 26. viii. 1914, Lloyd George 
Papers, C/3/16/3; F-0-371/1901/625U7. - These sources clearly 
demonstrate that Churchill was intriguing against Greys and that 
tha Buxtons worked without the permission of the Foreign Office. 
The view put forward by Hanak that: "particularly influential 
(. ý. on the reign Office) were the brothers Noel. and Charles 
ßod, n Buxton"i is simply nonsense. The reverse is true. See 
Hanak'a article in a" 
2 Miaute by Clark, 23. z. 1914# Minute by Nicolson, 23. x. 1914j 
'. o. 371/19ol/62507. 
3 Grey to Bax-Ironsidep 19. xi. 1914, (copy) i Grey Papers: 7.0.60ß/43. 
r! 
When ministers went abroad in person# it'vu. ditticult to conceal 
their activities from the local diplomatic representative.. 2n Thbruary, 
1915, Lloyd George tried, without having Grey' e '. prior consents, to put 
his own ideas to the Preach Govercnt. Bertie creaked to Greys 
U3 send you herewith = record of the interview 
khich the Chancellor of the Exchequer had with 
the president of the Republic en the 3rd. Inst. 
Nr. Lloyd George made from ny record an amended 
version so as to make it more palatable to some 
tastes: and will no doubt communicate it to yet 
but I thick you ought to have the correct card 
of the races so I send it to you. "1 
It was only when Lloyd George was Prime Minister, and n se faced with 
a very week Foreign Secretary, that he was able, by setting up his own 
secretariat and opening his own channels of foreign communication, to 
drastically re zoe the authority of the Foreign Office. 
fsquith's management of the Cabinet and Grey's own'personality helped 
to minimise differences in the Cabinet. Asquith woks a master at steering 
Cabinet discussions away from oontrovorsial issues. Lloyd George. later 
claimed that the Cabinet wereneeray forbidden. to discuss matters of 
foreign policy. 
Z This is no doubt an exaggeration; but it would seem 
very likely that 1s" ith turned debate , sway 
from foraigný affairs. Some 
ministers, Churchill and Lloyd George. ara the best examples,. deliberately 
made remarks in order to provoke their colleagues.. , 
Grey was very quiet 
and unassuming, and never caused offence in this way. This not only 
protected him over questions of foroigu affairs$ it gave bim a moral 
standing in the Cabinet. By never joining in the sort of intrigues and 
1 Bertie to Grey, 7. ii. 1915i Grey Papers, ß. 0.800/57. 
2 Lloyd George, vol. I, P p. k6-47. 
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pettiness that always exist in committeeßp Grey was able to assume--a 
position that va® to some extent above criticism. 
S. The ForeignOffice. 
The permanent officials at the Foreign Office helped Grey to keep 
matters out of the hands of the Cabinet. In the Foreign Offiäe the 
natural tendency of civil servants to try to run policy was carried 
to a remarkable degree. They resented atr attempt by outsiders to 
interfere in foreign affairs. When perfectly harmless peace organisations 
sent in formulas for a League of Nations# the typioal reaotion vast 
"Are we to oontinus to enter this drivel? "1 Sir Eyre Crowe felt that 
if outside advioe was wanted: 
81b great amateur oonferenae is the British 
Parliament vhich has its proper plane and functions. "2 
B ertie1a description of the Buactonso made shortly after their near 
assasination in the Balkans, shows the 'eextent to which malice could be 
carried against meddlesome outaidersi 
"The brothers Messrs. bnxton have been here, " he 
wrote from Paris, "on . their return homeward journey from the Balkan States. Their convictions as 
expressed by the taller one who was shot in the jaw 
at Bucharest are not dissented from by the shorter 
one, who was shot through the lungs """"" N3 
This 6xtraordiaa; 7 possessive jealousy was in p xt the result of 
profeesionaliam, in part the oonsegtenoe of the exclusively upper middle 
class and aristocratic character of the Yoreign Office. Diplomats looked 
1 7.0.371)2802,12930. 
2 Minute by Crowe, 12. x. 19]8,1P. 0.371/4365/425. 
3 Hertie to Grey, 7. i. 1915, Grey Papere, p 7.0.800/57" 
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upon themselves as trusted advisers, there to keep the Government on the 
right lines, and not as faithful servants of their political masters. 
Maat' diplomats believed that they had a right to decide the country's 
foreign policy. 
The Foreign Office particularly resented the influence of the 
radical-paoitiot wing of the Liberal Party. Shortly after the outbreak 
of war, Harding® wrote to äioolaon ad articulated their common 
disenobantment with the Liberal Governments 
"I was pleased to see the agreement with France and 
Russia as to the future conclusion of peace, (that 
of 5 September, 1914) as I. know so well how little, 
a radical government is to'be'relied one especially 
when it contains elements like Haldane and others 
with German sympathies and peace at any price ideas. wl 
Oa oocasions this antagonism took the Soren of disloyalty. Hiaolson2 and 
Bertie would speculate with French azd Russian diplomats about bow such 
more reasonable British foreign policy would be if the Conservatives came 
to power an a result of the 1913 elections. Grey had to repriaand his 
Permanent Under Secretary because of his excessive friendship with 
French Ambassador and General Wilson. licolson was *obliged to write in 
suitably humble terms to his Chiefs 
$Pray do not thiLk either Cambou or any iilitary 
man has been speaking to me sihoe I last saw you. 0 4 
However wuoh Civil servants disapproved of Grey$ they saw his 
attitudes and policies as being preferable to those of the Cabinet as a 
I Hardinge to llicolgon1 5(possibly 8)9.1914, -Carnock Papers, 7.0.800/375" 
2 Etter to Sazanov1 22. iv. 1914j, Int"Bea" (Series 1) III 263" 
3 Memorandum by Bertie, 21,. iv: 1914; Bertie Papers, 7.0.800/166. 
4 Nicol aqn to Grey, -5. viii. 1914, Grey Papers, F. 0. ä00/94" Wilson was 
the bete noire of the Liberals after the Curragh incident. 
ýý 
whole$ and they recognised that their. in$). uenoe and authority rested 
on their ability to work through him. They were nearly always-prepared 
to, support the Foreign Secretary and to keep influence out of the hands 
of the radical. wing of the Cabinet. 
9. $ir&rthur Nioolsosa 
There were in the Foreign Office three leading pereönelitiess 
Sir Arthur Düoolson, Sir,: Eyre Crowe and Sir William Tyrrell. It 'hals 
frequently been asserted that Vicolson was Greg's foremost adviser; 
indeed, that he was the power behind the thrones 
1. 
liieolson was certainly in a position of great importance. When 
Hardinge had been Permanent Under Secretary, he had instituted reforms 
which had made the Permanent Under Secretary all powerful. The 
organisation which Uardinge lett, # and $icolson inherited, may best be 
described as being pyramidal. The Foreign Office was divided into 
departments, at the head of each department was an Assistant Under Secretary, 
and- at the apex of the triangle was the Permanent Under Secretary. Work 
passed from the most junior member of each department to the most senior, 
and then went on to the Permanent Under Secretary, before going to the 
Secretary of State. It was the Permanent Under Secretary who was the 
link between the Foreign Secretary and his permanent staffs Only the 
Permanent, Under Secretary had right of access to the, Secretary of State. 
A skilful, energetic and tactful man could use such authority to wield 
immense Influence. 
2 
1 Mays A. J. the P aesi, a. 2 of the Hehsbur¢ Mo cv (196) 5, Yo1. Ii p. 53; 
B. D. Z( i) , D. Viii. 1 2 For the general background, Stainers Zara, ßrevv Hadi Uee. an_ the 
Forei¢n Offices 19o6-1910, N i, 4o (, 10 3eufr' ) 
X. 3. 
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Sir Arthur Dticolson arrived at the foreign Office at the end of 
1910. He was sixty one years of age#, a senior and respected diploaatp 
with a long and honourable career behind. His great triumphs had been 
as Britalzfs plenipotentiary at the Algeciras Conference, and the 
negotiation of the A41o-aussiau Entente. In his aie®ion to St. Petersburg 
(1906.1910) he had shown himself to be a firm and loyal representative 
1 
of the powerful anti-German sentiments of the Foreign Offioe" 
Hico1son wau also growing old, lazy and arthritio. His natural 
conserviit! 3m wd the corrosive effects of poor health and age produced 
a dangerous inflexibility in his habits of thought. He had no interest 
in the sort of routine'work that filled his days as Permanent aller 
Secretary. A life spent between the Foreign Office and his house in 
Chelsea was dull fare for one who had so lately enjoyed stich glamour and 
prestige at St. Petersburg.. Like many diplomats and soldiers who P h. 
a large part of their lives *broad# he found it difficult to adjust to 
the changing values and pace of life at home. Moreov8eer, Diicolson was 
old enough to remember the time when the post of Permanent Under Secretary 
had been regarded as being a rather clerkish jobs The most forceful 
reminder of these days was the fact that taking the post involved a lall 
in salaryi a matter not to vulgar that it was below causing him some soul 
searching 
2 Hicolson always hoped that his appointment would be temporary, 
and that he would be able to and bis career at the Paris Embassy. 
3 
Nicolsoa' a appoiYttment wag; rot' a alcoesop and between 1910 and 193. 
the authority of the Permanent Under Secretaryship steadily diminished. 
1 Harold. äicolson's excellent biography is of immense *äluo, r ; 
and is 
absolutely frank on nearly all points. 
2 Nicolsoni p. 319. 
3 Nicolson, p. 320. 
0 
There were three maize reasons for this erosion of powert Nioolson 
Was unable to cope with his work; he was looked in personal and political 
feud with Tyrrell, Gree a Private Secretary$ in which Tyrrell used to 
intluenoe to undermine'Nicolson's authority; Micolson and Grey disagreed 
over policy, and this breach later widened into a personal antipathy. 
How far Vicolson wes''failing "to finit bis duties as Permanent 
Under Secretary is not easy to establish. According to Bertie, the 
Foreign Office wes a complete shambles because Nicolson could not cope 
with his work* The Permanent Under Secretary being partly a victim of 
his own indolence, and partly the vioti® of a system that put too great 
a burden of responsibility on one man* In Jgn: eryi 19150 hi was 
writing to Tyrr®u.: 
NI write to you on a matter uhioh ought to concern 
the permanent Under Secretary, but as the present 
holder of that post exercises bo sort of authority 
in the office .... it would be useless to write 
to Nicolson" He takes no trouble with anything 
that does not interest him and will sign any lame 
excuse that a Department writes for him*$2 
Things might not have been quite as bad as Bertio indicates. Hertie 
was very cantankerous, and van in the habit of making excessive and, in 
some cases# unfounded accusations. Bertie laboured under delusions bf 
grandeur. His sel! -esteem'vas enorwous# and he had the revealing habit 
of writing 
ja In Bismsrak when he suggested lines of policy# Though 
Hertie and 2 iooleon had known one another Binse 1870s they did uöt get on. 
When Bertie found that Nicolson 'anted the Paris Embassy, it was a mortal 
1 Memorandum by Berties 19. zii. 1914# Bertie Paperaj, F. 0.800 1 3. 
2 Dertie to Tyrrell, 16.1.1915, (copy), Bertio Papers, 8.0.800/169" 
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blow to his qur Dronr_,. 
1 Even vorse1 in June, 1914, Nicolson, 
anticipating his early appointment, to the Paris Embassy, had rather 
tactlessly a oached Bertie about buying approached uyiYý his furniture. This was too 
much for the Ambassador, and during the Sarajevo crisis his main concern 
seems to have been to Pruotrato Nicolson's uttampt to have his job. 
3 
Sortie later formed a very similar dislike' for Lord Esher. He came t, ) 
believe that Esher, who was used to a vex-. r grand liaison officer ', itweari 
London and the French Army, was tryin; to usurp his authority as Ambassador. 
He would refer to Bober as "the Dog at the Fair" (which, when ono 
considers Esher's appearance, is a nice description). 
None-the-leas, it is evident that Nico]. son had no enthusiasm for his 
work. 
4 
Faced with a vast amount of paper work and ezoessive administrative 
duties, he was unable to exert real influence in any direction. His 
minutes give the impression that he was vrorking in great hasto on matters 
that had ceased to interest him. 
Tyrrell and Nicoleon enjoyed a Peculiarly unsatisfactory relationship. 
In June, 1915, Hardinge wrote to Nieolwozit 
$I know he (Tyrrell) has riot been very nice to 
you since you have been at the Foreign Office. "5 
This was not an untypical. piece of Foreign office understatement. Harold 
Nicalson, always IL canwpicuously kind commentator, also alluded to the 
Lee to Bertie, 1'+. iv. 1914,. Bartle Papera, F"0j800 188. 
2 Nicolaoa to, 13ýrtie, 23. Ti. 1914r Bertie Papers, ?. 0.800/188. 
3 Bartle to Tyrrell, 34. vi. 19I4, (copy) Bertie Popero, F"0.600/188j 
Memorandum by Bortie, 25. vii. 3.914# -Be: "tie Papers, P. 0.800/188; 
Memorandum by Bartle, 30. vii. 1914, Bertie Papery, P. 0.800/188. 
4 ii. Diicolson, pp. 334-333" - 
5 Hardinge to Nioolson, 21. v. 1915' Cerriock Papers, P. 0.800/378. 
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feud between Tyrrell and his father. 
"There arose in the Foreign Office (and almost 
imperceptibly) two schools-of thought; the one 
represented by Sir Edward Grey and Sir killiam 
Tyrrell; the other by Nicolson and Crowe .... 
loyalty, confidence, collaboration were, as 
between Grey, Crowe and Nicolson, continuously 
maintained. ", 
Tyrrell' a name is not ceable in its absence. 
The reason for the mbittered relations between Tyrrell and Nicolson 
lay in basic disagreements over policy. 
a 
These disagreements were 
aggravated by a personality clash. Tyrrell's influence with Grey in itself 
undermiza d Nicolson' s authority. Tyrrell went further,, he tried to get 
Nicolson out of the Foreign Office, and, endea oured to prevent him having 
the Paris Embassy. 
3 
Grey found his Permanent Under Secretary to be an awkward subordinate. 
Nicolson was really only interested in two things: the conclusion of an 
Anglo-Russian alliance; leaving the Foreign office and taking up an 
ambassadorial post. Nicolsoii's persistence in advocating the former soured 
Gray's attitude towards him, 
4and he slowly warmed to the second of Nicolson1s 
desires. Shortly before the outbreak of war, it was tacitly agreed that 
Nicolson should have the Paris Embassy. 
5 By that time Grey stopped taking 
Nicolson into his confidence, and Nicolson lacked either the will or the 
good sense to try to ingratiate himself with a political matter who was 
taking little notice of him. 
6 
1 H. Nicolson, p. 329. 
2 Chapter II. 
3 Memorandum by Iiertie, 30. vii. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. 0.800/188. 
4Y ansittart, Lord, is Mist Procession (1958), p. 120. 
5 Sea Cambon despatches. during the early part of the Sarajevo crisis. 
D. D. F. (3rd Series) X. Also on very important issues Nicolson set 
down his ideas in minutes and iaas ovidently rot seeing much of Grey. 
5', 
The comity of wer oUigs3 Grey to kopp Bartle at Paris an3 Nicolaon at 
the foreign Office*1 But the re. tide between the Searetarg of State 
and the Permanent Under Secretary Hater reaUy improved. I hen, in 1916, 
Hardinge again became Permanent Untier Secretary, the French Ambassador 
noted the difference between his influence and Nicolsonfae 
011 est rare qu'en arrivant au Cabinet 4'Hardinge, 
je na to trouve vide parce qu'il est au ler stage. 
11 n' en 6tait pas da mime aveg Niaolson, qui passalt 
quelque foil plus dune journee aana voir Grey. "a 
Grey and Kico]. son acknowledged the llm4. t®d basis of their understandings 
"You (Nicolson) do not seem to knoiý' Grey noteds 
ethat in Germany I. am said to be stupid and a mere 
tool of that arch-devil Nicolsoa. And the Germans 
who said this! has been in England and has met men 
ihhich makes it the more cttxikimg, a3 
One is tempted to adds as the e xwra sear, Discuss? 
The permanent Under Secretary vac tired and uziwelll he disliked the 
atmosphere of wnrtimo diplomacy's the debasing of the steMards to 
which he was accustomed. He lost err inclination to determlfle eYeDto#4 
and his war aims emerged as marked4 different from Grey' e. 
5 
1C), Gär 
13Mg G of e. 
Shortly before the outbreak of ware Barbe had recorded that Grey 
vistieds 
T -E;; to Bestieg 21. d. 1914, Bertie Papers, 1.0.800 166; Memorandum by 
B ertie, 19. xii. 1914, B ertie Papore, '. O. 800/163: 
2 E. Caznbon to J. Caabaat l. viiº1916t Cambon,, Pºl ggIllgRoBjellgil (1946)# 
vol. 111, p. 116. 
3 Grey 1UE ite, undated, on bottom of the first page of. Spring-Rice to 
Nicolson, 27. xi. 1914, Carnock Papers, P. 0.800/376" 
4 H, Nicolson, pp. 427... 423. 
5I cannot share Harold Nicolsonl o view of his father' is war aims] the 
question is considered in Chapter III. 
S3 
"to get rid of Nicolson from the Foreign Office 
as he stands in the way of something better 
via. Crowet"1 
Crowe had risen bteadi1y into the upper echelons of the Foreign Office: 
in 1906, he had been made Senior Clerk, and in 1912, Assistant Under 
Secretary. His forceful (and some thought too forceful) personality, 
his high intelligence, and his immense capacity for hard work# established 
his position as the most likely successor to Nioolsön. 
The retention of Nicolson as Permanent Under Secretary did not 
immediately halt Crows'a rise to power. On 7 August, 1914, Crowe 
presented Nicolson with a long; and well-argued memorandum. 
2. 
He suggested 
that the war forced the used for reorganization in the Foreign Office. 
The centre-piece of his proposals was the creation of a War Department, 
which was to deal with all pol cel questions directly concerning the war, 
and the affairs previously dealt with by the Eastern and Western European 
Departments. ' Crowe suggested he himself be put in charge, and that he 
should have the right of direct access to Grey. 
3 
Crowe's proposal was 
wise and-timelys Nicolson agreed to Crowe's suggestions, and the reforms 
were imme4iately instituted. 
4 
As head of the War Department, which was 
by far the most important department-within the Office, Crowe assumed a 
position technically not far interior to, Nicolson'a own. 
Grove's significance within the Foreign, Office hierarchy is a 
I Mamorandam by Bertief 25"vii. 1914, Gertie Papers, E0; ß00 iss. 
2 Memorandum by Crove# 7. viii. 1914, - F. 0.366/40089" 
3 Crowe's phrase iss *All correspondence recpeoting the war# should 
continue to be submitted through me so as to preserve unity of 
direction. N This mV either have m3ant sibmitted to Nicolson, or 
that Crowe already had direct access to-Grey, probably the latter. 
4 Xinute by Nicolaon 7. vii. 1914, on bottom of Memorandum by Crowe, 
7. vii. 1914, E0.366/1ß089. 
S`ý 
deceptive guide to his influence. Crowe rose to power in spite of, 
and not because ofs his relations with Grey. The Foreign Secretary-never 
liked Crowe and they did not get on. Harold-Nioolson has given us the 
reasons for the strained relations between Grey and Crowe. 
"sir Lyre Crowe'a'magaitioeDt qualities of brain 
and soul were sometimes marred by an excess of 
rigidity .... he . " had the unfortunate habit 
of indicating to the Foreign Secretary# and bis ' 
colleagues in the Cabizatt that they were not only 
ill-informed but also week and Billy, °i 
Contemporcry records Very such confirm this picture of Qrowa. Anderson, 
an envoy of the King of Danmark, complained that; 
"Sir E. 'Crowe had treated him witb, great abruptnesa 
and had assumed a dictatorial attitude towards him. 
Mr. Anderson stated Sir E. -Crowe had evidently lost 
control of himself,, and that he had felt compelled 
to gat up and leave the room after a short period. p2 
Crowe might have flourished under a different Cbief# but with Grey such 
habits were fatal. Grey was teer too sensitive a man to tolerate direct 
critioimm, however Well-founded it might have been. 
Grey went egainat Grove's advice on nearly every major point of 
policy in 1914 - German policy before Sarajevos the July crisis, the 
declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, bringing Japan into the war, 
and Turkish polioy between August and Ziovembvr, 1914. It nay'well have 
been this that drove Crowe to write mirutera that were, intensely insulting 
in tone.. At about the and of October# 1914, - natter$ came to', a heads 
according to Bertie; 
1 H. Nicolsorº,, pp. 327.32S. 
2 Dr mond to Grey, 25"v. 1916, Grey Papere, F"O. BQO/1.5. 
cs 
°Crowe has cowplotely lost hie head. Ric Prussian 
blood came out and be was insubordinate and- 
insolent to Grey who has doaided`that bis 
appointment to succeed Nicolson is impossible. 
He has to judgement, ' tact or eense of proportion, 
His ability is undoubted. "I 
Crows was moved from the War Department into the Commercial Department 
(Contraband Department). 2 
11. Str_Wl1liaw Tvrr®11. 
Sir William Tyrrell vassthe most influential of the Foreign Office , 
civil servants. All those who had personal knowledge of the Foreign 
Office knew of TyrreUl'a pre-eminenco, To reppatw air Franole 
Oppenheimer'a unforgivable pun, Tyrrell aas the "Grey Eminonae" of the 
Foreign 0ißioe: 
3 
Tyrrell was much more than Gray's foremost adviser, he was a close 
personal triond. Sir Valentina Chirols who was well acquainted with 
the situation at the Foreign Ottico, u Tate (in 1913), 
his (Tyrrell' a) influence with air E. Grey 
is growing greater and greater - perhaps 
too great. "4 
One diplomat, writing in -the Spiting of 1914, recorded the gossip at the 
Foreign' Offices 
1 Memorandum by 
. 
Hertie, 19"adi9I9148 Bertie papers, 7.0.600 163. 
2 The former Commercial Department came to bo known as the Contraband 
Department, and later evolved into, the Ministryof Blockade. 
3 0pperheimer, p. 206. This pun has a pedigrees Uhlmann, the Counsellor 
at the German Embassy, referred to Tyrrell as the "Grade Eminenz" 
of the Foreign Office. 
4 Chirol to Hsrdinges 2. vi. 1913, Bardinge Papers vol. 93. 
SG 
"I was at the Foreign Office on Saturday but saw only 
Crowe and Dome Juniors. Vioolson'and Tyrrell were 
both away, I am told the latter is high in favour and 
is everything to Grey. "1 
In his memoirs Grey paid tribute to 1yrrells 
"I had occasion,, in office, to kww the great value 
of Tyrrell'u public service; but the tbiug i 
Prize most is our frienc1t bips that began in the 
Foreign Office, and contitaºcd unitztorrupted and 
intimate after office ties c6asod. "2 
Tyrrell was also a great friend of the Asquithe and, unlike Grey, 
would spend weekends with them in the oountry. 
3 He was excellent and 
amusing company. Even the rather sevºerä ' aouzding Miss Gertrude Bell 
concluded her totters to bim in positively racy -styles 
*Bless you # my dear Willie, good fortune and good health be with you. Don1t overwork end remember 
that I am your lov®. "4 
Tyrrell had risen to prominence through the Private Secratary's 
Department. If the Foreign Office could be likened to a school, the 
Private leecretary'e Department, was the alpha stream - perhaps "Pop" 
would bo as more fitting analogy. First as Grey's präois writer, and 
later as his Private Secretary, Tyrrell had vade himself iadiepensable 
to Grey. He advised bii on policy, helped him with the a'ress and 
parliament, and smoothed over inaumerablo omall diffieultiee. 
* 
I Lee to Bertie,, 14. ii. 1914, Bertie Papers, E. 0.800 1BB. 
2 Grey, vol. I, p. viii. 
3 Margot Asquith to Balfour, 16, yi. 1915, Balfour Papers, add-49794, 
4 Gertrude Bell to Tyrrell, 7"xii. 1913, Grey Papers, P. 0.800/104" It 
should be noted that at `this'time endearments did not 'carry the 
same overtones as they do to--day. 
5 H. Nicolson, pp. 327-328. 
ýý 
Though a public'esrvaut, Tyrrell had the style of a politicians 
be worked through personalities rather than through norma chänne1e. 
With a revealing ii tt titude, the Ameriaau Attbassbidor reportedt 
"ý2r t'rll:. r Tyrrell, the z2sr: tary cf Sir Edhaerd 
Grey - himself# I think# an I. P. "1 
All those who recorded their i pressiena of Tyrrell described him on 
being a brilliant man. Lichnovzlqr uTota of'adieser hoch intelligenter 
Maas"2 and iiardinge of "a very. clover young man" 
3 
Tyrrell' e intellect 
was of as intuitive and apaaulativG nature. It was typical of the 
mentality of the Foreign Office to, patt this down to a strain of oriental 
4 
blood in his ancestry. Educated in Germany: and perhaps more 
aigniticeatly under Jowett at Ball. fol, Tyrrell had a knowledge of foreign 
countries, vzd qualities of sell-concidence that Grey himsolf leaked. 
Grays reliance on Tyrrell wau to a degree a choice of the heart; 
Grey was attracted by opposites. Kt closest friend in the Cabinet was 
Raldane;, his most intimate adviser in the Foreign Office was Tyrrell* 
both man possessed attributes that Grey did not; they were worldly, 
urbane, cultivated, clever and talkative. Grey was quite different; 
he was taciturn, simple in hic'tnates, and usually pedantic in his 
reasoning. 
LoUCV of Tyrrell's intluenae on the British foreign relations Ls `immensely 
difficult to chart. - Ty. =ell wrote very few miwteai and conducted his 
Page to Bourse 2.. r. 913. ei ick: Boje, kifa And Letter; -9? Oter 
H. Psa (1924), aol. I, p. 201. " 
2 Prince Lichnovaky, Ifeine er Mission (1918) 0 3 Hardinge to Dlicolson: 21. vi. 1915, Carnock Papers, F. O. &00/373. ' Bardinge .r 
was, as usual, being excessively "pompouss Tyrrell was nearly fifty 
years of age when be wrote this letter., 
4 Anton-Grwatking P. D, 
, 




business almost entirely by word of mouth. Which of Grey's ideas came 
out of his own head, and which out of Tyrrell'sp is impossible to demonstrate. 
For years the two men saw one. aaother daily, and their intimacy was so 
great that hardly a line passed between them. It would seems from that 
fragmentary evidence that does exist1 that between 1912 and 1915, 
Tyrrell was a most formidable influence on the course of British foreign 
policy$ indeed# he may well have been its chief architect. 
There is one further difficulty In estimating Tyrrell' a role. 
In the early Spring of 1913 TyrreU suffered a "fervour breakdown',. 
In late March or early April, 1915, Drummond replaced Tyrrell as Grey'a 
Private Secretary. flow quickly Tyrrell was Kgoimg downhill" before then 
is problematical. 
l 
It would appear that he remained GreyIa foremost 
adviser right up to the early Spring of 1915, for an late as February of 
that year Grey had-entrusted him with important talks with Colon l äouse. 
2 
The Foreign Secretary, as bis night grew worae# relied more and more on 
TyrreU. 3 
In the later part of the were,, Tyrrell worked himself back into 
favour, and in 1925p he succeeded Crowe as Permanent Under Secretary. 
His diplomatic career ended, somewhat more happily than $icolsoa'sp at 
the Paria Embassy. 
12. other rei n Office PsreoD"iga. 
The eclipse of Nioolsoa and Crowe gave opportunities to younger men 
1 In the letter from Gertrude Bell. * already quoted, Tyrrell was being 
advised to ease ups and this use in 1913. 
2- intimate Pavers of GQ1ý_onelHQUMy Vol-Is P-374- 
3 In some cases this can be traced e. g. certain correspondence, 
f9äff 
i rf om favour see 
ýChirol e Härdige, 
handle 3. 




Papers, ýi 91 sPp vol. 93, and Hardinge to Nicolson, 21. v. 1915, Carnock P apers, F. 0.800/37g. 
0 
to guide policy. George Russell Clerk,., a senior clerk, rose to a. - 
position of some aitkwrity. At the- beginnixg of the vary, Clerk was, 
put inAWar Departmental and when Crowe left, he was its L adingtti 
personality. Like many of the moro. junior members of the Foreign office, 
Olerk seems to have looked upon Crowe as the model of everything a civil 
servant should be. Clerk's minutes were very like Crowela; they were 
full, lucid and, precise. Clerk possessed one quality that Crowe lacked, 
tact. He was particularly influential on matters concerning the Near 
and Middle last. 
Sir Erio Drummond was Asquith! a private Secretary for Foreign 
Jlffaira j his job, was. as to link Dowuir g- Street and the Foreign Office. 
He succeeded Tyrrell as Grey' a Private Secretary Drummond was a close 
friend of Tyrrell#s.. and he later endeavoured to bring Tyrrell baok into 
the Foreign Offioe hieraroby. 2 He vas also popular vith Asquith. and 
the Asquith family. 3 However, like Tyrrell, Drummond vas never obliged 
to put down muoh on paper, so it is very difficult to -judge the extent 
of his influence. 
13. Thee Fore Foreign Of, e and Other Denartmente of State. 
Contacts between the Foreign Office and ether departments of State 
existed on two levels consultation between Cabinet Ministerej 
correspondence between the tiapartments". 
1 Memorandum by Crowe, 7. viii. 1914, F. 0.3 lý0089. 
2 Minute by Drammond# 6. iv. 1916,, on the back of Bryce to Grey, 6. iv. 1916, 
Grey Papers, 7.0.800/105. 
3 Margot Asquith to Balfour, 7. vii. 1917, Balfour papers, add. 49794; 
Margot Asquith to Balfour, 11. vii. 191' , Balfour Papera, add. 49794. 
to 
Aa between Grey and other tainieterß the Foreign Seoretarar wade 
little attempt to organise a common policy,. Grey did not enjoy very 
cordial relations with Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary. Haroourt'$ 
unstable personality often maritested itself in rather unpleasant 
behaviour. A contemporary complained theta 
He lives a very luxurious snobbish and rather 
vulgar and ostentatious private life. His love 
of intriguing and wire pulling is pronouaeed. 11 
It was the latter, that annoyed Grey. . Harcourt had been entrusted with 
negotiation with the German Embassy over Portuguese Coloaieop and 
instead- of following the agreed courser be'used the opportunity to 
further hie own German policy. In consequence Grey let the Anglo- 
German Agreement oVer Portuguese Colonies lall through., Neither Harcourt 
nor Grey Were-too pleased with. the action of the otber. 2During the 
Sarajevo- crisis IIargourt had tried to organise, mass resignations from 
the Cabinet1 and this furtherdabittered their relations, In the 
Autumn of 1914 a'squabble between the Ibreign Office and Colonial Office, 
4 
which should' have been settled at i1. tnisterial levels was allowed to drag 
on between civil servants for two monthr". $ad Harcourt and Grey enjoyed 
any cordiality in their relationship, this dispute could have been settled 
in half an hour. 
Similarly. Grey touzd Churchi . 1-overbearing, . and resented 
his attempts 
to interfere in-foreign policy. ` Iahen the Foreign office uncovered the 
1 Character 8ketbli of Harcourtl 1912, by A. Ponsozby, in-the possession 
of Lord Ponsonby. 
2 Memorsnduaº by Bertiei 19. ii. 191 1 Hertie Papers F"0.800/188" The ling was also anzoyed, and spoke of "that damned fellow Harcourt"s 
Memorandum by Bert . ei 20. ii. 1114 ýertie PWapars ý, ý 3 professor Temperley, e record an ervie wb irr 
09tr 
Papers, add. 56386. 
4 Chapter VI. 
Li 
Buxtonsä exploits, Grey wrote a rather embarrassed minutes 
"No notice abould'be taken"of. this; I do not 
understand it; I will deal with it with 
)ir: cburchif. "1 
Churchill was one of the few members öf Cabinet who seems to have troubled 
to read Foreign Office telegrams# and were contivaally suggesting points 
of policy. At the bottom of one of Churchill's minutes, Grey wrote in 
exasperations 
"I have said that the Cabinet will be consuited"e21 
Grey got on auch 'bettor"vith Kitchener and Lord Crew, the Secretary 
of State 'for India. 'This did not mean that they had any appreciable 
effect on his views or that there was `any attempt made 'to have a common 
war aims policy. Indeed Grey was the fieroest'aritic'ot their plans to 
expand the British Empire at the expense'of Turkey: 
3 
There would appear to have been'very few 'infora@. l_ contacts at a 
lover level, and oertain1ly not on questions of lots -term planning, like 
war aimse One can trace the relations between the Foreign Office and 
other Departments 150 easily and completely through äorreapondenoe, that 
it is obvious' that Vöz7 little vai tai4 discussed on a personal basis# 
Some correspondence vas sxabanpd' between the Foreign Office und '' 
Colonial Otfice'ebout war aims, but there was to attempt made to establish 
special institutions for discassitsg such matters: Thera was nothing 
1 Minute by Grey, undated, c. 23. x. 19149; F. O. 371/19Q]. /625O7. 
2 Buchanan to Grey$ tel., 28. ii"1915, and minute by Oburchill, 28. ii. 1915, 




like the endless series of war aims committees which were established in 
1¢ 
the second halt of the war. In conceipeme, there was no co-ordinated 
or common inter-departmental policy. 
14. ku Ima 3nthe: Emmtiy. 4f. Nig181.1914 ; )roh . 19]3. 
In the early part of the First Vorld War, a sauoll amber of men in 
the Cabinet and the Fbreign Office were deciding the ands for which 
Britain was waging weir. The nature of deoision-making, process for war 
aims was a continuation of the prei-w#r system for deoiding caestions of 
foreign policy. The established structure for managing Britain's 
foreign relations had been modified in two respects: the Foreign Secretary 
had more authority vie vie the Cabinet than precedent allowed; within 
the Foreign Office# - informal chmelo of influence had been superimposed 
on its strictly, hierarchical organisation. 
In other respects also the pattern of authority and influence was 
a continuation of the pre-war, situation, Up to the Sprung of 1915, the 
deliberations of the executive were unruffled by the clamour of public 
opinion or disturbed by the excitement of new ideas; neither had military 
necessities yet began to dictate the course of Britain#a foreign relations. 
It is to these questions that we must now turn. 
15. L1. Op jaign and -Rar 
Aims. 
In the years before 1914 public opinion had existed as an influence 
on foreign policq only in the inanimate way that military and financial 
strength does* it suggested limits within wbiob it would be wise to 
1 The exception was the inter-departmental committee on desiderata in 
Turkey in Asia, CAB. 27/1. 
tý 
confine policy, but wan tat a fountain of ideas and oentiaents to which 
those who executed policy- looked for inspiration and guidance, On 
crucial issues - Anglo-French military conversations# and ALaglo-Russian 
naval talks - the publia at large was often ignorant, or deliberately 
SvM 
misled* 
The initial impact of the wear was to make the executive even more 
independent of e-xternal influences. Before the war, dissenting opinion 
had been able to exert Dome influence through the "establishmant" 
Members of Parliaments the quality pross# the Church Clubland, and so 
on. The outbreak of war witnessed unparalleled demonstrations of 
national unityt official foreign policy became qrnouymous with the 
national interest. The Foreign office was not slow to perceive that 
this wave of uncritical popular support could be used to assert its 
independence from "establishment" pras=s groups. At the same time, 
the executive did not feel to be cootrainedt either by its own conscience# 
or by the weight of popular demand to enter into a dialogue with popular 
opinion. 
16. The Prese. 
Radical newspapers - the Manchester Guardian wd the Daily News 
had been amongst the severest critics of Grey's-foreign, policy. They 
held that it &l e-xcessive]. y anti, that it involved the nation in 
dangerous European sgaabblea, and that it uns leading to an enormoirsa = 
and wasteful ezpenditure on armau+ents. ' With the coming of war the 
criticism of the radical press became very mutad, C. P, Scott, the Editor 
t- t et 
of the Manchester Guardianpi and Cadbury# who had a large stake in 
ri 
the Daily News, were most, reluctant to= . incur the wrath of public opinion 
by attacking the Government. Scott$ in, particular,. was a conspicdous 
source of disappointment for those who looked to him. to uphold the 
radical tradition in foreign policy. 
The executive had two organs which could be relied upon to print 
what they wanted; the Westminster. Gazette and the weeklyaurnal, the 
Spectator. 
On the Continentt the Vestminster Gazette was regarded as, the organ 
of"the Liberal Party. 
3 
It was widely believed that its editorials were 
officially. inspired. The charge that the Westminster Gasette was an 
official journal wasp of courses false* On the other hands d, A. Spender'a 
later claim, that as 9ditor of that-paper he always printed just what his 
conscience demanded$4 is even further from the truth. 
Spender was a friend of-Asquith and Grey. In the ti'wenties, he 
helped Grey, when Grey was writitkg. his memoiraj5 later, he was co-author 
or Asquith' a semi-official biogrepby, 'Yet Spender remains an oddity 
among the friendships of the second half of Aac ith'a career. The 
journalist had none of the qualitiea Asquith seemed to admires he had 
neither wealth, nor social positions t»r even a fand of innocent chatter; 
1 Scott to Moral, 24. ix. 1914, Scott to More1#25. ix. 19]41 Morel Papers, 
Box. 8.6.1 Scott Correspondence with Artbor Evans,. Scott Papprcr 
add. 5C94S. 
2 Cadbury to Morey 3"x. 1914, Box '. 8. # Morel, 'apere] Cadbury to. 
Harrisono 20. iß:. 1917, Morel Papers, Box F. 6. 
3 Albertini, vol. il, pp. 208.209. 
4 Spender, J. A. The Public Life (1925)8 p. 131. 
5 There is some correspondence on this in the Spender. Papers, add. 
46389; Greyy# vol. I, p. xix. 
6s 
Spender was a poor and priggish Liberal. The friendship of Spender and 
Grey is more plmtsibles Grey chose his friends for their qualities an 
sympathisers rather than fora º capacity to amuse. He certainly found a 
sympathetic ear in Spender. Spender's`' papers have been hoavily useded; 
but from the little that remains it is stiU, evident that Spender was 
allowing the Westminster Gazette to be used as a mouthpiece for Grey'a 
ideie. Grey and Asquith both flattered Spender, primed him on policy, 
and told him ornat line his paper should tak4. Spender frequently 
Visited the Foreign Office# egad reported gossip to Grey and Tyrre11.2 
Grey and Aagaith were not entirely dependent on 8penderta goodwill. 
In 1908, the Westminster C}euette bed tun into . menial trouble. The 
Liberal party had stepped in, and through an intermediary, Lord Allendale, 
had purchased I considerable dumber of shares in the Westminster Casette. 
Though the point never had to be put crudely, (Spender,, like Grey and 
Asquith, was aS alliol man) Spender Jas the employee-o! the Liberia Party. 3 
The Spectator also followed the official lino. St"Loo Strachey,, 
the iditör# often met with Tyrrell end Grey, d he-did all he could to 
please tbem. 
4 When, after some editorial misdemeanour, the Proaa Bureau 
1 See Spender Papers, add* 4638 aM l 389" 
2 spender to Grey, 17. ii. 1915, Grey Papers F. 0.800/1111 Memorandum by 
Spender, August, 1914, Spender Papers, add. l+6392" 
3 AsViith Papers, 14.5.148. 
4 See correspondence between Foreign Office and the Spectator, 
Strachey Papers. This author env these papers when they were in 
possession of the 5peotator. They were then in boxes marked 
1914v 1915 and ao on. Recently they have been moved to the 
Beaverbrook Library. 
ýý 
complained to the Spectator, the liditor yss mortifißds 
In questions like this, " he pa'otestedp, "mt duty 
is to do what those Ao are responsible %iaat me to«"1 
During the Constaatix pl. e negotiation of Merch# 1915, Strachey was 
used by the Foreign Office to 41V Russian euspioione about Britiah 
policy., 
a 
Strachey, carried bis loyalty to tbG point where it was 
damaging his own interests. 
, 
In October, 191.6, ß be wrote a curious,, 
unsolioitcd latter to Gray, 'in which he pointed out the great servio®a 
he had rendered to the nation. 
"I heard only reoently of two Englishmen giving 
up reading the Spectator #because they could 
not bear to see the boots of the American 
Government bLacked'every weak by Strachey. ' 
This ought to be a testimonial to the thoroughness 
with which I have parried out the wishes expressed 
to me by the Foreign Office and through Robert 
Cecil, "3 
The relations between the Times and the Foroign Office were of some 
complexity. Betwoori l9ß5 and about 1912 or 192.31_ the Times and the 
Foreign öffice had been on the moot cordial terms. Lord Edmud 
Fitzmeurice# who had been Grey' a Farl . amentary Under Secretary, took 
the 
editorials of the Times to be indicative of -official policy4 Arthur. 
Ponsonbyi who had himself been it diplomat and Private Secretary to 
Campbell Bannerman, observed thnts 
"The Foreign Office confides in no one but the T9. mes"11 
Strachey to Bu aster, 15. i149 copy , Strachey Papers. 
2 Strachey to Benekendortf, 141. iii. 1915, (copy) p Strachey Papers. 
3 Strachey to Grey, 3. x. 1916, Grey Papers, W. O. /11Q. There is also 
a copy in the Strachey Paperß. 
.. Fitzmaurioe to Morgan, 31. vii, 191 , Spender Papers, +äd. 46392. 
5 Ponsonby to Lloyd George, - gptember, 1912, (copy) , Arthur Ponsonby Papers. 
b J- 
Several. of the Journalists from the Times were on intimate terms with 
the permanent officials at the Foreign Office., Colonel A Court 
Repingtonj, the Military Correspondent,, had had a central tke "in 
organizing Anglo-French military talks at the end of 1905.1 Sir 
Valentine Chiroll the Foreign Editor until 19722 had been a diploisatr 
and was hold in high esteem by U rdingeo and, Nicolson, 
3 
and was on 
"particularly friendly t3rms" witty Tyrrello 
4 The Foreign Office 
frequently played host to. Henry Wickham Steed, of the Foreign Doak of 
the Times. In the Spring ot. 1914 Steed was sent by Grey and Tyrrell 
to Paris asp in the modern Jargon, -a public relations man for the State 
Visit of Bing George V, 
5 
After about 1912, the relations between the. Foreign Office and the 
Times began to turn a little sour. The reasons for this are not entirely 
clears , 
it may have had something to c with the influence of Northcliffe. 
The more likely reason is that the relations between the executive and 
journalists are always liable to sudden change, 
, 
Those who give 
information become very irritated if Journalists tail to give them a 
favourable press] journalists tend to resent attempts to dictate what 
they write. Once the situation arises where mutual trust is lost, then 
relations can become very-acrimonious in a surprisingly short period of 
1 Monger, pp. 23 2S . 
a See Chirol's correspondence with Hardinge in the Hardioge Papers. 
3 See Chirol' a correspondence. With Nicolson in the Carnock Papers. 
4 Crewe to Grey, 14. v. 1915, Grey 11apors, "F. ß. C00/95" 
5 Memorandum by Bertiet Beiii*19IJq Bertie Papers, F. 0.600/176. 
b 
time. There' were o or two incidents that embittered rolitious between 
the Foreign Ottice 'azd the' Times. Tyrrell strongly objected to' the 
Times editorials during the Sarajevo'örisis, 
l Nioolson and Grey were 
furious with'tho Timen when, in Novomboz, 1934, it attacköd Sir Louis 
Mallet for his handling of diplomacy at the Penis. It was forbidden 
that Wickham Steed be allowed to set 'foot inside th® Foreign Office 
building. 2 In retaliations Steed roiused`to co-operate when Foreign, 
Office officials asked him to be less prop-Slav' and more pro' Italian in 
3- 
what he wrote. Such tactics merely irritated the'Foreign Office still 
further, # and minimised the intluet a of the Times. 
bile the Northol: fe Press was i=emety powerful# its tactics were 
so crude that its attempts to innuonco the 'Government had a per e; oe 
effect. Nortboliffet s megalomania anc his tear perfection of tactlessness 
conspired to rob him of any influence on the conduct of 'Britain' a foreign 
relations, Margot Asquith' a description of Northcliffe as beings, Na 
brute .... vain, sw©U. onr-headed Snd Vile, j4 would have wan a round of 
applause in the Cabinet and a standing ovation in the Foreign Offi. ae. 
5 
Except for occasional Zito of pique over erticleo in the Timos# the 
executive had very little trouble with the prass on questions of foreign 
affairs. Mast editors were moue tint to embarrass the Gayer ºut. 
1 See chapter II. 
2 Fi eQ of the Times (1952) , volume 4 part Is p. 234", SetosrWatso'n, 
A. W. .aryk In ggaland 
(2943)! 'p. 61. Who banged WicIhez Steed io 
not absolutely clear, 'but it was probably Nicoleon, gee H. Nicolson, p. 428. 
3 7.0.371/2376/51340. 
4 'Margot Asc4ith to Lord Cromerf. 19, Vi. 1915, Cromer papers. * 7.0.633/24. 
5 Northcliffe to Rodd, 18. v. 1915; Rodd to Drutmondj, 2. vi. 1915$ Miautes 
by Drummond and Crewe; 7. vi. 19150 Grey Papers# 7.0.800/65. 
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The Government suffered considerably lean criticism on matters of foreign 
policy than it had had to endure before the war, and the traditional 
source of: opposition# the, radioal press Was conepicuoualp silent. 
17.1ndio4 Williats. 
In the early part of the First L'orld War the` pacifiet movement was 
very weak. This eclipse in its influence 'helped' to free the executive 
from all external pressure groups. Ihen; in the later part of'the war,, 
the pacifist movement gained popular support, the Government tae obliged 
to look to the political "right" for backing. The stronger became the 
pacifist movement, the more the Government lost its independence to 
extreme elements: indeed# the overall effect of pacifist movement was 
to make official policy more extreme thin it would have been if'no 
pacifist movement had existed. The weakness of the movement in the first 
year of the war is therefore important to an understanding of the extreme 
independence of the executive in that period. 
In the years around 1914, the term'pacifist embraced a wide speotrum 
of opinioa. Nowadays pacifism is sytavnynmous with non-violence] then it 
meant a disinclination to use violence, and the pursuit at policies that 
wäuld make war# if Dot impossible, then at least lese likely. 
The movement had disparate intellectual root.. It was to all' 
intäzts. and purposes an ideological rubbish dumps hers add there one 
finds interesting pieces among the 
äebris; but the overall impression 
in one of contusion. The Main stratd of belief wag inherited from 
Cobden and Brigbts the optimistic conviction that'the üE*. t ersalising of 
TV 
the common interest in the production and distribution of wealth would 
bring a golden era of peace and understanding between men and uationsi. 
This b3]. ief had bocome mixed with other notions. The strangest ýot its 
bedfellows was th3 tea%hiug of J. A. Hobson c his apostle,, H. S. 
ßrailetord. 
Z 
According to their doctriness-it was the vary man who 
manipulated trade and finsnoa who wore the shadowy figures behind 
international. unity and strife. Economic interpretations of 
international dispute were hopelessly intertwined with older radical 
2 
ideas. 
Added to this there was the New raoiZism of Norman Angell, Angell' a 
ideas carrot be understood outside the context in which, they vmre stated. 
The crux of his doctrine consisted of a series of criticisms of the 
social Darwinist ideas of the time. He tried to demonstrate that war 
was not inevitable, and that it It came it would lead to financial and 
economic faits 
These varied and contradictory ideas cams together in a common 
acceptance of a conspiracy theory of foreign policy. The Government was 
not reprepentifg the true interests of the people, it was being moved by 
mysterious sectional interests. 1bothor the conspiracy was aristocratic# 
in Bright's sense, or plutocratic, in Hobson'os was never quite clear. 
The unity of the movement lay not in common ideas and consistent principles, 
but in common and consistent opposition to official policy. 
Before the war the radical-pacifists gained wide poprýalcr support. 
1 --Brailsiord, H. N. The Var of 5 pel and Gold 1q l1+ . 2 This author cann6t, share e view pu o war by . A. JX. Taylor (and 
others) that in men like E. D. Morel nineteenth century radical traditions 
remained pure - see the - "OhIpter : -bn 
E. D. Morel in Mr. Taylor' s The 
TroubleTJ3k-ers (1956)-and Dr... 'ulliger! s unpublished Ph. D. - The Idea 
versity, 1953. 
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Grey faced very serious criticism from radical back-benchers in his Qvn 
Party. They found fault both with' the principles upon which Grey's 
poLiay rested - ors at least, those principles upon whioh they believed 
it rested -- ade with the wisdom of reroving foreign policy from the 
demooratio, influer e of legislature. It was argued that Grey'a policies 
were not merely mistakons, but that they Tiere the Inevitable outgrowth of 
a corruptness in the institutions which managed foreign policy. 
i 
Convifloed that Grey had no time for theme radical back-benoheris began 
to organise themselves politioally. 
In 1912, seventy or eighty M. P. 's- from the radical wing of Liberal 
Party and 'the I. L. I. formed the Liberal Foreign Affairs group., The 
leaders of the group were Noel Buxton, Artbur Porsonby, Philip 1Morrell 
and Ramsey Macdonald. It was conceived as a protest against-an 
"obscurantist doctrine of diplomacy's in the short run a watch oommittes 
on Grey' a toreign policy; in the long run an embryo for a type of Senate 
Foreign Affairs Committee. 
2 
The group waa tint without significance. 
In the winter of 1913-1914 it brought a good deal of pressure to bear on 
the Goverment over naval estimates. During the Sarajevo crisis radical 
back-beuchera threatened open party revolt it tht Cabinet opted for war. ` 
Their opposition caused Grey and Asquith' such etw iety. bicolsou, aware 
I Ponsonby, A., Democracy the Control of Forsian Poi (191270 
2 memorandum by A. Ponsonby, undated, a. Springt 1912, Arthur Ponsonby 
Papers. 
3 Harvey and Malteru to Ponsonbyt 19. xii. 1913,4Lrthur Poneonby Papers. 
4 üotes by A. Ponsonby on, meeting with Grey, 29. xii. 1914, Pousonbyýto 
Grey, 29. xii. 1914, (copy) Ponsouby to Asquith, 30. vii. 1914, (copy), 
Arttnir Ponsonby Papers. 
5 Asquith, vo1. II, pp. 9 & We (All references to Asquith arep unless 
otherwise stated, to Me s, -epd 
Reflections. ) 
ý2 
of the seriousness with which Grey regarded the Parliamentary Apposition 
to war, wrote; 
"I am sure that the country (I am not thinking of 
City financiers or back-bench M. P. ''ý) is : sound. ' 
There were similarly impressive demonstrations in favour of neutrality in 
the country. 
Once Britain was at war the whole pacifist movement collapsed. This 
sudden eclipse has been noted by historians, 2but it has not been properly 
explained. 
Radicals, many of whom had experienced the tribulations of opposition 
during the Boer War, expected public opinion to be carried away on a 
wave of patriotic fervour. The knowledge that their own position was 
weak made them reluctant to attack the Government's foreign policy. 
The result was that a very . widespread disillusionanent with official policy, 
and even opposition to the war itself, went unvoiced and unheard. This 
dissatista: tion only assumed political dimensions when the pacifist 
movement ro-grouped and reorganised as the war pent an. 
It is interesting to study the contusion of the radical-pacifists 
through the person of C. P. Scott. Scott, as the Lditor of Manchester 
Guardian, had real power to iftluenc3 the public, and his dilemma was 
typical of all the anti-war group. 
No sooner had ver broken out than a number of radical and I. L. P. 
1 Nicolson to Grey, l. viii. 1.934, copy , Carvock Papers, F. a. t OO 375. 
In his final draft - published in B. A. Xi - Nicolson did not include 
the passage quotsd. 
2 Hanak, 9.9 
g, . 36. wt. 1.4ý I fi- 144 , (t q )ý . 
&0 -l of pct. Z 
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MJ. 's were grouping "united for common action on war question0.1 
The hard core of this group$ together,, with E. D. More1 and Norman Angell, 
were to tors the Union of Democratic Control Throughout August# 1914, 
Scott was'ln close touch with this Sroupp. and early in September, he met 
with 24 rel1 Ramsey Macdonald, ' Phillip MorsU and C. P. Trevclyan to discuss 
the policy which the U. D"Co should, e Copt 
2 Morel had prepared a harsh 
indictmout of the Government' a ioraign policy, and he wanted to come out 
openly agaS-nat the kar. Scott# supported by Ramsey Macdonald insisted 
that no direct attack of this type could be made. In deterenoe to 
Scott's opinion the U. D. C. line was toned down. The U. D. C. was diverted 
from its original purpose of opposing the war; it became a propaganda 
organisation devoted to criticising the purposes for which war vas being 
fought. Moral slwaya considered this change in direction was an: error. 
"We made a tauge wistake,, a, die wrote in 1915! "in not 
challenging the whole policy right away and from the 
very bogiming making ourselves perfectly clear on 
that point. "4 
About a creak after the U. D, C. beet sottlod its tactics, tho Morning 
Postj, the Daily . express and the Spectator accused the Croup of claadestine 
pro-German propagezda. . More15 and C. P. Treve2. yan soused that they were 
1 C. P. Trevelyan to Morel, 54iii. 1914., More. Papers, Box P. 6. 
2 Memorandum by Scotty 3-49ix. 1914# Scott Papera, add. 509010 
.3 Marora. n w 
by Scott, 3-4.1x"1914 Scott Papers, add. 50907.. 
t, Morel to Pousonby, 5. viii. 1915, 
(copy), 
Morel Papers# Box F. 6. 
5 Morel to Scotty U., ix. 191Q, Scott 'apere, add. 50908. 
6 C. P. Trevelyan to Scott, 13. ix"193.4# Scott Paperu, edd. 50906. 
-4-j 
dangerously isolated from public b ;ij3,, and they appealed to Scott for 
open support if matters grew worse. ` At this point Scott took fright 
and opted right out of the movement. He explained to Morel that: 
"I think it would be a fatal orror to attempt 
to-deal with anything controversial at present 
.... e I agree with your cbjocta but I am apt 
to part company with you as to methods - co I 
am better off out of it. 9 
Such retioense wen the rule rather then the exception on the radical wing 
Party 
of the Liberal/and the I. L. P. 
A secondary weakness in the pacifist movement was an int llectua1 
crisis. There was an obvious contradiction between the enormity of the 
tragedy and the banality of the remedies put forwards Ever. e pporters 
of the U. D. C., like Ramsey Macdonald, had no confidence that democratic 
control of foreign policy would significantly- improve the conduct of 
international affairs* This intellectual crisis helped to bring many 
Liberal intellectuals down on the sido of Grey rather than his critics. 
The wuaknesa and confusion of lohe pacifist movement in the country 
was watched by a disintegration of its poaitiott in Farliament. 
The permanent officiala at the Foreign Office hated the xadioal- 
: cifiste. At the very best they, looked'upon them as silly idealists 
end well-intentioned cranksp and at the worst as traitors: Lowes 
Dickenson, the author of *Internatipnal lnarchvs and by no means an 
Scott to Morel, 2. x. 914, Mor apars, ox ". 
2 Scott to More]., 24. ix. 1914, Morel Papa s, Box F'. 6. 
3 Ipiacdonald to Morel, 24"viii. 1914,1': ore1 Pa7ers, Box 7.8. 
4 Gilbert hurray to Ponaouby, 6.1.1915, Artbar Pondoaby Papers; Bryce 
to Ponsonby, 1. v. 1915, Arthur Pot onby Pepera. 
unintelligent observer of the inters tional eystewj, was summa lly 
dismissed as "an academic radical detached from the realities of lifooN 
%hroughout the, war the Foreign Office pursued a campaign against 
E. D. Morelp2 a vendetta which passed ell bounds of good tests and reason# 
and which must stand as ova of the nastiest and least creditable episodes 
in the history of that departmento From very early on in the war the 
civil servants at the Foreign Office were prepared to believe reports 
that pacitisis were creatures of international eooialism1 controlled by t'l 
military hierarchy at Berlin 
3 The notable exception to. this 
, 
View was 
Tyrrellj4who enjoyed much closer contacts with the leading pacifists than 
his colleagues. 
5 Greyts attitude was not quite as extreme as that of 
his civil servaatai and spot quite as tolerant as that of his Private 
Secretary. He looked upon critioißm as being directed egaiuat him 
personally, and saw the radicals as being not merely unreasonable but 
6 
not- open to reasoao 
I 7.0.395/45 ZI't . 
2 F. 0.395/53205362] F. 0.395/10/33236j F. 0.395/W/66039j 
F. O. 395/140/168672, 'f The attitude of the Home Office, Military 
Intelligente and the Special Branch of Scotland Yard was worse. 
They conducted themselves with all the vindictiveness and, 
pettiness of a secret police force in a totalitarian state - see 
Foreign Office'tiles quoted, and also H. 0.45/263275/10741/88; 
11.0.45/263275/10741,4 9; ßi. 0.45%10801, /30740 2. 
3 Victor Fisher to Grey, 18. aci. 1914r and Minute by C1erkp 21. xi. 1914, 
and Minute by äicolson, 23. xi. 1914, ý 7.0.377/2176/731751 also 
7.0.37], /21.76/77288. 
4 Minute by Tyrrell, undated, *c. 23. xi. i914, F, o. 371/2176%7317$. 
5 Tyrrell to Ponsonbyt lO. i. 1913, Artbau Fonsonby papers. 
6 Minute by Grey, undated, c. 16. iv. 19l5,7.0.371/2505/445U, 
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The Foreign Office kaa very quick to see that ' maaa enthusiasm for 
the war could be used to tree itself from its critics in the Commons. 
Radical M. P. s -' zho had never found it easy to make much impression upon 
the Foreign Secretary, were in the unenviable position of being branded 
as pro German if they dared to rebuke the Government. The Foreign Office 
knew it could rely on the patriotic spirit of the House of Commons to 
intimidate pacifist oriticisms and played on the goodwill, of Members in 
getting awkward questions rewoved% When an embarrasair cüestion did 
remain tabled, the Foreign Offioe fiere either for ignoring its or 
humiliating the M. P. who had asked it. In $ovember, 1914, Xing, a 
radical back-bescher, tabled ac estiou which touched on the thorny topic 
of Russian encroachment into Persia. The advice Gray recoiled on how to 
answer the question: reveals the contempt whioh his civil servants had 
for radioal book-benchersi and also their extreme oonZidenoe that they 
could use popular oupport to ignore the . Q, xliantentary criticism. 
"I imagine" wrote Clerk" "that Mr. äing does not 
really wish to embarrass H(is) Majesty's), G(overnment) 
at this juncture, but whether he does so wish or not, 
I think his and similar mischievous activities should 
be checked without remorse. I would not invite sixy 
opportunities for attacking; Russia in Parliament. 
If MrJing tries to press the point he might, be 
stubbed. °2 
Grey could never bring himself to be quite as rude asIhis advisers 
wished, but he used the strength of 
ibis position to aaold'debate. It 
1 e. g. F. 0.37 : 448 491696 Beck to Ponsonby, 25. riii. 191 , Arthur 
Ponsoziby Papers. 
2 Minute by Clerks 24. d. 1914, F. 0.371/2080/76008. 
TT 
was well over a year after the outbreak of war before there was any 
. 
kam 
, real Parliamentary discussion on foreign policy and war aims. In 
Parliament, as in the country, Grey's bitterest critics were eilenoed. 
18, Eaonomio Intere®ts. 
Tha influence of eoonomio interests sad pressure groups has been 
a source of fascination both for Marxist historians and for their critics. 
on the wider question of whether ideas are determined by 'economios, I 
will not presume to speculate;, 
, 
such iýatt. ei i are of a philosophical 
nature. The narrower . issue of the influence of economic factors may 
be divided into two Smaller questions; the influence of private industrial, 
Zinaxiaial and trading intarestsj the Qoverrment's aonaern with the 
eooaaeio interests at the nation. 
The influence of private eooix mia interests vas of . 4n 4mal importance. 
The rather dubious inataaoe of an approach made by the Pacific Phoiphatea 
JU to the Colonial Ofices for the right to work miaairals on the 
captured German Pacific islands of Augur end NJ4auru j see®6 to have been 
the ozily case where private business interests directly approached a 
Department of State on a matter, resting to war aims. 
l While it is 
possible that more vas cane privatölr1 or on a local level in the colonies, 
the line of reasoning ßdäpted in official documents points to the fact 
that such approaches were never of aiW importunas. 
The Government vas, of coinraep concerned with Britain' a economic 
interests. But in the early part Of the vsr there was p» attempt made 
1 C. O. 1 10 343ß2f C. 0.61 10 35162; G. Q. l l0 3658. 
ýý 
to use the war as an instrument for ooonomio retribution against 'Germany. 
There Were, howeveri piecemeal attempts made to improve Britain's 
economio and trading position: 
lq. Nat±ýnsLtlee. 
The sway of pros oure groups pleading aational. nausea was not large. 
The Foreign Office usually received emigres gentlemen with courtesy 
and Maseryk1 and Supilo, 
2 
the Groat representative: l# were respected. 
But the civil servants at the Toreign Office bad a professional aversion 
to'dealing with unofficial groups end, private individuals 
3 iibat was 
more-they tended to look upon the nationalists from Eastern and Central 
Europa as comic opera figures. The trouble was that these men usually 
attached themselves to some well-meauiPg member of the English upper 
classes1-and felt that this gare them a licence to pester*the Foreign 
Office at will. Particularly unfortunate in this respect were the Poles. 
Unable to ezpress. 'the©selres coherently in English, they took to writing 
memoranda of interminable length in French. To make matters worse they 
shunned the typewriter and copied out their communications in a most 
difficult handwriting. When these memoranda were handed in personally 
it trould seem that they found their way almost immediately to the 
wastepaper basket. Those that were registered hardly ever have an attached 
minute. Not that the Foreign Office was above deriving some light 
amusement from them. 
1 7.0.37 190067456. 
2Megr r1 1I Rescectina' the South Slave. ' CAB *37/123/4; i 
3 Minute by Crove# 31. v: li. 1914, F. 0.371/395/46074t Minute by 
Nicolson, l. i%91914, F. 0.373/Z)95/46074" 
T9 
NIt is characteristic of Polish politics, M, vrote' 
Oliphant# "that the several self-styled representatives 
of Polish feeling here have all prothiced different 
schemes s 'Oche future of Poland. In this connection 
,I heard yesterday that M. Filipoviea, rho has been 
in correspondence with the P. O., has gone off his 
head and has had to be placed in an asylum.,, 
The Czechs and the South Slavs had an able spokesman in R. W. 5eton-, 
Watson, who was on friendly terms with several of the: permanent officials 
at the Foreign Office - Clerk, Lord Eustace Percy, and the two Niool$ons. 
While these men were sympathetic towards the plight of the subject peoples 
of Eastern and Central Europe, they did not believe that national. self- 
determination was the main issue of the war. 2 
Of all the groups represonting the interests of aspiring nations, 
the Zionists were probably the best organised, and had most voices in 
the Cabinet. Lloyd George was enthusiastic about the-prospect of Jewish 
national homeland. Herbert Samuel pleaded the case in the Cabinet and 
with Grays 
20.92MIusio11. 
In the early months of the Great War those who menrged Britain' a 
foreign r6latioas had more freedom than at a1z7 time before, They were 
able to use overwhelming popular support for the war to assert their 
1 Minute by Oliphant, l2. xi. l914 Y. 0.37 190D 905. 
2 see Chapter IV. 
3 There is little to add to Steins L., The E Lfour, Dgglagatiu*n (1962). 
There is same , information in Memorandum by Scott, 27, %j. 1914* Scott 
Papers, add. 50901; Samuel to Lloyd George1 33. i. 1915,, Lloyd George 
Papers.. C/7/96; The 1 uture of Pa , ebne by Samuel, January 1915, 
-CAS. 37/123 4j Samuel to Gre71 22.3.1915, Sequel to Greys 17"ii. 1915# 
Grey Papers, $. 0.800/100.1 
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independence from dissenting prey=re groups. At the same timet the 
temporary eclipse of opposition groups on the 'political left freed the 
exsoutive from the influence of its most vociferous critics. ' 
The groat authority of the executive rested on a. aimple and 
extreme polarisation of popular opinions a massive s4 uncritical 
support for the war at one pole; a very stunted antiwar group it the 
other. 
Authority within the ®xaäutiVe was held by a' sinall group surrouuc1i 
Sir 8dwarü Grey. This responsibility tor war aims was concentrated in 
the hams of a few men in the foreign Office axd the Cabinet. 
The process whereby the treditional centres of authority began to 
lose their freedom of action was at macs dynamic end subtlos many factors 
interacted vith an alarming and fascinating mobility which language, 
however carefully chosen can never quite imitate. Your main divelopmsnts 
occurred. 'irstlyt military deadlock weakened the position of the 
political area of Britain's foreign relations. The ends of foreign policy 
Were increasingly determined by military needs#l Secondly, the demands 
of war obliged the executive to seek greater sacrifices from the civilian 
population. This weakened the position of the exooutire X18 
ý 
via public 
opinion, and cede it far more sensitive to popular sentiment. Thirdly, 
growing disillusionment with' the Urar swelled the 'ranks ý. of the- several and 
, various anti-war groups, and this maäe. the Government increasingly reliant 
on nationalists who whole-heartedly supported the war. 
2 Foiarthlyr there 
1 The Secret Treaty of London was solely the child of military necessity 
sees F. 0.37112507, and 7.0.371/2508. 
2 This author made a study. of this dovelopmentt using Cabinet. Offics, 
Foreign Office and Home Office files. He reg rets'thatlack', öf space 
forbids his making any detailed examination of the question, and begs 
the readerb indulgence for not Waking further elaboration on the point. 
The general trend may be noted in Memorandum by Percy, 2. v:: 1915, 
Grey Papers, 7.0. $00/95" 
51 
arose a moral and psychological commitment to see the'war through. This 
made it virtually impossible toýconsider a 'peace in which the allies were 
not completely victorious. 
1 
These new influences were sufficiently pmm: 1n ed as to constitute 
a break in the coatimity in Britain o foreign relations. While there 
are similarities between war aims before and'e for the Spring of 1915 
and in this dissertation, I attempt to indicate thqa . to continue the 
story past this date#' it would be nooesaary to redraw the parameters 




1 Both Grey and Lloyd George felt this --. see Grey to Mallet, 24"ii. 191 , Grey Papers, F. O. 300/10%; Moaorync]um do a conversation with Lloyd 





During the First World War the destruction of Prussian militarism 
figured prominettly in -public statements of British war aims: Both 
the Prime MinisterI and the Foreign Secretary2 emphasised that it was 
to realize this high ideal that the war against Germany was being waged. 
Yet few, if any, historians have bathered to inquire what was meant when 
Grey and Asquith avowed the sation's resolve "to rid Europe of the 
military caste of Pxu ssia. " 
When Grey and his'colleagues in the Cabinet spoke of destroying 
Prussian militarism, their minds turned back to the events of the early 
summer of 1914. They believed that the military advisers of the German 
Government had been responsible for the warf, that this group had gained 
control of German policy, and had forced upon Gexmagy's neighbours the 
grim alternatives of humiliation or war. Destroying Prussian militarism 
was a matter of punishing, the disturbers of the peace - the 
German 
military caste - and of discrediting' their sinister ideals - militarism. 
Only if this happened would the tranquillity of Europe be restored, and 
the British Empire safeguarded for future generations. 
If we are-to understand the policy of the British Government, we 
1 Speech by Asgiith at Dublin, 25, ix. 1914,1914 
2 Speech by Grey at Dachstein Hall, 22.111.1915, (1915). 
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n 
must see how it viewed the role of its German counterpart ii, 
the events leading up to war: we must, therefore, go 
back to the Sarajevo crisis and before. 
While much has been written on the origins of the First 
World War, this author believes that Grey's policy has been 
almost universally misinterpreted, and that given our exist- 
ing analyses of it, one cannot understand British attitudes 
towards German war guilt. ' The first part of this chapter 
tries to show that in the period between the Balkan Wars 
and the World War Grey felt that he had come to an understand=- 
ing with the German'Government about European problems, and 
that he could rely on Bethmann Hollweg, Jagow and the Kaiser 
to keep the peace and hold Germany's restless allies in 
check. This new policy, based on the experience of Anglo- 
German co-operation during the Balkan Wars, involved working 
with Germany. It was a departure that was the source of 
much controversy in the Foreign Office, and was marked by 
the Foreign Secretary's growing reliance on Sir William 
Tyrrell, and his mounting irritation with Sir Eyre Crowe 
and Sir Arthur Nicolson. The latter held that this new 
course was fraught with danger, and that Germany remained 
as aggressive and as untrustworthy as ever. But Grey 
drew a distinction between the German civilians, on the one 
hand, and aggressive, militarist pressure groups, on the 
other. This conviction had a powerful influence on 
British policy during the Sarajevo crisis. Grey believed 
that the best hope for peace lay in conciliating Germany, in 
order to strengthen the position of the German civilians 
ä, gainst pernicious militarist elements. Grey has been 
widely accused of a lackadaisical handling of the July crisis: 
but, in fact he was well aware of the dangers of the situation, 
and deliberately pursued a moderate line in the hope that 
9 9" 
this would secure the aseendenoy of peaceful councils at 
Berlin. The failure of his policy convinced the Foreign 
Secretary and the Cabinet that the German military had 
taken charge of their nation's destiny, and had wilfully 
plunged Europe into var. 
The second part of this chapter shows how Grey and his 
colleagues intended to destroy the Prussian military party, 
and the importance of this end in British war aims. 
2. Grey's Policy to I912 
In his early years at the Foreign Office, Grey was much 
influenced by the anti-German group of diplomats which had 
secured the key positions at the Foreign Office and the 
most important embassies. 
' He subscribed to a theory of 
Gernman aggressiveness, and his policies reflected the beliefs 
and prejudices of Hardinge, Crowe, Mallet, Tyrrell, Nicolson, 
Bertie, Spicer and Cartwright. 2 Britain, her power at 
once declining and challenged by Germany's bid. for predomin- 
ance in. Europe and expansion overseac, could only maintain 
her imperial position and check German ascendency by ranging 
herself alongside the Franco-Russian alliance. These new- 
found friendships with France and Russia relieved-Britain of 
some of the global burdens of isolation, and ensured that, 
the Dual Alliance was sufficiently strong that it did not fall 
beneath the sway of I. nperial Germany. Such were the 
parameters of British foreign policy 
I. Steiner, Tara, Grey,, Hardinge and the Poreign Office, 
1906-I9I0, Ii. J. X. 3" 
2.. I. Ionrer, pp. 99-IO3,299-300,313-3I7. 
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until 19121 after that date Grey parted company with his Ge;; anophobe 
advisers, and sought friendship with GErxnany, 
3, The Liberal Party and Foreign Policy 
There were four main racsons for this new departure in Grey's 
policy$ political pressure from within the Liberal Party; the influence 
of Haldane and Tyrrell; Grey's growing tendency to ignore the advice 
of the anti-German group in the Foreign Office; Grey's own conviction 
that Germany had abandoned, her aggressive designs. 
Many Liberil$ looked with shame and anguish upon the ever mounting 
cost of armaments, and with horror upon international tensions that had 
on several occasions brought the cation close to war. There was to the 
Cabinet a strong undercurrent of, discontent with the seemingly endless 
spiral of Anglo-German antagonisms, Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, 
was positively pro-German; 
l` Morley preferred Germany'to-Russia12 Lloyd 
George, for once predictable in the ro a of the parsimonious Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, wanted to pare down naval estimatesl3 Haldane 
favoured keeping open channels to moderate elements at Berlin. 4 Other 
ministers, even though they tolerated', Grey's policy, hoped for a better 
understanding with Germany.,. On the Liberal backbenches, radical-pacifists 
1 D. N. B., 1922-30, (1937), pp. 390-391s Memorandum by Gertie, 30. vii. 1914, 
Bertie Papers, F. 0.800/174s Harcourt to Grey, 8.1.19141 Harcourt 
to Grey, 9. i. 1914l HarcourtAo Grey, 6. iv. 19141 Grey Papers, 
F. 0.800/91. V 
2 Morley of Blackburn, Viscountri Memorandum on Resignation, (1928), 
ppA47j Professor H. Temperleyrs record of an interview with Grey, 
Spender Paper, add. 563861 Memorandum by C. P. Scott, 29-30. v. 1914, 
Scott Papers, edd. 50901. V 
3 Jenkins, pp. 332-335. V 
4 Strachey to Haldane, 16. vi. 1916, (copy), Strachey Papers. 
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were fast losing patierce with a foreign policy which, they-felt, emanated 
from professional diplomats who could think only in terms of crude 
mechanics of international power. l 
Opinion inside the Party was not in itself decisive; Grey had 
successfully resisted radical criticism for half a decade, and as one 
disgruntled M. P. wrote to hims 
"But I amýafraid youiregard the views of radical 
backbenchers as merely mischievous so I will spare 
2 you any mores" 
It did, however, constitute a body of opinion that obliged Grey to look 
for ways of improving Anglo-Garman relations. 
4. Haldane and Tyrrell* 
Of greater significance was the influence of Haldane and Tyrrells 
Grey was such more liable to listen to advice from close personal friends 
than to yield to direct political pressure. 
Haldane had always held that there were moderate and extreme elements 
at Berlin, and that Grey could strengthen the position of the more 
liberal sections of German opinion by cultivating amicable relations with 
Hardings, who disliked Haldane and, his pro-German sentiments, felt 
hq was capable of leading Grey astrayt 
"Edward Grey...., is quite ready to 1t ten-to German 
blandishments influenced as he is by Haldane in his 
views. "3 
But if Grey was being influenced by Haldane, he was being auch more 
L Character sketch of Gray by. A, Ponsonby, 19129 Arthur Ponsonby Paperst 
t1ernnrandum on Liberal Foreign Affairs Grcup, by A. Ponsonby, undated, 
c. Spring 1912, Arthur Ponsonby Papers. 
2 Ponaonby to Grey, 15, xii. 1911, Grey Papers, F"0.810/111. 
3 Hardings to Chirol, 30. iv. 1913, (copy) Hardinge Papers, vol. 93. 
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influenced by Hardinge's own rp otege, Tyrrell. 
l 
Tyrrell was the moving 
spirit behind the Anglo-German detente of 1912-1914. Why Tyrrell broke 
with 
anti-German 
group in the Foreign Office is not absolutely clear, 
though some points do emerge. The influence of personal ambition cannot 
be ruled outs Tyrrell liked to shape events, and it may well have been 
that it was only by turning against the anti-German group that he could 
assert his own ascendency. On another level, Tyrrell was intellectually 
more flexible than most of his colleagues in the Foreign Office, and 
he was sympathetic to Gray's very difficult position as a . member of a 
Liberal Government. 
2 
Tyrrell challenged a theory-that had been gaining ground in the 
Foreign Office for almost a decades the theory that Germany was more 
aggressive, more powerful and more dangerous than other States. He 
believed that German restlessness had been contained and she accepted 
the facts Imperial Germany had arrived at maturity. Britain could 
therefore negotiate with Germany without jeopardizing her own security. 
Moreover, such a course of action would strengthen Britain's bargaining 
position against France and Russia. Sir Valentine Chirol, who (as we 
have seen) was a close friend of Tyrrell's, wrote to Hardinges 
"I confess I am a. little alarmed at the extraordinary 
change which his (Tyrrell's) views seem to have undergone 
in the course of the last six months...... ...... the 
course which William Tyrrell welcomes must, he (Nicolson) 
is convinced, bring us once more, cnd is now alresdy 
bringing us, into the orbit of Germcny policy. "3 
1 Hardinge of Penshurst, Viscount, Old Diplomacy, (1947), p. 12. 
2 H. Nicolson, P-329-. - 
3 Chirol to Hardinge, 18.111.1913, Hardinge Papers, vol. 93. See 
Chapter V for Tyrrell's attitude towards Russia. 
t2 
Educated in Gerraany, 
l 
and equipped with a. fino intuitive intelligence, 
2 
Tyrrell was receptive to German fears and enjoyed cordial relations with 
German diplomats. 
3 In numerous semi-official and informal conversations 
with the German Embassy, Tyrrell brought Anglp-German relations to a 
level of some intimacy. 
Our diplomatic histories of the pre-1914 era have either not mentioned 
Tyrrell's dealings with the German Embassy; or they have held that they 
never in fact existed, and that, the evidence which says that they did is 
unreliable. The reasons for this neglect seem to lie, though the point 
is never made explicitly, in the feeling that it would be very difficult 
to explain the origins of the war if the Anglo-German understanding was 
more than a seffes of limited negotiations on colonial issues. This 
author would contend that unless it is realised that Tyrrell (and Grey) 
believed that they had coma to a tacit understatding with the German 
Government about European problems, neither Grey's policy during the 
July crisis, nor the subsequent pattern of British war aims is explicable. 
The conviction that militarist, groups within the German Government had 
brought about the war, was grounded on the assumption that the German 
civilian government was to be trusted. We must therefore examine the 
question of Tyrrell's contacts with German Embassy. 
The debate opened with publication of the-German Foreign Office 
archives. It was revealed that in 1912 Yyrrell, had approached 
Richard von Mhlmann, the Counsellor at the German Embassy, and suggested 
an Anglo-German entente. Accordigg. to, Kuhlmann, Tyrrell was speaking 
. 
for Grey, but they were running against`the majority opinion in the 
1 Lý. Gwatkin-Ashton, F., D. N. H., 1941-1930 1959 p9894.. 
2 H, Nicolson, pp. 327-329. ~ 
3 Von K6lmann, R., Erinnerungen (1948), pp. 339-341,343,3731 
. Lichnovsky, p. 29. 
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not 
Foreign Office, and the matter should therefore/be made known to the 
Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Arthur Nicolson. l In his biography of 
his father, Harold Nicolson dwelt at some length upon this interview, 
and though he dii$ot provide an adequate explanation of it, he did not 
2 
doubt the authenticity of Kuhlmann's story, Nicolson's view is well 
worth emphasising because he had first-hand knowledge of the Foreign 
Office in this period. In 1948 Kühlmann's memoirs were published. 
Kuhlmann's story was that Tyrrell ran Grey, Tyrrell wanted an Anglo- 
German understanding, and he and Tyrrell workedjtogether towards this 
end"3 In spite of its many errors in detail, Kuhlmann's story might well 
have been taken'as useful evidence had it not been for a savage criticism 
by the late Sir Lewis Namier" Namier's Avenues History contains a 
long essay on 
Kühlmann, 
entitled Story of a German Diplomat: ' Namier's 
theme is simple: KAhlmann was a compulsive liar; his dates are wrong, 
his facts improbable, his understandings of the workings of the British 
Government imperfect, and his views of the role of an English civil 
servant little short of ridiculous. Namier succeeded in discrediting 
Kühlmanns Ashton-GWatkin', in the Dictionary of National Biograte, 
cites Namier's analysis as a conclusive refutation of Kühlmann; 
5 
more 
recently, Dr. 2ara Steiner Invoked Namier's judgement and discounted 
6 
Kuhlmann's evidence. 
1K hlmancý to Bethmann Hollweg, 15. x. 1912, G. P. 33,128841 Kuhlmann 
to Aüsi artige ; Amt,, 16. x. 1912, G. P. 33,12885. 
2 H. Nicolson, pp. 384 - 386. 
3 Kuhlmann, p-D. 313,337-341,343,373. 
4 Namier, Lewis, Avenues ßf History (1952), pp. 74-91. 
5 Ashton-Gwatkin, p. 895. 
6 Steiner, Zara, Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office, 1906-1910, 
H. S. X, 3. 
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Without wishing to detract from the reputation of a very great 
historian, I would take issue with Namierl s view. Sir Lewis' attack 
was not a dispassionate historical analysis. He made no bones about 
the tact that he despised Kühlmann; he saw him as a German Conservative 
parading as a man of reason and moderation. Equally he made it clear 
that he was defending Tyrrell from what he considered to be unjust 
charges. He had known Tyrrell during the First World War, when Tyrrell 
had been his Chief in the Political Intelligence of the Foreign Office, 
and felt it his duty to defend his good name. But when Namier's argument 
is closely examined, it becomes very suspect. His claim to have privileged 
knowledge of the situation is not quite true. Namier did not know 
Tyrrell before the war, and he had only an imperfect knowledge of the 
Foreign Office and foreign policy in that period. What is morel his 
contacts with Tyrrell were at a time when Tyrrell was at the nadir of 
his influence# only shortly. after personal failings had all but wreaked 
his career. Namier1s argument that no English civil servant would have 
acted in the way that 
Kühlmann alleges is s, l s odubious. Kuhlmann 
described the relationship between Grey and his Private Secretary taus: 
"I feel that Grey was not a strong man ... he was to 
a great extent dependent on his advisers and colleagues, 
especially Sir William Tyrrell. "1 
In 1912 Arthur Ponsonby, who was a friend of Tyrrell and a relative of 
Grey, considered: 
"He (Grey) trusts the opinion of his permanent officials 
more than his own judgement. "2 
I Kuhlmann, p. 313. 
2 Character Sketch of Grey, 1912, by A. Ponsonby, Arthur Ponsonby Papers. 
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Harding*, who had worked with Gray for five years, wrotes 
01 know wo1L the innaenc* he (Tyra ell) enjoys wilt, 
Ed. ierd Gý ey" 1 
The late Lord Henket', in raV ways the ideal authority, later remembered 
that Tyrrell acted in a manner quite out of keeping with that expected 
of a permanent official at the Foreign Offioe, 
2 Nemier himself *aid 
that Tyrrell imagined himself na a diplomttist in the style of 
Talleyraud. 
8ühlmaruºý 0 story idinaocurate on points of detail, , 
but in outline 
it is correct and it is confirmed by contemporary evidence ,3 
Grey cam* to take TyrreU' a advice on German policy. Writing in 
April, 19141, ana diplonat+ reporting the gossip at the Fordign Offices 
wxot®, 
#Tyrrsll 3s everything to Grey Bath are tow very GermauophiLe. *4 
Tyrrell' a deali- s with tha Garman Zabassy had Gray'e approval. Tyrrell 
owed hic favour to Grey's patronags, and he could not have gone bebiM 
Grey' a back. The first time the German Ambaseador or Kuhlmann called 
at the Foreign Office, Tyrrell would have been found out. Both 
Lichnov&y and äühlmarm were certain that Tyrrell spoke for Grey, and 
they would not simply have taken ßrey's word for thief they must have 
confirmed Tyrrallt a statements through their on conversations with Grays 
Tyrrell latctionally operated at a neaoxdary level, because Grey van 
not willing to work through attiolal nk l$. In part, Grey wanted 
1 Rarditgo to Chirol# A. iv. 1913, (copy) Hardin-go Papers# vo1.93" 
2 Iiankeyi voL. T, p. 364. 
3 Nailer and Dr"Steiner both otaim that tharo is no evidence to support 
änhlmanW a story. This is not the case. 
1. Austin Lee to Bartie# '. 4. ivs1914, Bertis Tapers, F. U. 600/188. 
5 Lichnovsky# p. 29. 
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to explore possibilities; in part, Grey was reluctant to give offence 
at Paris and St. Petersburg should news leak. Tyrrell, who "possessed 
a remarkable instinct for avoiding diplomatic difficulties, "1 was a useful 
and loyal courier. In early July, 1914, Colonel House reportedt 
"Tyrrell brought me word to-day that Sir Edward Grey would 
like me to convey to the Kaiser the impression I have 
obtained from my several conversations with this Government, 
in regard to the better understanding between the nations 
gf, Europe, and to try to get a reply before I leave. Sir 
Edward, he said, did not wish to send anything official or 
In writing, for fear of offending Freach add Russian 
sensibilities in the event it should become known. "2 
Psrhaps the molt significant insight into Tyrrell's influence with 
Grey, and the way in which Tyrrell was using unofficial channels of 
communication to Berlin, is that in the Spring of 1914 a secret meeting 
was arranged between Tyrrell and Jagow. Though this meeting *ever 
came to fruition, it had Grey's approval, 
3 
and its purpose may well 
have been to solidify the Anglo-German detente.. The preparations for 
this meeting were a closely guarded secret and were probably unknown 
to the rest of the permanent officials at the Foreign Office. During 
the July crisis it was Tyrrell, and not Nicolson, who was ehtrusted 
with the delicate negotiations with the German £mbassy, 
4 
g. The Demise of the Anti-Group. 
Tyrrell's influence was matched by Grey's growing dislike of the 
anti-German group in the Foreign Office. Hardings had a strong 
1 H.. Nlcolson, p. 327. 
2 Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. I, pp. 249-230. 
3 The Memoirs of Count Bernstorff, translated by Sutton, E., 
(1936), 
p. 137. 
4 Especially, Lichnovsky to Auswartige Amt., tel", 29. Vii"1914, 
D. D. 359" 
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personality, and had been able to impress his views on Grey, . kith the 
departure of Hardingesthe spell which the anti-German group had had 
over Grey was brokeeo Nicolson, shy and retiring, never succeeded in 
establishing the same degree of cordiality in his relations with Grey' 
as had his predecessor* 
l. The Foreign Secretary was reluctant to listen 
to Crowe., By 1914 doctrinaire anti-German sentiments had ceased to 
guide Britain's foreign policy. Crowe complained to Berties 
"Grey had allowed Harcourt to negotiate with the German 
Embassy and had taken no heed of the Foreign Office 
warnings in; regard to Germany. "2 
6. Grey and , the Anglo-German detente., 
In the year or so, between , the Balkan mars and the World War, Grey 
became certain that Germany had abandoned her envious challenge to 
British power, add had put aside her aggressive ambitions, German 
co=operation during the London Ambassadors' Conferences; the appointment 
of the Anglophile Prince Lichnovsky as ambassador at London; the 
seemingly pacific attitude of Jagow, Bethmann Hollweg and the Kaiser: 3 
these developmetts convinced the Foreign Secretary of Germany's goodwill, 
and of her desire to see peace in Europe and an end to the years of 
embittered relations between Germany and England, 
The ramifications of the Anglo-German detente w the Bagdad Railway 
negotiations, and the negotiations over Portuguese Colonies - fall 
outside the scope of a study of war aims, One totally neglected 
1 Chapter I. 
2 Memorandum by Bartle, 17. ii, 1914,, Bertie Papers, F, 0,800/186. The 
negotiations were those over Portuguese Colonies. 
3 F. 0.371/1987/4361i Nicolson to de Bunsen, 25. v, 1914, (copy), 
Carnock Papers, F. 0.800/374, 
It 
aspect of the 
detente is of is ensa importances Grey came to believe 
that Germany gras a rastrainitzg influence in the Triple Alliame, and 
that she would nse her authority to hold Austria and Italy in check, 
This iras especially important after 191 whan the most likely sources 
of international disNte ware in the Balkans* Like the United States 
and the Soviet Union in our own time, the foreign Secretary felt that 
Britain and Germany bad recognised their mutual interest in seeing that 
they were not dragged into conflicts by their friends. In the Spring 
of 1913, Chirol recordedt 
"die (Tyrra]. l) Is convinced however, that we are relieved, 
at loact for a long time to come, from the German menace. " 
Tbio conviction vaS shared by Grey, who in May, 1914, instructed Bucbanans 
"it De mcd to map tbnt. in et, sntial matters of policy 
, which are roally important, Germain sometiwea restrained 
Auettia and Italy, p$rtioaltrlyy the former, and allowed 
them orgy to go to a certain point" 
The Abaasad+ar wau laf`t is z» doubt as to the significance which trey 
attached to this view# and was told it teas 'worth bearing in mind in 
future davelapments.? 
On 24 June# 1914 the Germ" Ambassador Wormed Grey that he had 
been i. nitr'uoted by Bethmann HQ1lwsgt 
"to tell me (Gray) that ho-hoped it new developments 
or emergencies arose in the Balkan s# that they utd 
be diecusscd as ire :1 between Germany and ourselves 
as the dittic lti6e that arose during the last Balkan 
orisias and that we shall be able to keep in as close 
touch. " 30 
1 Chiral to Hard go, lß*iii. 1913, Bardinge Paperer V01.93. 
2 Grey to Buchanan, 7. v: ° . 191.4, (copy), Grey Paperß, 7.0.800j74. 
3 Grey to Goschan# 24. vi. 1914,8. D. X1,4. 
1s 
It would seem that Lichnovsky made up this story to further Anglo-German 
understanding., His own record of the conversation is ominously vague on 
the issue of who raised the question of co-operation in the Balkans. He 
reported to Ber11np it seemed to use" and then mentioned the substance 
of the convereation. 
Grey was "taken in" by Lichnovsky; and not least because he had said 
what he wanted to hear. The next dar, the Foreign Secretary saw Bertie. 
Bertie's memorandum on their conversation is of singular interests it is an 
extenait# record of Grey's views on the very eve of the Sarajevo crisis. 
Bertie was toldi 
"We are on good terms with Germany and we desire to avoid 
a revival of friction with her.... * the German Government 
are in a peaceful mood and they are very anxious to be on 
good terms with England. " 
Gray went on to allude optimistically to his conversation with Lichnovsky, 
and informed Gertie, as he had informed Buchanan a month earlier, that he 
would continue 
"intimate conversations with France and to lesser degree 
with Russia so far as might be expedient so as to be a 
connecting link between Germany and the Triple Entente 
and a check on the hastiness of Austria and Italy. "2 
Grey thought that he had brought Anglo. Ce. nan understanding to a 
point where Germany could be relied upon to prevent Austria from causing 
serious trouble. This was the central assumption of his policy during 
1 "In view of the possibility that a new war in the Balkans might break 
out and that Russia might then decide to conduct a somewhat more active 
foreign policy, it seemed to us to be of the greatest importance that 
the intimate contact which existed between us during the last crisis 
should be maintained in face of all occurences, in order that we might 
successfully encounter any warlike policy on the basis of common 
understanding. " Lichnovsky to Bethmann Hollweg, 24. vi. 1914, D. D"5" 
2 Memorandum'by Bertie, 27. vß. 1914, Bertie Papers, 1.0.800/171. 
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the Sarajevo crisis. When,, in August 1914,, the British Government. 
looked back on the events of the previous month, the crucial question, 
was why German poll ,t 
had deviated. from its pacific, course. 
. _This 
was 
why such great emphasis was placed, on the German military - as opposed 
to. the civilian Government - it wan the military who were held to have 
been responsible. for Gerwai e dramatic, and sinister XgIlQ jggg. 
In October, 191, Grey. wrote= 
"We bad#, I tboughti. during the Balkan crisis of a. year 
ago, or soy made sorge progress, towards getting the 
European groups of Powers together. 
, 
We got on very 
well with Germany at, this time, because the Prussian 
military party did not think the time for war had 
come and left the civil element alone. "l 
7. Russia' epd Germany., 
There were. twQ., Views in the 'araigm Ottioe about the Auglo-German 
detente. 
, 
Grey and Tyrrell believed, that Jagowt Bethmaaß Hollwegt, 
the Kaiser, and Liatwovaky, genuinely canted friendship with Britain and 
pease in Sump®R. They held that the outstanding signs of aggressiveness 
in, Germany did pot. tneen duplicity on_the, part, of the German Government,, 
rather, they indicated that there, were , contending, 
factions at Berlin. 
Crowe and äiaolaon Considered that Germany remained as aggressive and 




to drive awedge_between. Britain and her allies, These two contending 
views existed right up, to August, 1914, and'were'carried over into the debate 
on war ai®e. Grey, loter. hold that, the aggressive groups had gained 
Grey to Roosavelt: 20, x"1914, (copy)! Grey Papers, F. 0. ä00/110. 
Published in Grey, vol. lli p. 14].. 
y+ 
the upper h*ndj Eicolson felt that Germany had been consistently 
aggressive, and Grey had Just . misunderstood 
the situation. 
It was the German reaction to the re-emergenoe of Russian pover 
that provided the, prism through which the Foreign, Office viewed Berlin. 
In February, 1914, the German press launched Vitt cc anti-Russian 
campeigns,. and whipped up public feeling against the increases in the 
size of the Russian . army. 
Crowe analysed these campaigns at some 
lengths and tried tä: jshow. Grey.. tbat Jagow was not to be trusted. CroweI a 
argument was that German, poUpy was dominated by an aggressive mentality. 
This spiritual malaise flowed from, two sourcess Prussian militarism and 
lust for territorial.. e-xpansionf ' bourgeois desire for global power and 
prestige. Ttieae', aentiment4 ýe'e inatitutionaliaed in the bureaucratic 
and military structure of the German Empire;. they ware represented by 
powerful pressure' groups ý- the Navy' Leigue and the, Parr-Germans: they 
were instincts ingrained into the subconscious' of every German. 
l He 
felt that to believe that the German civilians were peaceful was to 
misunderstand the whole character of the German Government. Signs 
of friendship were like the temporary disappearance of sores on body 
contaminated with syphilis. "" H. advised Grey that Jagow was deliberately 
working up -anti-Russian feeling, in Germany, ' and was hoping' thereby to 
screw aI onoessions out d England that would'rupture Anglo-Russian 
relations. 
z But Crowe realised that Gray was taking no notice of his 
advises ' his simitea took on the tone of impatience and rudeness: 
1 Memorandum by Crowe, - 1. i. 1907, B. D. IIIO pp. 397-lß, 20. 
2 7.0.37711987/7300. 
!l 
"It is really absurd for Herr von Jagow to think 
that anybody will believe his disclaimer of 
responsibility. for the press campaign. The way 
the campaign was conducted is to anyone familiar 
with the classic work of Wr. Busch conclusive 
evidence of the authorship of the F. O. press- 
bureau', which works under Herr von Jagow's orders. "1 
As it was cocoon knowledge in the Foreign Office that Grey trusted Jagow, 
a 
this minute was very_jnsolent jibe at the Foreign Secretary. h 
Sir George Buchanan, the Ambassador at St. Petersburg, also warned 
that Germany was trying to drive a wedge between Britain and Russia, 
He concluded from the anti-Russian press Campaigns that the German 
Government was trying to create tensions as a prelude to dividing the 
Ententes 
"Unless..... Germany is prepared to make still further 
financial sacrifices for military purposes the days of 
her hegemony in Europe will be numbered; as even 
without the co-operation of England, Russia and prance 
combined will be strong enough toconfront the united 
forces of the Triple, Alliance. There are, however, 
still thege, 'critical years to pass before that result 
is achieved., In the. race. for armaments Russia has more 
staying powers than Germany; and as Germany Is aware of 
the fact, there is always the danger, that she may be 
tempted ti precipitate a conflict before Russia is 
-prepared to meet it. During these critical years, 
therefore, Russia will stand, in need of our support; 
and, should we fail to give it when she appeals for it 
England will not be numbered amongst her friends; "2 
Buchanan's despatch was carefully noted in the Foreign Office and was 
3 
widely circulated. But as'we, have seen, Grey rejected Buchanan's 
advice, and sent him a private note of explanation. He pointed out 
that he trusted Germany, and that ', she could be relied on to keep the 
1 Minute by Crowe, 17.111.1914,. F. 0.371/2092j11537j also minutes by 
Crowe, F. 0.371/2092/1 38. and 11628. 
2 Buchanan to Grey, 18.111,1914, B. D. X(U), 528. 
3 The Minutes are not reprinted in British Documents; F. 0.371/1988/12716. 
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for one Power to make-to-another and it-comes oddly from 
a Power who quite rightly makes'-secret arrangements,. with her 
allies - arrangements which for aught we know &V -comprise' 
certain measures against us in possible eventualities. We 
must not forget that only a year, or two ago Germany pressed' 
Russia to engage to remain neutral in the event of hostilities 
between Germany and England - as she strove also to secure 
our neutrality in case of a France-Garman con+ýý. iýt.... w.... 
I sincerely trust we aball'not walk into this trap but keep 
our hands par. ectly free and our fiend hips unimpairedo"x 
The Foreign &eor©tary refused to put any siUistsr-constniction on 
German policy. He believed Bettiman Hollweg and Jagow vero honest men like 
himself, and he trusted them. 
2 He felt that the German reaction was a 
natural one; the German civilians were merely being pushed by public opinion, 
and were expressing genuine apprehension, His main concern was to repair 
as quickly as possible the damage to Anglo-German relations. 
"The (ßerliaer) Tageblatts" he zwted! bows a serious 
leakage in Faris. The article should not be mentioned 
to Priaoe Lichnovsky. ". 
It was symptomatic of the times that he was much more anngryr with Iswolsky 
and Poinaar , whom he suspected of having leaked news of the talks, than be 
was annoyed with Germany for protesting about them. 
4 Early in June, he 
made a statement to the Commons dovqiapß ax binding British obligations to 
go to war. 
5 
A statement stich, he hoped# would moth his radical critics and 
cpuietsa German anxieties*, Grey saw the situation at Berlin as one 
of aggressive groups putting pressure on a well-intentioned 
1 Minute by äioolsoui 7. vii. 1914, Carz ok Papers# F. 0.800 375, 
2 Memorandum by Spender# Augu*t-193.4, Spender Papers, add. 46392.. 
3 Minute by Greys undated, on the back of Goschen to 2iicolson, 23. v. 1914, 
Carnock Papers P. 0.800/374; also minute by Grey, undatedg a. 7. vii. 1914, 
on Mite by Nicolson, 7"vii. 1914, Carnock Papers, P. 0,800/375. 
4 Memorandum by Bertie, 27. vi. 1914, Bettie Papers, 7.0.800/171. 
S Grey, vol. I, pp. 288-2901 F. 0.37]12092/26663. 
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civilian Government. This impression vis confirmed by the German 
Ambassador. On 16 June, Bethmann Hollveg informed Lichnovskytthat if 
the rumours of Anglo-Rus$iän naval convention were true, it would have 
a profoundly disturbing itiflueiice. The German Ch I ncelUor explained at 
length that the news of Anglo-aussian naval talks had upset opinion in 
Germanys and that in consequence the Pan Germans and the militariats 
were encouraging - him to embark on a policy of adventure. 
1 
Lichnoraky 
brought the matter to Gr®q'e'att®ntion. The Foreign Secretary noted 
German teary and töld Bertie: 
"Bethm*nn Hollweg says that the Pan Germ anieta will make 
use of reports, oP such an agreement, to agitate for 
additionsto the German fleets which is regrettable 
just as relations. between Germany and England have so 
improved. "2 
In this atatementi, ®ade three days_before. the Sarajavomurders, e can 
observe the seeds of. the. subsequent. theory of thewar guilt, of particular 
cliques within the German. Governm®nt.., There ismoderate, civil$an 
Government being pushed, by military and, quasi"militaryelements., 
Late in June LichnovskI returned, to Germany for, a short holiday. 
While he was away# the Archduke Francis Ferdinand wes murdered. In 
the course of his stay_Lichpoysky eaa both the kaiser and Bsthmann 
Hollweg.. He picked up" sufficient'ixlf9rmation to know that very 
serioujoousequencea were'likeli to follow from the assasinattons at 
Sarajevo. 
1B ethmaaa Hollweg to Lio uovsky, 16. vi. 1914, D. D. 3. 
2 Memorandum by B ertiej, 27. vi. 1914, Hertie Papers, x'. 0.800/171. 




The disagreement over German- policy went one step further as a 
result of Anglo-Russian naval talks. In April, 1914, Grey r*luctantly 
agreed to Anglo-Russian naval talks. The talks themselves were of 
little importance, and they had hardly got under way when the war began. 
2 
What was of much greater significance was that news of the talks 'was 
leaked, and provoked an enormous outcry in the Ger®ah ftess. The 
Germans, already alarmed by a dramatic increase in Russian power, felt 
the ring of encirclement tightening around them. 3 
Throughout late May, June and early July, 1914, the German 
Government kept raising the-matter with Grey. Nicolson and Crowe again 
analysed the situation in a fundamentally different way to Grey. They 
held that the German Government Was' deliberately using the talks as an 
excuse to drive a wedge between Britain and Russia. Crowe notedt 
"The old themes Germany may have allies, and make military 
and naval connections with them. England mustn't. "4 
Nicolson wrote Grey a long minute on the subjects 
"I hope-that you will allow', me. to make an observation to 
you in regard to that portion of the conversation which 
Prince Lichnovsky had with you yesterday relating to a 
naval understanding with Russia. He practically warned 
us that If we enter into any kind of naval arrangement 
with Russia certain unpleasant consequences would ensue 
and we may, therefore, infer thst if we wish to avoid 
consequences we must abandon any naval conversations with 
Russia. In short we are to abstain from taking the most 
elementary-precautions, and. from discussing any arrangements 
which. might be necessary to our defence in certain 
contingencies. This request is a pretty 'strong one 
1 Grey to Buchanan, 7. v. 1914, (copy) Grey Papers, F. 0. ß00 74. 
2 Buchanan to Grey, 3. iv. 1914, Minute by Grey, 16. iv. 1914, H. D. X(ii) 
5371 Grcy to Bertie, '1. v. 1914, B. D. X(ii)541i Note due Ministre, 
24.1v. 1914, D. D. F.. (3rd Series), 155; 'Asquith to King George V, 
14. V. 1914, CAB. 41/35. See also Chapter V. 
3 For the German reaction see, Zechlin, E. Deütchland Zwischen 
Kabinettskrieg und Wirtschaftskrieg* N. Z. vo1.199, pp. 347 et"seq" 
.4 Minute by Crowe, 9. v .,. 71 092/25526. 
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The Ambassador returned to London late on the 4 July (Saturday) 
went straight to see Haldane, 
i 
and, on 6 July, Grey. He would no 
doubt have gone to see' Grey immediately, but for the fact that Grey 
spent Saturdays and Sundays at his cottage at Itchen Abbas in the New 
Forest. In the hope that Grey would restrain Russia, Lichnovsky 
blurted out all he knew: 
"The Aabassador went on to speak to me privatdly, he 
said, but very seriously, as to the anxiety and 
pessimism he found'at Berlin. " 
Grey was told by Lichnovsky that hot 
"knew for a fact though he did not know the details, 
that the Austrians intended to do somethigg and it 
was not impossible that they would take military 
action against Serbia, " 
In layman's language, "not impossible" implied probability, and Grey 
asked: 
"Surely they did not think of taking territory? " 
Even more disturbing were Lichnovsky's revelations about the attitude 
of the German Government. He explained to Grey that they were 
terrified by the increase in Russian power, the weakening of Austria, 
and the renewed threat of encirclemeät as a result of Anglo-Russian 
naval arrangements$ 
"The Ambassador went-to say that there was some feeling 
in Germany that trouble was bound to come-add therefore 
it was better not to restrain Austria. and let trouble 
come now, rather than later. "2 
1 Haldane to Grey, 5. v1i. 1914, published in Maurice, Major-General 
Sir F., Haldane (1937), va1. I, p. 348. 
2 Grey to Ru! bold, 6. vii. 1914, fl. D. XI, 32. 
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What Grey meant was that there was some feeling in Germany in favour 
of a preventive war against Russia: On 16 July - and in ýt e -intervening 
time Crey had had no more införmation from*Lichnovsky - 15; ey told Berties 
"that whereas hereto Germany has feigned alarm at the 
encirclicg policy against her'falsely attributed to 
His'Majesty's Government under the inspiration of 
King Edward, and has made it an excuse for largely 
increasing the size of'her Navy, she is now really 
frightened of the growing strength of the Russian 
Army, and may..... bring on a conflict with Russia 
at an early data before the increases in the Russian 
Army have their full effect and completion of Russian 
strategic railways. "1 
Lichnovsky indicated that it was the "militarists" and "Pan Germans" 
%to were now having a decisive influence on policy. ßethmann Hollweg, 
who before the assasinations, had felt he could resist their pressure, 
was now quoted as being-"pessimistic". 
2 
How then did Grey see the situation at Berlin? The modern jargon 
would be "hawks" and "doves"; in the jargon of half a century *got 
"a war party" and "a peace party". When Lichnovsky left Grey on the 
morning of 6 July, the latter kn'ew, that certain groups within the 
German Government were in favour of making an issue of the Sarajevo 
crisis in order to reassert Germany's international position, and 
perhaps as a pretext to mou#a`pre've*tive war against Russia, Even 
In this asrly part of the crisis; ~it. is probable that the Foreign 
Secretary wss already Identify ing`t e hawks with the military and the 
doves with civilians. Dethmann,, Hollweg was still explaining his 
1 Memorandum by Boitie, I6. vii. 1924, Bertie Papers, F. 0.800/161. 
2 Grey to Rumb-)ld, ' 6. vii. 1914, B. D'. XI, ' 32. 
log 
situation to Grey. While Jagowi who only shortly before had asserted 
Germany had no interest in the B alkane, 
1 
was away on his honeymoon. (An 
institution hardly conducive to planning wars). On the other hand, 
Lichnovsky had indicated that the aggressive elements Caere military or 
quasi-military - the Navy Leagues the Pan Germano and the militarists. 
2 
8. Th_eSarale a gripipo 
The course of the Sarajevo Crisis is so WeU-kno1n that it would be 
both tedious and unnecessary to examine it in detail. Here, the 
narrative will be confined to points of re-interpretation,, in so far an 
these are necessary for an understanding of the Britihh Government's 
attitude at the origins of the war. 
Nearly all historians have agreed with Albertini3 that Grey attached 
only a passing interest to the revelations of the German Ambassador. 
Scholars as varied in temperament and background as lay, 
k Trevelyan, 
5 
and Mr. Martin Gilbert 
6 
have adopted the view that Grey was only anxious 
about the Serbian crisis after the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum. on 
23 July. In this author's view, such-an interpretation is erroneous, 
I. Nicolson to de Buusea, 25"v. 1914, 
2 Memorandum by Bertie, 27. vi. 1914, 
to Rumboldt 6. vii. 19L4, B. D. II, 
3 Albertini, vol. II, pp. 205-6. 
4 Fay, S., he Origins of tbeWorl 
5 Trevelyan, p. 245" 
6 Gilberts M. 1 The EuroD, etPov_rs. 
(copy), Carnock Papers, F. 0.800/374" 
Bertie Papers, 7.0.800/171; Grey 
32. 




it is based either on faulty assumptions or misleading evidence, or 
misinterpretation of evidence. These points can be dealt with in order. 
Hereto scholars have seen Grey as rigidly anti-Q3rmsn, or at least 
in the bands of anti-German, diplowats. 
I 
They have therefore expected 
that If Grey had been concerned he would have warned Germany not to 
precipitate trouble. Once one takes away the assumption that Grey was 
anti-German, then one would not expeattto find Grey threatening Berlin. 
There are tW nairi: -sources of faulty cridencds memoirs; Lichnovsky's 
despatches. Churchill2 and Lloyd George3 later asserted that the crisis 
had gone unnoticed before the Cabinet rieating of 24 July, and they placed 
great emphasis on its suddenness. In fact their testimony is misleading.. 
On the evening of '21 July Churchill had dined with Grey, and they had 
discussed the Serbian crisis in some detail. Moreover, it is evident 
that Grey told Churchill of the possibility, of a, general European war. 
4 
Albertini,, cites LichnovskyVreporte to Berlin as proof. that Grey was 
optimistio. 
5 Lichnovsky's despatches a. Ns unraliablei, he was continually 
lying to his on Government; and in this case he was trying to conceal 
how much he had told Grey on the 6 July. 
The misinterpretation of evidence has largely lain in taking. Nicolson' a 
views as'. 'baing indicative of Grey' .6 It is vary foolish to consider 
because tb. e'permanent Under. Secr tary Lias not concerned that Grey was not 
worried. '1'iIndeed, on two occasions Cambon drew his Government's attention 
1 bea. Inttoduction. 
2 Churchill. 1'. S. ß The World Crisis (1923), vol. 1, p. 193. 
3 Lloyd George, vol. I, p. 54" 
4 Churchill to Grey, 22. vii. 1914, Grey Papers, F. O. 80O/C8. 
5 Alber. inii Jo1. II, p. 209. 
6 Gilberts' pp. 33-39. 
4 
sob 
to the differences between Grey and Nicolaon. 
I 
Against this cvideave (such as it is), there is ranged a mass of 
material indicating that Gray vas alarmed from 6 July onwards. Haldane, 
who was olo®er to Grey than any other member of the Cabinet, remembered 
Grey being concerned before 24 July. 
2 There is an impressive amount 
of contemporary evidence which points to Grey's grave apprehension. 
Paul Cambonp the French Ambassador, sent back two despatabesi on 93 and 
22 July, ' indicating Grey was very concexned. This is confirmed by 
the reports of the Russla 
s 
and the ItaUan Ambassadors .6 For the dates 
between 6 and 24 July, we have no lees , then -coven different 'contemporary 
aouroea - Grey1 Baottendortff Imperials, Cambon, Churchill, Bellin and 
7 
Bertie - which cp]. iait1 report Grey as being very apprehensive. 
It Grey was apprehensive then %rhy was his polioyy so insipid? The 
central point ie ttat he hoped he would be able to talk the German 
Government back into a. peaceful. frame of mindp egad by not threatening 
her he would atr 'then the position of the doves against the bauko. 
He would thereby succeed in persuading Bethmenn Hollweg and Jagow to 
follow the Douse of policy he believed had been agreed upon. The 
refusal of the Ga=ans to be reassured, and their itasistenoa on pressing 
the Austro-Serb crisis to war# convinced Grey that the hawks had gaitad 
Cambon to Yivianii tol. $ 9"vii. 1914,, D, D, F. 3rd aeries X; 483. 
Cambon to Bienveuu-Martins 22. vii. 1914,, D. D. F. (3rd Series) X#. 559" 
2 Haldane, p. 270, 
3 Cambon to Yiviani1 tel., 9. vii. 1914, D. D. F. (3rd Series) Y 433. 
4 Cambon to BienvemiU-Martin, 22. vii. 191.4! D. D. F. (3rd Serie2) X, 559. 
5 Benckendortf to Sazanow, "16. vii. 1914, published ins De Siebort] Boo 
and Sohreiner, G. A,, (1921), P. 858. 
6 Imperials to Di Sanguiliaoo, tel., 15.7.1914, D. D. I. (4 XII, 233. 
7 Ballira to Jagow) 24. vii, 1914, 'Q9P. 39,15869. 
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the upper sand, and that Germany was in the hands of a ruthless .. 
militarist group bent on aggression and domination. To folldw Grey's 
reasoning we have to go back to 6 July. 
Lichnovskyýrevelations must have come as a considerable shock to 
Grey. 1 Only a fortnight before he had been approached about co-operating 
with Germany in managing any new "flare up" in the Balkans. " He told 
his ambassadors at Paris and St. Petersburg that he trusted Germany. 
Moreover, for over a year Nicolson and Crowe had urged him to put no 
faith jr. German Government, and to close the ranks of the Triple Entente. 
During that time Grey had brushed aside their advice, and let it be 
known that it was unwelcome. Now, suddenly, and almost without warning, 
he was told that Germany was no longer in o co-operative mood, How 
should Grey have used British influence in the cause of peace? 
There seems little doubt that Grey was psychologically committed to 
see his German policy through. It would have been a severe blow to 
his prestige In the Foreign Office If ha ware forced to admit that 
co-operation with Germany did not work. Such a course would have been 
tadtamount to admitting that his judgement had been completely at fault. 
His options Piere limited in other ways. In retrospect-one policy 
seems obvious: to have informed France and Russia of the news from 
Berlin, and to have warned Germany - perhaps unofficially - that in the 
event of £ general European ar Britain would not remain neuttal; this 
was the deterrence argument of the anti-German group in the Foreign OffIce. 
2 
1 Grey recorded that he was "disturbed by what the Ambassador had told 
me".. Grey to Rumbold, 6. v11.1914, B. D. XI, 32. 
2 Memorandum by Bertie, 27. vi. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. 0.600/171; Minute 
by Crowe, 25. vii. 1914, B. L. XI, 101. The argument frequently put 
forward, that for constitutional reasons no such threat could have 
been given, does not hold water. Grey could easily have taken the 
German Ambassador on one side and told him that in his opinion 
England would not remain neutral. 
10: 1 
There were drawbacks to such a policy. The Irish problem was itself 
nearing crisis point, and was fully absorbing the interest of. the 
nation and the Cabinet: doubtless, Grey was reluctant to seize the 
initiative at such s moment. What was more, Lichnovsky had spoken in 
confidence, and it would have been a breach of trust to have compromised 
him. There was no certainty that a threatening policy would have 
brought Germany to her senses. According to Bethmann Hollweg and 
Lichnovsky, the hawks had been able to seize the initiative because of 
fear of Russia and the threat of encirclement. A bullying line might 
only have succeeded in strengthening "the war party" still further. 
Even had the firm policy been successful In getting Germany to back down, 
it would have meant an end to the Anglo-German detetite, 
l How would 
his colleagues have reacted to a breach in Anglo-German relations over a 
Balkan dispute in which Britain had. no interests directly invol*ed? 
In the long run an anti-Cerra an policy was, 'Grey felt, bound to strengthen 
the militarist and aggressive tendencies in Germany and to weaken the 
position of the liberal sections of opinion. Haldane, who was very 
close to Grey, later described pre-war policy to St. Loe Strachey, and 
Strachey, alluding to Haldane's views, wrote: 
"You believed that there was a powerful peace party in 
Germany, or rather, that the party which called Itself 
a peace party would remain in being, would grow in 
strength, and'would ultimately control the situation 
if we refrained from upsetting the pacific applecart. "2 
1 "I Bertie said.... it was fear of British naval interve-ration 
that prevented Germany from going to wir with France about Morocco. 
Yes, said Grey, but we are on good terms with Germany now and we 
desire to avoid e reN1vIl tit friction with or. " - Memorandum by 
i1 ," 
er e apars, r. O. 800? 71. 
2S racrt4f 
? 7o. 91IAne, 16. iv. 1916, (copy), Strachey Papers. 
I0 
The decisive anti-German policy was simply not practical. 
The alternative policy, of informing France and Russia but not 
threatening Germany, had even greater drawbacks. Buchanan had warned 
over and over again that in the next international crisis Russia would 
look to Britain for support, and 
"Should we fail to give it when she appeals for it, 
England will not be numbered amongst her friends. "1 
As Germany herself was in an intransigent mood, Grey could hardly have 
appealed to Russia for moderation. He would have faced an immediate 
rec est.. for diplomatic support, and he was in no position to promise 
Russia anything. He later explained to Professor Temperley that had 
he tried to restrain Russia, then shevwould have replieds 
"'Will you support us if it comes to war? ' And to that 
we could not have given an affirmative answer, "2 
Thus British interests demadded that the crisis was played out lh a 
low key. 
The Foreign Secretary clung to his original intention of using 
Germany to restrain Austria. The basis of his policy in July, 1914, was 
to conciliate Germany so that the hawks at Berlin and Vienna would be 
held in check. 
After his ilterview with Lichnovsky he did three things. Firstly, 
he informed the German Government that they had nothing to fear from 
Russia, and that there were no bindigg Anglo-Russian engagements; he 
then rreaffirmed his policy of working in co-operation with Germanys. 
1 Buchanan to Grey, 18. iii. 1914, B. D. X(ii), 528. 
2 Professor H. Temperley's record of anninterview with Grey, Spender 
Papers, add. 56386. 
ho 
and appealed to Bethmann Hollweg to follow the same policy as he-had done 
during the Balkan Wars. 
l Secondly, he saw the French2 and Russian3 
Ambassadors, and informed them that he anticipated a serious crisis to 
arise as a result of the Sarajevo murders. What he did not mention 
was that he gained this intormätione from Lichnovsky. He hoped to 
awaken St. Petersburg and Paris to the dangers of the situation, but 
he did not want them b feel that the Orman and Austrian Governments 
harboured any malevolent intentions. He advised Cambon and Benckendorff 
to urge restraint at St. Petersburg, and asked the Russians to do all they 
could to convince eer®any that they had no aggressive , ýo iitions. 
Thirdly, he sent to Berlin for confirmation of Lichnovsky's story. 
4 
Nothing in the course of the following ten days -9- 20 July - 
indicated that his policy was bearing fruit. J. A. Spender called at 
the Foreign Office, and reported that the German and Austrian Embassies 
were trying to bring the British press round to a pro-Austrian line in 
the Serbian dispute. 5 From Vienna, De Bunsen reported that Austria, 
encouraged by Germany, was going to take strong action against Serbia ;6 
this report was confirmed by intelligence gleaned from the Austrian 
Embassy in London. 
7 The Foreign Secretary grew ever more alarmed. On 
16 July, he told Benckendorff that Germany awght not restrain Austria, 
and the jmbassodor observeds 
1 Grey to Rumbold, 9. vii91914,8, D. XI, 41. 
2 Grey to Bertie, 8. vii. 1914, B. D. XI, 38, 
3 Grey to Buchanan, S. vii. 1914, B. D. XI, 39. 
4 Grey to Rumbold, 6. vii. 1914, B. D. XI, 32. 
5 Memorandum by Spender, August 1914, Spender Papers, add. 46392. 
6 De Bunsen to Grey, tel., 16. vii. 1914, B. D. ý. XI, 50. 
7 Minute by Crowe, 16. vi1.1914, B. D. -X1,50. 
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"Gray did not seem very reassured..... I have no 
doubt Grey has used very plain language at Berlin 
and Vienna*" 11 
Benckendorff was mistaken. Grey was still deliberately 
refraining from threatening Germany, and was hoping that the German 
civilian Government was going to save the situation. 
By the 20 July the situation had grown so alarming that the 
Foreign Secretary called Lichnovsky to see him. Berlin now had their 
itmbassador on a much shorter rein, 2 and when questioned he was evasive. 
But Lichnovsky was a poor liar, and the hair-raising policy of his own 
Government had brought him to the edge of nervous despairs his 
suspicious behaviour was not such as to encourage confidence. 3 The 
interview did nothing to alleviate Grey's anxieties. 
4 
Between 20 - 22 July, Grey changed the tack of his policy. He 
was so depressed by the news from Berlin, that he resolved to by-pass 
the Germans in the search for a peaceful solution to the crisis. He 
suggested/ttge Russians that should the crisis deepen, then they should 
negotiate directly with Vienna. 
g Sazanow6 and Potncar7 (on the Mate 
Viisit to Russia) refused to countenance such a course of action, and 
expressed a desire for the Entente to act as a single diplomat entity. 
1 Siebert and Schreiner, p. 856. 
2 Despatches to Lichnovsky in D. D. 
3 Cambon to Bienvenu-Martin, tel,,. 24. vii. 1914, D. D. F. (3rd Series)XI, 23. 
4 Cambon to Bienvenu-Martin, 22. vii. 1914,. D"D. F. (3rd Series) X, 559; 
Grey to 1: umbold, 20. vii"11914, B, D. XI, 66, 
5 Grey to Buchanan, tel.., 20. vii. 1914, D. D. XI, 68. 
6 Buchanan to Grey, tel. 22. vii, 1914, B. D. XI, 76. Buchanan to Grey, 
i' tel. 23yvii"1914, H. D. XI, 84. 
7 Poincare, R., Au Service de la France (1926) vol. IV, pp"252-253. 
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Grey, unable to agree to such a policy, returned to his original plan 
of persuading Berlin to help to resolve the crisis. 
At the same time the situation was not entirely black. Rumbold 
reported that Jagow'dented having any knowledge of what Austria intended 
to do, and that he had affirmed his wish to help resolve the crisis) 
This telegram started another round in the dispute between the pro and 
anti-German factions in the Foreign Office. Grey felt that Jagow was 
telling the truth, and that he was to be relied on. Spender, who was 
a daily visitor at the Foreign Office during July, 1914, recorded that 
Grey told him he had faithlin Jagow and believed what he told him. 
2 
Crowe again tried to show Grey that he was being duped; he argued that 
there were no moderate elements at Berlin, and that the idea of dove 
faction was a chimera. The true German object waw to. break the Ententee 
"the attitude of the German Government...... does not 
bear the stamp of straightforwardness...... They appear 
to be relying on the British Government to reinforce 
German and Austrian threats at Belgrade; it is clear 
that if the British Government did intervene in this 
case, or by addressing admonitions to St. Petersburg, 
the much desired breach between England and Russia would 
be brought one step nearer realization. "B 
In spite of Crowe's advice, Grey continued to believe that there 
was a 6ströý' ? "dove" faction at Berlin, and that the best chances of 
peace lay in strengthening tftsr. r position by being as moderate as possible. 
The "peace party" was felt to consist of Bethmann Hollweg, the Kaiser 
and Von Jagow. On the'29 July, 1914, Herbert Samuel, writing to his 
wife, indicated that the 6abinet agreed with Grey that there were 
I Rumbold to Grey, tel., 22. vii. 1914, B. D. XI, 77. 
2 Memorandum by Spender, August, 1914, Spender Papers, add. 56392. 
3 Minute by Crowe, 22. vi1.1914, B. D. XI, 77. 
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definite "hawk" and "dove" parties at 8erliu. 
 It remains to be seen,? he wrote: "whether or not 
Germany regarding war as iz itable, will then strike 
at France. There is still a hope that under the 
intluenoe. of the Emperor. and B etbmaan Hollweg, the. 
Chancellor, she may nots*1. 
with the delivery of the Austriaf. ultimatum to Serbia there arose the 
last dispute over German policy betwen. Crowe and Nicolcono-on the one handy 
and Grey and Tyrrell, on the other. The former insisted that Gerwan. y sought 
dominations and the only way to halt the plunge Into war wee to come out 
openly on the side of Prance and Ratseis. Only direct opppsition to Germany 
would check her aggreeaivs policy etd save a breach is &uglo-Russian 
relations. AW other palioy would mere3. y encourage the German Government 
to coatiaie as they had been doing. 
2 Grey again rejected Crowe' advice 
and inslsteds 
Olt is premature to make as' statement to France and 
Russia yet. "3 
He held that the beat chance of peace left not in threatening . 
Gerwe y, but 
in reassuring hers only then would the "pacific elemente* in the German 
ßoyernment have sufficiently strong argument to resist the civii. ixns. In 
this matter grey carried the Cabinet idth him. McKeaaa, the Home Secretary, 
remembered 
1 Samuel tro hie vitei 29. vii. 19]4,, Samuel Papers1 File A/157" 
2 Miautes by Crowe and Hicolson, 25, Vii, 1914,, B. D. XIS 101. 
3 Minute by Grey, undated, certainly 25. vii. 1914, H. D. ü, 101a 
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"The resolute determination of the Cabinet, led by Grey 
in this respect, " was "not to cause war by an assurance 
given by us in advance either to France or to Russia. " 
On 29 July, Samuel'wrotes 
"Meanwhile our action is'held in suspense for if both sides 
do not know what we shall do both *111 be less willing to 
run risks. "2 
It is evident both from these statements and the Foreign Office records 
that Grey was deliberately refraining from threatening Germany. On 
30 July, he made a last desperate effort to change the balance of forces 
at Berlin. Britain would guarantee Germany against the encirclement 
she feareds 
"If peace can be preserved, " he instructed Goschen to 
tell Bethmann Hollweg, "and this crisis safely passed, 
my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement 
to which Germany could be a party, by which she. would 
be assured that no hostile or aggressive policy would 
be pursued against her or allies by France, Russia, and 
ourselves, jointly or separately. "3 
The real architect of this policy of conciliation may well have 
been Tyrrell. It was Tyrrell who had intimste contacts with German 
certainly 
Embassy, and he was almost/counselling moderation so that Jagow and 
Bethmann Hollweg would be in a. stronger position to resist the war party. 
1 McKenna to Spender, 8. v. 1929, Spender Papers, 'add. 56386. This 
statement could not have meant. that Grey was frightened of Russia 
provoking Germany - see General notes by Lord Crowe in Spender 
Papers, add. 56386 - its only meaning was that he did not wish to 
provoke Germany. 
2 Samuel to his wife, 29. vii. 1914, Samuel Papers, F; LeA/157. 
3 Grey to Goschen, tel., 3). vii. 1914, B. D. XI, 303. 
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In late July, 1914, he had an argument about the anti-German editorials 
of the Times with his friend Sir Valentine Chirol. 
I On 31 July, 
Tyrrell wrote bitterly about the belligerent tone of the Times which, 
he believed, would encourage Lerman fears, and thereby German aggressions 
"The 'new style' and line the Times takes makes me fairly sick. "2 
Grey's policy was, of course,, a, failure, and by 2 August the 
German violation of Luxemburg's neutrality had convinced him that 
the "hawks" at Berlin were firmly in control of German policy. Herbert 
Samuel, writing that evening, described Gray's mood at the moment he 
realised that'all was in ruins: 
"H" is outraged by the way in which Germany and Austria 
have played with the vital interests of civilisation, 
and have put aside all attempts at accommodation made 
by himself and others, and while continuing to negotiate 
have marched steadily to war. "3 
At this point everything about German policy in the previous month 
must have slotted into place. The groups which had been pressing for 
a policy of adventure had gained control, just as Lichnovsky had told 
him rfquz weeks before. They had refused to accept a negotiated 
settlement and had deliberately precipitated the conflict. The very 
way in which they had systematically lied to him, and betrayed his 
trust - and for a man with Grey's morality this was perhaps the worst 
crime - convinced him of their utter ruthlessness. 
1 Dr. Zara-Steiner, who was kind enough to read through parts of this 
manuscript, drew my attention to this spat. 
2 Tyrrell to Ponsonby, 31. vii. B14, Arthur Ponsonby Papers. 
3 Samuel to his wife, 2. viii. 1914, Samuel'Papers, File 5' A/157. 
Samuel wrote two letters to his wife on this date. There is no 
way of differentiating between them. 
I1L 
Gray's analysis of the situation was accepted by the Cabinet. On 
3 August, John Simon told C. P. Scottz 
"he had been entirely deceived by Germany and that I (Scott) 
ought to know that the evidence was overwhelming that the 
party which had gained control of the direction of affairs 
throughout the crisis had deliberately played for war. 
The Emperor was away on his yacht and in his absence the 
Crown Prince and the war party - Tirpitz and the rest - had brought matters to a point beyond control.... beyond 
doubt Germany could have held Austria in check and 
moderated her demands, but the party in power did not wish 
to do so. "1 
Thus when Grey pleaded with Cabinet and Commons for war, he was - 
not asking for war against Germany, but for war against the aggressive 
elements in Germany that had wilfully plunged Europe into war. In 
the Sprigq of 1915, he wrote to Rennell. Rodd, the Ambassador at Rome, 
and icidicated the distinction he drew. between the 
role 
of the German 
civilians - the doves and the military - the hawks - in the events of 
July, 19141 
"Jagow did nothing, Bethmann'Hollweg trifled and the 
military intended war and forced. ft. It was a huge and 
gratuitous crime, the outcome of pride and ambition. "2 
9. Reports of Homecoming Diplomats. 
When British diplomats returned from Berlin and Vienna, their 
reports on German policy 'in July, '1914, served to confirm Grey's views. 
Sir Francis Oppenheimer, "the Consul-General at Frankfurt, came 
back to Loddon at the end of July.. Oppenheimer was held in high regard 
1 Memorandum by-C. P. Scott, 34viii. 1914, Scott Papers, add. 90901. 
2 Grey to Rodd, 6. iii. 1915, (copy), Grey Papers, F40.800/65. 
Ifs' 
at the Foreign Office, and his reports on German financial policy, 
on which he was expert,. were universally praised and widely circulated. 
The story Oppenheimer told was that the ce; acial decisions had been 
made in Berlin in the first week of July. The military-had'been the 
decisive influence and had retained control of German policy throughout 
the crisis. During the long weekend of July 31 to August 3- Monday 
a Bank Holiday - Oppenheimer was at the Foreign Office, and also met 
several Cabinet ministers in the course of discussions over the financial 
bus 
crisis, In Simon's statement, to C. P. Scott (which have already been 
quoted) one can sense the influence of Oppenheimer's views. 
I 
influential than Oppenheimer was Sir Horace Runbold. r For 
most of July, 1914, Goschen, the Ambassador, had been absent, and' 
Rumbold was Charge d'Affaires at the Berlin Embassy. As early as 
the 11 July Rufbold had repotted that Lichnovsky's fears were probably 
Justified"2 Rumbold had at one time'been private secretary to Lord 
Cromer, and it is from a letter of Cromer's that we can judge the sort 
of story Rumbold told at the Foreign Office. Rumbold believed that 
the crucial decisions had been made by the German military in the first 
week of July. Even more striking is that Cromer, in referring to Germany 
"egging on" Austria, was - on 14 August - already using the term the 
"blank cheque". 
3 
Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the Ambassador at Vienna, also expressed 
the view that the main culprit was Germanyl that the Austrians would 
1 Oppenheimer, pp. 228-233. 
2 Rumbald to Grey, ll. 0l. 1914, S. D. XI, 44. 
3 Cromer to Strachey, 14, viii. 1914, (copy), Cromer'Papers, F. 0.633/23. 
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not have acted without her permission and encouragement. 
1 
10. Sir Edward Grey and Prussisn Militarism. 
For Grey tho war was at once a calamity for civilisation and a 
personal tragedy on an enormous scale. He would examine and re-examino 
the diplomacy of the Sarajevo crisis; he hoped to convince himself 
that he had dons all he could to avert the war. His own involvement 
played heavily on his own consciences 
"there was often a wakeful time, " he wrote in his memoirs, 
"round about four o'clock in the morning - that time when 
vitality is low and spirits are depressed and the. mind is 
often prey to doubts and anxieties. I would try one 
hypothesis after another, considering what hope there 
would have been in any of them. M2 
Shortly after Grey left office, dertie wrote to Hardinges 
"I am sure he felt acutely Boche accusations that he could 
have prevented the war and that he wondered to himself 
whether he had done those things he ought not to have 
done or loft undone those things he ought to have done. "3 
It became important to Grey, for personal as well as political 
reasons, to believe that nothing would have dissuaded the German military 
from their evil designs. He insisted that they had planned for the war 
and deliberately precipitated its 
"It is. all stuff to say that we could have prevented this 
war by declaring solidarity with France and Russia. 
Germany intended to force war or humiliation on France 
and Russia. "4 
I De Bunsen to Grey, 12. viii. 1914,, F. 0.371/2173/41920. 
2 Grey, vol. I1, p. 47. 
3 Bertie to Hardinge, 16.41.1916,. (copy), Bartle Papers, F. 0.800/163. 
4 Grey to Gertie, 16. ix. 1914, Bertie Papers, P. 0.800/166. 
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Or again: 
"The German Governatent, In the hands of this military 
caste, prepared for this war, planned it and chose 
the time for it. "1 
If the military caste had gained control of German policy in July, 
1914, then what had happened to the civilians inr, whom he had placed his 
trust? Crowe and Nicolson, who did not subscribe I Grey's "hawks" 
add "doves" theory, had no need to explain this. 2 They held that there 
never had been a peace party. Grey was never quite certain on this 
point. Once or twice he wrote as if the military had seized control 
almost in style of coup d'etats the German military had "dominated" 
Germiny, 3 and the civilians were "machtlos". 
a But for the most part 
he seems to have felt that Jagow and Bethmann Hollweg had been weak and 
given in to the military, At any rate they were only the front men for 
the war party, and had they been left alone then everything would have 
been alright. 
In certain respects Grey's attitude towards German policy in July 
1914 remained consistent. The belief that there were two parties in 
Germany was carried through the Sarajevo crisis into the war. In other 
ways his ideas did changes he came to attribute different motives and 
characterisbiisto the German military party. During the Sarajevo crisis 
there had been two theories of German foreign policy - and by and large 
these two rival views remain to-day. Crowe hold that authoritarian and 
expansionist ideals were Toatod into the, very fabric of. the German Empire; 
1 Grey to Strauss, 26. ix. 1914, lcopy),. Grey. Papers, F. 0.800/1U1. 
2 For Ciowe and Nicolson's war alms, see Chapter.. 3. 
3 Grey to Strauss, 26. ix. 1914, (copy) Gray-Papers, F. 0. ß00 111. 
4 Grey, vol. II, p. 26. Why Grey used a German word when he had no knowledge 
of the language is a mystery. 
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aggressive militarism permeated all branches and aspects of German 
society. . 
Grey and Tyrrell had equally recognised aggressive tendencies 
in Germany, and they also believed that certain sections of German 
society were imbued with the spiritual ideals which Crowe held 
characterised the German system in its entirety. But they felt that 
the influence of these sinister values rested largely on what to-day we 
would call a "frustration-aggression complex, " brought on, above all, by 
the Russian menace. 
l During the war Grey modified his ideass he began 
to see the German military party as the very incarnation of evil. His 
outlook tended to be less and )mss the function of his experience,, and 
more and more a reflection of his prejudices. and education., English 
Liberal-historians - and perhaps Lord Acton is the best example - had 
explained history as a struggle between antithetical spiritual forcess 
a conflict between liberty and absolutism, between equality and domination. 
For Acton all international villains of the modern world - Charles V, 
Philip II and Louis XIV. - were a manifestation of a single political 
ideal. Their actions flowed from a lust for domination; their behaviour 
was characterised by a ruthless subordination of all values to feed an 
insatiable craving for power. 
2 This craving for universal domination had 
no causes and no roots, it was in the very ether of history. Such 
ideas shaped Grey's attitudes. Grey came to see the Prussian military 
1 Two memoranda by Bertie - 27. v1.1914, F. 0.600/171; 16. vit. 1914, 
F. 0.800/161 - bring this point out very clearly. 
2 In this respect Acton's famous lecture, The 8eginntngs of the Modern 
State, is especially illuminating, Lord Acton, Lectures on tubdern 
Histor 
, introduction by Trevor-Roper, H. 
(Fontane, 1960 pp. 42-60. 
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party Doti as an outgrowth of German history and German society, 'but as 
an outbreak of a spiritual cancer alirays latent in international relations. 
Writing on Louis XIV, Acton had observed thats 
"the idea of a predominant Power in Europe was a part 
of absolutism. It proceeded from the some love of 
authority,, tte same prido in-greatness, the same 
disregard for the equal,, rights of men, the same 
pretentions to superiority and prerogative, 
international as well as national. 
1 
Grey, writing on the German military party, used 'the same concepts and 
even the same vocabulary$ 
"The Prussian military caste has dominated Germany 
and the whole of the West of Europe is in danger 
of being dominated by it.... 2 it (the action 
of the German' military caste) was a huge. and 
gratuitous crime, the outcome of pride and ambition. "3 
As wo shall shortly observe, this simplistic view of the German problim 
Influenced Grey's war aims. 
11, The Destruction of Prussian Militarism. 
What precisely did Grey mean when he spoke of destroying Prussian 
militarism? He desired to destroy the power and influence of the German 
military party that had brought about the war; he refused to consider 
concluding a peace with the German Government as it existed. Military 
defeat would shatter the charisma of militarism and destroy the internal 
ascendency of the military hierarchy. 
In October, 1914, Grey wrote# 
1 Acton, p. 236. 
2 Grey to Strauss, 26, ix. 1914, (copy), Grey Papers, F. 0.800/111. 
3 Grey to Rodd, 6. iI1.1915, (copy), Grey Papers, F. 0.600/65. 
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"I can see nothing for it but to fight on till we 
get a peace that will secure us against Prussian 
militarism. Once freed of that, Germany will 
have nothing to fear, because we shall have no 
more to fear from he r. "1 
It is difficult to put any other construction upon the phrase "once freed 
of that" than an intention to destroy the German Government as it existed. 
The point einarges forcibly in despatches to Washington in late December, 
1914, and early January, 1915, This correspondence was prompted by 
rumours that Germany might be willing to make peace. Grey outlined 
two major principles for British war aimst the evacuation and indemnity 
of Belgium; security against further German aggression. On the second 
point, he saw the main safeguards in either the destruction of Germany 
as a Great Power, ors 
"an internal change which made Germany a democratic 
state emancipated from the rule of the Prussian 
Military Party...... but it cannot be imposed from 
outside, though it may be an indirect result of the 
defeat of Germany in the war. "2 
The Foreign Secretary dismissed any idea of permanently crushing Germany 
as being impractical as well as being impolitic. This left the second 
alternative. Grey spelt out his position in a telegram sent on 2 
January, 1915. 
"I gather the President's friend (House) considers 
there is no chance of the United States Government 
cnuntersigning any agreement for the preservation 
of future peace. If this is so it is difficult to 
see how a durable peace can be secured without the 
1 Grey to Roosevelt, 20. x. 1914, (copy )$ Grey papers, F. 0.800 11Q. 
Published in Grey, vol. II, p. 141. 
2 Grey to Spring-Rice, tel. ', 22. xii. 1914, Grey papers, F. 0.800/84. 
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"complete exhaustion of one side or the other. (The) German Government single us out for special 
animosity and work up hatred against us in Germany 
by the most unjust charge that we were responsible 
for this war and (we wcre)'the aggressors in it. 
A peace made while this temper continues would 
leave us exposed to cartain attack in the future 
unless we spent even more largely than before on 
armaments. "1 
Here the enemy is specifically defined as being the German Government. 
The war is to be a war a outrance, for nothing else will provide a 
secure peace. Victory for what? A victory to destroy the existing 
German Government, or to be precise the Government controlled by the 
German military. 
There could be/npoint in discussing peace with Bethmann Hollweg, 
Jagow and the Kaiser because they were puppets of the military. As 
Grey putt; the German Chancellor had beeng 
n 
"So false and mean that I distrust'him altogether. '"2 
Asquith's attitude towards the German military party was very 
similar to Grey's. They had enjoyed the closgstss of relat$ons during 
the July crisis, and Asquith made several statements Insisting on the 
need to destroy Prussian militarism. If there was a difference between 
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, then it was a difference 
of emphasis. Asquith was influenced by his legal training, and he 
looked upon German aggression as, criminal activity. The wrong-doer 
would have to compensate for the wrong done', and be punished with a 
I Grey to Spring-Rice, tel., 2.1.1915, Grey Papers, F. 0.800/85. 
2 Grey Minute, undated, c. 1. i. 1915, on Bertie to Grey, 28, xii. 1914, 
Grey Papers, F. ©. 800/5EA. 
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peace that was harsh enough to convinco the public of its failure., 
Haldane also shared Grey's views. During tho July crisis Grey 
was staying at his house, and they must hive discussed the situation 
daily. The Lord Chancellor thought that the influence of the war 
party would have to be destroyed if there was to be any certainty of 
a stable peace. 
"It is desirable. " he wrote in a memorandum for the 
Cabinet, that the German military hierarchy be 
dettiroued: '! 'Z 
Then members of the British Government insisted on the need to 
destroy Prussian militarism, they meant to bring down the German 
Government, dominated as they believed by a military clique. This was 
with the evacuation of Belgium, - the foremost of British war aims. 
Even in 1916, when Grey doubted that the war could be brought to 
a docisive conclusion, 
3 he and his civil servants still clung to the 
idea of discrediting the war party by forcing them to accept defeat. 
Sir Louis Mallet set down the Foreign Office views 
,, The German Government's theory has been that they have 
been fhacvictims of a nefarious conspiracy which 
culminated in a treacherous attack upon Germany by 
invidious enemies. If they can show their people they 
have defeated their enemies, maittained their European 
possessions intact, got back their colonies, and 
preserved the iibegrity of the Austrian add Ottoman 
Empires, far from being a revolution, the military 
party will be regarded as the saviour of society 
and the Hohenzollern and'Prussian system more firmly 
established than ever. "A, 
1 Asgaith's notes anritten- i: j pencil on the back of a Foreign Office 
telegram, undated, c, 23.1x. 1914, they Papers, P. 0.800/84. 
2 The Future Relations of the Great Powere, 8. iv. 1S15, by Haldane, 
CAt3.37 127 17. 
3 Grey to Asquith, 15. ii. 1916, Asquith Papers, MY. 29t Memorandum 
by Bertia, 1i. vlii. 1916, Bertie Papers, F. 0.800/171. 
4 Mallet to Grey, 22.11.1916, Grey Papers, P. 0.800/10 9. 
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Grey, though sickened by the slaughter of war, could see no way round 
this arguments' 
"ho hankers after pence..... on the other hand he cannot 
imagine or devise any terms unless Germany admits defeat. "2 
In the summer of 1916, a Foreign Office Committee was established 
to look into the question of war aims. Unfortunately, the-minutes and 
report of this committee have disappeared, and we are left only with a 
memorandum by Sir F. alph Paget and Sir William Tyrrell, written in 
3 
August, 19 16.4 This memorandum is probably a shortened version of a 
I Gray to Mallet, 22.11.1916, (COPY). Grey Papers , 'F. 0.800 109; Grey, 
vol. 1l, p. 125. 
2 Esher, vol. I1I, p. 298. 
3 Foreign Office Memorandum, 7. viii. 1914, by Paget and Tyrrell, 
CAB. 29 1%P-5. 
4 Paget, in a private letter (see footnote immediately following) 
refers to having been "one of coca-nittie". It is evident that 
this must have been something more than a meeting of Paget and 
Tyrrell. The constitution of the committee is open to questions 
two members were Paget and Tyrrell. In a note Drummond wrote to 
Grey, he referred to "the committee I have ventured to propose 
for considering our desiderata as regards the reconstruction of 
Europe. " (Minute by Drummond, 6. iv. 1916, on the back of Bryce to 
Grey, 6.1v. 1916, Grey Papers, F. 0.800/106) Drummond suggested 
Paget, Tyrrell and O'3ierne. O'Bierne could not have been a 
member because he died on board the Hampshire with Kitchener. 
O'Bierne was an expert on Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and it 
is possible that George Russell Clerk or Sir Louis Mallet (or 
both) took the seat Drummond had intended for him. In January, 
1917, there was a memorandum on war aims drawn up by Mallet, 
Tyrrell and Clerk. (CAB. 16/36/IC/27) There is no obvious reason 
for this co-authorship save for the fact that they had all been 
members of the Foreign Office Comraittee. (Paget's name being absent, 
because he was now at Copenhagen), There were probably only one 
or two copies of the committee's report, and it was never 
circulated to the Cabinet. What happened to copies that did 
exist is a mystery. They may wall have been cannibalised by 
the later inter-departmental committees on war aims. 
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much largar report. Paget described, in a pilvate letter, the 
overwhelming importance which the Foreign Office Committee had attached 
to destrcytng the Prussian military partys 
"it may interest you to hear that for some time before 
I left the Foreign Office I was one of a committee 
appointed to draw up recommendations as to what our 
terms should be....... ... Of course everything depends on whether we are able to dictate terms to 
Germany, but we must go on until we can do so, 
otherwise we may consider the war as practically 
lost. We should get into endless difficulties if 
we started negotiations and bargaining, and 
moreover it would mean that the military party in 
Germany still possessed life and its thought would 
be to prepare for a war of revenge. All this has 
been stated in our report. "1, 
Ih ere is, insufficient evidence to say precisely how Grey intended 
to destroy the Pu ssian military party, though a picture of reasonable 
coherence can be put together. Grey had never been to Germany add 
he had no knowledge of the lenguage. So in deciding how Prussian 
militarism was to be destroyed, he was influenced as much by his 
political philosophy and intuition, as by any; ecmpirical knowledge of 
German conditions. Ile believed that the military party was a dictator- 
ship with a charismatic appeal, and hö'perceived that defeat in war 
would bring social, political and economic' upheaval. He felt that an 
allied victory would discredit the military regime and its ideals, and 
they would be swept away by revolution. This is almost certainly what 
he meant when he said, Germany might become a democratic state as "the 
indirect result of defeat". It is further implied in his many statements 
1 Paget to Findlay, 2. x. 1916, (copy), Paget Papers, add. 51256. 
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that Gemany would have to admit she had been defeated.. This was the 
general Foreign Office' view, and it was shared by the military. 
In the early ux: nths of the war B: itish military leaders had hoped 
to march into Germany and overthrcw the Gewann Governcent* By January, 
1915, they recognised that the overthrow of Prussianism in Germany would 
have to come about as a result of an internal revolutions 
"He (French) does not envisage without the aid of some 
additional Power a crushing of German' military 
ascendency unless it be through German internal 
troubles consequent on want of food and munitions 
or disappointment at the non-existence of alleged 
victories. " 
2 
While Grey had t ha itagiaation to see that military defeat would 
bring with it dynamic social and political change, he lacked the 
experience to understand that stable liberal democracies cannot be 
established overnight. The Foreign Secretary took his ideas from 
Liberal political theory and his understanding of English history. He 
felt that liberal democracy was the highest political condition for 
mankind. Like many liberals (even to this day) he could not accept 
that the nature of government is a reflection of the values and the 
structure of society-in-its totality. He considered that the defeat 
of militarism would lead. to a new political system and an altered climate 
of opinion. It never occurrad to him that `, . defeat might only 
convince Germans that they should fight the next war more efficiently 
the 
than the last. It, secmed inevitable that in defoat/military caste 
1 Mallet to Grey, 22.1191916, Grey Papers, F. ©. 600 1©9. 
2 Memorandum by BertiU, 21.1.191b, Bertlo Papers, F. 0.800/167. 
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would be swept away and a German democracy would be established. This 
would be a great achievement, for just as he believed that the Prussian 
system was the embodimeit of an evil spiritual farce, so he believed 
that liberal democracies embodied a pure love for peace and equality 
among nations. Once Germany had been cleansed of her lust for 
domination, she could take her place in the society of eationst 
"We-wish...... the establishment somehow of a Germany 
not dominated by a military caster a eation that will 
look at liberty and. politics from the same point of 
vitw as we do, and who will deal with us en equal 
terms and in good faith. "I 
12. Conclusion. 
For the British Governmett during the First World War the destruction 
of Prussian militarism was as important as was the destruction of 
National Socialism for their successors a quarter of a century later. 
(Indeed, if we are to believe Professor Fischer it was the same conflict). 
In many respects the policies in 
the two World Wars were similar: in 
both cases it was deeply felt that Britain was waging an ideological war 
against an aggressive, anti-Liberal and sinister political philosophy. 
A philosophy that formed the creed of a party that had been responsible 
for the war. 
Yet it is curious that while` historians have never doubted that the 
high object of the Second World War was- to destroy the flau Party, few 
have placed any eraphasls on. the destruction of the German military party 
during the First Worid lat. The'reesön . 
for thi9 neglect lies partly in 
1 Grey to Strauss, 26. ix. 1914, (copy),, Gray Papers, F. O. 804 111. 
j2.1 
a confusion over semantics. Gray and Asquith tended to speak of 
destroying militarism, and it is by no means obvious from their public 
Statements that they equate! militarism with a hawk party that had 
brought about'tha tiers To the untrained eye it could well seem'that 
the claim to be fighting to destroy, militarism was just propaganda. 
Moreover historians have been mislead in. thinking Grey's policy was 
resolutely anti-. Garman. The 
üetente 
with Germany has been neglected, 
and scholars have not seen that between 1912, and 1914 Grey trusted the 
German Government. They failed to gro%sp that Grey perceived two 
influences in German foreign policy., 
Th3se technical errors flow in large paart from a single sources 
the anti-war rivulsioa of the 1920' s. ixen closed their hearts and 
minds to the issues involved in the First World liar. In 1917, Siegfried 
Bassoon, in hig Fooz To = Dead Offs er. ridiculedthose statesman who 
said, England -wwaa fighting against militarism: 
"Good-bye: old ladt Remamber me to God, 
And tell him that'our politicians swear 
Tho7 von't give in till Prussian Rule's been trod 
Under the Heel of England...., Are you there? ...... 
less**** and the war won't end for at least two years; 
But we've stacks of QQn.... Itm blind with tears, 
Staring into dark. Chearol: 
I wish they'd killed you in a decent show: +' 
It was the asnticzenta expressed by Sassoon that coloured the way iný 
which men eame to took upon the ideals Grey held so dearly. 
1tr4 M- reelected and. arranged by Cardin, B", 19 s pp. 9&-99. 
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1. jptmduotion 
When, in early August# 1914,. the Cabinet were deciding what 
eventualities should bring Britain into the war in Europe, the main 
oonoern was to prevent Germat oontrolled, as most ministers believed, by 
a military paste bent on aggression and domination - from imposing her 
mastery on the North-West of Europe. In marching her armies through 
Belgium, Ger®agy challenged strategio dogmas long cherished in Britain, 
and re-awakened fears of Germany' a threat to British security. 
So when the British Government came to consider what terms of peace 
would be consonant with British interests it sought to ensure that in 
years to come Western Europe and the British Isles would be free from the 
A 
shadow of further German aggressions Germany would have to evacuate 
Belgium, and pay compensation fat the wrong she had done to hers she was: 
to retrooede the territories ehe lud seized from Franz in 18711 she 
would have to see her battlefleet so reduced in size that neither Briton 
nor German would doubt that the days of Germany's challenge to Britain's 
maritime aupremaay were at an end. 
Z. gliltera in the Decision to ro to Wa, _, r. 
That. Britain vent to war because Grey had entangled the nation in a web 
of commitment to France, or because Britain was legally and morally bound 
1 Chapter I. 
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to go to war to defend Belgium4row an external attaok# are ideas that have 
entered into the mythology of modern English history: Myths started by 
politicians and repeated by bistorieus.: The Cabinet opted for war in 
order to-uphold Britain'a atrategio interest in the independence of the 
pe. u- This'eame self-interest vas the amain influence on North-Westlo! Euro 
the developasut of British war aims-with regard to the North-West of 
Europe. There vas; a ooatitaxity of national self-intereetj not of 
international-obligation. 
As soon as war broke out, politicians were saying that Britain had 
been dragged in by secret undertak e given to Trance. In August, 
1914, Ramsey Maadonaldvrotes- 
 I ,, do not', care whether, the, House of Commons ratified 
treaties or a'committee, of the House, of, Commons were 
ooastitutedýto'appearýto"look into foreign business, 
we should have . probably,; have been in this wer, committed by 'a inistaken, view of,: honour, and a. web, of almost 
intangible statements, interests and desiresov 
After the wary, disenohauted'radicals published their aooounte of the 
events -'leading up to. war, ', a d° they., too alleged that it was commitment to 
France that brought about Britain* e entry into the Great liar. our great 
histories of the origins, of the var, of 3.914 play on the Anglo-French 
Ententexas a sare'runj-in that', ladder of escalation which turned a Balkan 
diepe: telinto a contliot of global dimensions. B eriadotte 5cämitt'a comments 
on-the European, alliance system - of which he viewed the Anglo-Prench Entente 
a3 one part -are typical . 
of}the liews of scholars of his generation. 
1 Macdonald to Moral,. 24; viii. 1914, Morel Papers, Box 7.8. 
2 Lorebura, Earls. (1919)= Morley of Blackburn, Viscount, 
Iemor mon Rasigna AIM)* Motley's account was published 
posthumously. 
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"Each year that passed bound all more closely 
to the Wheel. of Tate, until in July, 1914, 
none saw any escape, -from a war which directly 
concerned only two of the Great Powers. "1 
Of allthose who have asserted that the Anglo-French Entente brought 
Britain into the war, only Lord Loreburn and Lord Morley could have olaimed 
to have had first-hand knowledge of the deliberations of Liberal Cabinets 
before 1914, and on close examination even their evidence is dabiads le- 
Loreburn had left the Cabinet in 1912, and he did not know what went on 
at the crucial Cabinet meetings before the outbreak of war. Morley was a 
member of the Cabinet in July and early August, 1914, but none-the-less 
his account is unreliable. To put the point quite bluntly, Morley was 
senile# and could not follow what was going on, His condition was so bad 
that his, oolleagues found him an embarrassment. It was noted thati 
'Morley.. a...., is now so old that the views 
he ezpreseoa are sadly inconsequent and inconsistent. "2 
Like many old men, Morley was gripped with certain ideal fix®a, and one 
of these vas. that Grey had-committed Britain to go to var. It in a 
sgmptom of Morley'0 mental decline that while this is the theme of his 
moraMum on Resignation, he neuer once shows that the Cabinet went 
along with Grey in wanting to go to war to defend Franca from German 
aggression. 
We nov possess s3fficientdocumentary evidence to be able to say quite 
certainly that in August, 19]h, the Cabinet refused to go to war to defend 
1 Schmitt, ß. ' The Cow' of %h® war blew York, 1930, pi" H 




j'A=eys and Portrait a (19&) j, p. 217. 
2 Samual to his-vitep 2. viii. l914, Samuel Papers, File . 
/157. 
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France against Gernezw. The' question of bat Grey had or had#not, 
promised France becomes irrelevant, for even'had'the Foreign Secretary 
morally committed Britain, the, Cabinst did not'feel itself to be bound. 
In September, 1914, Sir Arthur Nioolson wrote in disgust to Hardinges 
"Iou will ua doubt have read the White Paper (The Blue 
Book of Documents relating to the Sarajevo Crisis) 
but I may tell you , 
ite privately that I passed an 
anxious forty hours at one moment. The Cabinet were 
not prepared to stand by France . and the argument 
was used that the quarrel originally an Austro-Serb 
one - then developing into a Russo-German-Austro-Serb 
one had only brought in France because she was bound by 
Treaty to come in - and we were free from obligation 
to any party, and as British interests were not for the 
present involved we should stay out and hold ourselves 
free to act as circumstances might demand. "1 
Iicolsou1s account is borne out by a letter of Herbert Sa®xe1, written 
to his vife as 2 Augaati in ubiah,, he deaaribed the "venta is the Cabinet 
meeting of that` morninis 
"I held we were not entitled to carry England into the 
war for the sake of our goddwill to France or for the 
sake of maintaining the strength of1France and Russia 
against that of Germany and Austria. This opinion 
was shared by the majority of the Cabinet. "a 
Neither is there anything in the despatohes of Grey or Cambon to 
indioato that it was the Anglo-French Entente that brought Britain into the 
World War. Indeeds quite the reverse, Grey told the. Frenoh Government 
that 
1 Ecolsoa to Harding., 5. ix"1914i (copy) Cs'iook Paper:,. 79Q. 800/375" 
2 Samuel' to his wire, 2. viii. 1914, Samztel Papers, Pile A/157. 
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Ith© present situation differed entirely from the 
Morocco incidents ....... Frence must take her 
decision at this moment without reckoning on an 
assistance that we are not now in a position to 
promise. "1 -' 
It would be giite wrong to believe that Foreign office civil 1jervaat6,2 
who believed Britain had an obligation to France, and Greys, who wanted the 
Cabinet to agree to go to war to defend Frances slowly gained the upper 
hand on this issue! It was Grey who gave war. Lloyd George informed 
the editor of the Manchester Guardians 
'Grey. had, under pressure, agreed that it Germany 
would roapect, Belgium neutrality he would not 
insist on supporting 1ranoe. (Perhaps, 4 said# 
he knew she wouldnt t) ""4 
Nicolson was furious with Grey for giving way# end in a stormy. 
interview told him; "You will render us a by-word among nations. 05 
The belief that Britain had a binding legal obligation to Belgium, 
vhioh obliged her to go to war# also emerged at the very moment when Britain 
entered the ropean conflict. on 6 August: Asquith told the Commonas 
Owe are fighting ..... to fulfil a solemn 
international obligation .... not only of law 
but of hönour. a6 
Here Aaquith was not being gaits open. The' importance of Belgium was 
strategic, and questions of law and of'honour had tot been a decisive 
influence in the Cabinet's decision to go to war" 
1 Grey to Bertiei tel. , 1. viii. 1914j B. DP XI, 426. 
2 Memoranda by_Crovef 31. Yii. 1914t B. D. XIS 369; $. äioolsou, -pp. 417-420. 
3 Harcourt to Lloyd Goorgö, ürdatid, c. 2"vi. 1i. 1914, Lloyd George PapersýC/13. 
1, Memorandum by C. P. Soott, 3M4. x. l914, Scott Papers, odd. 50901.. 
5 H. Nicolson, p. 419; the row is also deacribsd by Diioolson 2M in a 
letter to Hardinge, 5. ix. 1914 (copy), Carnook Papers, 7.0.800/375. 
6 Par, 11amentav Debates (Commons% Fifth Series, LXV i column 2079" 
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There were two legal interpretations of the Treaty of 1839, which 
had established the neutrality of Belgium. The controversy arose because 
the Treaty was a child of European Concert,, and was a collective agreement 
signed by all the Powers - Austria, Franoe.. Prussia# Russia and the United 
Kingdom. The question was whether the responsibility to see that the 
Treaty was upheld was a collective one, or whether it rested with each 
Power separately. It one Power refused to uphold the Treaty, were the 
others bound to do so? On this point there was no unanimous agreement. 
One school of thought hold that each of the signatory Popars had an 
individual responsibility. It was argued that. as the. only States that 
could-aeriöusly threaten the neutrality of Belgium were the Powers that 
had been parties to the '1839 Treaty, t6i Treaty would be meaningless if 
legal obligations were only cöllsotive. Thin interpretation was# 
however, the minority view. , 
In 187O# Lord Granville$ a legal advisers 
had assured him that obligation was collective. 
2 
When the question was 
considered in 1905# Sir Thomas Sand. raon, the then Permanent Under 
Secretary at the Jbreign office,, was in to doubt that responsibilities 
were collective end not indiiida. 
3 
The nature of the Treaty was again considered during the Sarajevo 
Crisis. On 27 July, the Cabinet agreed that at.. tts pa 'gaotipg i29tJu. y) 
Memorandum by Crowe# 15. xci. 1908, ß. D, IIi 311. 
2 Lew officers of the Crown to Lord Grenville, 6. viii. 1870, B. D. III, 311. 
3 Swiderson to G. S. Clark! 10. viii. 1905a cAB. 17/69. 
13(o 
the extant of Britain's obligations would be examinad. 
l 
In the 
intervening period the foreign Office oiroulated copies of the Treaty 
2 to the Cabinet* So when the Cabinet wet on 29 July-, it had had 
time and opportunity to ponder the matter. Asquith's Cabinet, containing 
as it did half a dosen liwyera, was singularly well-equipped to decide 
whether Britain had binding legal obligations. Asquith reported to 
King G. org. e 
'It is a doubtful point. hov tar'a single guaranteeing 
State is bound under the Treaty of 1839 to maintain 
Belgium neutrality if the remainder abstain or refuse. 
The Cabinet consider that the satter if it arises 
will be rather one of policy than of legal obligation. " 
After the outbreak of war it was convenient for Asquith to legitimize 
Britain's entry into the conflict as being an obligation snot only of 
law but of honour. * But olearly. hia own view had been that there was 
no legal obligation. 
The theory that Britain went to war beoause she was bound to do so 
because of her commitments to France and Belgium has to be rejected. It 
is necessary to look elsewbere for the reasons for the Cabinet's decision 
to take England into the oontliot in Europe. But before we pass on to 
the Cabinet' a motives for going to war in German{y, we must clear up certain 
misconceptions about the Cabinet crisis in the latter part of the Sarajevo 
crisis. 
It if well- own that 012 the eye of the war the Cabinet was deeply 
1 Asquith to King George Vs 2C. vii. 1914, GLB. 41/35, 
2 Copies of the Belgium Treaties, and minute by Montgomery, 28. vii. 1914, 
Lloyd George Papers# C/Box 25/Folder 7. 
3 Asquith to Kiug George Ys 30. vii. 1914, CAB. 4l/35" 
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divided and nearly &plit. The causes of this disagreement have not been 
well explained. _ 
Most historians' have spoken of "wer parties", "peace 
parties"# and uncommitted sections of the Cabinet. Jenkins has referred 
to "a potential tpeace partyl comprising no less than ten Ministers w of 
a total of tveuty4 These terms are Very misleading unless they are 
carefully cpialified. The "peaas party" of which Jenkins speaks was a 
peace party only insofar as they would not go to war to defend France from 
German aggression. ' However, on the morning of 2 August, that is before 
the rooting of this peace party which Jenkins desoribeep eight of the 
ten had agreed that a German Violation of the neutrality of Belgium, or 
a German naval attalak upon the iiortbern Coats of prance, could bring 
Britain into the war. 
2 In the circumstances the "potential peace party" 
could-just as well be described as , s, potential war party, indeed it would 
be a more accurate description. 
What then was the Cabinet crisis about? It wes above all a phenomenon 
of decision-making in crisis. Neither the pace nor the rigidity of 
military plans van precisely anticipated. Ministers considered many more 
1' Jenkins, pp. 363-364. Jenkins seams to, base his account on Morley, 
pp. 14-16. Morley was clearly mistaken about the purposes of this 
so-called peace party. I have drawn on Ssmuella letters to his 
wife, written daily, sometimes twice daily, during the crisis., 
These give a far more precise and vivid picture of the groupings 
in the Cabinet than does Morley's account. On a point of detail the 
"peace party" meetings 1.30 - 3.00 on 2 August, was a meeting of 
eight and not ten Ministers. Samuel also asserts that Morley could 
not follow what vac going on. 
2 Samuel to bis vita, 2. viU. 1914,5*" ]., Papers, File A/157. 
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aoatingb! 1 ies than in tact were possible. As late as 2 August, one 
minister was writings 
"I still hive hopes that GermvW will neither send her 
Fleet down the Channel nor invade Belgium, and that 
we will be able to keep England at peace while 
rendering prance the greatest, of services -,. the, protection 
of her northern coasts from the o®a and the protection of 
her 150 miles of frontier with Belgium. "1 
The unaertainttr over what precisely Germany would do led both sides in 
the Cabinet to try to force a definite decision. Grey wanted the 
Cabinet to agree to go to war it Germany attacked Trance; others demanded 
that as many options as possible ere kept open. The Cabinet disagreed 
over a hypothetical instances an eventuality that in retrospect seems 
absurd but at the time appeared real anoughs a German attack on France 
that did not coma through Belgium and was unaided by naval action in the 
Channel. There was never any doubt that a-direct German challenge to 
British security : could bring Britain into the war. 
The need to keep the Lou Countries out of the bends of a powerttitl 
Coatitiental advacrsary had long bam a tenet of British foreign polioy 
and strategic doctrine. The whale history of the Doutrality of Belgium 
centred around this issue. The arguments are well«knowAz a hostile 
Power which controlled Holland and Belgium would be in a position to mount 
2 
an attack on the British Islea" In the War offices the-Admiralty and 
the lbreign Office the doetrino was strex*ously upheld. In-1912, 
1 Samual to pia vita, 2"Viii"1914, Samu®1 Papers, Pile 1/157* 
2 Gausral starr tlemorazi m 31. viii. ]. 916, by Rabartson, CAB. 29/1/P-4. 
3 Fisher to Tyrrell, 13. i. 
1.915, Grey Papers, F. 0. Wo/107. 
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Sir Eyro Crowe had gots so far ao to suggest that if Belgium did not uphold 
her own nautrality, then Britain might find it necessary to declare war on 
her for not doing so# 
While the Cabinet considered that in legal terms responsibility 
under the 1639 Treaty wasa joint one, they vera, aot above using the 
Treaty as a pretext for entering the war. What was more, the Treaty 
of 1839, binding or not, was an arrangement between the Great Powers, it 
was not an obligation to protect Belgium from a bullying neighbour. It 
is important to note that when the Cabinet resolved to uphold the 
neutrality of Belgium, their object was not to protect Belgium but to 
protect British interests in Belgium' a neutrality. These two'objeota 
were not at all the same thing. It was only the braft-Idecfi)stzxnot 
Belgians to'resist German aggression that allowed the British'Goveromeat 
to present strategic necessities in the cloak of international lad and 
bonpur. 
It was on the morning of 2 August that the'Cabinet decided that a 
German violation of the neutrality of Belgium would constitute a aa-sun be11ia 
Now at this time it was not known whether Belgium would uphold her 
neutrality or not; indeed# hardly any communication had passed between London 
and Brussals. The Cabinht were prepared to invoke the Treaty of 1839 what. 
ever proved to be the attitude'of the Belgiäne: - On the evening of 
1 rareign Ottica Monorand , rebr' 47p 192^., by Crowe, C4B. 17/69. 
2 uaael to his wit., 2. viii"1914,5amn el Papers, file d/151l: 
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2 August, Cambon reporteds 
"The Belgian Government, informed by the British 
Minister at Brussells of the representation of the 
British Government to obtain from France and Germany 
a renewal of the guarantee of neutrality, replied: 
'That it thanked England, but that it was in a 
position to defend itself with its own forces. ' 
This curious reply arrived while I happened to be 
with Sir Edward Gray, we were given to think that 
there was perhaps some secret agreement between 
Germany and i3elgium. 
bir Edward Gray remarked that whatever the case the 
neutrality of that Power's territory is not only a 
Belgian interest, it was a British interest and 
Egglend must see it respected. " 
Thus the upholding of the neutrality of Belgium was simply a question of 
upholding British interests. 
The question of Britain&s obligation to protect the northern coasts 
of France was not raised in the early part of the Sarajevo crisis. It 
was brought up by Cambon2 and Nicolson on the aft,: )Aý: won of the 1 August, 
after Grey had told the French Ambassador that he could give no undertaking 
that Britain would go to war if France were attacked by Germany. Cambon 
and Nicolson, shocked and dismayed by the Cabinet's decision, sought to 
use the Fleet question as a means of persuading the Cabinet to reverse 
its decision. 
3 Grey agreed to raise the matter in the Cabinet on the 
following morning. 
4 
1 Cambon to Viviani, tel. 2. viii. l9l4! D. D. F. (Series 3) XI, 612. 
2 Gray to Gertie, tel., l. viii. 1914, B. D. XI, 426. 
Cambon to Viviani, tel., 1-viii-1914s D. D. F. (Series 3) XI, 532. 
3 Nicolson to Hardinge, 5. ix. 1914, (copy), Carnock Papers F. O. 800/375. 
4 B. D. XI, 424: Grey later said that the question of the protection of 
the northern Coasts of France had first been raised by one of the 
"peace party" in the Cabinet, but the above minute indicates that 
it was Grey who was pushing the matter at the crucial moment, Grey, 
vol. II, p. 2. , 
19-1 
Th3 Foreign Seorotuy had two forwi. dable argudentes it wau at the 
request of the British Admiralty that Irraue, had oouoeutrated her. Fleet 
iu the Waltara Medit©rraneau and Britain tiar&-in Home Wateraj it would 
have been. a grave risk to natioma?. t ecurity it u Carman Pleat were 
allowed to operate trashy in the Chu=el aM gain preddainanae there. 
These erguraento'carried weight tjlta the Cabinats it was agreed, with 
the s141e 6xo®ption of John Burns, that Britain could now allow Germany 
to control the Chswnl, and that if ehe attewpted ý to attack the northern 
coasts of Fraaoe then this would constitute a gaeu beelli. It soy well 
have been at this meeting - the moraing of the 2 August - that Lloyd 
George passed -a note to Maaterman: "What is your view of what we ought 
to do? O To i hick Macterman replied; "It I had to decide I, would guarantee 
Belgium and the Fleet policy. If Germagy agrees to that- no wars" 
This was the coneencue of opinion in the Cabinet. Herbert Samuel,, writing 
that eveaivg, eaxp]einods 
"I expressed my own conviction that ue should be justified 
in joining the war ... no for the protection o the northern 
coasts of France, which we could not afford "a' bombarded 
by the German Fleet or o; copied by the Geren army .. ".. 
Liu aanotioned°a statement by Grey to the FrenchlAmbassadorz 
this zfternoonp to bo folio 3d by a statement in Parliament 
tomorrow, that we . -ill. take action if the German Fleet 
comes doku the Qhavm to attak France. e3 
I Lloyd George to Mastezmaa,, 'ard Mast="m= to, Lloyd Georg®, urdatod, 
c. 2. Viii. 1914, Lloyd Georgro Papas, C/13., 
2 Grey to Bertie, tel. = 2*vW. 1914,9"D" Xl, 467; Cambou to Vi7iwai, 
tal., 2. v: i1.19I4, D. DJ. (3rd Sorias) XI, 612. 
3 smel to hia wife, 2. viii"1911+, gcmuel Pape: u, M4,057s 
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As it was Germany undertook not to attack the Channel coast of Franae, 
and it was the march through Belgium that brought about British entry into 
the var. 
The Cabinet decided what circumstances would determine British entry 
into the war before Germany bad attacked Belgium and before she was at 
war with Franoe. The prineiplea which conditioned the Cabinets decision 
were clears to maintain naval supremacy and safeguard the security of 
the British Isles. The distinction between the desire to maintain a 
general lbropean balance. of power and a desire to maintain a more limited 
one in the North-West of Europa was not a moral ones it was simply a 
difference of interpretation over British interests. But it had very 
interesting repercussions. 
Having made their decision to go to war, if Germany violated the 
neutrality of Belgium, or attacked the northern coasts of rranoe, the 
Gebinot then waited. This delay sU. owed: and almost by pure chance, 
the notion to fight, under the banner of international law and as the 
protector of ®'#Ustateo against strong and cruel neighbours. Asquith 
saw that the appeal of the ging of the Belgians for assistance had immense 
propaganda value. _, 
It was argued that, Britain was defending Belgium against 
German aggression, and a virtue was made of necessity. The consequence of 
this political and moral slight of hand were far-reaching. Bnglisbmen could 
fight with an easy conscience, * and the 6"orld could be told that British policy 
was moved by high moral principles. The Government were lucky in being able 
1 Communication from Germala Embassy, 3. viii. 1914, B. D. BIS 531. 
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to pass off a policy grounded on-the, logic of fenlDolitik as a selfless 
at in the service of international comity. 
3. L]ia se. LQrra n®. 
Britain did not enter the Great War as the ally of France and Ruaaia, 
and teahnioally she was free from commitment to them., She was not bound 
to make peace in concert with the Framoo-Russian illianoe. Such a state 
of affairs was obviously una-atistaotoryf in the lor4 ran it was bound 
to load to mutual suspicion and recrimination. At the beginning of 
Septembers 1914, Frame and Russia proposed that Britain should beoome 
2 
party to their allianca. 
l 
Crowe 3 and Wioo1®on were very muoh in favour 
of *M*IU to this request# for a the P®rrmanont Under $ aretery explained: 
suX1e$s us all 'ztumI together we ehall. aesu redly fall 
and ke could not give greater pleamu"e to Germ= y 
than to du, sliau to sign. a 
Gray ograwd; from the very beginning of the war he had tah it for 
granted thats 
"it we make gar in com;, on vo must obviously, make peace 
in comwon. a4 
The Cabinets vera leas' happy ubvut associating Hrit&. in with the Franco- 
Russian Alliances and Grey suggostod 'a more simple formula's Britain# 
Irranc3 and Rusäia should exehaW notes agreeing not to conclude a separate 
peace*6 This was effeotuatod on the'5 September 193.4",, 
1 Minute by Nicolson, 2.1x. 1914, '7.0.372173 j Buchanan to Grey, 
tel., 1. ir, 1914,7,0.371/2)73/45394.. 
2 Minnte by CrAwo, 2. ix"191 t ?. 0.371 2173/45394. 
3 Einute by Iticolson, 2. ßr.. 19)4,7.09377, /2173/46060« 
4 Minute by Nicolson, 27«viii. 1914, and Minute by Gray, undated c. 27. viii. 
1914,7.0,371/2Q08/64148. 
5 Asquith to King George Vp 2. ix. 19L4, CAB, 41/35. 
6 Grey to Buchanan, tel"# 3, ix, 1914, F"©. 371/2l73/4&6a" 
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The main difficulty in giving a pledge not to conclude a separate 
peace waa the fear that it would turn into an obligation to realise the 
war aims of 7ranoe and Russia* Nioolson felt that it would not$ 
"The assurance by no means fetters our liberty when terms 
of peace are being discussed - and in no wise binds us 
, 
to swallow all the terms which either of our allies 
wishes to, impose - in fact our voice would'be stronger in 
discussing terms of peace 3 LM engagement than 
without it. As in the latter case our allies might 
consider we had no right to any voice at all as regards 
their terms" 
In order to make the point quite c , ar aM to strengthen Britain's 
bargaining position, Nioalson advised . that any agreement should stipulate 
tbatz 
p*io one of the allies will endeavour to exact conditions 
of peace without the consent of each of the other Powers: *l 
This suggestion was taken up by Asquith and the Cabinets and the notes 
exchanged on the 5 September1 1914, carried a clause that the parties would 
not demand terms "vbiob had not been previously concurred by both the 
otbere. "2 
The agreement of 5 September, 1914, did protect Britain from the most 
extravagant of French and esian demands, but it also meant 
that 
compensation had to be found for tranoe and Russia 
for their sacrifices in 
the var. Asquith3 and Grey4 alvgs insisted that any German peace offer 
vould have to be addressed to Britain and her allies conjointly. 
This was 
1 Mitute by Nicolsoa, 24%. 1914, F. 0.371I2173/46060+ 
2 Asquith to Sing George Va 4. ix. 1914, CAB. 41/35. Minute by Asquith 
undated, o. 3"ix. 1914P F. 0.371/2173/46060. 
g Asquith's notes, written in pencil, on back of a Foreign Office 
telegrams undated, c. 23. ix. 1914, Grey Papers, F. 0. ß00/84. 
4 Grey to Spring-Rica, tel. = 23.! x. 1914, Grey Papers, 7.0.800/84; 
Grey to Buchanan, tel. # ll. i. 1915, repeated to Gertie, 7.0.800/75" 
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tantamount to saying that Britain was obliged to realise at least some 
of the war aims of France and Russia. Such a policy may have been harsh 
on German aad have constituted . en unwelcome extension of 
British 
commitments, but given the paranoid characteristics of nations at var, and 
their consequent fickleness1 it was both wise end necessary. When, in 
late December# 1914s there were rumour? thät Germany would be willing to 
evacuate Belgium* pay Compensation to her# and give securities against 
further attack# Asquith *»teds "This, of course, will not be good enough 
either for France and Russia, "2 French ambitions were therefore not 
without interest or signiticenoe for British war aims. 
The Paris Embassy regularly sent back reports as to the likely extent 
of France's post-war ambitiona, 
3and 
Grey made personal enquiries of 
Bertie about French war aims* While French claims fluctuated with the 
fortunes of war# it was evident the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine was 
the very miniaoum vhioh the Republic would or could accept. Britain vas 
therefore virtually bound to oontinna the war until Germany was prepared 
to disgorge her gains in the-War of 1870. 
such a rectification in Franco-German frontier was by no means 
unweloome to Grey. Before the wer the Foreign Secretary had strenuosuly 
opposed supporting lrarw" in aW reranahiate eaterprlse. 
5 The traumatic 
experieü e of August, 1914s cofvinaed him of the necessity of strengthening 
Western Europe e4aiast German aggression in the future, writing to thq 
1 Spring-Rice to Grey, tel., 24.7. ii. 1914i Grey Upera, F. 0. ß00 84. 
2 Asquith, Vol. II, p. 50-51. 
3 Letters from Bertie an4 Grahame, Grey Papers, F. o. 8a0/56(a) and 57. 
4 Memorandum by Bertie, 18. xii. 19 , Hertie Papers, F. 0.800/166. 
5 fljicolsons p. 3981 7.0.371/1987/4361. 
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millionaires philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, with whom he shared a 
common interest In wild Litep, good vorks and railway8, Grey explained: 
#What we wish is that those of us who 
survive this war should be able to live 
for the rest of our lives in the west of 
Europe free from the some menace. "I 
To hic less. philanthropic allies. he made it clear that by this he meant the 
strengthening of France's eastern frontiers 
vDiecussion of terms of- peace is acadepic.. till, (the) 
war has progresbed cufticiently to make Germany., 
contemplate the most obvious terms of peace such 2 
as the restitution of the Lost Provinces to France, " 
The British Government never considered any settlement would be possible 
which did not include the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine. Even at the 
time of the House-. Grey Memorandum in 7ebruary, 1916, it was understood 
that a peace through American mediation would have to include the transfer 
to Franoe of the European, territories be had Lost nearly half a century 
earlier. "I, don't think,, * wrote Grey,, A he (Hou6e). contemplated as possible 
3 
any peace which did not give Alsace-Lorraine to Trance. " 
To the more extravagant of, French claimss, such as. a buffer state 
in the Rhenish provinces -a sort, of latter day Burgundy- the British 
Government never gave. much thought. _ 
The danger uas always that France 
would not be strong enough to continue the wer,, not that she would be co 
Etrong that she would take too auch after the war was over. 
I Grey to Carnegie, 16. ix. 1914, (copy), Grey papers,, F. O. /600/106 
2 Grey to Buchanan, tel., 16. Xi. 1914, P. O. /371/2174/71776 
3 Grey to Mallet, 249ii. 1916, (copy) v Grey Papers, x'. 0. /800/109 
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In the dqo before the Battle of the Marne, there was some thought 
given to. vhat 8bould be done if the , Western Front collapsed-completelq, 
and Franse made peace 14th Germany. it is a great pity that there is 
very little. documentery evidence to throw a light on what was said. 
A letter from Ctarchill to Grey indicates that the question was discussed. 
Cbxrohill suggested that it France left the war England should carry on. 
Churchill saw the main danger lying in France handing over her Fleet to 
Germagy. While insisting that this was only a alight possibility, he 
pointed out that Germany old not have sufficient trained Bailors to man 
tbe.? rench, lleety and before they did have the British Fleet could go in 
and destroy it - Shades of Oran. Britain. would then evacuate the 
Mediterranean and 0 still have a fighting chanwe ... ' . concentratitg in 
Home Watexae"1 
Shea otter the Mara. Qrey was never optimistic about France's capacity 
to endure a long war, On December 16p 1914, Bertie found him in a 
typically despondent mood 
"Grey did, not seem sure of a complete victory, not 
from want of determination on our part, but on 
account ct trench weakness. Imbued evidently, with 
the views of Kitchener he thinks that the war may be 
a drawn atrugile«"2 
In retrospect it udjrbd seem a little incongruous that Grey insisted 
on defeating Germany3and sought to restore Alsace-Lorraine to'Francep and 
yet bye . feared 
Prance vould tot be strong enough to continue the war. 
What Gray had in mind was that the allies would bring Germany to a position 
wbere she would offer terms eoceptsb14 to the allies.. This did not 
C urc ll to Grey, 7.1x. 19 , Grey Papers, 7.0.800/-88., 
2 Memorandum by Bertie, 18. Z i. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. 0.800/166. 
3 Chapter II. 
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necessarily, mean a totalvictory# but rather a, defeat for Germany 
sufficiently severe that ahe would meet the minimum aims of the allies. 
Such en . admission of 
failure trIouldp he felt, be , sufficiently damaging 
to discredit the German military hierarchy and show the German people, 
the folly of their ways. 
4" B, e1tiui . 
The restoration and compensation of Belgium aas the most important 
of British war aims, and is the easiest to understand. The British 
Government vase absolutely committed to realise this end. 
Britain had gone to war in order to safeguard her own interests, 
but in making the German violation of the neutrality of Belgium a rya 
, and In extracting the last ounce of propaganda value out of 
Britain' a sole as the defender of international law and Germany's as an 
international billy, the nation became bound hand and toot to realise 
the evacuation and indemnity of Belgium. Promises were' made to the 
British public and to the Belgian Goverment. Grey assured the King of 
the Belgiaaa$. 
 We shall oontitae to help to the utwost, ot our power during the war., , 
The example of patriotism set by 
Belgium has moved us aUß and *ill never be forgotten. 
We shall strive to secure in (the) terms, of peace 
compensation for what Belgium has auffered: N3 
In all his official and unofficial statements of war aims Grey insisted, 
as he did is a private letter, written in Maröh, 1915, that: 
I dray to Villiers, tel., 21. viit, 1914, $. 0.3n/2161J41420. 
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"the irreducible minimum of British oondition$ is 
the, evacuation end restoration of Belgium, which 
meins at any rate pecuniary compensation to Belgium. "1 
OA no oocasioa, either in public or private, did any member of the 
Goverment hold out agy. hope of a peace in which the German armies did 
not evacuate Belgium, and the German people did not pay compensation to 
the Belgiens for the disturbance of their lives and the destruction of 
their property. In an. interview given to the Chiceaa Däi1y Zeus in 
the Summer of 1915, Grey did ey that if the only outstandiEg issue was 
the payment of an indemnity to Belgium, then he would be willing to 
oubait that point to arbitration 
2 As German liability was beyond doubt, 
this conoetsion was more to political tactics than to Germany. 
While Britain vas bound to tight on until Germany restored Belgium# 
she was not unwillingly bounds it was a vital British interest. What 
was more# as often happanet military action tended to increase the 
importance of the strategic needs tirhioh it seated. It produced a 
psychological and intelleatual commitment from which it was almost 
impossible to escape. 
There was, one problem which troubled the British Government from 
the beginning of the ears What vag to happen, if Germany could not be driven 
out of Western Europe?. It was always envisaged that it this happened, 
1 Grey to Rodd, 6. iii. 1914, Grey Papers, 7.0.800/65. 
2 Mamoraflcb m on. interview with Mr.. Swing of, the Chioago Daily hews, 
6. viii. 1915, by Grey, Grey Papers, F. 0. S00/95. 
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then G. rmagy would have to be bought out at the price of territorial 
concessions elsewhere. Several schemes were, suggested. These proposals 
tiers savor worked out in details partly. beoause the fortunes of war 
are so hazardous; partly because men will plan in detail for contingencies 
they welcome, and prefer only to give passing reflection to circumstances 
that, though-possible, they find abhorrent. In Augustj,. 19]J., it was 
suggested that, "we want as maßt' Merman Oolonies as we can get to use as 
pawns arban negotiating peace terms. *1' At the *ad of 1914,, Churchill 
pointed out that the deadlock on the Western Front obliged Britain to look 
for new theatres of war becsuse Germany would use the occupied areas of 
Irmas and Belgium as a Mpeaoe oountez'". 
2 in 1916, when Grey negotiated 
, with House about porsible American mediation, it was suggested that if 
the unwelcome situation arose where the allies would be obliged to appeal 
to America' a good ffie 5, then the price for German withdrawal from Belgium 
and the retrooeasion of Alsace-Lorraine would be concessions elsewhere, 
perhaps in Turkey or Africa. 
3 
This disagreeable, poasibility was considered 
by the Foreign Office Committee on war aims. Paget and Tyrrell noted that 
i! one at the allies left the war$ than the others might disaffect at an 
alarming rate. Should this happen Britain would probably be obliged 
to come to terms with Germany. In this oane, -German evacuation of 
Belgium mould have to be secured by Britain making. territorial concessions 
to Germ&Z17, possibly ceding ,a part of 
British East Atriaa. 
4 
1 Minute by Sperling, 10. Viii. l934,7.0.37711682/37617. 
2 Churchill to Asquith, 29. acii. 1914, Asquith Papers, M9.13. 
3 House, iol. II, p. 291. 
4 Foreign Office Memoralicb m, 7. Viii. 1916, by Paget "en Tyrrell, CA8.29/l/F-5" 
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5. ASK Aa Great, pave, 
While the British, Government sougbt': ta ensure that Western Europe 
was made secure against further German cggresaion, it did not desire to 
see Germany r3moved from the ranks of Great powere. In his famous, 1907 
Memoratuium, Eyre Crowe had anticipated the issues involvedi %a. ,t 
"So long as Fnglwod remains faithful to the general 
principle of the preservation of the balance of 
pouer, her interests could not bo served by Germany 
being redaoed to the rank da weak Pover, as this 
might easily lead to a 7ranco-Russian predominance, 
equally, if not mores formidable to the British 
Empire: "1 
The balance of power is a conftsing terms it is not that it means 
nothing, but that it has been used in suob a variety of senses that it 
has come to mean many things. Crowe had a peasimistio,, or if one prefers 
skeptical, view of states' international behaviour; he confessed: 
"I never expect foreign governments to cat consciously 
in &W way that is not in accordance with their 
national itt erests. "2 
For Crowe the balance of power was a, mechanistic device to ensure that 
the powerful did not grow too powerful; it ensured that the relationship 
between states or groups of states remained In equilibrium. It a balance 
of power were maintained then no single constellation of forces in Europe 
could threaten the security of the British Empire. 
Grey also had a balance at power doctrine, but Its nature was very 
different* In his memoirs Grey alleged that he never had anything to do 
1 Memorandum by Crowe, 1.2.1907, B. D. III, P-4179' 
2 Crowe to Paget, 14"x. 1916,, Paget Paperer add. 51256, 
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with the idea of the balance of powers 
"I have never, so far as I recollect, used the phrase 
the 'Balawe of' Pover'. I, have often deliberately 
avoided the use of it, and I have never consciously 
set it before oe as something to be pursued, attained 
and preserved. "1 
This was cateöorical enougbj, but it was not quite honest. Grey, writing, 
at a time Then the so-callfd "old diplomacy" was discrsditsd1 was eager 
to show himself in a flattering light. The vary phrase the balance of 
power smacked of pre-war o1nioism,, and of the policy of encircling Germany 
of which he bad, been accused. It is true that Grey disliked using 
diplomatic shortbaads be spoke of understandings rather than ententes, 
improved relations rather than 
(tenter. However beneath different 
words lay similar ideas and oonaepts. 
Zn 1907, Gray had observed: 
"The Germans do not realise that England has always 
drifted or deliberately gone into opposition to any 
Power which establishes hagaumony in turope. "2 
Again, in 1911, be told the Committee of Imperial Defence that there want 
")To appreciable danger of our being . involved in any 
considerable trouble in Europe, unless there is some 
Power, or group of Powers, in. Europe which has the 
ambition of achieving what I would call the 
Napoleonic policy. "3 
These sentiments clearly constitute some sort of balance of power doctrine. 
To uaderatan* Grey's ideas they have to be viewed as an outgrowth of 
his political philosophy. What vas his political philosophy? She 
1 Grey, vo1, Ij p. 5. 
2 Quoted in Monger, p. 300. 
3 ß. D. YID p"785. 
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radical i, itig of the. Liberal Party had always looked on the balance of 
power as a, sinister ideas nan evil tetisha of meni. ho had no interest 
in the betterment of mar ind, and wbo placed the narrow vanities of 
individual nc. tiona above the ncxti'old blewsings of international comity. 
It is not tboro that we are to find the basis of Grey's, Ideas. Ve must 
turn again to Lord Acton. Acton did . rat ozoe the ba1zir of power as 
being something k ked, he felt that it was a roblo political. ideal. 
Jriting on the k'ar of the Spanish Succession, he had ob. -crved; 
In one of his last conversations William (III) had saids,, 'we seek nothing bitt the security which comes from the 
balance of power. ' Our policy was not maintained throughout 
on that exalted levels" 1 
Why should Acton, a devout though eccentric Liberal, and a friend of 
Gladstone# have so praised that concept of a balance of power? The 
answer lies in Acton's concept of, power; aýconcept which Grey shared. 
Acton saw power. as a spiritual. force, it"was the lust for domination. 
"This law of the nodes world1 that power tends to 
o panel icdelinitelY OMd will transcend all barriers, 
abroad and at homes'.. until met by superior forces 
produces the rhythmic movement in history. "2 
From auch a concept other. ideas Sollovedi the dictatorial ctaty was 
by natura sZgressive becmiso-it was the embodiment of the craving for 
power of a few man. This desire for universal domination would inevitably, 
according to-Acton) spill over 'national frontiers. It could be contained 
in two ways: ideally by constitutional restraints atb mei but it 
dictatorships were established, then by a coalition of opposing forces on 
international level. The bale 'bf power was a rule` of law in a eooiety 
without laws 
1 Anton, p. 244. 
2 Aotoui p. 60. 
I 59 
Ia 7wgaty Fige, 
_Yenz 
Grey hinted that his attitude towards , 
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balance of power was Very similar to Acton' so He pointed out that in the 
eighteen-eighties and eighteen-nineties Britain had been, on more cordial 
terms with the Triple Alliance, the more powerful of the European power 
blocs. He reflected that this seemad to indicate that British policy was 
not devoted to the idea of a balance of power. He interpreted this 
curiosity thuss 
"there wae,, I. think, a beliof that the power of the 
Triple Alliance made for stability and therefore 
peace in Europe] that Franca and Eussia, though 
military the weaker, were restless Powers, Chile 
the Triple Alliance wag on the whole contented. 
The conclusion-1 would draw is that Great Britain 
has not in theory been adverse to the predominance 
of a strong group in Europa when it seemed to make 
for stability and peace. To support such a 
combination has generally been her first choices 
it is only when a dominant Power becomes aggressive 
and she feels her own interests threatened that she, 
by instinct of self-defence, if not by deliberate 
policy, gravitates to anything that can fairly be 
described as a Balance of Pouer. "l 
It was typical Grey (perhaps becau ae of 'a lack' of self-confidence) to 
indicate his-lins of reasoning in rather irdireot way, such as an 
intellectual digression. ' This is just what be did in this case. His 
statements when in office, two of whiah huv? been quoted, read almost the 
same as this section of his oemoira" 
ZJhat was dangerous about Germarq was not her physical size, or her 
army, or her navy, or even her economic strength,, it was her desire for a 
commanding position in Europe. This lust for domination was, Grey felt, 
the creed of the milita 7 oligarchy - The Prasoian Military Caste - 
who ruled Germany. Thus, providing German society was purged of these 
1 ßz"07, VOISIOp. 8. 
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pernicious elements, there was no need to destroy Germanys position as a 
Great Power. 
Most sections of the British Government agreed with Grey that there 
was no need to drastically curb Gorman power in Europe, providing that 
she sbendoned her aggressive tendencies. Indeed, in certain cases they 
were prepared to accept a stronger Germany if this meant a less aggressive 
one. The issues emerge quite clearly in memoranda on war aims drawn up 
towards the end of 1916, The case in point was whether ihOAP Austria 
proper was to be incorporated into the German Empire in the event of 
Austria-Hungary breaking up. For the Foreign Office, Paget and Tyrrell 
wrote: 
"It (Germaziy) will receive, it is true1 the Austrian 
population, but this accession will add to the 
importance and influence of non-Prussian states of 
the German Empire. Moreover it will mean a considerable 
increase in the Catholic elements in Germany, and 
everything tending to decrease Prussian power will 
naturally lead in the direction of a more permanent 
settlement in Europe, as it will diminish the 
aggressive tendencies of the Central European 
Empires through a weakening'of Prussia. "1 
Arthur Balfour, alieye one to play on subtleties that he hoped everyone 
elan had overlooked considered: 
"AppareDtlay such a change would create a great 
German speaking state more formidable than Germany 
before the war; and this might be$ in fact, what 
would happen. On the other hand, it must be 
remembered that this would probably modify the 
position of Prussia .... * the change might in its 
ultimate effect be a defeat for German militarism. 02 
L foreign Office Memorandum, 7. vii. 1916, by Paget and Tyrrell, CAB. 29/1/P-5" 
2 Memorandum by Balfour, 4. x. 1916# CAB. 29/1/P-7, 
IS6 
Balfour# 'hose great joy in life was to avoid stating anything approaching 
the obvious, must have been irritated with himself to find that the 
military mind of General Robertson could make the same points 
"it might be advantagepNs! Aus, ria proper were 
incorporated into that Empire (tho Gorman), more 
especially thereby 10 million South Germans would 
be brought in as a, coutterpoise to Prussia*" 
In the early part of the war British attitudes Auatria-Hungary had not 
yet come this Pari but the underlying principle that what needed to be 
curbed was not German power but her aggressive habits was already firmly 
establishsd. 
There vsra, Zw thormoram, very good reasons for maintalning Germany as 
a Great Power. It s3'=ad *ery likoly that the war would bring a vast 
expansion in Russian power, and it was felt that Germany was needed as a 
bulwark against Russia. Th3 Russophile Sir Arthur N icolson complained: 
"them are many people - some in responsible positions 
who thins that before ma r years have elapsed we shall 
have to join Germany for resisting the predominant 
power of Russia. "Z 
The centre of anti-Russian feeling was the Paris Embassy. Bertie3 
was almost as obsessively anti-Russian as Nicolson was pro-Russian. But 
M iooleoa's aside, about men "in responsible positions", was probably a 
reference to Tyrrell, who enjoyed'oordial relations with Bertie4 and who 
was in the habit of drawing Grey'a attention to anti-Russian reporta. 
5 
1 General Staff Memorandum, 31. viii. 1916, by Robertson, CAB. 29/]. /P-4. 
2 Nicolson to Buchanan 15. iii"1915, (copy), Carnock Papers, F. 0.800/377. 
3 Bertie to Greys, 25. vii. 1914 (copy), Bertie Papers, 7.0.800/177; Bertie 
to Grey, 14.11.1915# (copy), B ertic Papers, F. 0.800/177. 
4 See Chapter I and Chapter II. 
5 Grahame to Tyrrell, 23. ix. 1914, and minute by Tyrroll, undated, 
c. 25"ix. 1914, Grey Papers, F. 0.800/56A. See also Chapter V. 
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This, no doubt, infuriated Ziaolson. 
The Military was similarly disposed to maintain GermazW as a Great 
Power. Kitchener1 and Robertsonz emphasised the need for a strong Germany 
in order to maintain an equilibrium between the European Powers. Soldiers 
of that generation vere-inatiuenoed by social Darwinist ideas; they tended 
Pca. ý to look upon iar as a breathing space in whiob nations made themselves fit 
for the next round of international oombat. In a memorandum for the Cabinet, 
written in April, 1915, Kitohener lampooned an idea that a. permanent peace 
would follow the wer$ and vent onp in almost paranoid fashion, to examine 
every ooaoeiYable permmtatioa of international conspiracy that the British 
Empire was likely to tace. 
3 Given such a mentality it was only natural 
to want a strong Germany as a oounterpoise to Russia. 
Grey and Asquith were well aware of the arguments in favour of 
maintaining Germany an a strong Power# and as a check on the ascendency 
of Ruaaia. Suoh sentiments may well have influenced them in their desire 
to preserve Germany as a Great Pover. But they reasoned the problem quite 
differently. They saw ao need to impose harsh terms on Germany providing 
that militarism was overthrown and she became a democratic state. The 
Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister were by temperament and conviction 
men who believed in the Virtues of moderation " at least in public. lila. 
They were schooled in a nineteenth century tradition of compromise, and 
distrusted sudden and sweeping change. As politicians and Liberals at 
Future Relations of the Great Powers# 21. iv. 1915, by Kitchener, 
CAD . 127/34. 
2 General Staff Memorandum, 31, viii. 1916, by Robertsoa1 CAB. 29/1/P-4. 
3 Putube Relations of the Great Powers, 21. iv. 1915, by Kitchener, 
CAB. 127/34" 
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that, they believed that any policy, of crushing Germany would be immoral 
and difficult to enforce. It would have required a permanent occupation 
of Germany and a perpetuation of the abnormal conditions of war. A 
Carthaginian Peace was alien to the framework of their ideas. 
The notable euoept1on to the general feeling that Germany ought to be 
maintained an a strong European Power vas Sir Arthur Wicolsoa. The 
question ot, äiooleon&s war, aims has already been considered in Harold 
Iiicolaonte biography. 
' 
This author is loath to controvert aoy part of 
a study which is$ even flow, the beet record of British. foreign policy in 
the period immediately before the First World War#, and is an object 
lesson to all writere, of memoirs pn how a well-plaoed, intelligent and 
sensitive contemporary can be of infinite value to the historian. However, 
the evidence is overwhelming-that Harold l ioolson, no doubt moved by the 
very highest, motives of filial affection and loyalty, made his lather's 
war aims appear considerably more moderate than they were. 
)iiooleon' a thought was profoundly in luenced by social Darvini®t 
ideas* His soon unto of hims 
"He adopted ******, the mental habits of his generation, 
- and among other'tallaoies,, he imagined that 
virility was among the highest aims of human endeavour. "-2 
1 H. Nioolaon, pp. 432-433: Harold äieolac= draws his avidenae from 
the second part oY the war when nilitary victory no longer seemed 
possible. 
Z B. 1 ioolaonp p. x. 
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His correspondence is filled with phrases about nations "fighting for their 
lives"$ and "struggling for their existence as Great Powers". Whatever 
were the immediate reasons for the ware Nicolson felt that it had primordial 
causes; it was the inevitable day of reckoning when states fought for 
supremacy and surlival. Nicolson took his social Darwinist ideas to their 
natural conclusions Britain and Germany were two great Aational organisms 
locked in a death struggle in which one would surely perish. When Germany 
was defeated she would have to pay the fall price for her misbehaviour. 
Shortly after the outbreak of war'he explained his views to the Bulgarian 
Minister in London, and reported what he had said to Greys 
NJ told him .. "e we all intended, to prosecute, the 
war till wo 'had rendered Germany harmless for at 
least two generations - there can be no possible 
doubt that this war must and In the defeat of 
Germany though she might score, some limited success 
here or there. After this terrible war we should 
all require peace and tranquillity and the only way 
of ensuring these blessings was to defeat completely 
the disturber of the peace - Germany would lose all 
her colonies# her fleet and be reduced to a state 
of impoverishment, - but it was she who had raised 
the wind and she must bear the consequences - (I thought 
it just as well to beat the big drum a little though 
personally I firmly believe in all I said). x 
The Permanent Under Secretary saw no reason to maintain Germany as A 
counterpoise to Russia# and was quite willing to allow France and Russia 
to destroy her$ 
1 Minute by licolson, 24. Viii. 1914.7.03.371/1900/42998. 
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"Though there is every likelihood that, Russia 
will emerge from this war immensly, stronger 
than she vas before, she will not. be the same 
great menace like German militarism., The 
Russir. n character end the German characters 
Russian policy and German policy and aims are 
very different matters. It depresses me to 
hear as I have heard from soma circles, which 
should be botter, inforwod, that in some years 
we shall be fighting Russia to, preserve the 
balance of power. You (Buchanan) know as well 
as I do, the, baselessness of buch apprehensions. 01 
Nicol-Son wanted the post-War world to, be run by an Anglo-French-Russian 
2 
alliance; th© three Powerß. would cattle all questions between themselves. 
Such ideas found littlo Lavaur with either Nicolson'v colleagues or with Grey. 
6. Tä 3rman F2eet"i 
It can be observed that British war aims were not entirely consistent, 
on the general question of Germany s position in Europe, Grey was prepared to 
believe that the discrediting. of militarism would be an adequate guarantee 
against German misbehaviour in the future. 14 ere British interests were 
directly engaged solid physical chocks to_German aggression were demanded. 
This paradox was, in part the consequence of a, desire, to be doubly sure 
whore Britain's own national interests_were, at otake; in part it was the 
ra ult of the fact that Greg did not know how complete victory would be, 
and to what extent Germany would, be willing to take a responsible position 
in the society of nations. In no case was, this paradoxical reasoning more 
obvious and blatant than over the question of German, naval power. Britain 
was prepared to loaye Germany a strong power on land, and even to contend 
that it was to the general good that this should be so, but on no account was 
1 Nicolson to Buchanan 8.1.1915, (copy), Cär. ndck Papers, ?. 0. /800/377 
2 Nieolson correspondence with Buchauan, CG', hock Papers r o, /L30o/375-381 
c she prepared to leave Ge ny as a great sea Power. It 
would appear that this aim emerged quite spontaneously as 
soon as the war broke out. 
1 
When the Liberal Cabinet and their advisers looked back on 
the events leading up to war, they felt that the German milit- 
ary party had for many years planned to'impose their hegemony 
on Europe and to overthrow Britain's world Empire. The 
construction of Germany's battlefleet, under the inspiration 
of the arch-Prussian Tirpitz, 
2 
was seen as the centre-piece 
of Germany's challenge to British security. It had in- 
volved Britain in an expensive naval race, and had taxed the 
nerves of the Government and the nation. Introducing his 
first . WWar Budget, Lloyd George proclaimed: 
', 
"I should regard the War as having failed 
in one of its, chief purposes unless it led 
to an all-round reduction in the inflated 
cost of armaments. "3 
The Admiralty and the Foreign Office were determined that 
Britain should not be troubled by German naval power after 
the war, and insisted that the only permanent and satisfactory 
solutidn for the problem of German sea power and the cost of 
armaments was the destruction of the German Fleet. 
Foreign Office memorandum, written early in 19179 put the point 
with aýcrude"but disarming simplicity: 
"The fact is we- cannot allow other nations. to 
share our supremacy at sea: our geographical 
position alone obliges us to claim this 
monopoly. "4 
I. Minute by Churchill, 22. viii. I9I4, P-0-371/2I 
. 7342I4I 
2. For the Cabinet's view of Tirpitz's part in the events 
July, 1914, Memorandum by C. P. Scott, 3. viii. 1914, Scott 
Papers, add. 5090I-quoted in Chapter II. 
3. I7. ix. I914, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Fifth 
series, LXVIII, column 355. 
4. Foreign Office Memorandum, 2I. 1.1917, by Mallet, 
Tyrrell and Clerk, CAB. I6/36/TC/27. 
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The First Lord of the Admiralty told the War Council that the destruction 
of the German nest and the removal of the Kiel Canal from German control 
were the "great objects of British policy". C zrohillwas warmly 
seconded by Fisher#2 who added in characteristic style, that "if after the 
war Germany should build a new Fleet, we ought to go in and smash it., ' 
iiaakey, the Searetaxy to the C. I"D, # and himself an officer in the Marines, 
was of the opinion that Britaint 
"could not accept any'scheme (of collective security) 
which did not give us a very great preponderance of 
naval. force, and unless Germany is completely beaten 
to her knees, she would not agree to any scheme 
consistent with our national security. "3 
The precise manner in which the reduction of German sea power was to be 
effectuated was not-decided. in the early stages, of the war, when a 
great naval Armageddon was still anticipated,, it would doubtless have been 
premature to have prepared aW definite scheme. 
quite a lot of thought was given to what was to be done with a 
perms out fixture of German naval powert the Kiel Canal. The Canals 
aomeating the Worth Sea with the Aaltio, allowed German to move her Fleet 
from one to the other. One aahool of thought favoured a neutralisation 
of the Canals aooompenied by a trancter of Sohleswig-Holstein to Denmark. 
This Boheme was proposed by both Churchi]14 and Balfour when 
they were First Lord of the Admiralty. Balfour5 suggested 
1 War Council Minutes 10.111*1915, C18.22/i. 
2 War Council Mioutea, 10. iä. 1915, CAB. 22/1: 
3- Committee of Imperial Defence Memorandum on Freedom of the Lees1 
7. Yi"1915, by Homey, Grey Papers, F. 0.600/95. 
4 Wer Council Minutes, ]0. iii. 1915, C, AB. 22/l. 
5 Memorandum by Balfourp 4. %. 1916, CAB. 29/1, /Pm7. 
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that Denmark should be made aeaure against a German revanche by a guarantee 
of her sovereignty. Realising that mazy of hie Cabinet colleagues were 
abysmally ignorant of European geography, he saw fit to explains 
"I ought, paranthatioally to add that unfortunately 
the region through which the Kiel Canal passes is 
German in bothilanguage and sentiment. " 
The Foreign Office Committee on war'eime thought up a much more ingenious 
scheme. Ralph Paget, who sat on the committees wrote: 
"I suggest it being blown up instead of 'filled in'. 
It would be quicker and cheaper and Just as effeotive... - 
the Kiel Canal and Schleswig-Holstein were considered 
(by the Committee). We, were at first or the opinion 
that possibly the Canal might be made into a commercial 
waterway with a neutral zone on either side of it 
guaranteed by all the Powers. But we shortly determined 
that this would be inexpedient and would probably lead 
to trouble of some kind, it would be difficult to 
, guarantee against attack and would never pay commercially. 
We therefore came to the conclusion that it should be 
blown up* u 
The Committee suggested destroying the Kiel Canal rather than transferring 
Schleswig Holstein to Demakk because:. 
We worked all t"' ih, as far as possible# on the 
principle of nationalities. We recommend Schleswig 
should be given to Denmark while Holstein remained 
'German. I do bot think the Danes themselves could 
care for the former in as much as their one sentiment 
seems to be blue tint. ' öf the Germans. "1 
it is aad that the naval experts at the Admiralty have left us tja statistics 
as to the relative merits of rF filling iii and I t1owing up,, the 
1 Paget to Findley# 2. x, 1916, {(copy), Paget Papers, iºdd: 51256. 
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Kiel Cansl9 and went no further than suggesting that it should be 
"internationalised" or *closed*. 
' 
Unfortunately, Grey and Asquith do Dot gleam to have set down their 
views on the German navy and the Kiel Canal. There ia, however, strong 
circumstantial evidence to indicate that they went along with the views of 
the experts at the Foreign Office amid the Admiralty. Both men stood"'on 
the imperialist wing of the Liberal Party and attached great importance 
to British naval. enpremaoy. - In a review of foreign policy, Grey had once 
explained, the maintmume of Sea Power .... is the underlying motive of 
our policy in Europesll2 The Foreign Secretary-3 and the Prime Minister4 
were in the habit of taking the advice of the Service Departments without 
question. In this case, the consensus of professioinal opinion was so 
orerti., ho1®ing that it is very hard to believe that they did not go along 
with it. 
%" GOAQluflion. 
Britain was a satisfied Power; she desired to be left alone to, enjoy 
the benefits of her vast Empire; her overseas trade and investments, and the 
accumulated wealth of, decades of'prosperity. She ! ought, above ally for 
e®ourity. It was to ensure the safety of the British Isles that the 
decision had been made to go to wer* In the terms of peace the Govermsut 
sought to institutionalise this desire for security into the post-wer 
settlement. The evacuation of Belgium, the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine 
and the redaction of German' naval power were to safeguard Britain . and, 
western Europe from a German attack in the future., 
1 Admiralty Memorarnt 12. x. 19]. 61 by Jackson, CA8. a9 -3. 
2 B"Dt Up p. 784" ý 
3 Percy, Viscount of Newcastle, More Memo App (1958)# p943. 
4 See Jenkins biography for Asquith's style of conducting business. 
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In the early part of war, it was hoped to return to the halcyon days of 
the nineteenth century: the war was to be used to modify those aspects of 
the pre-war world that had been a source of danger and anxiety. Just as 
the destructiAn of Prussian militarism was an attempt to redress the evils 
revealed in the Sarajevo crisis, so war aims in regard to western Europe 
were to redress the ills of August, 1914, and to re-establish unrivalled 
naval supremacy. 
It would be idle to blame the British Government for pursuing narrow 
national interests. It is true that the events of July and August, 1914, 
demonstrated that the-excessive emphasis on national advancement could be 
a calamity for civilisation. On the other hand, it must be remembered 
that men looked back on a century of nearly unbroken peace] an era in 
which the Ezropean Powers had co-existed with remarkable efficiency. 
In that century the vast mass of mankind had benefited, albeit sometimes 
slowly and unevenly, by association with the nation state. The loyalty end 
affection withwvhich an enormous majority of men served their states in 
the war of 1914-1918 is in itself, a vindication of the pursuit of national 
interests by their leaders.. But the way in which those interests were 
interpreted' is open to question. 
If there was one thing that the war should have made obvious it was that 
the question of security bad ceased to be solely a matter of prudent military 
and strategic, preparations. It could only be attained by promoting harmony 
in international society. The advances in technology and the decline in 
Britain! a relative power were irreversible trends=and the Government should have 
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been far-sighted enough to see'that the sort of security they sought was no 
longer possible. 
Britain's destiny had become intimately bound up with the future 
stability of Europe, ai yet British statesmen and their advisers sought 
only to drive Germany out of Britain' backyard sind to trust that European 
problems would work themselves out. Thi: > was not only selfish, ' itwas, also 
silly and unimaginative. In 0-antral and Eastern Europe, where Britain had 
few interests directly engaged, statesmen ware unconcerned about ' the' precise 
terms of the settlements and polioy evolved as the child ot'expedienoy. ' 
It is to this area that we must now turn. 
1LI- 
CHAPTER IV 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE 
I. Introduction 
British policy towards Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans has already been the subject of some study. The 
most significant of these works is Dr. Hanak's admirable 
monograph, Great Britain and Austria-Hunsrary during the 
First World War., Hanak's volume is largely concerned with 
the development of public opinion, and does not dwell on 
official policy. This chapter in no way tries to contro- 
vert Dr.. Hanak's conclusions, rather it examines a different 
aspect of the same problem. Other studies have tried to 
demonstrate that British policy was directed towards the 
maintenance of the balance of power. W. W. Gottlieb, 
2 in 
his scholarly , examination of secret diplomacy during the 
First World War, went so far as to suggest: 
"If the Dual Monarchy did not exist, it 
would (to adapt a famous saying) have had 
to be invented by Whitehall as a counter- 
poise to Germany and Russia. " 
The archives do not indicate that this judgement is valid, 
and-it*is more than doubtful if Grey ever pursued this type 
of balance of power policy. 
3 
British policy towards the settlement in Eastern 
and Central Europe 
I. b'anak, Ii., Britain and Austria-}Iun ar durin the First 
World War, (1962) 
2. . Go 
tlieb, p. 20I: in the same vein, see Smith, C. J. 
Great Britain and the 1914-I9I5 Straits Agreement with Russia: 
e rod mises of fdovember 114, A. Hell. CXXX. No., . 
see Chapter Me 
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developed on an ad hoc basis. As Britain had few interests directly 
engaged in that region, policy was flexible. Indeed, the whole future of 
the Habsburg Empire was used as a pawn to serve Britain's immediate needs. 
The principle of British policy was that there was no principle or grand 
design. 
Up to the beginning of December, 1914, the British Government were 
prepared to believe that the war could be brought, to a decisive conclusion. 
They were willing therefore to make concessions to allies and possible 
allies in order,, to bring about an early victory. By November, 1914, the 
larger part of the Habsburg dominions had been earmarked for distribution 
in the settlemeit. After December', 1914, Grey became increasingly doubtful 
as to whether the war could be won, and looked for a negotiated äce 
with Austria -'Hungary. 
2. Attitudes Towards Austria - Hungary. 
It, would be quite wrong to try to establish attitudes towards Austria- 
Hungary upon the basis of those who favoured preserving the Habsburg Empire 
and those who favoured national self-determination. The dominating 
sentiment was neither sympathy for the Habsburg Empire nor sympathy for 
those who sought to overthrow it, it was support for British Interests. 
Nearly all those who had any influence on the development of policy were 
prepared to retain or destroy Austria, depending on whether either course 
seemed to @-Britain's immediate interests. It is only within this 
framework that it is useful to notice of shades of opinion. 
Frow the very beginning of the war there was within the foreign Office 
Ibq 
a large body of opinion that would have liked to have seen the map of 
Europe re-organized' according to nationality., The most significant 
members of this group were Sir.. Arthur Nicolsonl,, George Russell Clerkq 
2 
Max mü11er3 and Lord Eustsce Percya.. They were less certain as to what 
constituted, nationality. Clerk, wrotes 
"language is not always a safe guide to nationality; 
Cavour was an Italian, if ever there was one, yet he 
wrote his speeches in French andhhad to have them 
translated into Italian before'he delivered them, "5 
They only dimly perceived that the re-distribution of territory on 
national lines would in itself raise difficulties, and for the most part 
remained confident that respect for the nationality, principle - whatever 
particular construction was put on that term - would make for international 
stability and peace. 
While these men had contact with Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Stegd, 6 
they never saw the nationality principle as a cardinal tenet of British, 
foreign policy.. Clerk put the matter with a nice precisions 
1 A. Nicolson to Buchanan, 8.1.1915, (copy), Carnock Papers, F. O. /800/377 Seton-Watson to Arthur Miller 12. vi. 1915 
a Miller* 
, published in J. M. H. X70C, 1. 
2 Minute by Clerk, 7. x1.1914, F. O. /371/1900/67456j Minute by Clerk, 17. i. 1915, F. O. /371/2505/6149; Minutes by Clarkin F. O. /371/2507. 
3 Memorandum by Muller, '18. i. 1915, Grey Papers, F. O6/800/95. 
4 Memorandum by Percy, 2. v. 1915, Grey Papers, F. O. /800/95. 
5 Minutes by Clerk, *, F. O. /371/2507/r. 
6 Chapter 1. 
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The answer, if one ever has to be given, is that we 
cannot strain the principle, of nationalities to the 
point of riskigg success in the war. "1 
In the Cabinet Churchill was alone in favouring the destruction of 
Austria-Hungary as a point of policy. The First Lord of the Admiralty 
was the only member of the Cabinet who blamed Austria as much as Germany 
for the war. 
2 He. desired to bring the Balkan States and Italy into the 
war, and to serve this end was prepared to put the ottoman and Habsburg 
Empires up for auction. In sending the Buxtons to the Balkans, he 
instructed them to spread the word that, "Austria will be resolved into 
In September, 1914, he gave an interview to an her component_parts: 
3 
Italian newspaper, and expressed the view thats 
"We desire that this war should re-arrange the map of 
Europe according to the principle of nationality, 
according to the true wishes of the peoples that live 
in the territories that have been so long disputed. "4 
Churchill believed in his own propaganda. Like most men who feel 
that they have their finger on the, pulse of history, he was intent-on 
hurrying. it along. . 
The fall of multinational states was at once inevitable 
and consistent with British interests. .. 
In January, 1915, he*wrote to 
Kitcheners 
1 Minute by Clerk, 31. iii. 1915, F. O. /371/2376/37639. 
2 Minute by Churchill, 5. vili. 1914, F. O. /371/2167/36211. 
3 Churchill, vol. I, pp. 486-7, Chapter I. 
4 Giornol" d'Italia, 22. ix. 1914. 
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"Also I think the case for settling generally on 
ethnographical principles is a strong one and a 
hard rule for Austria and Germany. "l 
The Foreign Secretary refused to deduce his policy from eny such 
rigid principles. Temperamentally Grey had something of the "old fashioned 
Whig'about him, he distrusted abstract principles and put his faith in 
goodwill, common sense and pragmatism. He was neither for nor against 
the principle of nationality. He was capable of saying "we have no animus 
against Austria", 2 and, equally, that he would not attempt to save her. 
3 
He saw stability and security in terms of norms of behaviour and respect 
for law and conventional morality. Grey, having-never himself succeeded 
in sublimating his own introversion, found it difficult to understand that 
other men could be deeply moved by sentiments like nationalism. He at 
that Britain had few interests directly engaged in that area, and no 
military power to determine its destiny. His reluctance to commit Britain 
to any firm policy was further increased by his own ignorance about the 
political and national issues of Austria-Hungary. He was singularly ill- 
equipped with detailed knowledge and was acutely aware of the fact. One 
of the most revealing records of Grey's attitude towards the settlement in 
Eastern and Central Europe is a minute he wrote during the Italian 
negotiations of March, 19151 
"I should like to look at, the map of the Adriatic Coast...... 
Mr. Clerk can explain to me on the map. "4 
1 Churchill to Kitchener, 21.1.1915, Robertson Papers, 1/13/3. 
2 Memorandum by Bertie, 18. xii. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. O. /800/166. 
3 Imperials to Di Senguilieno, 16. ix. 1914, D. D. I. (5th Series) It 700. 
4 Minute by Grey, undated, a. 17. iii. 1915, F. O. /371/2507/31554. 
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When it is remembered that Grey had been concerned with foreign affairs 
for nearly a quarter of a century, that for ten of those years he had 
been Foreign Secretary, and during the London Conferences of Ambassadors 
he had been intimately concerned with the distribution of territory in 
the Balkans, it can be taken that lack of knowledge was really absence 
of enthusiasm and interest. After seeing Grey, Seton-Watson came away 
with an impression of having spoken to- 
"an entirely. Well-meaning man, who has been well grounded 
by some teacher in a subject in, which he is not really at 
home: (The South Slav questions 1" 
Grey's attitudes were typical, of those of his colleagues in the 
Cabinet. ' When Asquith declareds 
"we are fighting to: vindicate the principle' that. 
small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance 
of interra'tional good faith, byýthe arbitrary will of 
a strong and overmastering Powert"2 
he was thinking of 'states, In, a legal sense and not nations, in a spiritual 
one. 
3. The Background'to British' policy towards Austria-Hungary. 
The break-up-of. -Austria-Hungary had long been anticipated. In a 
world in which nationality had appeared as the key, to statehood, the Dual 
Monarchy stood as an anachronism. The triumph of-the Balkan States in 
their struggle with Turkey in the Balkan Wars seemed an ominous dress- 
rehearsal for the fate 0 ff the Habsburg Empire, and it was universally felt 
1 Memorandum by R. W. Seton-Watson, 4. V. 1915s s typescript was kindly 
shown to me by Professor H. Seton-Watson. 
2 6. viii. 1914, Parliamentary Debates, Commons Fifth Series, LXV, 
column 2079. 
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that the days of that Empire were numbered. 
After the, Balkan Wars there was an almost continuous buzz of 
speculation about the future of the Dual Nbnarchy. Shortly before the 
murders at Sare\jevo, Sir Arthur Nicolson wrotes 
"before long the disintegrating forces in the Dual 
Monarchy may become seriously operative.......... 
Austria may not, exist for any appreciable length 
of time as a coherent country. "i 
The Foreign Secretary had come to ,a not 
dissimilar conclusion,. Austria 
was "a star that may dissolvo, "2 
From 1912 onwards, the relations between Austria and the Balkan 
States were highly unstable. In itself this was of no moment to British 
interests, but it brought with. it'two dangersi an attempt by Austria, or 
the Balkan States backed by Russia, to, assert their international position 
could spark. off a general European conflagration; Germany and Russia 
might come together and-zsake, a huge deal over the future of Austria-Hungary 
and. the Balkans@3 It was. feared that such a Russo-German rapprochement 
could only react unfavourably on Britain's international position. 
4 
Grey approached, the-problem pragmatically. He saw no Immediate 
danger of a Russo-Germsn agreement,. and had,, no desire to involve Britain in 
disputes in which she had no'interests directly engaged. He hoped that by 
1 Nicolson to Hardings, ll. vi,, 1914,: (copy), Carnock Papers, F. O. /800/374. 
2 Minute by Grey, undated,, c. l. xii. 1913, B. D. X(i), 316. 
3 Minute by Clerk, 6. iv. 1914, 'F. 0; /371/2092/15087. 
4 Nicolson correspondence With Buchanan, Carnock Papers, F. O. /800/374-375. 
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working with Germany he would be, able to keep any difficulty within 
reasonable limits. This policy had bean successful during the Balkan 
Wars and, as we have seen, it was the basis of Grey's policy during the 
Sarajevo crisis. 
' 
In July, 1914, Grey centred his policy on Berlin, and. left it to 
Germany to restrain her ally. Professor Temperley, who later interviewed 
Grey, recorded: 
"His policy was, to try to get, Germany to put pressure. on, 
Austria. He had been criticised'for not approaching 
Austria -, direct. But he thought that if Germany - an 
ally - could not put pressure on Austria - he would be 
. unable toi" 2, 
As Grey assured the Germans that he would follow the same policy as he 
had done during the Balkan Warsi they would quite rightly have been 
3 
indignant had he then gone behind their backs to Vienna. The more so 
since Britain had no interests directly engaged in the Austro-Serb 
dispute. 
Grey refused to involve Britain in the original dispute between 
4 
and absolutely declined to consider going to wax so Austria and Serbia* 
long as the conflict was solely one between Austria, on the one hand, and 
Serbia and Russia, on the other. 
5 
1 Chapter 2. 
2 Professor H. Temperley's record of an interview with Grey, Spender 
Papers, add. 56386. 
3 Gray to Rumbold, 9. vit. 1914, B. D. XI, 41. 
4 Grey to De Bunsen, tel. 24. vii. 1914, B. D. XI, 91. 
5 Chu chill tBuGrehon 2? vlt , 
g914 ýýfX pjýr Ftp2800/ß8 
rey to cha ,e0 . vii. ,, 
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Once Britain was at war with Germany, a declaration of war against 
Austria-Hungary was inevitable. The Western Democracies could not fight 
against Germany and with Russia, and not against Austria. As soon as the 
Adriatic had been made secure, and the French armies shipped safely from 
North Africa, Britain and France declared war on the Habsburg Empire. 
I 
4. Poland* 
On 16th August, 1914, it was declared by proclamation of the Russian 
Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, that after the war there would 
be an autonomous Poland. It was to comprise of the Kingdom of Pd and 
(the Napoleonic construction), the western and Polish districts of Galicia 
and a large part of the area around Posen (Poznan). There was to be full 
freedom of language and religion and the country was to be ruled by a 
Lieutenant of the Czar. 
2 
Somewhat naturally, some sections of opinion in England were suspicious 
of Russia's-real Intentions. Lord Cromer feared a great increase in 
Russian power, and pointed to the, fact that it would "enormously weaken 
3 
the power of Germany on that side. " Even the author of Eminent 
Victorians, (always one for spotting hidden motives), managed to drag his 
mind from loftier thoughts` to reflect unfavourably upon the expansion of 
Tsarist sutocracy. 
4 
No such apprehensions existed in the Foreign Office. Sir gyre Crowe, 
the high priest of Ireklpolitik and the balance of power, breeted the 
proclamation with enthusiasms 
1 B. O /371/2167/36211; F. O. /371/2167/37761; F, O, /371/2167/37762. 
2 Buchanan to Grey, te1.14. viii. 1914, F. O. /371/2095/39209. 
3 Cromer to Lady Alice Shaw Stewart, 20. viii. 1914, (copy), Cromer Papers, 
F, 0. /63, /23. 
4 Holroyd. Vol-! I, F. 119. ' " 
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"I consider the Russian proclamation a, statesmanlike 
move in the right direction. "1 
This reaction was hardly surprising. - The German armies, as German armies 
will dog was pouring through Belgium and Northern France; the Russian army 
was urgently needed to engage Germany in the east. At a moment when there 
were rumours that Russia was holding back troops for a war against Turkey 
2 
the proclamation was taken as a healthy indication of Russian`tntentions. 
The war was entering, a critical phase, and, at such times promises are at a 
discount. Anything that Russia did to win friends to the side of"the 
Entente would serve British ends. It was hoped that the proclamation 
would win over the Poles. 
Russian autocracy was always an embarrassment to Britain, and her 
promises of a liberal settlement, suspect as they were, made her aims more 
consonant with the avowed purposes of the Western Democracies. Since an 
autonomous Poland could only. be established'by Rusgian force of arms, and 
if Russia were victorious any settlement could be imposed by her, the 
Russian plan was seen as a hopeful sign'of a liberalising of Russian policy. 
Grey approved of the Russian proclamation, and let it be known that: 
"His Abjesty's Government are in thorough sympathy with 
the Russian Manifesto and it was welcomed cordially by 
public opinion here. "3 
Here matters stopped. There was no question of underwriting any Russian 
promises. Britain had no interests directly engaged, and the, was no 
1 Minute by Crowe, 15. viii. 1914, F. O. /371/2095/39209. 
2 Grey to Buchanan; tel. ', 13. viii. 1914, F. O. /371/2171/38794. 
3 Minute, by Grey, undated, c. l: lx. 1914, and Clerk to Retinger, 4.1x. 1914, (copy), F. O. /371/2095/46074, Minute by Tyrrell, undated, c. S. ix. 191` F. O. /371/2095/47287. 
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wish to incur binding obligations in Eastern Europe. Clerk advisedt 
"We cannot guarantee Russian promises. "I Nicolson saw it might be 
insulting to Russia if Britain intervened, and suggested; "Let each settle 
his own affairs. "` 
Britain tacitly agreed to Russian proposals without making any promise 
to realize them. 
5. Roumania. 
In early August, 1914, Russia began negotiations with a view to 
bringing Roumania into the war on the side of the Triple Entente. 3 
Benckendorff urged Grey to ease Russia's task by guaranteeing Roumanian 
integrity after the war. The Foreign Secretary refused to be drawn, and 
told the Russian Ambassador of the? 
"impossibility of our undertaking to go to war in future 
years on behalf of the integrity of Roumania. "4 
The limit of British involvement would'be a diplomatic support at Bucharest, 
Satanow pressed on with his Roumanian negotiations# and in early 
October, 1914, a Russo-Roumanian tagreenient was concluded whereby in return 
for a Roumanian undertaking that she remain neutral, Russia undertook not 
to oppose Roumanian claims for the Roumanian areas of Hungary at the end 
1 Minute by Clerk, 20, viii, 1914, F. O. /371/209'/40933. 
2 Minute by Nicolson, undated, c. 20. viii. 1914, F. O. /371/2`, 095/40933. 
3 Torrey, Glenn A., Roumania änd the. Belliaerents, J. C. H. I. 3. 
4 Gray to Buchanan, tel., 8. vi1i. 1914, F. O. /371/2164/38078. 
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of the war. Britain took no part in the negotiation of this agreement, 
and it was - either by accident or design - misrepresented. The F, reign 
Secretary believed that Russia had promised Roumanian Transylvania to 
Roumania, thud she was pledged to realise Roumanian ambitions. Grey gave 
his support to the Russo-Roumanian agreement, but would not offer any 
material assistance in helping Roumania to wrest territory from Hungary: 
"Any guarantee of action after this war is over is 
limited to diplomatic support. "1 
At the time it was concluded the Russo-Roumanian agreement received 
little attention. Later it was to be of some significacce, and Grey's 
misunderstanding of the nature of Russian obligation was to influence his 
policy towards Austria-Hungary. 
In the matter of Roumanian ambitions, as over the quostion of Poland, 
Britain fell in with Russian policy, but declined to commit herself to more 
than diplomatic support. 
6. Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
The status of these provinces had, of courses been central to the 
Immediate origins of the war. 
The Serbian government had long coveted Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
Delinquent "students" across the Austrian. frontier, fired by Irredentist 
ideals, and armed, then as now, Nith"doctrines of direct action, raised 'a 
foul cult of assassination , 
t& the very täuchstone of manhood. 
2 They 
i (. 0. /371/2163/37466. 
2 Dedijer, V., The Road to Sarajevo, (1966), pp. 235-260. 
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succeeded in precipitating a conflict between Serbia and Austria, in 
which a reluctant Serbia had an opportunity to realise her ambitions. 
Grey had no love for Serbia, and had been distressed to think that 
a nation of compulsive regicides could start a general European war. 
l 
The whole shabby atmosphere of Balkan politics and diplomacy was repugnant 
to him. After a spell at the Foreign Office in June and July, 1915, 
during which the British Government had been trying to buy the Bulgarians 
into war with the offer of "douceurs" of 21- million pounds in personal 
bribes, 2 Lord Crewe, a man of more worldly experience than Grey, wrote$ 
"I own up that I shall give up responsibility for the 
Balkan negotiations without a tear; as after interviewing 
the various people involved, and communicating forwards 
and backwards with our excellent Allies, one feels as 
might a well-meaning croupier in a particularly low tripot. "3 
While Britain and France had no interest in seeing the realization 
of Serbian ambitions, it was inevitable that Austria would have to make 
territorial concessions to her. Serbia had in Russia a powerful patron, 
and the Pan-Slav hysteria which grippedýRussian opinion in 1914 made 
Serbian claims irresistible. The future of Bosnia and Hercegovina was 
as important for Russia as was the restoration of Belgium für Britain, On 
12 September, 1914, Sazanow treated Buchanan to his views on the terms of 
1 Grey to Rumbold, 20. vli. 1914, B. D. XI, 68. 
2 Drummond to Sax-Ironside, tel. 25. vi. 1915, and Crewe to Bax-Ironside, 
tel. 30. vt. 1915, Grey Papers, F. O. /800/4-3. 
3 Crewe to Gertie, 1. vi. 1915, (copy), Grey Papers, F. O. /800/58. 
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peace. One square in his grand design was the acquisition by Serbis of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina together with a part of Dalmation Coast giving 
access to the sea. 
1 The Czar'told the French Ambassador that Austria- 
Hungary would be broken up and Sezbia would receive "compensation". 
2 
The Foreign Office accepted that Serbia would be enlarged at the 
expense of the Habsburg Empire. Grey envisaged the establishment of 
"one great Slav state in which Serbia and Montenegro are merged. "3 
7. Italian Claims. 
As soon as it was realized that Italy would not join Austria and 
Germany, the Russians began negotiations to bring Italy into the war on 
the side of the Triple Entente.. Grey felt that Sazanow was being premature, 
and saw no point in pressing Italy too hard before she was either militarily 
or psychologically prepared to turn against her former allies. 
4 He did, 
however, make it clear that if Italy joined the war then she could expect 
compensation at the expense of Austria. When Cambon Informed Nicolson of 
Russo-Italian talks at St. ' Petersburg, and that France was Willing to offer 
Italy the'Trent valley, Grey approved, and proposed that the offer be raised. 
Showing a. timely, end not altogether uncharacteristic, largesse with the 
territory of Empire with which Britain, was not. yet at war, he noteds 
L Buchanan to NJicolson, 13. ix. 1914, Cannock Papers, F. O. /800/375. 
2 F. O. /371/2174/71999. 
3 Grey to Buchanan, ta1 '2l. lii, 1915, )F. O. /371/2507/35979. Was Grey 
thinking of a Yugoslav state, or, was he thinking of a huge Russian 
dominated Slav monolith? In either case it was to include Bosnia 
and Hercegovina Benckendorf'f to Sazanow, 3. xii. 1914, Int. Bez. 
(Series II) VI 
Iii) 
594. E 
4 F, O, /371/2164/38083. 
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"Certainly I agree but Trieste should be thrown in. "l 
On 12 August, 1914, Imperisli presented Grey with nine conditions 
that might secure Italy's entry into the war. Amongst these were claims 
for the Trentino up to the Alpine watershed and Trieste. The Foreign 
Secretary declined to offer terms until Italy had in principle agreed to 
enter the war, but he did indicate that Italy's claims for the Trentino 
to the Alpine Watershed and for Trieste could be accepted "absoluttaly"2 
Grey's enthusiasm in offering Trieste may well have been inspired by 
a desire to permanently aliminate Austrian naval power from the Mediterranean. 
Before the war the Admiralty had become increasingly disturbed by the 
construction of Austrian battleships and the consequent weakening of 
Britain's naval position in the Mediterranean. 
3 In A rtb, 1915, Churchill 
Informed Asquith that: 
"The advantages of preventing Austria from having a navy 
are overwhelming. "4 
g. The Position in November, 1914, 
By November, 19149 large parts of the Habsburg Empire had been 
reserved for distribution in the settlement. In the not unlikely event 
of Italy entering the war, and the war being brought to a successful 
conclusion, Austria would be reduced to little more than Bohemia, Austria 
proper, and a small Hungary. While Britain was not diroctly bound to 
1 minute by Grey, undated, c. 6. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/2162/3648. 
2 Grey to 8odd, 12. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/2171/38844. 
3 Asquith to King George V, 14. v. 1914, CAB/41/35. 
4 Churchill to Asquith, 7. iv. 1915, F. 0 /371/2508/41174. 
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destroy Austria, she, was bound to allies who were themselves intent on 
doing so. On the assumptions that the future of Austria-Hungary was not 
a British interest, that Britain had, no real powerto influence the 
settlement in Eastern and Central Europe, and that the concessions made 
would help to bring about a speedy end to the war, the British Government, 
or rather the Foreign Office in the nwe of the Government, had. agreed to 
plans which virtually amounted to . 
the, dismemberment of the Austrian 
Empire. hhatevar misgivings there had been about such a settlement, 
nothing had been, done to save Austria«, In Soptercbier, 1914, Grey told the 
Italian Ambassador that he would "not lift a finger" to protect Austria. 
l 
The-permanent. Under Secretary ', at. the Foreign Office could writes 
"We are absolutely bound to realize in great measure the 
aspirations! of the Slays, and I may also add the Polei* 
Austria will have to make up her, mind, whether, she 
offered terms now (February, 1915) or hereafter, to 
find herself shorn of a considerable portion of her 
present dominions. "2 
g, Negotiated Peace with Austria. 
Grey was never completely hopeful as to the. outcome'of the war, 
3''and 
by early Decemberl. 1914, his doubts were beginning to take on political 
'dimensions. It was becoming evident that there would be no early break- 
through on the Western, $ront. In, the east, the Fustian steamroller had- 
trundled forward and suns ff the; marshes of Tannenberg. Mille in the 
1. imperi+li to Di, Sengu1lisno; '16, ix. 1914, D. D. I. (5th Series)-I, 700. 
2 Nicolson to Hardings'; 3: i1«1915 (copy), Carnock Papers, F. O, /800/377. 
3 Haldane, p. 281. 
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Balkans, the Serbs, after initial successes against the Austrians, were 
drawing perilously close to disaster. As autumn turned into winter 
pessimism descended on the councils of the British Government. Military 
experts - Kitchener, 
l French2 and Hankey3 _ felt that it wouH be an 
arduous task to drive the German armies from the west of Europe, The 
fertile minds of Churchill4 and Lloyd George began to conjure up visions 
of new theatres of war. Grey, always ready to voile his apprehensions, 
wrotet 
"We will, of course, make every effort to prevent the war 
from being a long one and are training mer. and developing 
equipment as fast as we can. What we fear is lest the 
war must be long in order to be conclusive and lest France 
should weary of the strain. "6 
If the war against the Central Powers could not be brought to a 
decisive conclusion, it was necessary either to scale down allied war aims, 
1 . 
Memorandum by'Bertie, 18. xii. 1914, Gertie Papers, F. 0. /800/166; Remar 
on the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Memorandum on the Conduct of the 
War, by Kitchener, 25.11.1915. ,. GAB, 111. 
2 Memorandum by Bertie, 21.1.1915$ 'Bartle papers, F. O. /800/167. 
3 Memorandum by Hankey, 28. xii. 1914, Asquith Papers, M. S. 113, published 
in Hankey, vol.!, pp. 244-250s Hankey to Grey, 21. i. 1913, Grey Papers, 
F. O. /800/90. 
4 Churchill to Asquith, 29. xii. 1914, Asquith Papers, M. S. 13; most of this 
letter is published in Churchill, vol. II, pp. 44-45. 
5S estions as to the Military Position, by Lloyd George, 1.1.1915. 
C. A. B. 24 1 -2. 
6 Grey to Bertle, 4. xii. 1914, (copy), Grey Papers, F. 0. /800/56(s). 
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or to alter the military balance. The most obvious terms to be jettisoned 
were those in which Britain had the least interests the claims against 
Austria. If the war against Austria could be ended, then Germany. might 
be fatally weakened and brought to her knees. While Hankey, Churchill 
and Lloyd George turned their attention to finding new theatres of war, 
Grey began to consider the possibility of a negotiated settlement with 
Austria. 
The problem was one of great delicacy. Russia looked upon the war 
with Austria as being at least as important as the war against Germany. 
' 
It washher avowed intention to destroy the Habsburg Empire. If Russia 
were to believe-that her allies were. trying to cheat her of her heritage, 
than she might feel that the war was no longer worth the enormous sacrifices 
she was making, and conclude a. peace with Germany. In October, 1914, 
Buchanan had reported rumours that Russia was considering making peace. 
There was a hint of uneasiness in Grey's reaction. 
"I wihh to show it to the P. M. 'when I return, though I 
don't believe there. is any chance of Russia coming to 
terms with Germany. "Z 
The Foreign Secretary was therefore most cautious about raising the 
matter"of a negotiated peace with the Dual Monarchy. On 2 December, 1914, 
he spoke to'Benckendorff about the possibility of msking"a. separate 
settlement with Austria. Grey suggested that in face of Serbian setbacks 
1 Smith, C. J., The Russian Struggle for Power, (New York, 19%). 
2 Minute by Grey, undated, c. 18. x. 1914, F. O. /371/2173/60-+IC 
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it might be worth considering such a step. But sensitive to the 
Ambassador's reaction, he let the matter drop almost immediately) 
During December, 1914, there were reports that Austria herself sought 
41, 
to make peace with Entente. Prince Borghese, the Counsellor at the 
A 
Italien Embassy, reported that Count Forgasch, the head of the Austrian 
Foreign Office$ had acids 
"both Austrian and Russian soldiers were tired of fighting 
and were anxious for peace - and perhaps it would be as 
well if peace were made. "2 
On 17 December, the Gazette de Lausanne published an article by an unnamed 
though high-ranking Austrian diplomat. 3 It stated that Austria would be 
willing to make peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellums Russia 
receiving Constantinople, and in return withdrawing her support for Mental 
Montenegro and Serbia. Sperling observed, somewhat optimistically, 
"another straw showing which way the wind is blowing. "4 On the 18 
December, Rodd reported that. the. feeling in Rome was that Austria was done 
for. 5 Shortly afterwards, a'secretary from theýSpanish Embassy in Vienna 
came to London. His story was that the Austrian position was quite 
desperates they were short of'milk and coal and feared that Hungary might 
soon separate herself from the Empire, : The Austrians would be prepared 
1 Benckendorff to Sazanow, 3. xii. 1914, Int. Bez. (Series II) VI (ii) 594. 
2 F. O. /371/2176/80132. 
3 F. O. /371/2176/85265. 
4 Minute by Sperling, 18.4i. 1914, F. 0. /371/2176/85265. 
5 Rodd to Grey, 18. xii. 1914, Grey Papers, F. O. /800/65. 
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to cede Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Galicia# their only wish to save 
Austria proper. 
' 
Grey wanted to take advantage of any opportunity to negotiate a 
separate peace with Austria. After seeing the Foreign Secretary, Bartle 
notedt 
"that seemingly well-founded reports had been received that 
Austria is inclined to separate herself from Germany and 
make peace with Russia. He (Grey) does not think there 
can be any objection either from the British or French 
point of view. We have no animus against Austria. "2 
It was, however, over a fortnight before Cray began to sound out the 
Austrians.. This interlude of nearly two and a half weeks is curious, and 
we can only speculate as to why Grey waited so long before he took any 
action. There are three possible reasons', none of which i1sý exclusive 
of the otherse Grey was turning the whole matter over, in his mind; 
Russian military setbacks encouraged him to re-open the question; there 
was a secret visit by the French Foreign Minister to London on 4 January, 
1915, during this visit it was decided to go behind Russia's back and to 
start negotiations with Vienna. 
If peace was to beregotiated with Austria there'were bound to be' 
great difficulties in doing so. If the Russians were approached directly 
they would almost certainly have vetoed the suggestion out of'hand. They 
might well have suspected that Britain was tryingýto preserve Austria in 
order'to check their expansion. Fear of such hyper-sensitive reaction 
1 Report of Lord Murray of Elfbank, 21. xii. 1914, Grey Papers, F. 0. /800/101, 
see Appendix A. 
2 Memorandum by Bertie, 18. xii. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. 0. /800/166. 
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was not unreasonable. Grey and Tyrrell were obliged to deny quite 
unofficial rumours of this type. 
l Grey, whose temperament was rather 
nervous, was extremely sensitive to the possibility of irrational reaction. 
There was a second alternatives Britain should begin negotiations 
with Austria, and when the ground was prepared, she should then go to St. 
Petersburg. Such a procedure was also fraught with difficulties, 
Whatever the adjective secret meant in secret diplomacy, it did not mean 
private. The European system of diplomacy was conducted entirely on a 
pattern of personal contacts. Within such a system practically nothing 
could remain secret for any length of time. Leakages of information were 
the rule rather than the exception. The worst effect of such leakages 
was that stories were likely to become distorted, either because reports 
misrepresented the original facts, or because when men learnt of negotiations 
from which they were excluded they assumed that these talks were against 
had 
their interests. Grey /experienced just such a situation over Anglo-Russian 
talks. Commenting on the excessive German reaction, he had observeds 
"I cftan thought, in these matters, that things would be 
better if the whole truth were known..... They (third 
parties) were apt to think that there was a great deal 
more than they had been told. "2 
In wartime the risks of leakage were infinitely greater because 
everyone had more to lose. When Balfour was Foreign Secretary, he found 
the same difficulty in secret, peace negotiations. With a certain patrician 
1 Rodd to Grey, 25.1.1915, and attached notes by Tyrrell and Grey., and 
Grey to Rodd, tel., 26.1.1915, repeated to Barclay, Grey Papers, ' 
F. 0. /800/65. 
2 Grey to Buchanan, S. vii. 1914, B. D. XI, 39. 
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disdain for the less fashionable areas of London, Balfour noted that if a 
peace proposal were leaked, they- 
"might just as well, indeed much better, be proclaimed 
at CharingGross. At all events a proclamation at 
Charing Cross would accurately represent the facts. "1 
Such fears contributed to Grey's hesitation in again raising the question 
of a compromise settlement with the Dual Monarchy. 
December, 1914, and early January, 1915, saw further Russian military 
setbacks. She was dangerously short of munttions, ýand had difficulty in 
holding the German armies in Poland. More ominously, on 2 January, there 
came news that the Russian armies had been badly worsted in their campaign 
against Turkey. The Grand Duke Nicholas appealed for some military effort 
from Britain that would ease the position of', Russian troops in the 
Caucasus. Kitchener promised to do, what he could , but he held out no 
great hope that any British dea: onstration would be of material value. 
2 
The deterioration in Russia's military position may well have led Grey to 
consider very seriously the possibility of opening negotiations with 
s 
Austria-Hungary. ° 
The French Government were as eager as the British to see a negotiated 
settlement with Austria. On 1 January, 1915, Paleologue, the French 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, broached the subject with Sazanow. He 
suggested a peace on the basis of Austria-Hungary ceding Galicia and Bosnia 
3 
and Hercegovina. The Ambassadors short-term objective was 
4 
break the 
1 Peace Pr oposals,. by $aljour 28, ix. 1917, CAD/29/1/P22. 
2 -Magr7us, it P., Kitchener, Perguin, 1969). pp. 369-370; F. O. /371/2504/540. 
3 Paleologue, M., An Ambassador's Memoirs, translated by Elol ; F. A., (1923" 
vo1. I., p. 235. 
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military deadlock; his long term aim was to maintain Austria-Hungarys 
"cant qu'il, existeaa une Allemagne et une Italie nous 
serons interesses au maintien de 1'Autriche. "1 
It would appear that on 4 or 5 January, Delcasse met with Grey and 
Asquith, and it was as a result of this meeting that Grey took the initiative 
on the question'of negotiating peace with Austria. Delcasse's visit to 
London was very secret and there appear to be no records in the British 
archives of what was discussed. It Is necessary to piece together the 
chain of events from fragmentary evidence. On 28 December, 1914, Bertie 
telegraphed that Delcasss wished to visit London.? Bartle said he did not 
know what the French Foreign Minister wished to discuss, but suggested that 
it m, ght be bringing Japanese troops to Europe. Bartle's story had the 
ring of untruth about it. In the first'place, Bertie's explanation of the 
purpose of the proposed visit Is Unsatisfactory. If it was indeed to 
discuss the question of bringing Japanese troops to Europe, then 'why did 
not Delcasse say so? The matter had been'freely discussed between London 
and Paris. In the 'second place, Bartle said that Delcasse only, "hinted" 
at a visits but according, to Cambon3 the visit was of some importance to 
Delcasse. . If Delcasse was 
willing to, say this through Cambon'then+why 
not through Bartle? 
'Ehere is one possible explanations Bartle was trying to conceal his 
own activities from Grey, Whät; -. 1. a haightr have been ; trying to conceal was 
that he himself had been' trying to solve, the question of Austria-Hungary. 
1 Poincare, Vol. VT, pp. 5-6. 
2 ßertie to Grey, 28. xii. 1914, Grey Papers, F, O. /8OO/ 6(s). 
3 Grey to Bartle, tel., 3. 'i. 1915, ; Grey Papers, F. O. 600/57. 
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Bartle was vehamently anti-Russian, and he was resentful of Russia's Pan- 
Slav ambitions. He referred to Russia's 
"absurd and obsolete claim that she is the protectress 
of all Slav states. "1 
He was annoyed with Grey for not taking a stronger line in opposing 
Russian ambitions, and he had mentioned this to the Foreign Secretary on 
18 December, 1914.2 Moreover, ßertie knew that Grey was in favour of a 
negotiated settlement with Austria, and he also knew of the various rumours 
that Austria wanted peace. 3 In possession of this information, -Bertie may 
well have seen an opportunity to prepare the way, for a negotiated settlement 
with Austria, and mentioned the news from London at Paris. An ambassador 
had no right to do this, but it was typical of Berne toltaka initiatives 
on, his own account,. and to try to use the. French Government to implement 
his own ideas. He had done this during Grey's, visit to Paris in April, 
4 1914, he did it again in March, 1915.5- On the letter occasion, the 
Foreign Office were furious when they found out he had been trying to build 
a common Anglo-French policy agsinst'Russia. Clerk complained: 
1 Bertie, vol. I. p. 2. 
2 Memorandum by Bertie, 18. xii. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. O. /800/166. 
3 Murray of. Elibank to Bertie, 23/12/44, Gertie Papers, F 0: /800%16 1 
4 Memorandum by Sortie, 24. iv. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. 0. /800/166. 
5 Chapter 5. 
151 
"In fact, Sir F. Serbe was nit asked to build bricks, 
all that he was asked to do Was to put a definite 
question to the French Government and to ask for a 
definite reply...... If Sir F. Bertie had adhered 
to the text of his instructions he would have baen 
doing what we wanted. " I 
If Hertie had been trying to co-ordinate Anglo-French policy towards 
Austria-Hungary then he was being very silly. Both Britain and France had 
an interest in using the other to do any "dirty work" at St. Petersburg. 
The French Government had no intention of incurring Russian odium by 
opposing her over Austria-Hungary; Fateologue was instructed to make it 
quite clear that anything he had said about a negotiated peace with Austria 
had been on his own initiative. 
2 
Grey was suspicious of Delcasse's visit and Bertie's explanation. 
He replied that he would. see Delcasse if it were really necessary, buts 
"Under the circumstances a visit 61 Delcasse to London 
would give rise to surmises, some of which would be 
undesirable though'they would be udfoundedi for it 
might be suggested that we met to discuss some 
inconclusive peace and we wore giving in. "3 
The Foreign Secretary realized how "bad it, would look at St. Petersburg 
if it become known that the Freachland British Foreign Ministers had been 
discussing policy a deux., 
On 3 January, Carbon returned to London and: 
"stropq 1y ýur es (the) desire of U(inister) (for) 
F(oreign) A #£airs) to. come'to London this week 
to see (the) P. M. and Grey. He proposes to keep 
the visit secret. I (Grey) have agreed to see 
M(inister) (for) F(oreign) A(ffairs). "4 
1 Minute gy Clerk, 14,111.1915, Grey Papers, F. O. 800 57. 
2 Poincsre, vol. V, pp. 5-6. 
3 Grey to Hertie, 31. xii. 1914, (copy), Grey Papers, F. O. /800/56(8). 
4 Grey to Bertie, te1.3. i. 1915, Grey Papers, F. 0. /800/57. 
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04 There are no further records of Delcaase'a secret visit in British archives. 
It would seem highlr probablg that the French Foreign Minister did visit 
London early in 1935. The date was almost certainly the .4 or 5 January. 
Gray wrote on 3 January, which was a Thursday, and he specifically 
referred to Delcasý coming "this week", Deloasset s visit can therefore 
be pinned down to Friday 4 or Saturday 5. It was on the 5 Jawary that. 
Grey took the initiative in the question of negotiated settlement with 
Austria-Hungary. The evidence is circumstantial; but it would seem 
possible that Grey's decision to put out peace feelers to Vienna was the 
result of his conversations with Deý. cass 
I Indeed: the whole'purpose of 
Delcassol is visit could have boon to perm ade Grey to take the lead in 
this matter. Certainly in Februarar and March, . 915, the Foreign Office 
were suspicious that France was trying to use Britain to oppose Russian 
ambitious, while at the same time keeping her on hands clean. 
l There is 
one further piece of evidence which points to the fact it gras Deloa®se 
who, persuaded Grey to open the question of a negotiated peace with, Austria. 
When, on 7 January, Grey spoke to the Spanish Ambasaadori he told him thats 
"France and ourselvea. have tja quarrel with Austria. °2 
Nov it . 
is,. unlikely that Grey would `have spoken tor: France to a foreign 
diplomatist -AKlbezhhdAlat already obtained`Frsnoh sanction. There is no 
record in thq,, Foreign Office arohives of a report on the attitude of the 
Jhceaah Goverment towards £ustria-Hungary. 
Towards the and of 1914 Britain had. gent a mission to the Vatioan. It 
was headed by Sir H. Howard# a senior diplomat. Howard had on his staff 
3, Chapter V. 
2 Memorandum by Grey, 7,1.1915, Grey Papers.. F"O. 800/9S. 
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J. D. Gregory. Gregory was a u. re interesting personalitys 'he"was the 
possessor of an extraordinarily pretty handwriting and most disagreeable 
character. His career ended somewhat abruptly in the late twenties when 
it was discovered that he had been using his position to speculate on 
currency exchange rates. 
1 
He then had'the temerity to write his memoirs, 
2 
which were totally undistinguished and consisted mostly of anecdotes 
designed to show the vileness of Roumanian Jews. 
On 5 January, 1915, Grey telegraphed to Noward" Howard was instructed 
to sound out clerical circles about rumours thats 
"Austria-Hungary is anxious for peace and might be disposed 
to enter into discussions with the allies as to terms of 
peace independently of Germany. "3 
Howard was urged tobe discreet in enquiries he made. , 
Cleariy a most 
awkward situation would have arisen had Russia found out. 
Two daysüäter, 7 January, '-,. Gray saw the Spanish Ambassador. The 
Spanish' Monarchy, linked by blood, sentiment and religion to the Habsburgs 
at4iienna, had alzeedy shown some interest in the question of a peace 
between Austria and the Entente, and; Madrid was therefore an. obvious channel 
of communication. 
a The Foreign secretary: advised the Spanish Ambassador 
that Britain and F: ance'had no claims against -Austria, but that the Dual 
Monarchy would have to 'come to terms with Russia. If Austrja'w nted 
peace she should let this be known and'state her terms at St. Petersburg. 
5 
1 The so-called "francs', case", The s, 30.1.1951, p. 8. 
2 Gregory, J. D., n the-Ed aýof'. Di lomsc i Rambles and, Reflec'ions 
1902-1928 (l9 O fl .. 1 ! 3 Grey to Rodd (for Howard),, tel. ', 5.1, '1915, F. 0. /371/2505/1500° 
4 Gottlieb, pp. 29fß-7. 
5 Memorandum by Grey, 7.1.1915, Grey Papers, P. 0. /800/95. 
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All this was too much for Sir Arthur Pdicolson; he felt Russia 
would never agree to make peace with Austria, and that Grey was following 
a silly and possibly dangerous p i1cy in going behind Russia's back to 
negotiate with Austria. On'the same day as Grey saw the Spanish 
Ambassador, tiicolson Kxgte a private letter to Buchanan: 
r 
"It Is appalling to think of, the difficulties which will 
arise when the moment comes for the discussion of peace 
terms. I cannot imagine any peace which will be more 
difficult, It will practically amount to a remodelling 
of the map, of, EuroFe and we shall have to, find some 
means of liquidating both the Dual Monarchy and the 
Turkish Empire. "1 
Nicolson was, parhaps, trying to cover the tracks of his Chief without 
actually telling Buchanan what was happening. 
The news from Rome was: far from<encouraging.. Howard advised the 
Foreign Office that the fueling in the Vatican was. that while Austria 
was suffering badly fron. the war, there was no roal indicatlon. that she 
wished to make peace separately from Germany. Nicolson was greatly 
relieved, and rather smugly noteds "It-is not likely that, -Austria will 
conclude a separate peace. "2 
4. Negotiated Peace with Hungary. 
On the 14, January, Howard reported'that the Habsburg family viere 
making some attempts to persuade the papacy to. save the dynasty, even if. 
this involved sacrificing Galicia, 
3 Shortly afterwards events took a 
most unexpected turn. Instead ofmakinq cortacts''with the` Austrians, 
1 Nicolson to Buchanan, 7. i. 19159 (copy),, Cnrrock Papers, r. 0., ß00 377. 
2 F. O. /371/2505/2520. 
3 Howard to Grey, -tal. 0'14.1.1915, F. O. //71/2s05/ 262. 
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Howard made contact with the Hungarian Nationalist Party. Taking a very 
liberal interpretation of his instructions, the &otbassador had actually 
begun to negotiate with the representative of this group, a Count Szapary. 
Szapary had asked to see Howard at the British Embassy in Rome, and Howard 
had agreed to this. The Magyar explained that he had authority to speak 
for the Hungarian Nationalist Party and its leader, Prince Apponyi. 
Szapart proposed a deal: Hungary would declare her independence from 
Austria and make peace with the allies. In return the Sn`tldate would 
recognise the new Hungarian regime and respect the territorial integrity 
of Hungary. Howard, without waiting for instructions, agreed that 
Szapary should return to Budapest and fetch Apponyi. The pationalist 
leader would then come back with Szapary and they would have a secret 
meeting with him. 
l 
The crux of the Hungarian question turned on the Russo-Roumanian 
agreement of Octobers 1914" The Hungarians wanted to save the Roumanian 
provinces of Hungary. They feared that Roumania would soon enter the 
war on the side of the Entente, and that if this happened then she would 
demand Roumanian Transylvania. According to Szapary, the Roumanians 
were really quite happy under Hungarian zule; the Roumanians only wanted 
selfish expansion and intended to absorb Slav as well as Roumanian areas 
of Austria-Hungary. The Roumanians argued their case from the basis of 
religion and nationality; it would serve the Catholic cause if the 
Roumanian territories of the Habsburg Empire, were incorporatedidto Roumania 
proper. Gregory, who did not share Howard's desire for a separate peace 
1 Howard to Grey, tel., 16.1.1915, F. O. /371/2505/6149= Howard to Grey, 
tel., 16.1.1915, F. O. /371/2505/6150. 
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with Hungary, endeavoured to sabotage his efforts: in his immaculate hand 
he wrote private letters to Tyrrell and put the Roumanian cases 
"I had a conversation with M. Diamandy...... the semi- 
official agent of Bratiano (the Roumanian Prime Minister) 
....... M. Diamandy had heard however that our F. O. in London was lending an ear to similar proposals (for 
negotiated peace with Hungary). He feared very much 
that we were not "au courant' with the situation as 
regards Hungary and we still adhered to our old conceptions 
that Hungary represented a liberal country like ours etc. - 
we were still under Gladstonian sentiwehts. I said such 
ideas had been exploded by Seton-Watson and others. "1 
The permanent officials at the Foreign office were none too pleased 
with'Howard's initiative. Clerk, who could noimally have been relied 
" upon to be quite Machiavellian, referred Grey to the nationality principle 
and the morality of negotiating a settlement with Hungirys 
"I venture to record my belief that to leave Transylvania 
under the Magyars without strong evidence that the 
population desire it may prove a costly price'even for 
peace with Hungary. "2 
?x iýiiIller, the Foreign Office expert on Hungary, came out strongly 
against the prospect of a settlement with Hungary# and also invoked the 
nationality principle: 
"Apart from the obligation of our Russian ally towards Roumania, 
we should be acting contrary to the principle of nationality 
if we agreed to leave a population of three million Roumanians 
under Magyar domination, besides providing combustible 
material-for a future conflagration in that part of the 
world. "3 
1 Gregory to Tyrrell, 20.1.1915, Grey Papers, F. 0. /800/67. 
2 Minute by Clerk, 17.1.1915, F. O. /371/2505/61499 
3 Memorandum by 
1u1I1er, 18. i. 1915, Gray Papers, F. 0. /800/95. 
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Nicolson was very angry that Howard should have taken so much upon himself, 
and strongly advised Grey to have nothing to do with the Hungerianss to 
do so would be contrary to the nationality principle; it would, be foolish 
to put any faith in an opposition party. The Foreign Secretary was 
warned that the questian would have to be referred to the Russians ands 
"I (Nicolson)-have no doubt as to what St. Petersburg 
will reply. "I 
While Grey was reluctant to give up the negotiations, he found the 
logic of the arguments against pursuing them tobe insurmountable. He 
informed Howards 
"You are quite right to listen. to and report any proposals 
made" .... but .... "I fear this proposal is impractical. "2 
Paris and St. Petersburg3 were informed. Sazanow held that a peace 
with Hungary would be contrary to 'the promises he had made to Roumania. 
with 
He suggested that the Hungarians be kept in tow L/ assurances that the 
allies were sympathetic to the. Hungarian cause. 
4 A proposal to which 
Grey reacted with Gladstonian outrage: 
"The proposau..... Is not honest. Russia has told Roumania 
she can have Transylvania if she remained neutral. "5 
One suspects that Grey's annoyance was in part with the fact that Russia 
had indirectly committed Britain. Nage-the-less, the minute must have 
1 Minute by Nicolson, 17.1.1915, F. O, /371/2505/6149. 
2 Grey to Howard, tel.,, 17. i. 1915, F. O. /371/2505/6149. 
3 Grey to Bartle, tel., 19.1.1915, repeated to Buchanan and Barclay, 
F. O. /371/2505/7101,. 
4 Buchanan to Grey, tel., 25.1.1915, F"0. /371 2505/9523. 
5 Minute by Grey, undated, c. 26. i. 1915, F. 0.1371/2505/9523. 
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caused some raising of eyebrows in the Foreign Office. It was only 
later that Grey found out from Cambou that Russia was not bound to obtain 
Transylvania for Roumania, and she was only obliged not to object if 
Roumania claimed it. 
l But for the time being at least the quest for a 
negotiated settlement with Austria was over. 
These feelers for a negotiated peace with Austria-Hungary were 
conducted very much as had been foreign policy pre-wars authority rested 
firmly in the hands of the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office. 
However, there can be observed the seeds of subsequent developments. Firstly, 
throughout this period Lloyd George was employing his ferocious energies 
not just in considering problems of finance, but also in solving problems of 
foreign policy and strategy. As yet his iz. uence on foreign policy was not 
significant, but it is interesting to note that he more than any other 
minister looked seriously at the possibility of a separate peace with the 
Dual Monarchy. 2 The belief that the allies might be able to conclude a 
separate peace with Austria-Hungary remained with Lloyd George throughout 
the conflict,, Secondly, one can observe that established diplomatic 
procedures were unable to cope with the problems of war, and this contributed 
to the growing ascendency of military criteria in determining the course of 
Britain's foreign relations. khile Grey wanted a negotiated settlement with 
the Habsburg Empires, he was floundering once he attempted to pursue this end. 
This is less a reflection on Grey than a revelation of a basic truth about war: 
1 Minute by Grey, undated c. 22. v. 1915, F. 0.371/2505/64943. 
2 MurraycP Elibank to Bertie, 23. xii. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. 0.800/161; 
Note by Lloyd George on Memorandum by Murray of Elibank, 21. acii. 1914, 
Lloyd George Papers, C/25/f8. 
3 There was the well-known mission by Smuts and Kerr) less well-known are 
the negotiations in Copenhagen early in 1917, Paget Papers, add. 51253; 
Lloyd George to Balfour, 12. ii. 1917, Balfour Papers, F. 0.800/199. 
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military action is perhaps just another means of pursuing diplomatic objectives, 
but it is a means that is exclusive of diplomacy. Violence is dramatic and it 
can bring dazzling rewarda, but it is never a subtle instrument of policy. 
10. Conclusion. 
On one level British war aims with regard to Austria-Hungary can be 
viewed as dualist. In the first four months of the war Britain had 
accepted the ambitions of Russia, Roumania, Serbia and Italy. Ambitions 
which, if realised, would have meant a considerable reduction of the 
Habsburg Empire. From late November onwards, Grey was prepared to accept 
a settlement which for all he cared would have left Austria-Hungary as it 
was when the war broke out.. 
On a profounder level this dualism was a manifestation of a fundamental 
unity of ideas and attitudes. British interests were seen to lie in 
driving the German armies from France and B elgiump and in securing Western 
Europe from further German aggression. What happened in Eastern and 
Central Europe was of little importance. Uten it seemed that the 
dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire would help to defeat Germany, it was 
aaappted as desirable; when it appeared that a negotiated peace with 
Austria would help to bring Germany to her knees, then a negotiated 
settlement was acceptable. 
It can be observed that Britain was in a rather paradoxical position. 
k'hile she had little interest in the precise nature of the settlement in 
Zap 
Eastern and Central Europe, she found herself shackled to allies who 
were devoting much of their energies, physical and spiritual, to tearing 
down the Habsburg Empire. There was an uncomfortable discrepancy between 
the limited nature of British interests and the open-ended character of 
her commitments. This problem was patently obvious to men at the time, 
and the way in which Grey sought to resolve this unfortunate situation 
is a story that revolves around the question of Constantinople and the 
Straits. 
ýLb 
B93S . A, t CONSTý'. NTI2 OPLE AND TIM STRAITS 
1. Iatroduotion. 
In their. struggle against Germany the alliance with Tsarist. Russia 
was the blackest mark against the cause of the Western Democracies. To 
the war-weary peoples of the 1920's nothing symbolised the idiocy of the 
old diplomacy like the alliance with Russia; nothing weighed so heavily 
against the record of Britain's 'vattime diplomacy as the Straits Agreement 
of ; arch, 1915. The Entente had, it seemed,, been fighting a war for 
Russian imperialism. For the pacifist lefty the agreement over Constantinople 
and the Straits demonstrated that the,: allies had been every bit as cynical 
as the Central Powers] E. D. Morel complained that the purpose of the war 
was to crush Germany and 
"to make Russia mistress of the N(ear) E(sat), to 
give her Constantinople, and to extend her territory 
in Europe. That is what our sons are being conscripted 
for. "1 
In defence of the Government, it was argued that the Straits agreement was 
forced by 
"the madness (of Tserdom) which insisted that peace 
must not'be made until Constantinople and half of 
Turkey had been added to the Russian Empire. "2 
1 Morel to Ponsonby, undated, (copy )-$ o. l)ecember, 1916# Morel Papers, 
Bou. F. 8. 
2 Hirst, F. W., And Allen, F. E., Briticb war Bum (1926), p. 26. 
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Historians have been less emotive, but they. have tot- produced fundamentally 
di! lersnt iaterpretatiotis of the agreement of Nach, 1915.1 The agreement 
van expansionist and the initiative and impulse for it van Russian. 
The opening of the Foreign Office archives has provided students with 
an opportunity to look again at the events surrounding the decision to 
allow Russia to have Constarntinople. The archives do not disappoint those 
looking for fresh insights into familiar issues. They reveal that the 
queation of Constantinople was a oentral thread in, Arglo-Russian relations$ 
on 
and when this thread is pulled it is seen to touch / much broader issues: 
the-future of Bu5esa In the poft-w, x1d; Grey's plans for' a peace 
settlement. 
Historians have tended to exaggerate the harmony, in An . o-Russian 
relations from 1907 onwards. 'They, bWe seen it from the perspective of 
the -origins of the First World War, ý and the tightening of the bonds of the 
European alliance system. Such a conception distorts the character of 
klo-Russian relations, Britain and Russia did not share any fundamental 
community of interest, and the Asiatin agreements of 1907 only papered over 
their differences in Persia and the East. Beneath the surtaaa there was 
continual tension and suspicion, andperiodics]1 1thain differences in Asia 
threatened to disrupt their fragile understanding. It was not only in 
Asia that Britain and Russia disegrreeds Russia was not content to be the 
passive counterpoise to Germany that Grey wished3 " har p . icy and 
ambitious in the Balkens were a source of embarrassment to Britain. 
Thai Russian problem was similar to the German problems both were 
1 Keraer1 R. J. i J. M. H" l'iii. 
(1929)" 
nt-with Smith, C. J., -rnb Pro 
Russia: 
_ 
The Promisesor Noyembex. 19)4, A. H. R. CYXX, No. 4 - challenges 
the accepted view. But this author finds it difficult to follow his 
footnotes, and feels his elysis of the promises of November to be erroneous. 
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autocratic and aggressive Powers of immense strength. In the vase, of, 
Germany, an enemy, wer aims were directed towaxdn containing and restricting 
her power, With Rassiao an allyi it. was impossible to follow such a simple 
course: British war aims were. directed towards diverting Russian power in 
that direction that was least Inconsistent with British. interests.. This 
policy revolved around Constantinople and the Straits. 
Between August. and November, 1914,! Jnglo»Ruosian relations stumbled 
from one crisis to smothers first in the Balkan3, band . then in Persia, 
Russia pursued a policy that was damaging to British interests. Grey 
promised Russia Constantinople and the Straits as her reward. for co-operation. 
From Decamber1 1914, onwards, it became evident that Russia would not be 
able to realiss her gmbiti na in &irope.. This brought , with 
it an obvious 
problems where was Russia to find compensation for her sacrifices in the 
war? Grey resolVed to substitute, Russian ambitious in Europe with the 
quer at expansion at the expense of Turkey. - The agreement of March, 
1913, was gat simply a concession to Russian ; 'A.. demanäs,... it was a reflection 
of Ag1a-RusBian relations in th©ir totality. 
2. The Background to the ßttraait s -Q; 2 
iozj. 
During the nineteeath century the beUet that Russia had to be kept. 
out of the Mediterranean and the integrity of the ottoman Empire maintained 
was dogma in British strategic doctrine. xn a ]. uni. d and informative essay 
on tha. Straits question# the late Sir James Heacla, -Morley urote$ , 
LO 
"Pitt laid down the principle that the maixitonance 
of the Turkish Empire was a British interest .,.. He was thinking +cf the defence of India and the 
maintenance of British sea power in the Levant 
. ".. s obviously a most dangerous situation would 
arise if this (the Russian) fleet were-Able to use 
the Dardanelles as an impregnable baise. sl 
Whether the doctrine was over quite as sacrosanct in the minus of statesmen, 
as in the hearts of a chauvinistic people is open to speculation and 
research: certaialy by the turn of the century ideas vere being examined 
and reriaed. 
The aoquisition of Cyprus and Egypt strengthened Britainta naval 
position in the Eastern Mediterranean 'and lessened the danger of Russian 
sea power in that area. In 1903, a Sub-Committee of the C. I. D. (Committee 
of Imperial Defence) met under the chairmanship of the then Prime Minister, 
Arthur Balfour, aid considered how Britain's strategic position in the 
Mediterranean would be affected should Russia possess Constantinople with 
free access to the Mediterranean. The uaani,, uous conclusion of the Sub- 
Committee was that such an eventuality would not "fundamentally alter the 
present strategic situation in the Mediterranean"# and that the "maintenance 
of the itatUs gi Q as regards Constantinople is not one of the primary 
interests of this oountry. "3 The War Office and,... the Admirai. ty agreed' 
1 2 neadiam-mori. ey, btr James, studies 111 Big omatic H, storv (1930), p. 220. Readlain-Morley, p. 237. It is doubtful whether Cyprus. was of quite the 
significance that Headlam-Morley maintains. There was no large naval 
base there, and it was not felt to have a goof harbour, 'see Fisher to 
JCitchoner, ll. iii. 1915, Kitchener Papers, P. R. 0.30/57/80,1we don't 
want a barren island in the Mediterranean, s. 
3 
AIACojjstagtiooo , by A. J. B*Lfour, 14.11.1903, CAB. '/44L26. 
Maaorandum by W. Q. N3 1son, Director General of Mobilization and 
Military Intelligence, ; 2.3.11.1903, CAD. I/ lb. 5 Admiralty Memorandums February 1903#, 048. if b. ' 
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with the fintthgs of the Sub-Committee. The auccosdit Liberal Government 
accepted and andorsad the tin1thgs of the C. I. D, Sub-Committee. During 
the Boellian" cricie of 1908, Aaquith informed Balfour; 
"I attäctz very little strategic value -. so far as I 
am concerned - to the maintenance of existing 
restrictions and this is. the opinion of our 
military and naval advises. ", 
It was# how vor, the Anglo-Russian Entente vhich brought about a 
reversal of. Britaiul a poltoal opposition to Russia' a aspiration to hure 
11 
a secure outlet to the Mediterranean. From the very inception d the 
undoratanding with Russia Grey was willing to consider a relaxation of 
existing restrictions regarding the Straits. It was a price worth paying 
for, an improvement in Ang1o-Russian relations. 
2 Between 1907 and 1914 
the Yoreign S ecretary was alvays prepared-'to support, at least to same 
extent, Russian claims for tree access to the Mediterranean. 
In 1908, Iawolsky: the Russian Foreign Minister, came to London and 
asked for an opening of the Straits as Russia's compensation for the Austrian 
annexation of Bosnia. After consulting with the Cabinet# Grey agreed 
that the opening of the Straits was fair and reasonable and in principle 
(I) will not oppose it"" This was as far as he was willing to go. The 
public at large wsra not yet ready to accept a complete reversal of nine- 
teenth century traditions. If Russia pressed hor claims too hard 
Englishmen might have refused to accept the Entente with Russia. Iswolsky 
1 Asquith to Balfour,, 15. x. 19081 Balfour Papers, add. 49692" 
2 Grey to Nlcolsozl, 6. xi. 1906$ quoted in Grey, vol. 1, pp. 161-163+ 
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was asked to bide his time and to be content vith an undertaking that`the 
matter would be reviewed in good faith. when'a'wäre opportune moment 
presented. itselt. 
l The Russian Foreign Minister agreed to do soy but 
added a riders if when the time came Grey, went back on his promises then 
that would be the and of Anglo. tus ion Fettente. Greys. who. could be about 
as jumpy as-Asquith and Balfour were imperturbable# hastened to reassure 
Iewolskys 
"I positively desire an agreement which trill open the 
Straits on terms acceptable to Russia,... " , such an arrangement seems to me essential. to tbä permanent 
establishment of good relations between Russia and 
ourselves. n 2 
The undertskings given in 1906 left an obligation to review Ruaoian 
claims in sympathetic spirit at a later date. When, in kte, October, 1914, 
Turkey attacked Russial Russia had a Rijn fae case for askizg Britain 
to rodeew bar pledges. Moral obligations were xiöt altogether trivial to 
Grey. In December# 1914: he told UertSe thatt 
We must carry out our promises of 19G8. "3 
But Grays morality vas a flexible creatures he invoked it (more 
subconsciously than consciously) vhen it suited ulterior purposes. The 
promises remained valid and important because the Russian Enterte still had 
implications for the security of the Empire in. thetJast. 
"Grey observed, " noted Bertiep, "that he wished to deal 
tolerantly vitb 3azanow because the intorests of Russia 
and England in Persia, are difficult to reconcile. "4 
1 Aide4femoire given to Iswoleky# l4. %, 1908, B. D. Vi -377) 'Grey to 
IBwolskyt 15. x. ]. 908, B, D. Vp 388j, 
2 Grey to Iswolsky, 15. x. 1908, B. D. Vs 386. 3 Memorandum by Bartief 18. xii. 1914, Bertie Papers# 7.0.800/166. 
4 Memorandum by Bertie, 18. xii. 1914i , Gertie Papers# 7.0.800/166. 
ZP+ 
The sending of the German Military Mission of 'General Lianen von- 
Sanders to Conttentiuople, and the ensuing crisis of the winter in 1913-1914, 
re-opened the question of Russian acoeso to the Mediterranean. The Russians 
Felt that German control of the Porte would mean that their exit to the 
Mediterranean was barred for ever. 
]' Th3 crisis co-incided with the A0g1o- 
German detente# and Grey was reluctant to support Russia unconditionally. 
He tried to pursue an independent policy. 
Z Buchanan reported that Sasanow 
was "turiousw13 and Grey was obliged to recognise that'his independence 
vas limiteds 
"I do not believe that the whole-thing is voithall 
the fuss that Sazanow makes about it; but so long 
as he door make a fuss it will be important and 
embarre slug to us for we sau of turn our backs on 
Russia. 
'. 
",. we' should find ourselves back in our bad relations. " 
There vas tja pacific interlude between the Liwsnw zu Sanders crisis 
and the Sarajevo crieiej the tremors of the -one merged with the other. 
Buohaaaa warned that Russia would seize the first opportunity to reverse 
her setbacks at Constantinople. M'oreover# she would judge the merits of 
her alliezoo vith Frxnoe and her entente with Englsxd according to the 
support she was given in her dispute with Germes, 
6 
In May, 1914, the 
Cabinet still eonsidereä'the struggle at Constantinople suftioiently 
I Bestuschels Y,; $LLssi en For®i&n 92L1ß ury June. 1914s J. C. H. 
I* iii. 
2 Chapter U. 
3 Buchanan to Grays 23, xii. 1913, - 13. D. X (a. ) ý 446. 
I. Grey to Gosohen, 2. i. 1914,, B. D, X 0-i) 4570 
5 Grey to Gosohin, 15. xii. 1913i B. D6 (i)f 431" 
6 Buchanan to Grey, 7. i. 1914, B. D. Wq 463, 
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dangerous as to preclude £nglo-Russian naval talke including the 
Mediterranean. ' -Thus* at the outbreak of the war the ' question of Russia' 8 
position at Constantinople vas still a very live issue, and it seemed not 
unlikely that Russia vould turn her"attantiona to overthrouitig German 
ascendancy at the Porte and realibing bar. traditiozial'ambition:. 
3. The Ge, ýrýl Baß]t¢routd o -Russian Relations. 
There has been monograph on Ang1awRussian Entente, of 1907 to 1917, 
and unfortunately our bietories on the origins of the war of 1914 have 
exaggerated the extent of Ang1o-Ruaeian friendship. ' Britain and Russia 
were uneasy allies and unless this point is grasped it is impossible to 
understand the dove pmaat 'ot British war aims. 
One stumbling block to a very cordial Anglo-Russian understanding was 
the nature of Tsarist autocracy. Ite'repressiVe character ass distasteful 
to the Liberal, Governme t and omits: supporters. This mood of aggressive 
liberalism did nothing to temper the Thsrist system# but it did impose 
limits on the intimacy of the UYiderstanting pith Russia. As Macaulay once 
obs®rvedi 
'$We know no spectacle so ridiculous as the English 
pubic in one of its fits of parlodioal morality. n2 
Russian autocracy a1 O had its diplomatic iaco, and it'srac this, more 
than internal diet atorsbip, that ct#'wzdod Gray az his co1leaVe3 and 





V, ]. 4. v. 1914, CAB. 35. 
2s Rep Disraeli (1966), p. 146. 
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was felt capable of acting. In a more wayward, capricious and eggrecaive 
manner than Övernments bobolden to publio opinion At tome., Polioq Was 
open to the influence of irreopof$ible c1iquas and cabala, and its harmony 
could be upset by the idiosyncrasies of individual personalities. Even 
tho Rnasophile Sir Artkar Nicolson could write that Russia-V °af 
autocratic# and if you like Some uns= *z1ous, Government""2' In February, 
1914, Gertie found Grey to be; 
"very much preoccupied. at the internal situation in 
Aussie and the vacillating polic7 of the Russian 
Government in foreign at airsp the result, ot 
contending factions at court and the wcekneas of 
the Ezperor and want of concord in the Russien 
Cabinet. N2 
In cons®qts=o the Foreign Office felt uneasy when dealing faith Russia: 
there was always the- fear that. she might... do the unexpected, This is 
important for as understanding of the nervous character of British policy 
towards Riiu-iduring the war* 
more 
Russian power seemed the/dangerovs and daunting when (attar 1912) 
she began to re-organise her armed for'oesp to, put her Pinena. s in sound, 
order, and to embark on a process of rapid industrialisation. In the 
year or so before the outbreak of uar, it, was widely believed that Russia 
would soon outstrip GermwW as Europe'o .z 
a4or military power: Undoubtedly 
Russia's military might vas exaggerated. Men tended to forget the 
drawbacks of a oeutrallaeä bureaucracy they saw an autocratic systow . 
I Nicolson to 8erditgoi ll. vi. 1914, (copy # Carzock Papers, F. 0.800 379. 2 2"iecºoranäun by Dortiaj, 16. ii. 191.4, Bertie Papers# P. 0,800/168, 
3 See especially the correspor once between Nicoloon and Buchanan in the 
Carnock Papars. 
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a singular advantage in any astained pursuit of iaternetiafai power*, 
5trangely, it vas Liberals in the, ßlabtonian tradition, men who. praisad 
the efficiency of individual enterprise,, who bz Weht out this argument most 
frequently. Lord Morlsy'told. C. P, $cott that: 
"Russia was rapidly, becoming a . manaca 
to Europa with 
her vast and rapidly increasing population and also 
her rapidly increasing procpsrity. Tho Duna was no 
cback tu the ambitions of the ruling cLazsea. Gorme y, 
he thought, was right and she would need every man. 'l 
But the argument was also used by Consa'vatives,, Arthur Nicolson, 
comparing Buy ian aud British powert urotes 
Russia hod an autoaratio Governmmt$ with unlimited 
reiouroes at its disposal, while on the other hand 
we have a country with a parliamentary Government 
with vary limited means at its disposal and obliged 
to consider political and parliamentary exigencies 
at home, There is little doubt under such conditions 
which country is likely to gain the upper band 
enentual], y"2 
Fashirr_ablo geopolitical. doctrine a3. sa' tended to encourago an 
overestimation of Russian power#- Tha Russian "heartland" appeared as an 
impregt: able fortress, Grey thought Gaxmant uou]4 never be able to indict 
a decisive military defeat on Rusßia. Whatever i . tial . successes Germamr 
obtained, Bussia, vould, bar able to retiro deep into her Eurasian citadels 
obere be would vwnmon up reserves ot'' spiritual and physi0a3.. povar which 
would ensure her eurviv'at if not her triumph. 
3 
pit the Gerwex, a vin, O he speculated in September, , 
1911, 
"Pussian milita. »ism will doiato the whola of Europe* 
with the exception ot, Russia$ who will remain a power in 
. 
the east of :. rope end. in Asia, " 
I Mem rard', by C, . $S ottj 29-34. v. 19l4s äcottº Fapira, add"50901. 
2 Nio61$oU to Harditge$ 'U. vi. 1914i (copy), Carriock Paper , 7.0.800/374. 
3 Grey -t3 B ertieO ß. v. 1914,3 «D. y (ii)i 341. 
4 Grey to Roosevelt! 10. u. 1914: quoted in Grey, vo1. II, pp. 138-139i also 
Grey Ptp"rv, ß, 0.800/110" 
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Just as Britain was the suprsms, example, of a, great,, sea-based Empire in the 
style of Mahon, ' so Russia was the outstanding, example of 
a land-based 
Empirat_ each as dominant and immutable, protected by the theories of 
Empires. 
The exaggeration of R4asian power was of saM3 atgnificance for, like 
Italy in the 19; 0's, bor bargaining, po titian Was rmtch stronger than " in 
retrospect it sppetxed, Unless this e1» merit of misjudgement is understoodp 
it is easy to misunderstand the concessions that came to be made, 
In the 7irst World War, as in tbo Second, Britain and Russia had 
little more in cournön than a mutual enemy, In the Balkans and in Persia 
their policies were in direct opposition. Both these problems were 
carried ouörtr_om the pro-war era into war alms, and it is easiest to 
follow them through the internal. debate in the Foreign Office, 
The : 05-Ixecnae- of Russian power fron 1912 cards did net only atfeat 
Germany, it, cast a shadow over Britainva position in Poreia &n1ýGontral. 
Asia. Moreover., Rubsia, cone aioua of hör growing strength, began to pursue 
a more forceful policy In the Balkan:; a policy which threatened to involve 
Britain in oontli. ots in vhich she had no interest. There arose two 
schools of thought as bow best to meet the Russian menu oo. The one was 
represented by Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir George Buch&nan; the other by 
Sir William Tyrrell and Sir Edward Gr®y4 
Buchanan felt that, the enormity of Ftuaßian, power obliged Britain to 
tallow her bidding. He argued tout-a breach in the Entente would have a 
most unfavourable effect on Britain e position in Persia and the Esst. 
2)2. 
Sa$amows who was not the most serene of men, helped to encourage his 
anxieties by engaging in periodic displays of ill-temper. The manners of 
the Russian Foreign Minister anticipated those of 'bis, Bolshevik, sugo ssors. 
Buahsnsn*e despatches ore full of references to Sassnow'a histrionics. A 
fairly typical report rats 
"I have never seefit Sasanow so angry,, and hip tamper 
is not unlikely to be impro'ved by the memorandum 
(on Persia) Sir Edward Grey is going to give 
ßb Gndorff. "1 
He set down all his doubts and tears about Anglo-ftssiaa relations in 
lengthy letters to the Permanent Under Secretaz7 2 
licolson took up BuchananI e arguments with the Foreign Secretary. 
Nieolson was enormously pro-Russian; he would roter unashamedly to "my 
beloved Russians«"3 An atistocrat'NA by births a paternalist by temperament, 
and a conservative by conviction, hei. $aW little untoward in the political 
system of Teerist Russia. The fear that Russia would find Britain an 
unsatisfactory friend became a near obsession. In 1913 and 1914 his 
correspondence vu tilled 'with references to the grave dangers involved in 
offending Russia. 
Tyrrell and Grey looked at the Russian problem in a differrent"light. 
The Anglo-Ruaeian agreement over Peroia had toyer worked wells Russian 
agents methodically,, WA in defiance of the agreements tightened their grip 
on 1orthorn Pereis, and extended their int]uenoe into the neutral sore. 
1 Buchanan to Nicolson,, ll. vi. 1914 Cannock Papers, F. 0.800 379. 
2 See Carnock Papers. 
3 Wiaolson to Buohanang 15. ii1.1915, (copy), 7.0.800/377" 
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Her pölioy of organising the Balkan States against Turkey and Auatria 
threatened to'involve Britain in dangerous squabbles, and perhaps even 
in war. They recognised the importance of maintainizºg the Entente, but 
insisted that Russia had to be brought to heel. Tyrrell found Hicolson's 
policy hopelessly passives and zamplained to Sir Valentine Chirol about 
the attitude of the Permanent Under Secreteryi 
'who still wanted to leave the Russians to pipe 
the tune and us to dance to it whatever it may be. x 
Tyrrell Vaat®d to use the Anglo-German detente as a leger to eovew 
conoeesioas out of Russian 
"uillia* Tyrrell is very perky indeed, ' Chirol wrote 
Hardinge in April 1913, he "thinks that all Is for 
the beat of all. possible European and paints our own 
position as absot tely rauleag da rose., He seems 
to think that we can now snap our fingers at the 
Triple Alliance and at France and Russia, upon the 
latter of whom he had gone back in the most astonishing 
%157 ... He. 4. s convinced . t* that we are, relieved 
... * from the German menace and can therefore take a 
somewhat firmer line with Russia without compromising 
the Entente. "2 
It was to Tyrrellfe advice that Grey listened. In 1913 and 1914 
he pursued a_puch tougher policy in Persia, and refused to co-ordinate 
Anglo-Ruasian policy in the Balkans 
3 He Insisted that the beat policy 
, was to a*-operate with German' in #üropei and argued that to allow Russia 
to dictate Britain' s policy in Balkan di spites Would . an that Britain 
1 Chirol to iiardinge# 23. x. 1913, Hardings Paperas rol. 71. 
2 Chirol to Herdizge, L8. iv. 1913, lierdir%ge Papers, vol. 93. 
3 dote do Miniotre, 4. iv. 1914, D. D. F. (3rd Series), X, p"269" 
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rwu ,,; dragged idA-a quax 
dis in which she had no interest. 
l äi9Dlson 
bitterly resented Grey's policy, and his letters are filled with thinly 
veiled oritioismas 
NI tear" he wrote to Huabanan in Aprile 1914, 
"that before long we shall find that this hesitating 
policy will lead to unfortunate results and we 
shall find ourselves being given up as untrustworthy 
and undecided friends. This increases my fear lest 
Russia in giving us up in despair will take steps 
towards bringing herself into closer relations with 
Germany, and of course such a new course on. her 
part would seriously react upon our relations witi! i 
her in the Mid(dle) and Far East. "2 
It was the Sarajevo crisis that brought Anglo-Russian differences into 
3 
the open* Grey refused to join Russia e in bullyingViennaj hm absolutely 
declined to consider going lo war as long as the conflict concerned only, 
Germany, Austria! Rnss-'u and Serbiaj4 he refused Russian requests to 
threaten Germany with British interveotion. 
5 
Grey was by no means the 
most extreme in his suspicions of Russia] Bertie and many members of the 
Cabinet freely stated that Russia was the aggressor. 
' 
When Britain 
entered the war, it was not as the ally of Rdssiap but as the defender of 
her own interests in the North-West of Europe. Anglo-Russian differences 
over Persia were to continue without respite. 
1 Grey to Buchanan# 7. Y. 1914, (copy)* Grey Papers, F. 0.800/74. 
2 Nicolaon to Buchenaa 7. iv. 1914, (copy), Carnock Papers, F. 0.800/374. 
3 Chapter II. 
y Grey to Buchenaa, tel., 25. vii. 1914i B. D. YID 112. 
5 Chapter II. 
6 Bertie, Viscount of Thane, pik 19 L-1918 (193), "ol. I, p. 2. 
7 Lord Crewe's answer to queationaaire of J. A. Spender and`Protessor 
Teaperley, Spender Papers, add. 46386. 
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4. -g&t to j oye®ber. 1914. 
At the outset of the, war in Europe there, had been praotioally. no 
joint Anglo ussian military or naval planning. Military, talka, b d been 
ruled out on the grounds that aqr British expeditionary force would be 
seat to the test of Europe to fight alongside the French Azny. 
l Almost 
certainly the ulterior motive was to avoid entanglements with Russia. 
, glo-Russian naval talke had hardly got under war when events were overtaken 
by the coming of war. 
2 To make mattere worse communioations were poor. 
In 191.3 the General Staff had ooze out in favour of a direct Wireless link 
to. Russia* but nothing-seems to have been done about this. furthermore,. 
" it was felt to be dangerous to send military information by tel. egrambeaause 
it was suspected that the Germans had the cypher of the Russian Embassy in 
I Grey to Bertie, - l. v. 1914, B. D. x (11)0 , 541, 2 In his The Stru¢Qle for Mastery in Europe (1954), pp"512-513, Mr" 
A. J. P. Taylor states that the reasons for the delay in Anglo-Russian 
naval talks was that the Cabinet made them conditional upon an 
. agreement over Persia. Mr. 
Taylor has provided no footnote which 
would indicate where he gained this intelligence. It would seem 
that he based his conclusion on a Minute by Oliphant, 7"iv. 1914, 
H. D. X (ii) 537. This suggestion was never acted upon - Asquith 
to ging George V, . 14. v. 1914, CAB. 41/35. , The reason for the delay in talks was that Churchill did not think that the Russian Iaval 
Attaohg in London. was a sufficiently elevated personage to deal with 
such matters - Churchill to Grey, 14. vii. 1914, Grey Papers, 7.0.800/88. 
The talks were, to be negotiated by Battenberg when he visited his.. 
Russian relatives in August, 1914 - Battenberg tooNicolson, 23. x. 49141 
. Minute by 
Nicolson, 25. r. 19141 Minute by Grey, c. 25. v. 1914, Carnock 
Papers, 7,0.800/374" 
3 C. I. D. Meeting, ll. iv. 1913, -CAB. 2/3. 
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i London. What was known of Russian plans was hardly encouragi ;,.,, $hey 
involved an advano® an Austria. 
2 
Throughout the early part of the 'war the Hriti®h Government were 
continually complaining that Russia was not fully co-operating with har 
allies. Asquith wrote to King George Yr 
More is a strong feeling in the'Cabinet that the 
Russian military authorities should be more ready 
than tbQy have hereto 'shown themselves to take 
both the French and ourselves in their, oontidenoes. "3 
This distrust and exasperation was but the manifestation ot-political 
tensions and deep-rooted ausploions that', IV beneath, -There existed a 
tear that' Russia `would seize the opportunity to realize gains at the 
expense of Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, and would leave Britain and 
Franca'' in the lurch i* the vital struggle with Germany. 
Britain had only been at war for a single day when the sinister pattern 
of Auseian . intentions reeked "to come to 2. i&, 4,,. 'lt "appeared that 'Sa: anow 
van preparing for a war in the Balkans. and ' against Turkey at-just the moment 
when Britain needed her to throw all her'weight against Germaxy. - on 6 
August, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs-telegraphed to his 
ambassadors in London and Paris that, he had information that the-Austrian 
fleet, possibly aided by Turkish sd German vessels, would attack", Russia 
a -- in the Blsok' Sea. 
4 At the: some 'timet and -0ithout, consulting, Britain and 
1 Miaute by Grey, ' 19. i"1915, on Churchill to H. I. H. the Grand Duke 
Nicholas, tel., 19. i. 1915, Grey Papers, 7.0.800/75. The point being 
that the Russians would transmit information back to their Embassy 
in London. The Russians were themse2MeM not free from sharp practice; 
they had the most complex system of espionage of all the'Powers. The 
British Embassy at St. Petersburg had to suffer Russian agents 
masquerading as servants and the Russian Foreign Office regularly 
tapping the telegraph to London. 
2 Buchanan, G. y Mi, lifsSipnin R sijL. 
(1923), vol. I,, p. 216.; 
3 Asquith to ging George V, 22. ßc. 1914,9, : 
CAB., ý, ]/35. 
, 4 Sazanov to Benckendor ff, tel., 6. viii. 1914', Int. Bes. (3ariss 11) VI, 13" 
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France, negotiations were begun at Bucharest with a view to bringing 
Roumania into the war. 
1 
By the 8 August, Saeanow was olaiming that the 
German . Military Mission trag in 
full , control at Constantinople and there 
could. be , no doubt of Turkey'. a intention to , enter, the war* Russia asked 
fora joint warning to the Ports that an, act of war against one of the 
Esitente Powers would be considered as an act of va against them all"2 
The logic of Russian policy seemed inescapable when# on 13 August, there 
3 
came news that she was sending troops down to her frontier with Turkey. 
Russia was plotting war against the ottoman Empire. 
Russian intention vets a source of multiple embarrassments to Britain. 
The ey$tem of imperial defence Was untried. Grey, as always fearing the 
uorstp felt that the Empire might not be equal to the strains of var. 031 
the 2 August, when he had told Cambon that the Britieh. Fleet would protect 
the northern shores of France, he'. had held, out no hope of. sending an army 
4 to the continent. It would, he explained#, be needed in Egypt and India. 
He again expressed his, apprehensions: at the famous meeting of the War 
Council od 5 'August. 
5 
The problea of imperial detenoe well linked to a second danger, that 
of offending Muelix opinion in the Empire. The India Offices the Government 
of xndii ar3 Kitchener 'Were aonvinc d that Moeleme, in India and Egypt 'Would 
I Buchanan to Grey, '5. viii. i914, to]., 'F. 0.37 21 36298; Minute-by, 
Nioolson,. 5. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/2162/36451. 
2 Sasanow to Benckondortt, tel., 6. viii. 1914i Int. Be$. (Series 2), VI, 13. 
3 Grey to'Buchanan, tel., 13. viii. 1914,7.0.371/2171/38796. 
!, Cambon to Viviani, tel., 2. viii. 1914, D. D"F. (series 3), Ili 612. 
5 CAB. 22/1. 
6 Asquith to King George V, 17. viii. 1914, CAB. 4V, 5. 
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have grave misgivings about a liar with Turkey. , It would, they argued, be 
most hazardous to risk upsetting tens of millions of Moslems. 'If war with 
Turkey was indeed inevitable, then the world would have to know that it was 
she and not Britain and her allies, who had willed it. Grey was powerfully 
influenced by these arguments. When Sir Eyre Crowe, who at that moment 
was not Greyl o favourite civil servant1' oounse]. led strong action against 
Turkey, ' Grey somewhat petulantly rebukea him$ 
Nthose who consider Mohammedan opinion in India and 
elsewhere are firmly of the opinion that the first 
act of war must come from Turkey and not from um 2 
In August, 19141, the Foreign Office 'and the India office' hastened to 
prepare propaganda for Indian consumption in case matters came to'an open 
breach with the Ottoman Fuipire. 
3 
Thus for reasons of imperial aeaurity, and in order to ensure that 
Russia devoted all her energies to the war against Germany, it was essential 
that Auasla should Dot make Isar on Turkey. 
Grey embarked on a series of diplomatio ploys to frustrate-any Russian 
attempt to extend the var'to the ottoman Upire and the Balkans. He began 
by refusing to, co-operate in the I, toumanian hegotiatione. I In part, this 
sprang'from a wish not to be involved in the politics of Eastern and Central 
Eurnpe. 
4 But there was also an ulterior motive, that of sabotaging Russian 
attempt& to gain military allies ir, a preliminary to an attack upon Turkey. 
I Minute by Grows, 224111-19141- 0.371, /1970/3ä711. '' 
2 Mixuta by Gray$ undated, o. 22. viii. l9]4, 'x'. 0.371/1970/36711. 
3 F. 0.371/213d/43829. 
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Had Grey really wanted to help to bring Roumania into the war, then he could 
have helped Saxanow in a number of ways; instead he dismissed all idea of 
assisting Russia to gain Roumania as an ally, Aen 5azanow reduced his 
appeals for help to. a simple guarantee of Roumanian integrity for the 
duration of the var$ Gray refused even to consider such a steps 
"It does not seem necessary to alter our last 
instructions .... whioii. really covers the point. ", 
It wes 'a proposal made by the Greek Prime Minister that provided the 
centrepiece of Grey' s opposition-to 5azawv. on 10 August, the British 
Ambassador at Athens reported that Veuizelos wanted to reconstitute the 
Balkan League so that all the Balkan States could come into the war united 
on the side at the allies. 
2 
without consulting Paris or St. Petersburg, 
Grey gave hie fä11 support to the sohemo, 3 Superficially his enthusiasm 
for the Balkan Confederation plan was straightforward: to bring all the 
Balkan States in on the side of the Triple Entente. In fact the logic, was 
more tortuous. He did not vant to bring the Balkan States into the warf 
but to keep Russia out of the Balkens and to make her, ponoentrste on the 
war with Germany. Grey made no attempt to make Venieeloe! scheme work, 
end insisted on it only to frustrate Russian diplomacy. We can deduce 
that this was Gray's real motive from the comments of others. On 21 August,, 
Clerk noteds 
"we are. willing to pay a . 
fair price for peace in the 
Backaus just now too, but I -believe that it "puld be better for us and-the-world , if Turkey throw in her lot with Germany and we'devoted our efforts to the 
Belkam Confederation suggested by No 'Qenizalos. "4 
1 Suanow to Bsnckendorff, ll. viii. 1.914 (communicated by Benckendorlt), 
and Minute by Grey, undated, c. ll. viii. 1914# 
2 8rskine to Grey, tel., 10. 'viii. 1914, T. 0.3711216h/37861. 
3 Gray to Buchanan and Bortie, tcl., lLviii. 1914, ß`"D"371, %2164/37661. 
4 Minute by Clark, 21. viii. l9l4p F. U. 371/19OO/1147ß. 
202. O 
This ass vritten some ten days ifter Gr®y bad instructed Buchanan thatt 
"H(is) M(ajeatyts) G(overnment) thiDk'thie project should 
be encouraged and supported in every way possible and 
hope that he (Minister for Foreign Affairs) shares this 
view. " 
Support for the Balkan Confederation plan did-not immediately have 
the deeired effect. Sazemv told ý Buchanan that the idea was aN chimera". 
He asked what Britain would do if Greece came to the aid of Serbia were 
the latter attacked by Turkey or HW. gar a. 
2 
At a time when eyerything 
seemed to hang on battlers in `ran©e eM ßelgiump the news that Russia 
opposed the Balkan Confederation, proposal was taken as an ominous sign. 
Clerk advired: 
"S Venture to suggest that M*, Sazenaw's view as here, 
reported# and what we are told of Russia's attitude 
towards Turkey shows a dergeroua teudency. N3 
That, waning (13 August)! Vicolson told Bsnckeudortf that Russia should not 
try to extend the war to Turkey tor z 
it vould be unfortunate it efforts to this end 
(defeating Germalw) were diverted to side issues. " 
Grey warmly-approved of the lotion of his Permaaeat Under Secretary. 
5 
ßussian assuraaoes,. tkºat no troops ware being held back for a war against 
Turkey did little to alley British fears* On 15 Augusta the Foreign 
Seoretsry inprasood upon the Eisaisw assador: 
I Grey to Bucheaen* tel., 11. viii. 1914, y. 0.371/2164/37861. 
2 Buchanan to Grey, tel., 14. viXl. 2914, F. 0.371J1900/39166. 
3 Minute by Clerk,, 14. viii. 1914, F. O. 371/19U0/39166. 
4 Minute by Hico]. sonf 14. viii. 1914# 7. O"371/217]/39446. 
5 Miaute by Grey, undated, c. 14. rii14914,7, O, 37l/2171. /39tº46. 
6 Buchanan to Grey, tel. j 14"viii. 1914, P. O. 372/2171/39214« 
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"how desirable it was not to fasten any quarrel on 
Turkey during the present war is long as she 
remained neutral. It would be very embarraaaing 
to us# both in India aM in Egypt*, if Turkey came 
out against us. " 
The war, he ergusd, would be decided in the forthcoming battles in the 
North-West of Europe; ell allied efforts should be directed towards 
winning those battles the Triple Entente should forget about Turkeyj 
they should undertake to respect the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire as 
long as Turkey remained neutral. 
I 
It was against this background of strained. Anglo-Ruesian relations 
that Grey first raised the question of Constantinople and the Straitat 
He promised Russia that it she co-operated and Turkey misbehaved, then 
she could realise her ambitions against Turkey without British opposition. 
On 13 August, he gave assurances that any Turkish successes would be "wiped. 
out in (the) terms of peace. n2 On 15 Auguat, he told B enakendorttt 
*If Turkey sided with German r and Austria$', and they 
'here defeated then we oould not answer for what 
might be taken from Turkey In Asia Minor. " 
On the next days, be telegraphed to Cowtentinople and informed the Porte of 
the consequences of etitarisag the wax; 
"IOU (Mallet) should make it quite clear that 
neutrality does mean security for Turkey, but that 
it Turkey sides against as there are no limits to. 
the loss that she may inaur. "/+ 
1 Grey to BuahaiU 1 tal, v'15. riij. 1914, l P-0-371/2138/401+33*,. 
2 Grey to Buah«uan, tel:, 13. viii. 19l4, 
. 
F. 0.371, /2171/38796. 
3 Grey to Buohanan, 'tel., 15. iii. 1914* )'. O. 371/2138/40438. 
4 Grey to 24allet, tal., 16. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/2172/40069. 
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what exactly did Grey ai*n when he told the Russians that "we could 
not answer for what might-be taken from Turkey in Asia Minor"? That it' 
was an au, )idental slip may be za1edýouts there were three separate 
references to the same point within the space of tour days. Nor was it 
a statement o: British claims, or even a suggestion for the general. 
dismembarment of Turkey. 3ºbatever ambitious Britain had in the Middle 
East they did not lie in Asia )äner. At this time the term Asia Minor 
was used quite loosely, but its maximum extent was Anatolia and the 
northern areas of modern Syria; by no stretch of the imagination would it 
have included Mesopotamia or any other region where Britain wanted 
expansion. If Grey had been cynical enougbtto have been proposing a 
division of the Ottoman Empires, he would not have been ao negligent as to 
have spoken only of Asia Minor. He was clearly referring to Russian 
ambitious, ' and saying that. he would not oppos: Russian claims against 
Turkey. Indeed, in referring ope*ifically to Asia Minor he was making 
this gtite clear to the Russians. 
What then was Russia being promised? In November, 1914, eben a very 
similar sequence of events prompted a very similar offer, Grey specifically 
offered Constantinople uxd the Straits. It would not be unreasonable 
to assure that this was what he had in mind in August. At about this time 
(aid-August), -Clerk, one of the Foreign office experts on Turkeys recorded 
whet he thought would be the likely extent of Russian chimes 
"The real difficulty to ®y mind will-be the ultimate 
fate of Goustantinopie, we-know what Russia will insist 
on in that respect,. and I can only. say that if we can 
contrive to keep the Asiatic aide of the Boaphorous and 
the Dardanelles in the hands of one Power, and the 
European aide in that of another, the difficulty is 
greatly leäseued""1 
1 Minute by Clarks 21. viii. 1914,7.0.371/1900/41470. 
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Both Grey and Sasanow subsequently referred to the promiaea of 
August, 1914; though in both. cases their. soonfessions" were of a rather 
elliptical natýzra. In his meisoira Sazanow' mentioned that even before the 
outbreak of war with Turkey. Russian ambitious had been agreed to; Sasanow 
neglected to reveal the circumstances thereby this cameo about*I Grey let 
the story slip In the War Council meeting of 10 i4erch,, 1915. Opposition 
leaders and the Liberals were W. scuasing whether Britain. ought to agree to 
formal Russian demands for Constantinople and the Straits; end the Foreign 
Secretary alluded to what had happened in typically indirect way: if 
Britain were to reject Russian deme. nds1-then: 
 3ussia might claim that the aacriticea ehe: had made 
in East Prussia in the early days of the war had 
saved the Allies from deteat. "2 
His tboughts uerep no doubts turning back to August, 1914, when Britain and 
Franca had so urgently needed to secure the bid of the Russian armies: 
In late August the'vision of a Rucso-Turkish war receded. However, 
while the danger diminishe4 it was never far from the surface, and in late 
September it came to the fore again= and in an even more pernicious form: 
a Russo-Turkish War in PeLsia. 
For Britain the A410-Russieu Persian Agreement was in theory a model 
arrangement. It was contrary to Bxitain'a strategic principles to have 
oommon lend1'Yrontiers with powerful Continental Powars: Spheres. o! 
influence p'rotected Britain's interests in the Persian Gulf, While leading 
3' Sasanow, S., JAUX91-12111,1928,, p. 252. 
2 CAB. 22/1. 
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to no great extension of military burdons and financial strain., -Spheres 
of in: ]uenoe with a neutral zona had, all the adveategeo of partition with 
! ow of ttaa reapinsibilitiea. In fact the arrangement did not work well. 
The Auaaiene. adopted a very uzaatistactory policy towards their 
"aphere of influence". Russian agents methodically tightena1 their grip 
on northern Persia and extendax their nation' a influence into the neutral 
zone. Grey found himself caught in a cross-fire of domestic opinion. 
Imperialists argued that Russian encroachment was a threat to Britain's 
position in the Persian Gulf1 radicals hold that 1907 agreement had helped 
Tsarist autocracy to extend its cruel rule to a people who bad. long 
cherished their indeperydence. 
ý' Yet there was no very of going forward 
from or back upon the agreement of 1907. Britain had to uphold her 
iuterssts in Persia in order to secure the-Preien Gulf and the safety of 
the Inidian sub-continent.. Moreover, the nev .y acquired interests in, the 
Persian oil fields were of imeanae eooromto and strategic importance. Tot, 
neither-the Indian treasury for Whitehall could afford to foot the bill of 
partition, and on the eve of war Persia bad again become the focus of 
Anglo-Russian tensions. 
At. the end of August, 1914, Sasamw expreaead his apprehensions about 
the, rising tide of German influence at-Teheran. He suggested that the 
Koje. and Herbeia should be offered to Persia it order to secure her 
Adhesion to the side of the Triple Entento. 
2 
The proposal was not well 
received in Lordon.. Persia vas hardly ery use eis a military ally; indeed 
1 See in particular the last full-scale debate on foreign policy before 
the war in Gommona, 29. vi. 19]4, parliamentary Debates# Gounans+5th Series, 
vol. LXVXY., 
2 Sasanow to Henaken1orfl, tel. , 30. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/2080/4532B. 
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her assistance vbuld bale been- a poeitiYe liability. It. was . felt that . 
if there was trouble at Teheran then it was tot. of äritain&e making. For 
years tho F. uus". ens had been, alienating Persian opinion by their forward 
policy- and their bullying behaviour. An far as the Foreign Office was 
concernad the Buscians could reap what they had eown. Moreover! Persia 
was a Shiah Powers und it was considered that aW transfer of territory 
to her would strain the loyalty of Moslems in India, who were prodomiaantly 
Sunni. 
1 The Government at India and the India Office had designs on 
N! ®sopotamia, aud had na itatention of aiowing Russia to give awry territory 
that would compromise the security of future Britich possessioDs":. 
No pooaer had the Russien proposal been di1ested than reports began 
to come in of fighting between Turkish and Russian detachments Deer 
Azerbaijan-, 
4 Tho Persien Government saw an opportunity, to turn the tide 
of , Russian enaroechma t. -Persia doolared horu3 to be wutral, and . 
insisted that Russian troops should eva=de hor territory. 
5 
Throughout 
October there were clashes between Turkish and Russian troops, and the 
Persians became ever more insistent that foreign troops leave jzer soil. 
By the end of Octobers the stage seemed set for a fill-scale Russo-Turkish 
war in Persia. On 30 October, a Turkish flotilla attacked Russia in the, 
Black Bea. 
The 'situation wa: one of th3 most acute delicacy and danger. If 
1 Minute by Crowe, 2. i c. 1914, F. O. 3720804546. Viceroy to Secretary 
at State for India, Lot., 10. ix. 1914, F. 0.37]/2060/5855t. 
2 Viceroy to Secretary of State for Indias tel., 1D. ix. 1914, P. 0.371/2080/ 
58551. 
3 India Office to Foreign Office, 12, ix. 1914, F. O. 37]/2080/49001. 
4 7.0.371/2080/46559. 
5 P. 0.371/2080/56208j 7,0.371/2080/57458. 
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Russia were to turn her energies to a conflict in Persia against Turkey, 
she would have little to spare for the war against Germany. Were she 
successful in grabbing Persian and Turkish territory, she might become 
satisfied with the fruits of war and contemplate peace. A peace which 
would leave her with a gommanding position in the Middle East. Even were 
Russia not successful, she might succeed in driving Persia'into the hands' 
of Turkey and Germany. This would have a most disturbing effect on Muslim 
opinion in India. - Thus it was vital for Britain to ensure that Russia 
did not mount a campaign against Turkey through Persia. 
It is hard to weight precisely the relative importance of each of 
these fears in the overall desire to keep Russia out of Persia. The 
Foreign Office was genuinely, concerned about opinion in India and those 
in England who'would draw uncomfortable parallels between the German 
violation of Belgian neutrality and a Russian violation of the neutrality 
of Persia*' However, it would seem that the main concern was with Britain's 
position in the Persian Gulf, and the need to prevent Russian ascendency in 
that area. Grey found it easier and more tactful to play on sentiments in 
India and at'home when explaining British apprehensions to Russia. On 
one"occa'sibn Clerk advised: 
"we should use the argument of opinion here-and in 
India as sparingly as possibles it makes the Russians 
suspicious and if we always bring it out it loses 
weight. "2 
Of Britain's determination to keep Russia out of Persia there was no doubt. 
1 F. 0.37 2080 76008. 
2 Minute by Clark, 25. xi. 1914, F. 0.377, /2080/74916. 
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If the Russians tried to mount a wax in Persia, than: 
"it will lead to an open 'c; uarrel between fusaia and 
H(is) M(a Jo stye a) 41"1. 
Grey's position was quite ex xaýxäý s rý ý; difý'icult. He could not 
simp1y appeal for Rnaaian mod*xetioU, Rueeia had boon attacke3 by Turkey, 
and she was entitled to protect hTrae3. f. The Foreign hecretary tent- 
back to the idea of buying Russian co-operation with offer of Constantinople 
and the Straits. 
On 1 November, Grey telegraphed to Buchanan and instructed him to: 
"earuaet17 impress upon (the) M(inister) (for) . F(oreign) A(ffairs) that the inevitable war with 
Turkey may be a strain on Mohsmmedann opinion In 
India and Egypt. It is therefore easantiel that 
the Russian Government should do all in their 
power to ease the strain and help us to conciliate 
Mussulmen opinion by being most friendly to Persia 
and avoid(ing) all harohnooo there. .;,.. M(iniater) (for) F(oreign) £ (flair a) should realij3 the 
necessity of impressing on all Russian personnel in 
Persia that a conciliatory std friendly attitude there 
is essential. There may be no limit to the 
embarrassment and weakening of our hands that. may 
be caused unless the war with Turkey is set off by 
(a) bonavolent attitude in Persia. " 
In roturn Ruacia could realise her own claims against Turkey without British 
opposition: 
"Turkey has etown herself ft orrigible and impossible, 
ant deserves and should rocoivo no considaration ... o 
we give up all plea for consiäoration as for as 
Turkey is concerned. "2 
On 2 Novembers tha Cabinet tuet. The culminative effects of Turkey' e 
1 Minute by Clerk, 29. x11.1914# ]NO -37V2080 87677" 
2 Grey to Buchman, tel., l. ci. 1914, F. 0.377, /2060/65615" 
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hesitating diplomacy had broken the last threads of British sympathy towards 
her. Churchill- had set his heart on using the offer of Turkish territory 
as a bait to bring the Balkan States into the war. ' Kitchener considered 
that Turkey had behaved O to disgracefully that .. e ve. should not forget 
after the war is over. "2 His ambitions may have already been turning 
towards dreams of a land-route from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gult. 
3 
Lord Crewe wanted to absorb Mesopotamia into the British Empire. 
4 Lloyd 
George hated the Turks with all the fire of his high-minded, Low Church 
background. 
5 There were negotiations with the drabs to obtain their moral 
and material support in the conflict with their Ottoman masters. Asquith 
reported to the Kings' 
Nbaaaeforward Great Britain must finally abandon the 
formula of 'Ottoman Integrity' whether in Europe, or 
is Ania. "6 
The way was open for even further conceaaions to Russia. 
The Russian Government, far from drawing back from Persia$ seemed firm 
in their resolve to tight their Turkish war on her territory. 042 
November, Sassnov explained to the British Ambassador that he vould do 
all be could to lall in with Grey's wishes# but tbats 
1 Churchill to Grey, 23. iac. 1914, Gray Papers, P. O. 800 S8. 
2 Kitchener i»ter, undated, o. mid-September, 1914; these notes are 
made on 10 Downing street letter paper, so they were probably made 
at a Cabinet meeting, possibly that of 23. ix. 1914 when the abinet 
discussed the question of Turkey in some detail# Grey Papers, 
F. 0.800/88. 
3 Jukka Zievakiva' e, 
l9]3.19]. 6, published in Stu di_e_s 1; j nternat International History 1967)v edited 
by Boumsy K., and Watt, D. C., pp. 316-329, is a precise and sensitive 
study of litchenerta attitudes. 
!. India Office to the Foreign Officer 12. ix. 1914, F. 0.371/2080/49001. 
S Memorandum by C. P. Soott, 27. x1.1914, Scott Papers, add. 5O9Ol. 6 Asquith to King George V, 3. ix. 1914# CAB. 42/35. 
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"Turkey would almost oertainly attack Russia on the 
flank through, Aserbaijaz$ d in protecting herself 
on that side ehe, vould aieo be protesting Persia 
from aggression. " 
Buchanan was so alarmed that'he warned', Sazanow not to try to dismember 
Persia. 
i 
At the same time (2 November), Benakendortt informed the Foreign 
Office that Russia was being obliged to strengthen- her forces-in Persia. 
2 
Shortly afterwards it was reported from St. Petersburg that Turkey was 
sending 20,000 troops to attack Russia through Persia* On 30 November# 
Grey found himself obliged to Warn Russia not to try to dismember U-rWU, 
4 
Some dramatic gesture was needed it Russia was to be dissuaded from 
invading Persia. This time Grey deoided to make her a firm otter of 
Constantinople and-the Straits. Be sent a long telegram to St. Petersburg. 
He emphasised the need for the Entente to devote its efforts to defeating 
Germany, and explained that opinion in England might view Russian aggression 
C5 
against Persia in the same light German aggression against Belgium. 
Furthermore, if Russia insisted on carrying the war into Paraia1 Britain 
would be obliged to secure her own interests snd reinforce her garrisons 
in the Middle East. Such a course could only impede the allied war effort 
in Europe. On the latter point Gray was not bluffing, and had Kitchener's 
sanction before he sent the telegram*, - Having stated these disagreeable 
alternatives, Grey proposed a modus r. ni. Yandij iF Russia would not Violate 
Persian neutrality end would concentrate on the war against Germany, then 
Buchan=-to Grey, tel., 2. xi. 19l4p, F. a. 37 2080 330. 
2 Sasanov to 'Benckendorff, tel., 31.7.. 19]. 4, (com®inicated by Beaokendorff), 
7.0.37/2080/66390. 
3 Buchanan to Grey, tel., 12. zi. 19]41 1,0.373, /2171/69994" 
4 Grey to Buchanan] tel., ]0.: 1.1914, P. 0.371/2080/696476 
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"I should like the M(inister) (for), 'F(oreign) A(ffairs) 
to know that however much we may assume a defensive 
attitude in the war with Turkey .... we regard the 
conduct of the Turkish Government as having made a 
complete. settlement of the Turkish question 
including that of the Straits and Constantinople 
in agreement with Russia inevitable. It will of 
course be effected after Germany is defeated and 
whether or not Turkish rule is overthroun in the 
course of present hoetilitiee. "1 
On 13 2 ovember, Xing George V . told the Russian 
ilnbassador that 
Russia must have Constantinople at the end of the, war. 
2 The King'a 
promise was more categorical and less qualified than Grey's had been., 
There is no obvious reason for this discrepancy. It could have been 
that the King, who possessed 
, 
a: rather frank and direct nature;. simplified 
what Grey or Asquith told him to sey The more likely explanation is 
that Grey, who was in no position to give a binding pledge to the Russians, 
tried to use the cordial relations between the King and, the Czar a8 a means 
of adding weight to his promises. 
Grey'e policy had the desired affect* and the Russian agreed not to 
precipitate a contliat in Persia. 
In certain respects it can be observed that British policy towards 
Russia was Yery similar to policy towards Germa y Both Powers were felt 
to be irresponsible and autocratic; in both cases Britain evolved, a policy 
that consisted of pushing them abler from areas where they directly threatened 
British interests; in both cases these interests were seen to lie in 
1 Grey to Buchtn=j tel. i,, 12. x1.19]. /+, F. 0.37 2080 70280; Iut. Be*. (Series 2) V I, 507. 
2 Iut. Bez. (Series 2) VI'l 50b.. 
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strategic needs. Germany was to be driven from the West. of Europe and 
Russia diverted from Persia and the East. 
Policy towards the post-war settlement was working itself out within 
the existing framework of foreign policy. Neither in the manner in which 
it evolved, nor in the institutidne which evolved iti had the problem of 
the peace settlement been considered as something that lay outside the 
scope of the da . to-depp conduct of foreign alfaire. This caused$ at 
least to some extents a failure to grasp the need for stable foundations 
for the peace settlement* Those who were devising British war aims were 
giving little tbought to military and eoonomio developments vhicb made 
nonsense of the vision of security on which their policy was predicated. 
In trying to turn German and Russian ambitions to the east and oentre of 
Europe, they vere creating tensions which in the long run the British Empire 
was not capable of containing. 
S. Movembefi, 1914. to Februar, y 1915, 
Grey suaaaadsd in turniing Russian ambitions away from Persia. 
Unfortunately there was another side to the Russian problem. Russian war 
aims ware direoted not so much towards Turkey as towards Austria-Hungary 
and Germany. After a discussion of war aims with the Russian Foreign 
Minister in Septembers 1914, 'Buohanaza reported grandiose Russian ambitious 
in Central and Eastern Europe. On the questio of Constantinople and the 
Straits, SaaaEow had only: 
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"al]uded vaguely to the neceesity. of regulating the 
question of the Straits in a manner satisfactory to 
Russia and Roumania. "1 
In a long statement of war aims, wade in November, 1914i, the Czar 'elaborated 
rast schemes for re-organisation in, Europe, and. asked for no more than an 
internationalisation of ßonstantinople, 
2 
, 
Grey had been hustled into a 
rather awkward positions he had made promises to Russia in Turkey where 
her ambitions were limited; he had made no promisee as regards Europe, 
where the Ruaaian appetite wee emrmoua" 
This contradiction use the more blatant because of Russia$s poor 
showing+i aber war against Germagy. Kitchener felt that Russia was being 
thrown back on the deeensiye, 
3 
end Field Marshal)' French told Partie that: 
"he did not contemplate the possibility «"* of Russian troops getting to Berlin. s4 
At the same time the pattern of the war on the i3stern 'oat was becoming 
equally gloomy and obvious; . 
territory could only be von back at the most 
terrible coat in blood and treasure. Hanley told Grey that to believe the 
Germans could be driven out of trance was to believe in a "fools paradise", 
and was "hoping for the impoosible""5 Britain and Prance could hardly be 
expected to. fight on to roalize Russian claims against Lustri&. Hungarv and 
Germany. 
L Buchanan to licolson, 13. ix. 1914,, Gernock papers, ro. 8DO/3759 There 
io no doubt that Grey read this despatch, for he wrote in his own hand 
tbs names of the minlisters to wham It was to be circulated. 
2 Pal ologue, vol. I,, pp. 178,187-198; Buchanan to Grey, 23. xi. 1914 
I`. 0.371/2174/74460; tel. from Bordeaux, 2. xii. 194, F. 0.371/2174/71999. 
3. Memorandum by Bertie# 21. xii. 1914, Bertie Papers, F. 0.800/166. 
4 Memorandum by Bartief 21"i. 1915, Bertio Papers, 7.0. x/167. 
5 Hankejr to Grey, 21.1.1915, Grey Papers, F. 0.800/90. 
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The problem was clear: to find Russia some compensat- 
ion in the peace settlement which did not invslve too much 
effort on Britain's part. The answer was equally obvious: 
to substitute claims in Turkey for her war aims in Europe. 
Grey set about persuading Russia to look upon Constantinople 
and the Straits as her reward for her sacrifices in the war: 
he persistently and gratuitously reaffirmed his promises of 
August and November, 19I4. 
In January, 1915, there were rumours that the Government 
of Enver Pasha would be overthrown and a pro-Entente faction 
would seize control. Grey made no attempt to make a negot- 
iated settlement with Turkey any easier by paring down Russian 
claims. He did the reverse, and instructed Buchanan to 
inform Sazanows 
"there are rumours of trouble at Constantinople 
which may result in the overthrow of Enver and 
pro-German policy. This is much to be de-- 
siredp but whatever changes take place there or 
whatever happens durilg the war all I said to 
(the) M(inister) (for) F(oreign) A(ffairs) about 
the settlement as regards Constantinople and 
the Straits at the end of the war holds good 
as far as we are concerned. "I 
In February, 1915, the Foreign Secretary again reaffirmed 
his promises to the Russians. Shortly before the Fleet 
began its bombardment of the Dardanelles$ forte, 'the 
Commander of the Ist Turkish Army Corps at Constantinople 
started negotiations with the British Government through 
Greek intermediaries. He offered to stage a coup d16tat 
at the moment 
I Grey to Buchanan, tel., 14.1.19I5, P. 0.371/2506/4867. 
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the bombardment began. its conditions were that the, Entente would 
recognise his regime W would promise that Turkey suffered "no 
1 
discrimination or petty. " Nicolsott"felt that the, offer should not be 
passed over, because liquidation of the Ottoman Empire would prove a 
"strenuous task". 
2 However, Grey informed the Russians8 
Oil should not propose to negotiate any conditions 
which would impair or ality what I said to (the) 
M(inister) for F(oreign) A(ttairs) about the Straits 
and Constantinople after Turkey attacked Russia in 
October. p3 
There are three points that'ought to be noted about these telegrams, 
Firstly, Grey himself was opposed to Britain extending her Empire at the 
expense of Turkey. ' His object in insioting on Russian claims could not 
have been'to further British ambitions, Secondly, in January and February, 
1915, Russian demands tiara only for an izteraationalination of Constantinople 
and for tree access to the Mediterranean. Had Grey wanted to limit 
Russian gains 'he would 
havi tried to find some compromise formula which 
would have satisfied the Russians and the Turkish opposition party. Instead, 
11 
he wrote Russia a blank oheque as regards Constantinople and the Straits. 
Thirdly, at the time these assurances were given plans for the bombardment 
of the Dardanelles forts were well. under -. r y. Given that this attack 
was a naval one,, a "fifth column" at Constantinople was just what was needed. 
From the military point there was every reason for encouraging the Turkish 
I Elliot to Grey, tel,, 8. ii. 193i, F. 0437 2479149671 Elliot to Grey, 
tel., 9. ii. 1915, F. 0.371/2479/15471. 
2 Minute'by Nioolson, 9.11.1915,7.0.373/2479/1.4967" 
3 Grey to Buobanan, tel., 10.11.19)4,7.0.371/2479/14967. This telegram 
was drafted by Nioolson and Grey specifically altered the sense of Nicolson' e first draft and included the paragraph quoted* 4 War Council Meeting, 10.111.1915, CAB. 22/11 Asquith, iol. II, p. 69. 
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opposition by keeping Russian 
ölnipaasdot s Itoo a minimum Tthe Foreign 
Secretary must therefore have had some very good reason for encouraging 
Russian claims, 
It one looks closely at th , 'wo± itgýoi Greyl c nessages, it, can be seen 
that h3 was not, offering Constantinople aßä the Straits gXA . In early 
November his promises had been carefully tpxalitied. It was 9pocifically 
stated that Russian claims in Tuikoy were to be realised only "after 
Germarq had been defeated". In Jamtary., 1911s he withdrew this stipulations 
and stateds 
"Whatever happens in the war, all. I said to the 
14(inister) for F(oreign) M(ttairs) .... o holds 
good as tar as we aro concerned. * 
This unqualified undertaking was double-edged; while it promised Russia 
Constaatinoplo, it no longer promised the defeat of Germany. The strong 
implication was Russia should not soxpeet Britain to light on until Russia 
had realised her ambition in crape, but Nwhatever happened" Russia would 
receive Constantinople* 
it is from a conversation Grey lied with Colonel Rouse,, early in February, 
1915, that we kaow that Grey was trying to replace Russian wear aims in 
Europe with war aims in Turkey. The two men discussed the peace settlement 
and: 
"He (Grey) thought Russia might be satisfied with 
Constantinople and we (House nd Grey) discussed 
that is some detail. '1 
This was a month before Russia had claimed Constavtinoplef ' and at a time 
1 House to Wilson, 9. ii. 1915, House vol. I, p. 3ä9. 
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when her claims went no further than internationalisation. 
6. aonatentinoolo is Gre4 11 Plan for the Settlement in Eumoe, 
The Russian aoquisition of Coustentthople and the Straits was one part 
of a general-plan for the settlement in Europe. The plan involved` 
inflicting a defeat on Germany aufficientl, T severe that it would precipitate 
the overthrow of the German militar1* pary; the restoration of Alecase- 
Lorraine to France; 'the evacuation a$ indemnity of Belgium; the' ' 
compensation of Russia in Turkey. This peace was to be negotiated through 
American msdi. at p. 
The history of this plan. fBello into two parts. 'Between the middle 
of November, 1934, and the middle of da=. taxyt 1.915, Grey vas toying with 
the idea of a settlement on these linos. 'After the decision to mount a 
naval attack bn the Dardane . lee,, Grey saw that the plan had become a very 
real possibility. Ee set about preparing the way for it by persuading 
Russia to aacept, Constantinople and the Straits instead of gains in Europe. 
In the first two months at the war Grey had dismissed-fit idea o 
American aediation. In September, . 3.93.4, he wrotes 
"Mediation can only become p. -actical on the basis of 
soße terms of peaces it is no use to talk of mediation 
spart from terms. It the U*S. Government has anything 
to put forward, the allies can consider it. Till 
then there in nothing to conider. "1 
By the and of November, -1914, military deadlock end aptimißtia 
st*temants from Vilso had causad Gros to tako a more mallow view of 
1 Minute by Grey, undated, c. 1U. i%. 3.914, j, F. 4.37 217 l8.240* 
2 Despatches from Spring-Rice, Grey Papers, F. 0,800/84. 
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American mediation* when Bertis wrote complaining that Wilson might try 
to act as a mediator#1 Grey replieds 
"Personally I do not ßxoludo"`all. ' idea of United States 
mediation; but if Germany told the United States 
that she wanted peace and asked the President, Wilson 
to approach us, the quasticn of whether we should 
decline to negotiate or not would be one which the 
Allies mist discuss together before any of us could 
answer it. " 2 
He expressed very similar sentimouts to the Rusalana63 
In tact the Foreign Secretary was not quite so Scrupulous. By the 
end of December bu was discussing the basis of the territorial settlement 
in Europe with the° Americans. when, at the very, eand of 19149there were 
rumours that Germatsy might be willing to make peace, Chandler P" Anderson, 
a Secretary at the United States Embassy, was called to the Pareign Office. 
Anderson was about to return home, and Grey gave him a verbal message as 
to the terms of peace of 'the Entente Powers; the evacuation and compensation 
of Belgium; the restoration of the Lost Provincoa to France; Russian 
possession of Constant2Dple and the 3traits. 4 Later, in February 1915, 
the Foreign Secretary told House'm oh the same. 
5 
Substituting Russian 
war aims in Europo for war aims in Turkey was a necessary end, and an 
integral part of a echame to nagotiata poace t uoUgh Amwio*n mediation. 
In both conversations vith Amoriaan envpys Grey rotrained'fom 
committing himself in writing. This waa in order to avoid friction with 
1 Bertie to Grey, 27. xi. 1914, Hertie Papers# r. 0.800/166. 
2 Grey to Bertiei k. xii. 1914, Gertie Papers, F. 0.800/166. 
3 Grey to Buchanan., tel., 12. i. 191 
,P0.3 
ä /? YO l"1 )ý . 212-213. 4 Lick, A. # 'Filson; 
The truaele o pp 
5 House to Wilson, 9.31.1915# ilouau vol. Ii p. 369" 
ZSq 
his allies. The french and the Russians had no idea that Grey vas 
discussing the generral basis of the peace settlement with the United States, 1 -1 
and he made no attempt to enlighten' them. 
The vaq in which Grey conducted theeö negotiations with, the United 
States is reminiscent of the Xuhlmann affairs In both aasos Tyrrell 
was an important (azd p'taps ' de is1ve)' influence. Tyrrs2. l had met mat 
House and Wilson in the 'hinter of 19]3-1914 when he had gone to Washington. 
For a short time, when Spring. tiae, the Ambassador, was ill, he had been 
in charge of the Washington Eabass, ý2 He had made an excellent impression 
on House and Vilson, and thereafter enjoyed the most cord1. at relations 
with House. During the war, and izß spite of his decline, Greg used 
Tyrrell in his negotiations with House, 
3 
The parallels between the two 
negotiations goes deeper, In both caeos there are in the British archiveä 
so records of what had passed; the story aas, only be pieced together 
from foreign sources. Just ms the Fbreign ßffi-. e archives and the Gray 
'Pspera contain no substantial record of Tyrrellis conversations with 
IGihlmann, so they contain no record a# the verbal message given to Anderson# 
or to the Grey-Hou3e"Tyrrel1 conversations of tebruary, 1915. 
one can natice the same subtlety and deviousness in Greyie diplomacy 
as in his relations with Cabinet. This suggests that the accepted image 
of Grey as being a simple-minded and straightforward statesman needs to be 
modified. His policy and his character were a good deal more aomplax than 
this view would lead us to believe 
Chapter II. 
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7. pio1omacv. Stratecnr gnd the Dardar e, e]. 1_ . 
There are two questions that may, be asked about the relationship 
between the strategy of the Dardanelles and the diplomacy of Constantinople. 
Firstlyi were Grey'e colleagues aware that the Dardanelles operations, if 
successful# would have meant Coast xtiZople beire, handed over to the 
Russians? Secoudlys to what extent died political needs influence strategic 
policy? 
All the leading members'of Lsquithls Goveramont knew that Russia was 
to'have Conatantiuople at the end of the cur, and they were, aware of it 
before the decision'was made to mount an attack on the Dardanelles. There 
are no Cabinet minutes for this period, but one can piece 'together what 
other miuistars'were told from the names on the circulation lists for 
Foreign Office documents. 
l 
What is in doubt Is whether other ministers 
grasped how important Russian aoquisition of Constantinople vas to Grey's 
plan for the territorial' settlement in Europe. ^fiere the documentary 
evidence is too alight to pass a definitive judgement. 
. The `sooond question is more comple, %,, and certain general points should 
be acted. The decision to mount an attack on the Dardaaalles was not made 
for any single reasons it flowed fron a complex of motives. Churchill's 
reasons for thinking of the plan'were different from Grey# s reasons for 
supporting it. Moreover* the key men in the linking process between the 
various departments of State - Tyrrell and Hawkey - have left sparse records 
of their desliugss it is difficult therefore to see how the various and 
1 Sse names on circulation list on certain roreign office tiles, e. g. 
F. 0.371//30/70230j '. 7.371/2506/7274. 
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several motives slotted together. One-can-.. only sey that a motive existed, 
one catmot determine precisely. how significant it single motive was in the 
overall decision. 
Thero is a certzJ. n auat of documontazy evidence which indicates, 
that one raason for the DardaneUort cs psign was to gain territory to 
give to Fax: sia. The poiUL is mc4n cbli .: s17 in the report of the 
Dardanolle:: ' ýommics:. oü, This bod º met in 1916p and its purpose was to 
look into the roasons for the Dard U3s and Gallipoli fiascos. The 
Commiaoiouls roport is vsjua and cvasiuo on the question of the political 
motives behind tho campaign. It uas argued (ca, in these cases it, always 
is) that it would not be in the national interest to disclose such matters, 
however, on, paca 19 of their report we find the ststemsnt; that the 
operations: 
"would-have gone far to settle- a question which 
ban boea a aonataat source of trouble in Europe 
for centuries past. ", 
There is neither retaren,: 3 nor further elaboration on the point. Marxist 
historians2 have interpreted, this to mean that Britain Bought to block 
Russian access to th3 M, diterraa9en by sizing Cons ºantinoplo, The7r are 
right in believing that the reference is to the question of Constantinople 
and the straits there is nothing else it could have meant. They are 
quite wrong in thinlcinC that Britain sought to block Ihasaian aoöeess the 
statement could only bav meant the exact opposite, 
Taking the broad vice of political and istretegic plane one point 
1 Dardmoll. or Commission, Firot Report,; p"19" 
2 e. g. Gottliobi pp. 86-87. 
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emerges very toroiblys Grey began to encourage Russia to look to Turkey 
for her compensation for her sacrifices in the war at just' the moment 
'when Churchill's' plan was being accepted. ' This. implies, as does the 
statement in the report of the Dardanelles'' Commission, that political and 
considerations 
military helped each other to take shape. Such a conclusion is confirmed 
by the story that can be pieced together of relations between the Foreign 
Office and the Admiraltq in the first fortnight of 1915+ 
The Idea of an attack on the Dart flea was in circulätion from the 
very beginning of the war in h rope. Even before the entry of Turkey 
into the war there were references to the Fleet trying to force the 
Dardanallee. On 25 November the question was raised in the War Council. 
In late 1914, Fiaher. annd Harkey devised a scheme for an attack on Conetantinoples, 
and on 3 January, 1915,, Fisher presented Churchill with their plan for as 
attack on Constantinoples old battleships# aided by landings of Indian 
M Greek troops, would try to force the, DardanoUes. 
l 
Fisher's plan 
came to the attention of the Foreign office ends on 12 January, Tyrrell went 
to see Finher., The day after their interview Fisher wrotto Tyrrell, 
7isher's letter is worth noting. It throve a light on the aotivitiea of 
Grey's most intimate adviser in the days, Then the crucial decisions about 
the Dardanelles were being made* and# incidentally, it tells us a good deal 
about the Fisher-Churchill controveray. Fisher outlines his objections to 
Churchill's plan for the Fleet to force the Dardanelles without military 
assistance. The letter is written in Fisher's usual highly amusing and 
eooeatria'stylet 
1 Hankeyl 'to1. Iý p. 253. 
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'in view of your most valued talk'of yesterdays if the 
Greeks land 100#000 man on the Gallipoli Peninsula in, 
concert with a British narai attack on the Dardanelles 
I think we could count on an easy and quick arrival at 
Constantinople. A naval approaoh without any troops , #o 
would involve asp o_t_ ships and axoe stare of ammuitinu 
and a yeakening of, the Heayyrr( of the Pleat beyond 
approval and when the remains of the Fleet got to 
Constantinople it could do nothing but carry out a futile 
massacre 9 la Bombardment of Alexandriat (I participated). 
.. '(One Bulger worth a thousand-Greekst) 
make no mistake about the wer$ 14j dear Tyrrell. 
The German objective was gga Paris or Warsaw* jayis 
Aptweritt and they've got itt and the moment peace is 
=, alleged as Germany so Uich desires r- then Germany 
having Antwerp will annex 1ouaw. "1 
From Fishers letter it is possible to form some picture of that Tyrrell` 
had said on the previous day. He had mentioned to Fisher the rumours that 
Germany might be-willing to make peace and restore Belgium, and had quissed 
him about his scheme for an attack on the Dardanelles. These two topics 
had besn somehow connected in their talk] for in his'letter Fisher runs 
these two themes together. How were they connected? 'Writing a tow days 
earlier Asquith had bated that if Germany offered to restore Belgium this 
would be a welcome solution for Britain$ but had eddgd rather gloomily that 
this Mould not satisfy France and- Russia. 2 On 11 Jaraaary, the day before 
Tyrrell saw Fiebert trey had telegraphed to his L aeeadora at St: Peteraburg, 
Paris and Tokio, ' 
"(The) German Embassy has ). atily given (the) impression 
at Washington that they would like peace and would agree 
1 Fisher to Tyrsll, 13$. 1915, Grey Papers, F. 0.800 10?. - 2 Asquith, vol. II, pp. 50-31. 
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to evacuate and compensate Belgium... Zou should 
inform (the) Minister for Foreign, Affairs privately 
and confidentially and say I should be very glad at 
any time to have his views of chat line should be 
taken if we were seriously 4prmached. "1 
It can be taken that when Tyrrell saw Fiber on 12 January he had on 
his mind the question of what terms would satis4 Frsnce and Russia. 
From Fisher's letter it can-be deduced-that, wha t Tyrrell' suggested was 
that German ambitions had been frustrated and she might soon be villing to 
asks peace. Hoiaavex, soma compensation "irould have to be found for Russia. 
What therefore were the chances at aucoeesZ. l7 implementing Fisher's 
ooheme for a Dardanelles expedition? Now the connecting link is obvious, 
using the Dardanelles operations to grab territory to satisfy Russia* 
fisher, having said his saheme would cork, went on to warn. Tyrrell 
against his general ideas, "But make *o mistake about the war* My dear 
Tyrrell, * 
Such a schema is just what Tyrrell would have tight os.. Harold 
iiicolson deacrib. d Greg! a. Private Secretary as having "believed in personsl 
relations,, " und "the conversations of Sir William Tyrrell were intangible 
but euggsstiV., W he *excelled in examining the outer radius of international 
problems. "2 Vs know that in early 7ebxuer7 (the House conversations) 
Grey was intent on using the Dardanelles operations to gain a price to 
otter Russia. It is not at all uareasonab]. e to assume that this had 
oaourred to Tyrrell even before those operations were agreed on. If this 
1 Grey to Buab" "# B, tie Old Groaner, tel., ll. i«1915+ Gray Papers, 
7.4.600/75" 
2 Hicolsons p. 32ä. 
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was the case, then the political plans did#at least to some degree, Influence, 
the decision to mount a naval attack on the Dardanelles. Gray and Tyrrell, 
who had no great interest in militsrye"plenningp merely switched their 
backing from Fisher' a original scheme to Churchillts. , 
B. The Neeotiatigns; pt Muhy 19150 
The Straits Aare==4- of Marcb,, 19.5# is of quite singular interest 
from two points of view. In the first place, it came about as a result of 
an almost perverse-aeries of misunderata*Ungs. The chain of events) ideas 
and perceptions is of significance to this narrative. In the second placer 
it is an . acellent, example . of a certain 
type of international crisis: one 
which draws its force from an atmosphere of universal fear and suspicion. 
This mood undermined confidence like a run on a bask. In the. end mutual 
trust could only be restored by showing absolute good faith and meeting the 
totality of the do-ends of the claimants. 
In January and February, 1915, opinion in the Duna was rinsing strongly 
in favour of Russia acquiring, Constantinople and the straits. at the end of 
the war. 3 On 9 February, Sasanovt in a speech to the Dunaj spoke of 
solving the problems of. Russia's access to the k4editerrcneen. 
There was nothing in Sasanowl a speech that was surprising in view of 
what had already passed between London and St. Petersburg aandd Buchanan did 
not even bother to report it. The speech was quoted in the Times and a 
question was tabled in the House of Commons about it. 
l In wartime it was 
I F. O. 373/2479/Z4058 R 
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quite easy to persuade} P. o to withdraw quelitiona, end had the Foreign 
Secret=7 wanted to, he could have avoided answering it*' 
I Instead, Grey 
thought he would use the opportunity to indicate the new direction of 
his policy: 
2 
He consulted with Asquith and the Russian Ambassador#4 
and they approved Grey's statement to the Commons before it was made. 
The Commons were told; 
°Thie aspiration (Sasanowt a statement to the Du aa) is an 
aspiration with which we are in entire sympathy. ý The 
precise form in which it will be realised will no doubt 
be settled in the terms of peaces . 
Grey'e pronouncement virtually coincided with the opening of the 
bombardment of the Dard+ . tlea forts* By a curious irony it vas misquoted 
in the Russian press. The misreporting of Grg1 e statements coupled as ,, 
it vastiith the appearance of the fleet at Constantinople, created a most 
unfortunate impression in Rusetal it seemed that Britain was trying to 
check Russian ambitions. Why, the Russians asked themselves$ was Britain 
fighting at Constantinople when Russia was so hard pressed elsewhere? 
British policy seemed the plainest of bypoarisy; all the fine promises of 
goodwill had been nothing but a mask for the most treacherous duplicity. 
While Russia was locked in a death-struggle with Germany, Austria and 
Turkey, Britain was gobbling up the prizes of war. 
1 Chapter I. _. 
2 Grey to Beackendortt, 2. iii. 1915, (copy), Grey Paperef '. 0.840/75. 
3 Asquith' a initials, undated, cr244i#1914, - ? 0.371/2479/24023", 
4 Grey to Beaakeadorff,, 2. ii1.19] 5! (copy) 0 Grey Papers: 7.0.800/75. 
5 1.0.372/2479/2 053. 
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The Foreign, Secretary found himself in a not altogether unfamiliar 
situation. The diplomatic system 'was so ridden with half-truths, that 
at moments of acute tension suspicions, multiplied' like'bacteria,, end 
undermined the credit of good intentions. . The Czar waa; annoyed with 
B ritainf Sacanow faced a etorm: Lof protest in the Duwa. Grey was asked 
to make a further public statement on British policy towards Constantizoplej 
a statement that was to indicate a positive sympathy and support for 
1 
Russian claims* 
An unqualified public statement was just what Grey could not give. 
The question of whether Britain wanted Russia to have Constantinople was 
not the point at issue. The ditticulty lay in convinoing*publio opinion 
at home. Clerk vrotes 
"the moment Ruseia's imaginatidn seises on 5tänbou1 
as Russia's reward for her sacrifices# it seems to 
as that we can, only acquiesce"'2 
N icoleon was of the same opinions the difficulty Jay in giving the public 
statement Russia demandedt 
"We know very well Russia will have Constantinople ... the Government will no doubt decide whether public 
opinion in this country is ripe for so categorical 
a statement as M. Sasanow asks .,. o, whether it public 
notification on our part, to that effect is opportune 
or wise the Secretary of State alone can decide. "3 
Asquith did not cant azW public statement. He ! eared that public 
opinion was nöt ready for such a drau4ia reversal of traditional polioy, 
4 
l buchausn to Grey, 1. iii. 1915,7.0.37 2479 24058. 
2 Minute by Clerk, 2. iii. 1915,7.0: 37 2479 24058. 
3 Minute by Sioolsofl 2. iii. 1915,7. a. 371/2479 24058. 
4 Meeting of Wer Counoil, 10. iii. 1915, CAH. 2. 
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Grey hoped he would be able to ride out the storm, by, soothing, the Aüssians. 
He instruäted Buchanex' to reassure Sasanowl and appealed to Benckendorff 
to enlighten his Government as to the trine oircumstanoes surrounding his 
statement in the Commons. His letter to Benckendorft is interesting both 
for its contentep and in showing Grey's disarmingly etraighttoriard and 
simple processes of reasoning and-persuasions 
"I am more disappointed than I can express to hear 
from Saaanow that my statement in the House of 
Commons about the Straits has been unfavourably 
received in Russia« I wish I had said nothing 
at all. I have telegraphed to Buchanan to explain 
that I cannot be more Russian than the Russian 
Government in my public utterances. I have not 
told Buchanan that I had shown you the answer 
before I gave it, but I should be very pleased 
if you could telegraph something to Saaanow to 
explain how the answer came to be given and 
what I said to you as to my desire to say in 
public what I said to S azanow in private; and 
if you could explain this to the Emperor it 
would be very useful, for I hear he is upset. "2 
But the situation was already out of control; the pace -of'events was 
now being set at St. Petexsburg and not at London. D eloasse asked Iswolsky 
(now Russian Ambassador at Paris) what settlement Russia desired as regards 
the Straits and Constantinople. On 2 Marahi Benokendorff presented the 
Foreign Office vitb Sazanowta provisional statement. ý Rus8ie claimed 
#, cdess to the Mediterranean and a guarantee of the iouthern shor8 of the 
Sea of Marmara. 
3 This communication was immediately circulated 'to the 
Grey to Buchanans toles 2. iii. 1915 - F. 0.37 2479 24o58. 
2 Grey to Beackendortf, 2. iii. 1915, 
(copy), 
Grey Fapera, F. 0.800/75. 
3 Minute by licolson,, 2.11i. 1915, ` and Memorandum by Benokendorti, 2.111, 
1915, F. O. 371/241.9/25314. 
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Cabinet, and Bertie was instructed to ascertain the views of the French 
Government. z Before anything could be decided Russia had come forward 
with a completely new set of demands. 
On 3 March, the Czar informed Paltologue that the question of 
On the 'following day (4 ich), the Constantinople needed olearing, lp 
3 
French and British Ambassadors were presented with an Aide-Memoire which 
listed Russia's official claims. The Russians dropped their demand for 
a public statement and asked instead for secret agreement to-the terms of 
their Aide-Memoire. The French and Hritich Governments could then, in 
their own time and their own wer, educate their peoples as to the new 
realities. Russia asked for the question of Constantinople and the Straits 
to be settled in accordänce with her traditional aspirations. The precise 
interpretation of which was that Russia should receive Constantinople, the 
Qeetern shore of the Bosphorous,, the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, 
Southern Thrace, as far as the Enos-Midia liner and certain extensions of 
territory necessary for the protection of these areas. In return, the 
special interests of Britain and France at Constantinople would be scrupulously 
upheld, and British and French claims for expansion at the expense of Turkey 
would, be received aympatbatioally. 
4 
The Foreign Office say no point in holding out against Russian demand.. 
Clerk and äicoleon felt that the best policy would be to secure Britain's 
financial and trading interests at Coaatantinople, and ensure that there was 
free navigation of the Straits. While Grey and bis advisers were willing 
1 Minute by Grey, undated, oa. iii. 1915,7.0.371/2499/25014. 
2 Grey to Hertie, tel., 3.111.1915, F. 0.373J2479/22602. 
3 Buchanan to Grey, tel., 4"iii. 1915, F. 0.373/2479/25969. 
4 Buchanan to Grey, tel., 4.111.19150 F. 0.373/2479/25969. 
5 Miaute by Clerk, 5.111.1915# Minute by Nicolsonj 6.111.1915# 
7.0.371/2479/26072. 
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to agree to Russian demands, it was fear of France that encouraged the-very 
hasty acceptance of the terms of the Russian Aide-Memoire. 
In the week following the presentation of Russian demands, an almost 
comic coafutsion arose between Paris and London. The Foreign Office 
suspected that the French Were trying to put Britain in a position where 
they could represent to the Russians that Britain was opposing her claims. 
The 1! `renob hoped to obeok Russian ambitions and to lay the blame upon, 
Britain. The basis of the Foreign Office's suspicions lay partly in the 
untrustworthy character of the French Ambassador at St. P etersburg, and 
partly in the knowledge that Deloasse was against making conoessions to the 
Russians? When Bertie was unable to obtain any statement from the French 
Government about their reaction to Sazanowts provisional list of Russian 
claims#2 it seemed likely that the Quai d'Qrssy was keeping mute in the 
hope that Grey Could raise objections. The yrench would then go to the 
Russians and say that as Britain was opposed there was no point inparjaaing 
deaands. 
on receipt of the Russian Aide-Memoires Grey, Clerk avid Ricolson 
discussed what was to be donee Clerk advised that they should play the 
game as the French were playing- its they would not inform Gertie of the 
terms of the Aide-Memoire, nor would they tell him their own views. The 
Ambassador mould be able to ascertain the views of the French Government 
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pursued a very similar policy, and Cambon was not informed of the terms 
of the Aide-Memoire either 
: On 7 Marohp äioolson foted., with some 
apprehension that: 
"Deloass4l s reticence is curious.,. So. far as I know 
M. Caubon has received nothing from Paris as to, 
Russian demands and it. Ignorant of their. "2 
bs neither the British Ambassador in Paris nor the Frosch Ambassador in 
London were in a position to discuss the matter, a common Anglo-French flký 
was itupossible. 
Grey, already in Saxanoul a bad books because of his speech in the 
House of Commons, was determined not to be outmanoauvred. On 6 March, 
he cautioned Buchanan about saying anything until he had received formal 
instructions* The news that Trance had accepted Russian demands in 
principle but vas hedging in fact'convinced the Foreign Secretary of the 
urgent' need to secure Britain's position by accepting Russian demands. ` 
Grey later explained to Bertiax 
"I! ue had opposed &usata the French would have laid 
upon us at Petrograd the responsibility, for opposition, 
as it is they lay upon us at Paris, the responsibility 
for concession., The latter is. preferable. "3. 
On 9 March# Russian demands were brought before the Cabinet, Neither 
Kitchener, nor CburchiU, nor Hankoy saw any strategic objections to 
1 Memorandum by Hertie, 16.111.1915# Bertie Papers,. F. 0.8a0 167. 
2 Minute by äicolson, 7. iii. 3.915, F. O. 371, J2tý,, 9/26533. 
3 Grey to Buohannni tel., 6.111.1915,, F. 0.37V2479/26072... 
4 Buchanan to Grey, tel., 8. iii«191.5, F. 0.371/2479/27177. 
5 Minute by Grey, undatedp o. 26. iii. 1915, on the bottom of Bertie to 
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agreeing to Russian demands. Asquith noted that: 
"Russia' a claim irresistible - no English or French 
interest against. "1 
The larger part of the Cabinet' a ticaeý was taken up with a discussica ; oF: d 
that part of the Russisn Aide-Memoir© uhich. offered to consider "pathetic- 
ally British ambitious in Asiatic Turk6y. Since agreement to Russian 
demands would constitute a binding pledge.. and as it constituted' in 
abandonment of concepts long cherished in England, Asquith felt that it 
would be wise to consult the lecders of the Opposition. Bonar Luv and 
Lansdowne were invited to the War Council meeting of the following day. 
2 
Balfour, who had a regular seat, was also presant. 
For the benefit of the Unionist leaders Grey painted a simple and 
rather distorted picture of the Streits question since the beginning of the 
uar. He vaguely alluded to the promises of August and November, 1914, but 
neglected to mention that the initiative for these promises had been British 
and not Russisn. He played heavily on reports that Russia might leave the 
emphasised 
wsr# and that/ some gesture vas needed to keep up her morale and her 
interest in the conflict. It was a Very impressive'sad persuasive little 
speech. He made everything sound straightforward and omitted anything that 
was likely to cause controvercy. It was agreed that Britain should agree 
to Russian demands on certain conditions. Constantiropio was to be a 
trade entrepot and there u'aa to be tuU. freedom of the Straits for commeroial 
1 Notes by Asquith, undatedp Asquith Papers,, HS. 11.4. ' Those totes were 
made either during the. Cabinet Molting of 9- March or the War Council 
maoting of 10 Much, 
2 Asquith to King George VO 9. iii. 1915j GAD«11/369 
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vessels, Russia was to consider favourably any British claims that might 
be formulated with regard to the Ottoman Empire. Russia was to re- 
negotiate the Anglo-Russian Persian Agreement and Britain was to have the 
neutral zone. Russian-aims were"to, be realised only after the war had 
1 
been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. 
The substance of the various British counter-claims is in itself an 
enormous subject, and is too heavy and complex to be considered here. 
The question of British desiderata in Turkey and in Asia was examined at 
lepgth by an Inter-Departmental Committee which met in the Spripg of 1915. 
The Committee was beaded by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the former British 
Ambassador' at Vienna. The Committee came out in favour of a federated 
Turkey. 2 The re-negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Asiatic Agreements was 
debated at some length between the various departments of State. These 
discussions proceedecyät a very leisurely pace, and at one stage correspon- 
dance between the Foreign Office and the India Office was hold up for a 
month until it was discovered that an unanswered letter had been mislaid. 
By July, 19159 it was realized that it was too late for the De Bunsen 
Committee to consider the matter, and it was suggested that a further 
committee be established to look into that issue. 
4 
But nothing seems to 
have been done about this, and thereafter it was always pleaded that the 
situation was too unstable to come to any definite decisions. 
The smaller. and more pressing question of the nature of safeguards 
for British rights at Constantinople was considered more promptly. Britain 
made no stipulation as to Russia fortifying the Straits#5 but economic and 
I War Council Meeting, 10. iii. 1915# CAB. 22/l; Grey to Buchanan, tel., 
10. iii. 1915# F. 0.37l/2449/28770; Grey to Buchanan, tel., 10. iii. 1915# 
7.0.371/2479/25969. 
2 CAB. 27/l. 
3 7.0.371/2449/34054" 
F. Ü. 371//2 9//28770. 
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trading rights were carefully worked out. There was to be free passage 
for shipping; tree pilotage; no duties or dues on lights, dock wharfs 
and other facilities; Constantinople was to be a free port; there was 
only to be a small tariff on imports into the area taken over by the 
Uussiana. 1 
Grey handled the negotiations of March, 1915, with great oki1l. No 
Foreign Secretary could have hold out against Russian demands. Grey was 
slccessful in preventing Russian claims starting a wholesale expansion 
of allied war aims. Thera was within the gabinet a very powerful body 
of opinion which sought to stake out British claims in the Middle East. 
23 
This group included Lord Crewel Kitchener# Churchill and Lloyd George. 
4 
Grey thought that the British Empire was large enough and did not want to 
seize huge areas of the Ottoman Empire. 
5 
Furthermore, he did not wish the 
allies to have vast ambitionap ambitions utich arould have made it much 
more difficult to negotiate peeae. 
There seems little doubt that had Grey suggested to his allies, as 
some of his colleagues wished$ that the Ottoman Empire be divided up there 
and then, this proposal would have been accepted. The Russian acquisition 
of Constantinople would have been a part of a much larger secret treaty, 
and the Turkish Empire would have been carved up in the Spring of 1915. 
Gray managed to avoid doing this. He kept to his original plan for 
Constantinoples a schema to buy Russia out of Eastorn and Central Europe. 




j os8eaJonof Con anti non1e and the kt; alter F. 0.373J2479/361730 
Iwlia Office to Foreign Office, 12"ix. 1914, F. 0.371/2080/49001, end 
India office Memoravdiai, CAH. 2l, /1/G-14, ; -C. 
, Llax by I(it chener CAB. 24/]JG-13. 
uutea o war oun 
si. 1914 CAF3. Z . A 
y. 
it : lyý il pI 
Minutea of cho War t%ouucil, 1A. iii. 1915, and 
I 5'9' 
The Straits Agreement was in essence what he wanted* a contraction rather 
than an expaneiorAof allied ker aims. 
The sudden British acceptance of Russian demands left the French with 
a tell cca . oink. it is a revealing insight into Grey' e mentality that 
this duplicity troubled him. He had to give Buchanan some explanation of 
by he bad not consulted Frenoe. He'first drafted a statement that aas a 
lie. He told the Ambassador that he 31eod not inform Pa1'eologuef because, 
"your French colleague has already made a similar acceptance'. He then 
amended this to a baff-traths 
"Your French colleague seems already to have made a 
communication of similar purport to the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Aftaire. "1 
Since it vovould have been perfectly obvious to Paleologuu that he had not 
agreed to Russian demands shades of honesty and dishonesty had no political 
significance; It was just that Grey touud lying to be dieagreeable. He 
vas never happy in the moral olic; ate of the diplomatic eystem, -and the 
diplomatic game held no fascination for him; it did not excite his, 
imagination, it troubled his conscience, 
Grey not only succeeded in deceiving the French, he completely misled 
Bertie. In the first place: Bertie missed the central point of Grey$ a 
policy, ho wanted Russia to have Constantin oplej in the second, Bertie 
canted to resist Russian olaims: His consternation uas considaroble vhaa 
he learnt that Britain as accepting the terms of the Russian Aide-Memoires 
1 Grey to Buchanan, tet., 10. iii. 1915r ß'. U, 37]. /2479%2.5969" . 
Iss 
After turning the whole matter over in his mind, he convinced himself that 
the British agreement had. been an accident. What had happened had been 
that the Foreign Office had merely forgotten, to send him the details- of 
Russian demands, and becanse of this. administrative lapse be had been 
unable to form a common Anglo-Yreanh policy. This hypothesis became so 
reg]-in his own mind that he wrote a furious letter to Gräy. He explained 
how - disaster vas befall4n the British Empire because of elackzsesa in 
12 
the administration of the foreign Office. Both Drummond (now Grey's 
"3 
private Secretary) and Grey himself sent Hertie soothing letters of 
explanation. It was with a certain lack of grace that Bortie received the 
Haas that he had not been taken completely into Grey's confidence* He 
replied in a somewhat sulky and impertinent tones 
"It is perhaps just as well that I did not know 
your (Grey's) views, 9 4 
The Ambassador oould never bring himself to forgive Grey for his policy 
in Karon, 1915. When he learnt that Russia was not being very helpful 
in bringing neutrals into the -wer, he could not refrain from writing to 
Dxumnoads 
"our cono®meions to Russian rontimeut do not oeem to 
bear the refreshing fruit of counter"concassions 
when we wish to invite the co-operation of Greece 
and Italy. It is like drawing wisdom teeth out of 
3aaanow' a obstinate jaw. "5 
1 Gertie to Grey, 10. iii"1915r Grey Papers, F4Q. 800 57" 
2 Minute by Drutruiondi 31. i11.1915, quay Papers, F"d. 8OU/37. 
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The kgre©ment QY rOonstantinople and tho Straits of March, 1915,,. vas 
the culmination of Grey's policy from the beginning of the uarj -a policy 
which aimed at first to bribe Russia to throw all her weight against 
Ge aty, then to persuade tier to keep out of Percia, and finally to aase 
the task of negotiating peace by finding Russia compensation in Turkey 
rather than in Europe, 
When Grey and his colleagues came to write their memoirs, thcy were 
reluctant to admit that there bcd been more behind the question of 
Constantinople than a more concession to Tonrist imparialism. This was 
understandable] they were writing at a time : hen there was a ferocious, and 
14 many 'ways unreesonabl©1 criticism of th3secret Treaties of the Great 
War. Yet in eat telling the full story, Grey did not do full justice 
to the complexity of his motives or, more sadly, to the nobility of his 





It would be a conceptual error to try to explain British policy 
towards the German colonies in the light of imperialist doctrines. 
There was no inevitable correlation of ideas between a desire to maintain 
the Empire and will to extend it; imperialism did not necessarily mean 
imperial expansion. Whether Britain chose to add to her overseas 
territories depended largely on technical considerations. The report 
of the Inter-Departmental Committee on British Desiderata in Turkey in 
Asia, which met in April, 1915, stateds 
"Our Empire is wide enough already, and our task to make 
firm and lasting the position we already hold, and to 
pass on to those who come after an inheritance that 
stands four square to the world. "i 
Expansionist imperialism was not a crucial influence on the development 
of British policy towards Germany's overseas Empir®. 
Three pragmatic considerations shaped attitudes towards the future of 
Germany's overseas moire. Firstly, a desire for securityt as the De 
Bunsen Committee put it, to straighten the, "ragged edges"2of the Empire. 
Secondly, relations with the allies and the, pominions. there was a need 
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to find France, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South 
Africa compensation in the peace settlement. There was also some 
feeling that French and Japanese claims ought to be balanced by British 
gains. Thirdly, the progress of the wars ambitions tended to expand 
when the war was going well and to contract when it was going badly. 
2. Some Comments on Professor Louis* Volume. 
The appearance of Professor Louis' monograph, Great Britain and 
"r 
the Lost German Colonies, 19- 1 1919, nit seem to obviate the neod for 
further research and comment on'the subject. There is much to admire 
in Louis' study: the author has drawn on a wide range of primary 
materials, and it is a, source"of inspiration add guidance to all his 
successors. On certain topics - Togoland and the Cameroons - there is 
little or nothing to add to, 'Louis'', narrative. gut there are many ideas 
Louis puts forward that are in this'puthor's opinion erroneous and 
misleading. As his-study stands'on'the flank of this narrative, it is 
worth noting, both for the clarity of this dissertation and out of a 
sense of obligation to Professor Louts, ' imself, why I cannot concur with 
the central theme of his study. 
The main flaw In Louis! book" is'his, f. analysis'of the policies of 
Lewis Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary until )Jay, 1915, Harcourt is 
the key figure in Louis' nairative'of, thi early part, of the war. According 
to Louis, great "geopolitical importance"was attached to the colonial 
issue by some. 
p 
"British statesmen who believed the German gains in Europe 
, 
Could be 
1 Louis, Wm. Roger, Great Britain and the Lost German Colonies (1967). 
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"offset only by a consolidation and, expansion of the 
British Empire otierseas. The high priests of this 
doctrine were-Lewis Harcourt (Colonial Secretary until 
May 1915), and three members of the war Cabinet (from 
December. 1916)l Lord Gur$on1 General J. C. Smuts of 
South Africa, and Lord Milner. To them the"war. was 
being fought, above all, to achieve security tdr the 
Empire -a goals so far as they were concerned that 
could not be obtained without the elimination of the 
German colonies. *I 
Louis' generalisation is a Very'sveeping one. There is an obvious. link 
. 
between Milner# Smuts and Cursoaf they shared a common passion for the 
British Empire. But to link Harcourt tith this trinity'' is very strange. 
Before the war Harcourt was not a Liberal imperialist= quite the 
reverses he was one of the most extreme of the radical-pacifist members 
of the Cabinet. During the Boer War Harcourt had been a tierce critic 
of Milnerýs policies. Moreover Hareourt had been the most pro-German ,, 
member' of Asquith' a Cabinat"a Ha had triad to make colonial concessions 
to secure her goodwill. In Februaryr 19)4 Bertie sorted: 
"Crowe informed me that Harcourt had been commissioned 
by Grey to have a give and, take negotiation with the 
German Embassy (over Portuguese Colonies) y but that 
Harcourt had told the Under Secretary at the Colonial, 
Office, Sir John Anderson= that for political reasons 
he wished to make concessions to Germany and therefore 
Anderson was to devise a scheme which would do so and 
only give the appearance of giving satisfaction to our 
interests. The result of Harcourt's negotiations is 
the initialled agreement which Grey MM wishes to render 
abortive and by which we gain next to nothing. ". 
3 
1 Louis, p. 2. 
2 Chapter 11. 
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The Anglo-German agreement over Portuguese colonies fell through over 
the issue of publication. Harcourt was bitterly disappointed and wrote 
to Grey: 
"the abandonment of the initialled agreeaett with Germany 
would produce a most unfortunate effect. "1 
During the July crisis it was Harcourt who was the leader of the 
group that wished to split the Cabinet-Tather than support France. 
2 
"You must speak out for us, " he urged Lloyd Georgs, "Grey 
wishes to go to war without any violation of Belgium. "3 
On the 30th July, 1914, Beirtie noteds 
"Apropos the present critical state of Europe tirray (of 
Elfbank) told me that when in the Morocco crisis Asquith 
was determined to come to the aid of France by sending a 
British force to the Continent, Belgium or elsewhere, he 
did not inform Lofeburn, who when he learnt it, told 
Murray that had he and Harcourt known it they would have 
broken up the Cabinet, Loreburn for love of peace, 
Harcourt from preference of Germany to France. "4 
If we are to believe Louis, the'Little Englander, pro-German 
Harcourt of'2 August, 1914, became, -and literally overnight, an expansionist, 
anti-German Imperialist, armed with geo-»strategic ideas. This, of course, 
is just possiblet laut the fact that'Louis neglects to mention that 
Harcourt-'s pre-war system of tdeas`wao in direct contradistinction to 
the outlook he attributes. to him, hardly adds weight to his narrative or 
credit to his historical approach, 
1 Harcourt to Grey, 25. ii. 1914, Grey Papers, P. 0.1800/91. 
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This is not all Louis ignores. He neglects to mention tpe. very 
considerable body of information which indicates that Harcourt' plans 
were nowhere near as doctrinaire as he asserts. There are statements 
made by Harcourt in the War Councill and many minutest in the Colonial 
Office files that Would require most ingeneous interpretation to 
reconcile then to Professor Louis' &aalysis of Harcourt. 
Now Louis might be permitted to ignore all this oontradictory 
information if he could demonstrate that the hard core of Harcourt$e 
beliefs layin what !.: bed's calls "geo-atrategyl. 'Louis never establishes 
this poiut: it stands only by virtue of not being examined. It is no 
wore,: hau'a, taulty theory. Let, us look. more olooely at what Louis means 
when be. explains Harstourtl e var ai's; 
To the geo-strategists whoýsaw the war as a global 'se 
well as a European struggle againat Garman militarism 
-the successful campaigns. against the German colonies 
seemed to ensure the future security of the Empire. 
Harcourt was. the outstanding representative of that 
school of thought in 1914-16. Even if Germany at 
the end of the war were able to make gains in Europe, 
he believed they vuld be offset by'thelose of her 
colonial Empire. ...... his "reasoning is easy to' follow. Until thi last months of the war, it seemed 
entirely possible that Germany would emerge from the 
struggle as the master'of Europe whose next ambition 
, would be global 
1 War Council Minutes, 1041i. ]915, CAB a2/i. 2 e. g. "If N. Z. are to, have Samo" eventually they oust pay AU (costs of 
oooupatiou)" If Samoa is-to be given up w3 must I suppose pay kM 
the cost of temporary occupation. " Minute. by Harcourt, 1. x. 1914, 
C. 0.616/5/37254" This is hardly the comment of a rabid, expansionist' 
imperialist. Very many similar examples can be found. 
3 Louis, p. 68. 
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hegemony. But* otº1y with oolontee as bases for her 
submarines and airplanes, and with the help of African 
manpower, would Germany be able to bid for world conquest. 
Without an overseas Empire, Germany would be contained in 
Europe. °1 
Alas, Harcourt's reasoning was not quite as easy to follow as 
Louis Imagines. Louis badly misinterprer ewavidence. To take one 
example, and probably the most important,: Raroourt'a memorandum 
ß_s2 which he wrote in March, 1915. This was the most extreme 
statement of HaraourtIs views and Louie p] äes great emphasis upon it. 
What Louis %- dpa , cnotro mention is that the meaning of this ms aorandum 
is precisely the inverse of what, he alleges. Harcourt did indeed outline 
a scheme for the division of Germany' c oolönial Empire, but he prefixed 
this scheme by explicitly stating that these terms would only be realised 
if Germany was. aompletely'defeated. According to Louise the whole point 
of "goo- strategic" thinking vas to protect the Empire it G. rmany was not 
defeated* xt: ia; atently obvious that had Harcourt held the ideas that 
Louis asserts! -then he would not have said that his claims would only be 
realized is the eventoC a total allied victory. He would have said the 
precise opposite. 8qually clearly, Haxoourt- meant that. in the case of a 
drain struggle some of 4oru any' is colonies would be given back. 
Having made a miD to examination of Louie' narrative,, it can be said 
that he does mot bring-forward-one shred-of evidonoo that establishes his 
central thesis about Starcourt. , There is every reason to believe that his 
1 Louis, p. 2" Even in the aase of Lord Milnor this the31s has no basis. 
Louis accepts the faulty view put forward by A. M. Gollini ( pcons1 
that Milner vented a negotiated peace at the expense of Russia. 
Recent research by my good friend Mr. Victor Bothwell shows that this 
idea is erroneous*- 
2 There is a copy of this Memorandum in the Asquith Papers, MS"11.4, and 
also in the Lloyd George Papers# but I could not find a copy, is the 
Public Accord Office. 
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policies evolved from go Qore pragmatic considerations outlined in the 
introduction of this chapter. 
3. German East Africa. Auguste - December. 1914, 
Under Article XI of the Berlin Treaty of 1885, large areas of East 
and Central Africa - Belgian Congo; ths, British passessions of Uganda, 
British East Africa, Zanzibar; the northern strip of Angola; the southern 
part of Italian Somaliland; German East Africa - had been neutralised, 
and made into an ar*a of free trade. On 9 August, 1914, the Belgian 
Minister in London, Count de Lailang, called at the Foreign Office and 
saw Nicolson. The Permanent Under Secretary was told that thef'Belgian 
Government sought the neutralis atfon'of the Belgian Congo under Article XI 
of Berlin Treaty. He'further explained that the French had already 
agrsed to this proposal, &nd they were making representations to Germany 
through, the auspices of the Spanish Government. 
' 
The Belq hn plan w&s not warmly received in London. The'permanent 
official6 at. the Foroign Office were well aware that Germany-would dema1d 
that the Berlin#Txcaty should be impleoonted in its entirety, and German 
East Africa would be neutralised as well. They were not prepared to 
allow Germany to keep her African colonias, out of the war. The problem 
had long since been foreseen: in 1911, the Colonial DofenceCommittee had 
argued that if there were an-Ang'lo-German war, then Article XI of the 
Berlin Treaty would have to go by the board. As Britain was the strongest 
linute by Nicolson, 9. viii, l914, F,, 0.371/1882/383501 Memorandum b 
Count de Lailang, 9. viii. 1914, P. 0.371/1832/37617; A, Hardinge to 
Grey, tel., 12. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/188? / 38483. 
ý'ýý 
local military and naval Powers it would be foolish to allow Germany to 
invoke the Treaty. 
In a war with Germany the advantage of the observance 
of neutrality with respect to the Protectorates in the 
Free Zone would lie.... .... with Germany and not with 
G. B. "1 
had 
On 5 August, 1914, 'a sub -committee otC. I. D. /wet to consider 
offensives against the German colonies" -. The Committee ¢onsistedd 
representatives from the War'Office, the Admiralty, the Colonial Office, 
the India Office and senior officers -of British African Regiments. They 
agreed that the Indian Government should organize a force 
ig"ainst German 
2 
East Africa# and the next day the " 
Cabinet sanctioned "a small force 
3 
being sent from India against Dar-se-5äliam. * 
The divilsertants at the'loreign Otfic® saw these military plans 
as a means of obtaining both'short and löng-term advantages.. Britain. 
might need German territories. to barter"With, in the peace settlement; 
in tho event of a total victory$ they sought to consolidate' Britain's 
African Zmpire by 'absorbing German East Afriaä« 
"German treaty rights and aspirations"in Africa' wrote 
Sperling, "..: are', a very serious hindrance to the , expansion of British itiflurnce and commerce in the regions 
affected and depend largely on the. possession by Germany 
of German at Africa*$ 
1 Minute' by Percy, '10oviii. 1914,, 1.0.37 188 37617. 
2 Sub-Committee of-, C, I. D, º, to consider Offensives Against German Colonies, 
5. Yiii. 1914, -Asquith Papers, MS. 111., Again, `there appears to be no 
record of this meeting, in-materials at the Public Record Office.. The 
copy in the Asquith is'a duplicated copy; it was usual for C. Y. D. 
reports. to be printed; it is probable that in the hectic days of 
early August, 1914, itwas forgotten to keep proper records. 
3 Summary. by Hankey of Sub committee of the C. I. D", 6. viii. 1914, and 
marginal , notes. by Asquith, Asquith Papers, MS. 111. 4 Minute by Sperling#'10"viii. 1914,7.0.371/1682/37617. 
5 Minute by Sperling, 10, viii. 1914,7.0.371/1882/37617. 
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Clerk agreed; and pointed to the long-standing dream of a Cape - to-Cairo 
Railway. Sir Eyre Crowe-felts 
"It is a recognised imperial interest to establish a 
territorial-connectlon between the British protectorates 
In East Africa and Uganda on the one hand and Rhodesia 
and the Union of South Africa on the other. " 
Why should the Foreign Office have been so eager to add to the weight 
of Britain's imperial burdens? At one extreme, Sir Arthur cticolson 
looked upon the war as an inevitable day of reckoning; the fittest 
empires would triumph and the weak would go to the wall. Such were 
the inevitable rules of what late Victorians would'have called "national 
virility". To deprive Germany'of her colonies was to do no more than to 
abide by the laws of nature. 
3 
Sir Eyre Crowe is a more typical example of the ideas of his English 
contemporaries. Crowe was probably the most anti-German of the permanent 
officials at-the Foreign Office, and believed that imperial Germany lusted 
after universal domination. Nbre interestingly, he was a very systematic 
thinker, he deduced his policy from a theoretical view of international 
relations. While. other civil servants differed from Crowe on points of 
emphasis and were never quite so ruthlessly logical, the pattern of 
Crowe's ideas w4ir typical of those held in the Foreign Office in this 
period. 
The impersonal rule of Nicolson's universe wes a process of 
1 Minute by Clerk, l0. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/1882/37617. 
2 Minute by Crowe, ll. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/1882/37617. 
3 Minute by Nicolson, 13. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/1901/43088. 
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international eliminations Crowe's world was dominated by the idea of 
competitions for the one struggle for organic; for the other it was 
mechanistic. Crowe's theory of politics was similar to eUUssical 
theories of economics. All states sought to maximise their power, in 
just the same way as businesses sought to maximise their profits 
) 
Like classical theories of economics, Crowe's model was a simplifications 
its sole actors were sovereign states, their sole activity was the 
accretion of their international power. 
Given Crowe's assumptions, other ideas naturally followed. The 
only fountain of morality was the sovereign state; to say that there 
was such a thing as international morality was either silly or, to use 
one of Crowe's favourite phrases, "conscious humbug". There was 
nothing immoral about depriving Germany of her colonies; it was an 
action equivalent to driving an unscrupulous competitor into bankruptcy. 
Crowe's theory of state behaviour held that Germany (or any state) 
would always try to assort, their international position. To give 
Germany back her colonies, on the grounds that this would ease Anglo- 
German relations in the future, would be a very expensive and short- 
sighted philanthropy. Crowe believed that it would be wise to keep 
Germany as a strong power in Europe as a balance to Franco-Russian 
alliance. 
2 The situation was not at all the same in Africa, there 
German possessions were a direct threat to the security of the 
Empire. 
Grey agreed that Germany should not be allowed to keep her colonies 
1 Crowe to Paget, 14. x. 16, Paget Papers, add. 31256. 
2 Chapter 3. 
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out of the war. It would also seem that at this time (August, 1914), 
he desired to keep German East Africa after the war. In a letter to the 
ColonialtOffice outlining the Foreign Office's views on Congo neutrality, 
Crowe wrotes 
"Sir Edward Grey thinks it is desirable to take the 
offensive as vigorously as possible against all German 
Colonial possessions, especially those in Africa, where, 
as Mr. Harcourt is aware, German treaty rights and 
aspirations form a serious obstacle to the expansion of 
British interests. "I 
It should be noted that this letter is not conclusive proof that Grey 
had designs on German East Africa. Official communications between 
Departments of State were always made in the name of the Minister. The 
gist of Crowe's letter is taken from Sperling's minute (khich has already 
been quoted), and not from any written comment of Grey's. It could 
have been that whoever drafted the letter to the Colonial Office (probably 
Lord Drogheda, Crowe's acting Private Secretary), took Grey's initials to 
mean that he agreed with the reasoning-of his civil servants. - xn fact, 
it could have been that the Foreign Secretary only agreed with-t 
recommendation that they should not allow German East Africa to: b 
neutralised. 
The Colonial Office2 also felttbht there could be no question of 
neutralising Central Africa, and, the French3 and Belgians4 were in4rmed 
that the Congo would not be kept out of the struggle. 
.,., ti 
1 Foreign Office. to Colonial. Office, 13. viii. 1914, (copy), F. 0.371 6?, 1 
37617. 
2 Colonial Office to Foreign'Office, 15. vii1.1914, F. 0,371/1882, /39514, 
3 Grey to Cambon, 16. vili. 1914, (copy), F. 0.371/1882/39514. 
4 Grey to Count Lailang, 16. viii. 1914, (copy), F. 0.371/1882/39514. 
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The major difförence between the Colonial Office's outlook ana the 
Foreign Office's was that the former- was very much more provincial in its 
attitudes. Harcourt and his advisers were tormented by the fear that France 
and Belgium would pre-empt the British offensive against German East Africa; 
their soldiers would occupy German territory and Britain would never be able 
to establish her. claims" For the first four months of the war the Colonial 
Office refused to allow French or Belgian troops to attack German East 
Lfrica. Harcourt was as anxious about French and Belgian expansion as he 
was concerned about dangers arising from Germany possessing an overseas 
Empire. His suppicions were the legacy of traditional animosities and 
departmental jealousy. The military operations against German East Africa 
were under the control of the Colonial office# and Harcourt seems to have 
wanted a triumph for his own Department. As Sir Philip Magnus has observed: 
"Lewis Harcourt, the aesthgtio Colonial Secretary 
... e was charmed by his role as director of military 
operations in different parts of Africa. ". 2 
On 10 August, the French offered to send detachments from 
Madagascar against Dar-es-, Salaam? Harcourt declined the offir. 
4 
1 The Sub-Committee"of the C. I. D. dealing with offensives against the 
German Colonies seems to have met from time to time throughout the 
period August-November, 1914, and to have supervised military arrange- 
ments. In September, 1914, Lambert, a Clerk at the Colonial Office, 
referred to "Sir G. Fiddes' Committee". The Committee he meant was 
doubtless the C. I. D, Sub-Committee on, which Fiddes sat for the Colonial 
Office. There would appear to be no Minutes of this Committee, except 
for the single record -in the Asquith Papers- of the meeting of 5 August, 
1914. In. a Foreign Office minute,, Lord Eustace Percy referred to the 
Committees (he spoke of the "Overseas Defence Committee"# but certainly 
meant the same committee as was referred to in Lambert's minute) but 
Percy only knew of its dealing by word of mouth, and this points to the 
tact that its minutes have not been lost, but rather that they were never 
made. From the way strategic decisions were arrived at, it is evident 
that the Committee only had a supervisory function. The references to the 
Committee in F. 0.371/1882/37617.0.0.616/4/36229. F. 0.371/1883/40171. 
2 Magnus, p. 343. 
3 Bertie to Grey, tel., 10. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/1882/37836. 
4 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 11. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/188 38060. 
F. 0.371/37860; Grey to Bertie, tei., 12. viii. 1914, F. 0.37 1882/38060. 
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At the end of August, 1914, the India Office suggested that the campaign 
against German East Africa was a "side show" and should be postponed. 
Harcourt indignantly refused even to consider the matter. 
l 
There were more tribulations ahead-for the Colonial Secretary. On 
21 September, it was reported that Belgian troops were being sent to 
Rhodesia to attack Bismarcksburg. 
2 
The IndiraExpedition was already 
prepared, and Harcourt grew frantic lost the prizes of war be snatched 
from his grasp at the last minute. He instructed Buxton, the High 
Commissioner of South Africa: 
"From apolitical point of view it is eminettly undesirable 
to have Belgium taking part in operations against German 
Colonies inrAfrica either by themselves or in co-operation 
with British forces, and you should endeavour to discourage 
such action as far as possible. I must leave it to your 
discretion what reasons should be given, such as lack of 
supplies or others. " $ 
When, at the beginning of October, further reports came in of Belgian 
troops preparing for an attack, Harcourt again insisted: 
"Belgian action (is) most undesirable in view of possible 
political complications hereafter and should be discouraged 
as much as possible. "4 
The Belgians saw that any attempt made on a local level to co-ordinate 
military policy would be frustrated, and approached the British 
Government through diplomatic channels. 
5 
By this time the'Foreign 
I Minute by Harcourt', 26. viii. 1914, C. 0.616 32062. 
2 Buxton to Harcourt, tel., 21. ix. 1914, C. 0.616/4/36229. 
3 Harcourt to Buxton, tel., 22.1x. 1914, C, 0.616/4/36229 - also in F. 0.371/1882/52448. 
4 Harcourt to Governor of the East-African Protectorate, tel. 3. x. 1914, 
F. 0.371/1882/56308. V 
5 Villiers to Gray, tel., 6. x. 1914, F. 0.371/1882/56273. 
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Office was beginning to find Harcourt's policy to be petty and unnecessary. 
j 
Sperling advised the Foreign Secretary to reconsider the questions 
"It°(the refusal to co-operate with Belgiu! n), was prompted 
originally by the apprehension felt at the C. O. that the 
Belgian Government might seek some compensation in German 
East Africa at the odd of the war, if we accept active 
co-operation of their Colonial troops" .... the "Belgians 
will be so indebted to England after the war that they 
will, not claim anything England wants. "l 
Grey, who had from August been willing to co-operate with Belgium, 
2 
approached Harcourt on the tatter, 
3 but was firmly tolds 
"The Indian Expedition to Dar-es-Salaam is due on the 
14th. It is very, -Important 
that no offensive in 
German East Africa should be taken from the Belgian side. 
I hope this may be stopped for the present at any rate. "4 
Grey, who had a marked tendency to bow to military opinion, even when 
it was expressed by someone as obviously lacking in martial qualities 
as Harcourt, gave way. When, at the end of October, the Belgians made 
a further appeal for Anglo-Belgian military co-operation in Africa, 
the Colonial Office again refused to reconsider its position. 
5 
In the first week in November, the Indian Expedition against German 
East Africa suffered a humiliating setback off Tanga. 
6 
The Foreign 
Office immediately turned on the Colonial Office for having refused 
Belgian military assistance. 
1 Minute by Sperling, 6. x. 1914, F. O. 371 188 56273. 
2, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, ll. viii. 1914, C. O. 616/12/30086. 
.3 Grey to 
Harcourt, 6. x. 1914, (copy), F. 0.371/1882/56273. 
4 Harcourt to Grey, 8. x. 1914, F. 0.371/1882/56273. 
5 F. 0.371/1882/616321 F. 0.371/1882/66873. 
6 Guinn, P. A., British Strategy and Politics, 1914-1918 (1965) p. 33. 
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"The whole difficulty arises from the extraordinary 
jealousy of the Colonial Office of any action taken 
by the Congo troops beyond the Congo frontier. The 
result of this policy can only be the prolongation 
of the operations against German East Africa with 
unnecessary loss of a good many lives. "1 
The Foreign Office sent a communication, which contained "some pretty 
plain speaking, "2 to the Colonial Office, and Grey once again saw 
Harcourt on the subject of Belgium taking the offensive against German 
East Africa. 
3 
The military fiasco greatly weakened the authority of the Colonial 
Office. Military operations were put under the control of the War 
Office. 4 On 25 November, the French were invited to send colonial 
troops from Madagascar to German East Africa. 5 The Colonial-Office 
and the Foreign Office gave the-War Office conflicting advice about 
co-operating with Belgium. 
6 The War Office found the ideas of the 
Foreign Office to be more congenial from a military point of view. Not 
that the War Office's analysis of the campaign in Africa was such as to 
encourage confidence. 
"As far as I, can make outs" General Callwell Informed 
Sir Arthur Nicolson, "His Majesty's Government have 
no definite military policy in that part of the world. "7 
Up to December, 19149, operations against German East Africa were 
1 Minute by Sperling; 17.491914, F. 0.371 iß82 71865. 
2 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 16, xi. 1914, (copy), Minute by 
Sperling, 17. xi. 1914, F. O. 371/1882/71852. 
3 Minute by Grey, undated, c. 17. xi. 1914, F. O. 371/1882/71865. 
4 Guinn, p. 33. 
5 Grey to Bertie, tel., ', 25. x1.1914, and minutes of Harcourt and 
Kitchener, undated 'c. 25. xi. 1915, F. O. 371/1882/75245. 
6 F. O. 371/1882/82994.. 
7 Callwell to Nicolson, 9. xii. 1914, F. O. 371/1882/81461. 
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made with a view to keeping that colony after the war was over. The 
campaign was conceived as a colonial campaign in Victorian style. 
Harcourt treated himself to the luxury of subordinating sound military 
principles-to political needs. Nineteenth century strategic concepts 
were married to nineteenth century political phobias. The Colonial 
Office was unwilling to look at the war on a global scale, and could 
think only of local differences with France and Belgium. It can also 
be noted that the phenomenon that alliances are most cohesive when the 
common danger is greatest. gperates through space as well as through 
time. In Africa, where the allies faced little military danger from 
Germany, co-operation'was not merely poor, it was deliberately avoided. 
The Foreign Office took a broader and more sensible view of the war 
than did the Colonial 10ffice= it was not so petty politically, and it 
had a finer grasp of military necessities. While the two'Departments 
squabbled over how-the campaign against German East Africa was to be 
conducted, they were in agreement on its purpose: German East Africa 
was to be British after the war. 
a. German East Africa, December 1914'- March 191,5. 
The campaign in German East Africa was a small event. Its 
relationship to the war in Europe was like that which one finds in 
Shakespearean drama between ninon, and major plots. The African campaign 
n 
was on/ltogether smaller and more trivial plane, distinguished only by, 
bickerings, misunderstandings end incompotence, all designed to give 
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light relief to the more massive circumstances unfolding behind. Being 
an event of less consequence, Its destiny was subject to external 
Influence. 
In November and December, 1914, two major developments effected a 
change in attitudes towards German East Africas the entry of Turkey 
into the wax; the deadlock in the war in Europe. The former shifted 
imperial preoccupations from Africa to the Middle East; the latter 
caused some members of the Government to consider allowing Germany to 
retain her East African possessions after the war. 
Before the entry of Turkey into the war, German East Africa had 
been the richest prize that Britain could hope to gain. It was largest 
and most prosperous of German colonies; it stood on the flank of the 
Indian Ocean, and the port of Dar-es-Salaam could be used as a base from 
which to threaten mercantile routes. German aggression and instincts 
of, self-defence and greed (rather than elaborate doctrines of imperialism) 
made it a natural focus for British ambitions. 
With the entry of Turkey into the war, attention moved from Africa 
to the Middle East. The overwhelming majority of the British Government 
felt that if imperial interests-had to be secured through expansion, then 
it was far more important to absorb parts of the'Ottoman Empire than to 
take. German territories. The only Repartment that to some extent held 
out against this opinion was, somewhat naturally, the Colonial Office. 
The changing priorities of the Foreign Office can be traced quite 
easily through the attitudes of George Russell Clerk. In August,.. 1914, 
i4-q- 
Clerk had strongly argued the case for keeping German East Africa after 
the war. 
I Once Britain was at war with Turkey, he saw it as being 
infinitely more important to .Qe British ikterests in Mesopotamia those 
thar/In Africa. In March, 1915, he advised Grey: 
"It is important that we should have a clear idea of what 
we want for ourselves in the Turkish Empire. Our allies 
have probably each got their shares of the Sick Man's 
inheritance clearly defined in their minds, and if we 
do not take care we shall find ourselves 'left'o"2 
When the expedition to Mesopotamia suffered a setback, he urged that 
If necessary troops be taken ffom East Africa to protect Britain's 
position in the Middle Easts 
"the one disaster is teaiporcry, the other is permanent 
and incalculable. "3 
Similar sentiments were expressed even more forcibly by: Kitchener. 
His eyes were so rivetted on the dessert that he was willing to neglect 
the hors-d'oeuvres altogether. 
"But it is not only in Turkey that there is likely to be 
territory to divide up at the end of the war. There are 
also German colonies in Africa, some of which will, as 
for as can be foreseen at present, be at the disposal 
of the Allies when the settlement comas. These German 
African possessions are no doubt of value to whatever 
Power eventually retains them, but it would be absurd 
to compare their value to the British Empire with that 
of Alexandretta, Mesopotamia and the Bagdad Railway, 
and with all that their possession would mean as security 
to Egypt and the Suez Canal, as well as India. "4 
1 Minute by Clerk, lO. viii. 1914,1.0.371 188 37617. 
2 Minute by Clerk, 9.1ii. 1915, F4.371/2479/27177. 
3 Minute by Clerk, 5.131.1915, F. 0.371/2479/25893. 
4 Alexandretta and gesonotamie by Lord Kitchener, 16.111.1915, 
CAB. 24 1 G-12. 
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At a lower level, the Middle Eastern pressure group was for more numerous 
and powerful than the African one. The imperial vision shifted bodily 
from Africa to the Middle East. Even Harcourtl was obliged to acknowledge 
that claims in Mesopotamia would have to take precedecce over claims 
for German colonies. 
Considerations of quite a different nature also began to influence 
policy towards German East Africa. German East Africa was the only 
one of the German colonies in which Britain had a free-hand to decide 
its destiny. Elsewhere-West Africa, S. W. Africa and the'Pacific - 
the allies and the Vominions had an important, and often predominant, 
voice. They insisted that the German colonies. adjacent to their own 
territories should be confiscated. The larger part of Germany's 
overseas Empire passed beyond recall. The only area where Britain 
could make some gesture of goodwill towards Germany was German East 
Africa. There was therefore a strong case for allowing Germany to 
keep the colony after the war. 
"It would be a mistake, " Kitchener told the War Council, 
"to acquire more of these (German colonies) than we 
could avoid, as it would more than anything else 
interfere with the future establishment of goodwill 
between Germany and ourselves. "2 
This view was also held by Churchill. 
3 
The Foreign Secretary came out figainst retaining German Est Africa 
after the war. He told the War Council4 and Asquith5 that the Empire 
I The Spoils, March 1915, by Harcourt, Atquith Papers, M. S. 114. 
2 War Council, 10. iii. 1915, CAB, 22/l. 
3 War Council, 10.111.1915, CAD, 22/i. 
4 War Council, 10.111.1915, and 19.111.1915, CAB. 22/1. 
5 Asquith, vol. II, p. 69. 
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was large enough already, and it would be'unwise to add further to British 
responsibilities. It is probable that. Grey had a more potent reason for 
not wanting to take German East'Africai', ' he did not want to prolong the 
wer more than was necessary. In the early months of the war Grey had 
raised no profound objections to keeping German East Africa after the var. 
its civil servants and the Colonial Office had both worked on the assumption 
that it would be retained in perpetuity$ and'the Foreign Secretary had not 
opposed this assumption Usually when he wanted to caution the Foreign 
office about its oiewe1 he wrote, a short minute indicating his objections. 
He did not do so in this cases Moreover, in the correepopdence between the 
Colonial Office end the Foreign Office there were no deflections which would 
indicate that Grey was opposing the general con-sen-cuss The Pbreign 
Secretary was in thi habit of thinking of a line of action for one reason 
end explaining it in terms of - another" It is quite likely;, that in the 
early part of the var, whon he had belioYed that the war could bs brought Io 
a triumphant oonclueion, he was prepared to keep German Esst dtxloa. With 
the deadlock in the war in Europep he treated to limit allied claims as much 
as possible. foverer$ being unduly sensitive to. the goesip ifl the Foreign 
Office and Governmental circles that he was excessively opaoirist" in his 
attitude to the Waft he explained hie Views in terms of broad strategic ideas. 
This, explanatiön waled be more consistent, with what we know of Grey' e war 
aims generallys th; general contraction of-allied claims from December, 
1914, onwards. It is also more consistent with other records of his 
attitude towards German East Africa. 1n a long conversation about war 
Zý-ý 
aims with Bertie, Grey raised no strategic objections to claiming German 
East Africa. 'Bertie's'memorandum on Grey's views indicate that his 
main reason for not wanting German East Africa was to avoid putting 
Britain and her allies in-a position where they would not be able to 
negotiate peace with Germany. 
1 
After December; 1914, German East Africa became relatively less 
important in British war aims. On one level, the imperial vision 
shifted from Africa to Turkey. On another level, setbacks in the 
principle theatres of war made it seem unlikely that Britain would be 
able to enforce a settlement in which Germany was ccmpletely stripped 
of her overseas possessions. There arose a dualism in war aims if 
the war could be won decisively, then the arguments for retaining 
Germany's overseas Empire would be overwhelming{ if military stalemate 
continued, then the arguments in favour of returning German East Africa 
were in the ascendent. 
5. Japan. 
The future of Germany's colonies north of the equator was settled 
in the first five months of the war. Japan fell heir to one half of 
Germany's Pacific Empire. While this divilion of territory had been 
swift, it had not been Britain's intention to give Japan the opportunity 
to extend her dominion,,. As in German East Africa, British policy was 
aimed at keeping her allies out of Germany's overseas Empire; firstly, 
1 Memorandum by 13ertie, 11. viii. 1916,. Bertie Papers, F. 0.800/171$ see 
also Minute by Grey, undated, c. 4. ix. 1915, Grey Papers, F. 0,800/95. 
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in order to ensure that imperial trangüiflity was not disturbed by the 
expaußion of rirel empires; cecardly' in order to koopcopen ex many 
options as possible* 
Grey found these objectives impossible to, reaiiza" The absence of 
a community of Ar ]o-'Japanesa interests ma=t that tha two '"island 
exipires" could only reconcile their c ferences by recognising their 
common right to expansion at the expensa of the zm tusl enemy. The 
systematic resort to this neana of minimising !. tsglo-Jspnne$e tensions 
led inevitably to the divisio'of the German Empire in the Pacifio. 
But in August, 1914, the chei. n of events seemed uoehere near as inexorable. 
Commenting on the conclusion of the Anglo-Japansce alliances 
Professor Grenville has 1aritt®nt 
mAllianees are usually founded on a comn: nity of interests 
and the desire to pursue similar policies. This, however, 
was not- the basis on which t1hoArglo'4apanese alliance 
vas built. "1 
This absence of m community of gurposo was rovcaled in August, -1914,... 
eben Britaiz nach Do attempt to fully invol u her cUiaaae with Japan. 
Australia and New Zealand were never 'Vciry sappy with t ho Japanaas a1liaaae, 
and had no wish to sea Japan extend her Empire by seizing German territories. 
The United States looked on aaxiourlq lost Japan used the war in Europe as 
an opportunity to gain a commanding position in the pacific , 02 The British 
1 Grenvi11ep J. A. S., 
L, inetaethCentury 1964 9, p. 390. 
2 Lodge to Grays I7. viii. 1914, Gray Popars, F. 0R800/108; Bsrcisy to 
Grey, tel. 8. viii. 1914, F. 0,37V2168/37529, 
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Government 'Were sensitive to the apprehensions of the Dominions and the 
U ited Ststes$ and trat least because they shared their : ears. 
The political disadvantages. of inviting Japan to hilly participate 
in the war were by no means counterbalancod by her value as an any in war. 
The Royal Navy was thought to have as fficient preponderance of force to 
destroy Germany' a wireless and telegraphic sy: tea in the Pac. ific# and to 
drive the German Fleet from the High Seas. This done, the fall of German 
islands in the-Pacific would be a matter at course. England had little 
to gain and much to lose by inviting Japanese entry.. 
The most articulate and least tactful challenge to this policy came 
from sir T+ rro Crowe. Ate or Crowal a ciixnites gives us an unclouded glimpse 
of his oun forceful personality and grinding logic, and the preoccupations 
of his political masters. 
"I still hope our policy (of not anvit Japan to enter 
the war) wilt be re_eoneidered, In a war of this kind 
and magnitude there is one supreme and over-riding 
considerationi to smash the eneu definitely, rapidly 
and with the employment of all I. egitiLate mesas. " 
"Germany should be driven out of the whole ]Pacific and 
out of China. The question of the relative position 
of Britain axed Japan after the war iss end should bai 
of secondary donaideration. All half measures are a 
mistake. "i 
Grey liked neither Growela reasoning nor the somewhat aggressive style 
in which he expressed himself* He wocrily rebuked Crowot 
The pros axd cons of bringing iri the Japanese are 
grave and would need too long a mtto. For the. 
praseut ve do not ask the Japanese to come is and 
have left our Admiral a free hand. "2 
1 Minute by Grove, 10. viii. 1914A F, 0,37 2L68 37529. 
2 Minute by Grey, undated$ 0. l0. viii. 1914 F. Q. 371/2168/37529. 
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It soon became evident that, whether Britain desired it or not, 
Japan was determined to use the preoccupation of the European powers 
elsewhere to further har own position. in the Far East, on 8 Auguats, 
Greene, the British Ambassador at Tokyý1 reported that'the Japanese 
Qover=ent were favourable %boa declaration of war* Grey refaed to 
be drawn into giving the Japanese a ODo= in a request for Japanese 
help rudder the terms of the inglo-, tapse all. iwce. 
ul cannot, aq that. t :e . eoia', interests 
_o 
of Qxaat 
Britain -.. * are so seriously menabed as to ake it essential on that ground alone to appeal to the 
alliaace. * 
Britain asked for only a limited amount of naval assistaaca"2 
It 3e easy to miss t ha significanao or not sally it okizig the Lnglo- , 
Japanese a13. iance. If Britain appealed t Japan for aid, then ohs was obliged 
to find her compensation in the pe&c© Battlement. She vas, zoroov©r 
committing hersah to something that t3hc might not have'to concade. It 
was by no means obvious that the Empira would bo enCee'al&d by the, wars 
it seemed possible, even probable, that Britain. would ersurgo from the 
war as a member of victorious and dominrit coalition. ' At the time of 
the peace £ottlem3ut the balance of 
, 
pcwo/Y in tho Par East could have 
swung decisively in favour of Britain, and then she would regret promises 
made at a moment of wecknass. 
Grey left Japan in Sao doubt that he did not wart her to seizo 
2 
Gracns to Grey, te3.. # 8. viii. 1914,; F"Q. 37 2167 37281. 
Grey to Greene, tel., ll. viii. 1914# C. U. 6l6/37 ßh43. This reference 
aAd certain subsequent ones are taken fröm a long Foreign Office 
memorar4nn presented to the Colonial, Office in Februarys 1915" 
Having taken theta telegrams down undur a colonial office reference, 
I did not duplicate mst labours by taking than down under a Foreign 
Office one. ,I apologise 
if this-is the cause of some confusion 
to the readers Asquith to, ging George V, ll"Viii. 191 # CAB. 35/1. 
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German territories in the Pacific. 
"What is requiredis ..... an assurance in any form that we or Japan can make public..... that will make 
it clear that Japan is not going to seize German Islands 
In the Pacific, with which the self-governing Dominions 
desire to deal with themselves, and also she is not going 
to take advantage of the situation to seize Dutch East 
Indian colonies or interfere with the Pacific coast of 
C htnil i*- I 
On 15 August, the Japanese Government delivered their q ttmatbm to 
Germany. On the same day, the Foreign Secretary impressed upon the 
Japanese Ambassador that it was essential that any declaration of war 
should be accompanied by a public statement that Japan would not attack 
German Islands in the Pacific. 2 The Japanese response was hardly 
reassuring. Grey was given personal assurances that a public statement 
would be made, but the Japanese refused to coamtt, themselves as to the 
time or the place. Then, on 16'August, Japan announced to the world 
that she had delivered an ultimatum to Germany, it was a proclamation 
unaccompanied by any statement of intention'to limit her military action. 
Greene immediately raised the matter with Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Baron Kato. This interview gave real cause for disquiet. The 
dmbassador suggested a, number of ways by which Japan could assure Britain 
and her Dominions and friends that she had no designs on Germany's Pacific 
Empires As quickly as Greene, made suggestions, Kato provided ingenpous 
and plausible explanations as to why Japan found them unacceptable. 
Greene came away feeling *decidedly gloomy: 
1 Grey to Greene, tel., 13. viii. 1914, C. 0.616/37/84439 
2 Grey to Green4, tel. no. 84,15. viii, 1914, Grey to Greenef tel., 
no. 63,15. v1ii. 1914, C. 0.616/37/8443. 
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"It looks to me as if the Cabinet was reluctant to 
commit themselves to the limit suggested in your_ (Grey's) telegram. "1 
Two days later, however, events took a brighter turn. Japan gave a 
private assurance that sl#s,; had: 
"no intention of seizing territories outside the 
China Seas, such as German Islands in the Pacific, 
which might cause apprehension in Australia and 
New Zealand. "2 
At the same time Japanese Prime Minister made a public statement 
indicating that Japan's interest lay in rooting out German influence 
from Chins, and she harboured no ambitions elsewhere. 
Grey had not succeeded in keeping Japan out of the war, but he had 
succeeded in limiting her claims. She would be rewarded with the 
German concession of Kiao-chow. On 19, August. Grey noted the likely 
extent of Japan's territorial compensations 
"It cannot be expected that Japan will spend blood and 
treasure in Kiao-Chow and get nothing for it - not even 
the remains of the German lease. " 
3 
Japan's action ran counter to her pledges: her war effort was not 
confined to protecting her trade routes and eradicating German Influence 
in China. Early in October she began offensive operations against 
Germany's Pacific Islands. The Colonial Office found themselves in an 
awkward situations they had to explain this unwelcome development, to 
Australia and New Zealand. Harcourt resorted to a not altogether 
unexpected remedys 
1 Greene to Grey, tel., 17. viii. 1914, C. O. /616/37/8443. 
2 Green to Grey, tel., no. 95,19. vili. 19141 Green to Grey, telo no. 96, 
19. viii. l914, C. O. /616/37/8443. . 3 Minute by Grey, undated, c. 19. viii. 1914, F. 0.371/2019/40679. 
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"Yes, " he informed his Department, "certainly wait till 
Australia and New Zealand begin to complain. "l 
By the end of October Japan had captured all German possessions north 
of the equator - Pellew islands, East and West Caroline groups; Marshall 
islands; and 'tfezi- concession at Kiao-Chow. The Japanese claimed, both 
in private and public, that the occupation of these territories had been 
made solely for strategic reasons, and it was emphasised to the British 
Government that it was "not a political occupation. "a 
Grey realized that there could be no question of theowing the 
Japanese out of the territories they had occupied, and an agreement was 
reached whereby for the duration of the war Japan occupied German 
possessions north of the Equator, and the British Empire territories 
south of the Nquator. 
3 
The Equator was the obvious line of demarcations 
it corresponded to'the actual areas under occupation, and it formed what 
Professor Schelling would deem to be a natural meeting point for "tacit 
bargainißglk". The Foreign Secretary still hoped to keep free of binding 
commitments, and insisted thats 
"all occupation of German territory by our respective 
forces during the war is without prejudice to permanent 
arrangements that will have to be made after the war 
when the Allies come to settle terms, of peace. "4 
Yet for all his hopes, Grey must have seen that the fate of Germany's 
possessions north of the Equator, was slipping out of Britain's hands. 
Britain's bargaining position was further weakened by a curious series 
of events in November, 1914. 
1 Minute by Harcourt, 8. x. 1914, C. 0.616 1 35180. ' 
2 Greene to Grey, tel'. -, 10. x. 1914, C. 0.616/12/32903. 
3 C. 0.616/13/46782; C. 0.616/13/48511., 
4 Grey to Greene, tel. no. 216,26. xi. 1914, C. 0.616/13/48511. 
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on 1 November, 1914, a British squadron was badly beaten at the 
Coronel. l The defeat made a trifling difference to'Britain's overall 
naval superiority, but it came as a profound shock to the Admiralty and 
a bitter blow to public opinion. The Admiralty panicked and insisted 
on inviting Japanese aid in the war in the Pacific. What happened next 
is best described by Lord Eustace Percys 
"late one night, after the disaster at the Coronel, 
the Cypher Department transmitted to Tokyo an 
Admiralty message which they could not, they felt, 
take the responsibility of querying or delaying. 
It was a request for the co-operation of Japanese 
cruisers in the hunt for the Scharnhorst. and 
Gneisenau. From that moment Japan became our 
active ally, with ultimate consequences in Pacific, 
and in Anglo-American relations, which were to 
change history. "2 
Percy was slightly exaggerating. Japan was already in possession 
of the German islands north of the Equator. But one point is clear, 
Britain had appealed for Japanese aid, and Britain was obliged to 
compensate her for her sacrifices in the war. 
The Japanese Government saw their opportunity, and on 1 December the 
British Obassado r reported that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told 
him: 
"having regard to the very widespread; operations, which=k ý -, - 
the Imperial Navy is and has been'enga#ed in co-operation 
with the British Navy, the nation would naturally insist 
on retaining all islands lying north of the Equator, and 
the Imperial Government will rely on the support of His 
Majesty's Government when the proper time arrives for the 
fulfillment of the above object. "3 
1 Marder, A. J.,. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 196 , vol. II 
pp. 101-116. - 2 Percy, p. 43. 
3 Greene to Grey, tel.,, 1. zii. 1914, C. 0.616/13/4851],. 
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For all intents and purposes, the game was now ups Britain could do 
nothing'but accept that after the war japan would annex those territories 
she had occupied. Grey refused to make the matter the subject of 
secret engagements, and insisted the question would have to be decided 
at the peace settlemento , At the same time, he assured the Japanese 
that$ 
"We ....... shall not put forward formal claims in 
these regions (Japanese occupied territories) 
ourselves in the final terms of peace without full 
consultation with Japan. "i 
Britain had accepted that German possessions north of the Equator had 
passed beyondrecall. Harcourt began topprepars the Diominions for a 
Japanese Empire extending to the'Equators 
"I feel I ought to" give you (Ferguson, the Governor-General 
of Australia) personally, some e&p1snation ... *6 our 
fleets were so fully engaged in the North Sea, Atlantic, 
Mediterraneanf and'inýconvoy of. troops across the Indian 
Ocean that we could not spare enough to deal with the 
Pacific. We had therefore. to call in Japanese aid .... 
this has changed the character of the Japanese participation 
and no doubt of their eventual claims to compensation ..... 
it is the intention of, the Japanese at the end of the war 
to claim all the German Islands North of the Equator ..... 
You ought in the most gradual and. diplomatic way to begin 
to prepare your Ministers for thejpossibility that at the 
end of the, war Japan may be, left in possession of the 
Northern Islands and, we with everything South of the Equator. " 2 
Thus, by the end of 1914,, the fate of Germany's, Pacific Empire was 
sealed. How had this camä about? ' British policy developed as a result 
of q4tontinual selection öf. alternatiVes, each of which left a diminished 
range of choice. In tleend there was only one possible solution left. 
1 Grey to Greene,, 'tel., 3. x11.1914, C. 0.616 1 48311. 
2 Harcourt to Ferguson,, 6. xi'i. 1914, quoted in Louis,, p. 42-43. 
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Having accepted Japanese entry into the war, Britain was obliged to 
recognise her claim for the German concession of Kiso-Chow; having 
accepted her occupation of German islands, she was constrained to 
accept the possibility of the Japanese refusing to return them; havigg 
asked for Japanese help, she was obliged to find her compensation for 
it; having received favourably Japan's claim that she was entitled 
to keep German islands Aorth of the Equator, she had mortgaged her 
interests in that area. A very similar sequence of-events had 
occured in Eastern and Central Europe, but there Grey was able to pay 
off the mortgage by the ingeneous scheme of substituting one set of 
claims with another: he exchanged the deeds of Eastern and Central 
Europe with the deeds of Constantinople and the Straits. With Japan 
there was nothing else to offer her; she was bound to keep what she 
already had. When, in May 1915, New Zealand complained bitterly about 
Japanese expansion, it was noted in the Colonial Office that: 
"We and Now Zealand are met by the practical difficulty 
of turning Japan out of the islands, of which she is 
now in possession, which she wants to keep and in 
lieu of (which? ) it Is-difficult to see what we are 
to offer her. "1 
In 1916, the War Office observed: 
"Japan is unlikely to release her hold on them (the 
territories she-occupied) without a substantial 
quid pro quo, which it will not be easy to find, "2 
Policy towards' Germany's Pacific colonies had evolved not from a 
single political-plans but rather: as an. outgrowth of a series, of decisions 
1 Liverpool to Barcourt, 13. v. 1915, "andinute by Just, 23. vi. 1915, 
C. 0.573/1173/28632. 
2 Memorandum by Robertson, 30. viii; 1'916, CAH. 29/l/P-d. ' 
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of a diplomatio nature. These decisions vets made as a diplomatio 
solution for the problems of foreign policy, and without sn clear idea 
of how the peace settlement should be orgatiiaed. 
Saud, Eric 6. ku`ita 411. lIgw'ZI g= Wg l .3 nn of 
British policy towards German South 4sjt erica and Garman colonies 
in the Pacific 5auth of the Equator grzw out of the nature of Britai ta 
relations with the Dominions. Ths Dominionsi tied to B: itatn by economic, 
political, x ilitaý and sonntimentol 114eroutss mach n signi. tioau 
contribution to: the war effort. It xaa evident that they would have 
to be rewarded for their sacrifices, and It was obVioua,, from the very 
beginning of the war, that they would deed those Ga. -man, posaassions 
adjacent to thair te: ritcrios. 
German South-West Africa wea bh3 only Garxzin colony that was a 
direct threat to InperleX security, The Gera allowed it to be used 
as a ratuga for rebellious Hoerr, and this as t "conti=al Aourae of 
irritation for th3 Union and for ttu3 Xapo. Mial. Govan nt. 
l 
On 6 Augaatt Harcourt appaa1ed to tho Union o:. South Africa to 
-West 
mount operations against otrategic contraa In Gozaar South/Africa. He 
stressed, however; 
"You (the Governor-tatarm, of South Africa) will realize 
that any territory now occupied tust at the conclusion 
of the war be, At (the) dipposa1 of the Itporia1 Gov3rz ont 
for (the) purpose of (the) ultimate sottleuent. d2 
In the Foreign 0tfico. Sir Eyz e Cz'owo sav that, uthztev r stipulations were 
1 Louts, p. 50. 
2 Harcourt to Buxton tei,, 6, viii»19214 C. 0.616/l0/28764. 
ISB 
made, the Union would seek rewards for its sacrifices and outlets for its 
ambitious: 
"i feel that wW such 'att ptu (to keep:; German colonies 
out of the war, ) he wrote on 11 August, "would meet 
with strong disapproval in the Union of South Africa, 
who may be assumod to _ 
be willing and, ewer to assume 
the burdens of driving the Germans out of Africa bag 
and baggage. "1 
The Colonial Gftioe itself had designs on the v=]3i mina of German 
South-West Africa. Sir John Anderson the Permanent Under Secretary* 
obsenedl 
'Very satiefactary. a sh U of course fall beire' to, aä. 
Governmaut proparty and rights (the German Governmentr e 
bolät gs in tha +liamoad aias) it we bet South-West 
Africa. '2 
The : ouch African campaign against South-blast Africa began in 
January 1915, and was successfully concluded in Jute of the same year. 
Even before it was completed, Grey end Harcourt were convinced that 
South Africa vronld not allow South-West Africa to be returned after the 
war, and that it would be impolitic to insist that; 
:, 
she did so. 
3 
This 
remained the assumption of the British Government for the rest of the waur. 
In 1916, Burtie noted a difference of opinion between policy towards 
German East Africa and German Soutb-West Africa; 
Our South Africans, " he told Gray, "would tot tolerate the 
retroaeasiou' o£ German South-West Afrjaa for the South 
Africans had taken German South-Wust Africa and were now 
conquering German East Africa, Grey 'agreed in regard to 
South-West Africa, but would not commit himself to the 
retcntiou of Garman East A. riya iu tat-cu. ", 
1 finute by Croce, 11. viii. 1914, F. Q7) 1882/3763.7» 
2 Minute by Anderson, 26. viii. 1914, C, O, 616/100600. 
3 Var Council, 10. iii. 1915# C19.22/lt 
4 Memorandum by Bertie, ll. viii«1916, Bertie rgpera, F. 0.800/1711 the 
same logic is apparent in the later part of the war - son The Reoort 
pP T. o%wi tStMRA11I0 firr}`fýýrrrý+ias .. n R! rwwwtýý.. ý.. 7 ? %-. 4A, &"m4A AN +_hs Tnr+ma 
os Peaca$ GA13. a/77. 
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British war aims with regard to Germany's colonies 'in the'Pacific 
south of the Equator was 'moved by 'similar principles. When 'the 
Australians and New Zealanders took Sognoa and German New Guinea, they 
took it for granted that their occupations would be permanent. ` As 
early as the 12 August, 1914, the local New Zealand commander. reporteds 
"From a commercial standpoint German Somoa would be a 
valuable, though small, 'addition'to His Majesty's 
t ominions. "1 
when Australian forces occupied German New Guinea, the local 
41efs were 
told'that, "the British flag would'not be hauled down. "2 
The Imperial Government tried, for a's long as'possible td'm ke it 
clear, that the occupat, 
territory'should 
not prejudice the 
4'ntuai 
negotiation of the settlement. Büt it was hopeless to try., tö, 'y, nforee 
this principle, and, with Japanese. claims 'for German territory north of 





Nowadays it is customary to conceive, 
of imperialism and imýerial 
policy as political activities moved by! principles fundamentall+ 
different to all others. This. , is ox'a'ka reflection of 
the conscience 
and self-image of our age than It: Is ßän, 'i sight Into the past:. Imperialism 
has become unfashionable, and in däiýg'$o pit has become '. ridiculous. It 
is seen as meaning more than the "pow es i.. 1n, of a, string'of overseas 
1 Officer Commanding Local Forces., J o. His Excellency, 'tha Commander-in- 
Chief, 12. vii. 1914, C. 0,616/2%40772. 
2 Holmes to Ministry of Defence, Wlbourne, 13. x1.1914,0.0.616/20/13596. 
3 afar Council, 10. iii. 1915, CAB. 22/t; Memorandum by Bertie, 1l, viii. 1914, 
Bertie Papers, F. ©. 800/171, ; 
sý ; 
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territories rather it is a set of priorities and values which were 
supposed to have epitomised national amour ro re, and which, we are told, 
we have ncwemancipated ourselves from, 
In a limited number of cases the idea of global policy being moved 
by a system of preconceived ideas holds goods Kitchener deduced his 
imperial policy from a highly emotive attitude towards the Empire, 
and saw imperial expansion as a preordained coursee But Kitchener was 
by no means typical, He had spent his life defending the frontiers of 
the Empire. " As Secretary of State for War he was out of touch'and out 
of step with the rest of the Government. He was altogether less 
cultivated, 'less mentally agile and less urbane than his colleagues, 
Asquith's smooth Balliol mind could notes 
1, 
"K, who generally finds things out sooner or later 
as a rule rather later. "1 
Kitchener was practically alone in seeing imperialism and imperial 
expansion as one and the same idea. Even Lord Curzon saw that there 
was no necessary correlation between these two ideas% 
"It was an amusing feature of our discussion, " he wrote to 
Balfour, "that the Ministexs who took the most imperialistic 
lime were lifelong Radicals,, 'such as the P, M., Montagu and 
Barnes; %bile the people who were most anxious to curtail 
our responsibilities were the, Conservatives, such as Milner, 
Chamberlain, and myself. "2 
From the archives one gains an impression that abstract doctrines of 
imperialism had only a marginal influence on the development of'British 
policy towards the. Gerrnan colonies; One'finds that the most powerful 
1 Quoted in Jenkinit, p. ` . 
2 Curzon to Balfour, 10. viii. 1919 -Balfour Papers, edd. 49724, 
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emotiöns are greed, -pride and 
teer; but these are universal sentiments 
which influence all looms d political bargaining and calculation. It 
II 
would be tzaive to . 
believe that they are more or less powerful in one 
generation than the net. British i: sr alms with regard to the German 
colonies evolved in very «gab the name way as did the regt of British 
war aims. It was above all, a rerporiwo to inmedizto. noedc a. "ä leties. 
England was obliged to insist on the retention of German possessions in 
the pacific and South-West Africa simply Out of obligation to Australiat 
South Africa 
New Zealand/and Japan. With , 
Gern East Africa Britain had a freer 
hand, sand there was a more subtle interplay of forces. The' mast striking 
influence was the very parochial attitude of the ColonialOffice# who were 
a$ 'anxious vbo4 trance and Belgium as they were- about German's. Equally 
interesting is the way in which Grey tried to balance allied ambitious 
against their capacities, 
Beneath all the edc yitig currents of opinion end sentiment one can 11 
perceive the powerful. influence of impersonal factors. Above eU, in the 
long run an almost intangible process of psychological commitment to the 
war against Germany: a commitment that made it very difficult to return 
her colonies. Arthur Balfour, always a detached observer of men and events, 
saw that there was a certain inexorable logic determining Britain's global 
policy: 
"Mr. Balfour remarked that it was a consequzence of our 
geographical position that we had dona wort of the 
conquering of distant territory# and that this wer 
z .t ht and 1i1 others in a nap of the world with =re red on it. "i 
1 Minutes of the Eastern committee, 24. iy«191ßs CAß. 27 a4. 
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In the early part of the Great War Britain fought for security: she 
sought to protect and maintain that which she already possessed. The 
main purpose of the war was to drive the German armies from the west of 
Europe and to safeguard Britain from German attack in the future: Germany 
was to evacuate Belgium and to pay compensation to her: France was to 
receive Alsace-Lorraines German naval power was to be drastically reduced. 
Uiile Britain sought checks to German aggression in the future, she also 
sought to destroy the influence of those who had disturbed the peace of 
Europe, the German military. There was a profound conviction, based on 
experience of the events of July, 1914, that 110 settlement would be secure 
as long as the German military could d; termine their nation's destiny. 
Theca were the irreducible guarantees%that Britain. cought. 
British claims for German colonies in East and West Africa were more 
negotiable. In this respect it is useful to borrow the economists' 
concept of the marginal unit. The advantages of taking German colonies 
were balanced against the cost of enforcing euch a settlement. But it is 
easy to drive the parallel too tars the bargaining situation was not quite 
the same as that in the economic market] calculations were essentially in 
arises 
the style of mental arithmetic - "if such and such a situatioxVthen we 
might'do this 'or that. " SPicuilation about "ifs" in history is not always 
a fruitful exercise, but it is often a quite interesting one. had the 
situation arisen where the German armies had sustained severe- though not 
7-0 
crippling - setbacks, and Germany offered terms which met the irreducible 
claims of the British Government, then probably she would have salvaged 
some of her African colonies. 
Though Britain sought security, she lacked the strength to maintain 
bar on position through her on efforts. Japan, Australia, New Zealand 
and the Union of South Africa all helped Britain in the coAFlicl' against 
Germany. Britain waa bound to continue the struggle until Germany had ceded 
her Pacific Empire and South-West Africa to them. 
Britain was no less bound to find Russia compensation] though Russia, 
with her enormous geographical extent, could expand in many directions. 
In the first four months of the war Britain was willing to acknowledge 
Russia's right to expansion in Europe. This was the magnet that was to 
keep Russia locked in her struggle with Germany. After December, 1914, 
Russia's military weakness made it unlikely that she would be able to 
wrest territories from the Central Powers, and Grey strove to substitute 
her ambitions in Europe with claims against Turkey. 
L'hile Britain sought security against German aggression, she had up 
desire to endanger the Empire by allowing France, Russia and Japan wax 
too powerful. In Lrica, Persia and the Far East, the Government 
endeavoured to check the ascendency of Britain's allies. 
While Britain v-ant to war for limitod ends, her leaders underestimated 
the extent to which the war itself would create new international problems. 
They hoped and believed that vio]a noe would do its work quickly and 
efficiently. This miscalculation would be incredible were it not for the 
fact that the limited war strategists of our own day have also failed to 
1di. 
recognise that war is a vehicle for rapid social and international change 
and disorder. In the early part of the First World War, Grey and his 
colleagues were able to consider the problem of the peace settlement on a 
pragmatic basis. As the »war went onthe stability of the international 
erstem began to disintegrate: a wider and more complex range of problems 
had to be pondered. The war ceased to be an instrument for defending 
the harmony of the pre-war worlds from it had to be forged new patterns 
of comity and of order. 
Lord Acton, in a lecture given twenty years before the First World 
War, passed commend on British war aims in the War of the Spanish Succession. 
"In one of his last conversations William (III) had 
said: 1We seek nothing but the security which comes 
from the balance of power. " Our policy was not 
maintained throughout on that exalted level. " 
1 
This is a more fitting epith t: to the development of British war aims in 
the First World V'ar. than any which this author could conjure. 




These notes are not intended to be exhaustive or complete. They 
are offered as a guide and supplement to the text. The author has 
assumed some basio knowledge on the reader's part, and has not thought 
it necessary to make any comment on man who are (even now) well-known. 
APDOSON, Sir John. (1858-1918) . 
Civil Servant. Eduoatedt Aberdeen University] Permanent-Under-Secretary 
of State for Colonies, 1911-1916. 
AS !UH, EmmAlige 1argcret (known as Margot),, Countess of Oxford and 
Asquith. (1864-1945)" 
Margot does not lend herself to short notes, she was larger than life. 
The daughter of a partially self-made Scottish landowner, she became a 
prominent society figure in the 1880's. She owed her notoriety to her 
high spirits, her cutting turn of phrase, and, one suspects, a liking 
for the company of the great and powerful. 
too active) interest in her husband's career,, 
certain succes de-scandale. 
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____ . 
J. p Earl of Balfour (1848-193o). 
She took an active (and perhaps 
Her memoire achieved a 
Philosopher and Statesman. Educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. 
M. P. 1B76; Freaident Local Government Boards 1885; Chief Secretary for 
Lit 
Ireland, 1887; Leader of the House of Commons, 1891; Leader of House of 
Commons and First Lord of Treasury, 1895-1902. Prime Minister, 1902-1905. 
From November, 1914, he attended the tsar Council; First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Ray, 1915 - December, 1916 ; Foreign Secretary, 1916-1919; 
Lord President of the Council, 1919-1922; Lord President of the Council, 
1925-1929. 
D22 0 DORFF. Alexander (1849-1917). 
Russian Diplomatist. Ambassador at London, 1903-1917. 
BMVI ýTORFF, ei=ich. Graf von. (1862-1939) 
German Diplomatist. Ambassador at Washington, 1908-1917. 
pERTIE, siFrg&gjs, 1st ý ; Baran, of Thane. (1844-1919). 
Diplomatist. Educated Eton. British Ambassador at Paris, 1905-1919. 
DE Ht N HULL_ hEG. Theobald von. (1856-1921). 
German ätatesman. German Chancellor, 1909-1917. 
BUCHANAN. Sir George (1854-1924) 
Diplomatist. Educated Vellington College. Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
1910-1918; Ambassador at Rome, 1919-1921. 
JJ John Elliot (1858-1942). 
Trades Unionist and Politician. ; ducatidn, self taught. M. P. l892; 
President of Local Government Board, 1905-1914. 
CABON., -Paul 
(1843-1924) 
French Diplomatist. Ambassador at Madrids 1886; Ambassador at Constantinople, 
1890; Ambassador at London, 1898-19Z). 
Ml- 
CHIRO, I.. Sir (Ignatius) Valentine (1852-1929) 
Traveller, journalist and author. Educated in France and Germany, and 
at the Sorbonne. Clerk at Foreign Office, 1872-1878; Correspondent 
of the Times, 1892-1912; Employed by the Foreign Office during the war. 
ERK. = George W8: 211J1874-1951) 
Diplomatist. Educated Eton and New College, Oxford. Clerk at Foreign 
Office 1895. Assistant Clerk, 1907; let Secretary at Constantinople, 1910; 
Senior Clerk, 1913; Private Secretary to Curzon, 1919"; First minister at 
Prague, 1919-1926; Ambassador at Constantinople, 1926-1933; Ambassador 
l 
at Brussells, 1933-1934; Ambassador at Paris, 1934-1937. According to 
Vansittart, "one of those coming man who never arrives. " 
g E- Marquess of. Crewe-iiilner. Robert Offlev (1858-1945) 
Statesman. Educated, Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. Viceroy 
for Ireland, 1852-1895; Leader of the House of Lords, 1908-1916; 
Secretary of State for Colonies, 1908-1910; Lord Privy Seal, 1908-1911, and 
1912-1915; Secretary of State for India, 1910-1915; -Lord President of 
the Council, 1915; President of Board of Education, 1916. 
cg iair e (1864-1925) 
Diplomatist. Educatid, Gymnasia at Dusseldorff and Berlin; 'Entered 
Foreign Office, 1885; Assistant Under Secretsrry, 1912; Permanent Under 
Secretary, 1920. 
RE EINSEN Sir Henries (1852-1932) 
Diplomatist. Educated, Rugby and Christ Church College, Oxford; entered 
P. O., 18771 Ambassador at Roma, 1913-1914; Chairman of the Inter- 
Departmental Committee on British Desiderata in Turkey in Asian Spring, 1915" 
zip 
DELCASSE. Theonhile (1856-1923) 
French Statesman. Minister for Colonies, 1894-1825) Foreign Minister, 
1898-1905; Minister of Marine 1911-1913; Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1913; 
Foreign Minister, August, 1914-October, 1915. 
UMERGUE. Gaston (1863-1937) 
French Statesman. Minister for Colonies, 1902-1905; Vice President of 
the Chamber, 1905-1906; Minister of Commerce, 1906-1908; Minister for 
"LIInstruction Publique 1909-1910; President of the Council and Foreign 
Minister, 1913-1914" 
DRÜN M)ND. Sir Eric, 16th Earl of Perth (1876-1951) 
Diplomatist. Educated Eton. Entered Foreign 02Zice, 1900; Private 
Secretary to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1908-1910; 
precis writer for Grey, 1910-1911; one of the Prime Minister's Private 
Secretaries, 1912-1915; Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary, 1915-1919; 
Secretary-General of th© League of Nations, 1919-1933; British Ambassador 
to Italy, 1933-1939; Chief Adviser on Foreign publicity, Ministry of 
Informations, 1939-194D. 
5T A OF ELI AK,, Alexander Murr (1870-1920) 
Politician. Educated Cheltenham; 1910-1912, Liberal Chief Whip. Elibank 
joined Lord Crowdray's oil firm.. S. Pearson and Son in 1912 and worked in 
London and Paris from 1912 to November, 1915. He kept up his political 
connections and was used in an unofficial capacity by the Foreign Office 
and Asquith and Lloyd George '- see, Murray, Hon. A. C. M. Mater-and Brother 
(1945), p. 162. 
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ESHERIViscount. Brett. Restinald Balliol(1852-1930) 
Government official. Educated Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. 
M. P. 1880-1885; Secretary for forks, 1895; Member of Elgin Commissions 
1903; Chairman of War Office Reconstruction Committee (Esher Committee) 
1903-1904; Permanent Member of Committee of Imperial Defence, 1905; 
During tha First World Lar was used as a sort of liaison officer between 
London and the French Army 
EIMES - Sir irre Vandeleur (1858-1937) 
Educated, Dulwich Colleges Brasenose College, Oxford; Assistant Under 
Secretary of State for Colonies, 1909-1916; Permanent Under Secretary of 
State for Colonies, 1916-1921. 
FITZ UtICE. Lord Edmond, Petty-Fitzmauricej 1st Baron Fitamaurice of Leigh 
(1846-1935). 
Statesman. Younger son of the Earl of S helbourne, 'later 4th Marqutss of 
Lansdowne, brother of 5th Marquess of Lansdowne. Educated at Eton and 
Trinity College, Cambridge. Unlike his brother, he stayed with the Liberal 
party after 1886. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1905-1908; 
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, 1905-1909. 
C5 HF. Nf *Hon. Sir, 4iillism Edward. 1st Baronet (18474924) 
Diplomatist. Educated, Rugby and Oxford; Ambassador at Berlin, 1908-1914" 
t A1TE. Richard Burden, let Viscount Haldane of Clean (1856-1928) 
Statesman, Philosopher and Barrister. Educated, Edinburgh Academy and 
Edinburgh and 
Gottingen Universities. M. P., 1885; Secretary of State for 
war, 1905-1912; Lord Chancellor, 1912-1915; Lord Chancellor, 1924. 
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HARCQURT, Lewise III Viscount. (1863-1922) 
Statesman. Educated, Eton* Harcourt was a devoted secretary to his father 
and only became an M. P. at the age of 40. First Commissioner of Works, 
1905-1910] Secretary of State for Colonies, 1910-1915. 
MGE. Charles, Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858-1944) 
Diplomatist and Statesman. Educated, Harroq and Trinity College, Cambridge; 
i 
entered Foreign Offices 1880; Attache at Constantinople, 1881-18841 Third 
Secretary at Berlins 1885; Washington, 1886; Charge d'Affaires at Sofia, 
1887-1889; Second Secretary at Constantin. rl-, 1.889-1893. Head of Chancery 
at Paris, 1893-1896; First Secretary at Teheran, 1896-1898; Secretary 
at St. Petersburg, 1898-1903; Assistant Under Secretary at Foreign Office 
1903-1906; Permanent Under Secretary at Foreign Office 1906-1910; 
Viceroy of India, 1910-1916; Permanent Under Secretary at Foreign Office, 
1916-1920; Ambassador at Paris, 1920-1922. 
UQUSE. Edward Mandell (1858-1938) 
Adviser and Envoy of President Wilson. 
VQW Sir Esmej, let Baron Howard of Penrith (1836-1939) 
Diplomatist. Educated, Harrow. Entered Diplomatic Service, 1885. 
Ambassador at Stockholm, 1913-1918. 
H. Sir Henry (1843-1921) 
Diplomatist. Minister Plenipotentiary in British Mission to Holy See, 
1914-1916. 
is LSJ !. Alexander (1856-1919) 
Russian Diplomatist and Statesman. Foreign Minister, 1906-10; Ambassador 
at Paris, 1910-1917. 
Sot 
TJAGOW Gc ttlieb son. (1863-1935) 
German Statesman. Ambassador at Romei 1905-19131 Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, 1913-1916. 
fº 
&I MME, Richard von. (1873-1948) 
German diplomatist and Statesman. 
Counsellor at Embassy in London, 1908-1914; 1914-1916, Minister at the 
Hague; Ambassador at Constantinople, 1916; Foreign Minister, 1917-1918. 
Sir Henry Austin (1847-1918) 
Diplomatist. Educated, Elizabeth Collegej, Guernsey, and Pembroke College., 
Oxford] entered Foreign Office, 18701 Commercial Attache to Belgium, 
Switzerland and France. 
Ljc oYSKYS Prince Karl Max" (1860-1928) 
German Diplomatist. Ambassador at Londons 1912-1914" 
LQRMUR. 
,., rl of, 
Reid. Robert ThreshiR (1846-1923) 
Politician. Educated at Cheltenham and Balliol College, Oxford; M. P. #188U; 
Solicitor Generale 1894; Lord Chancellor 1905-1912" 
. STERMAN. Charles Frederick (1874-1927) 
Politiden. Educated, Weymouth College and Christ's College, Cambridges 
M. P. $ 1906; Under Secretary at Local Government Boards 19(18-1914; 
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, 1914-1915. 
W "L LET. Sir Louis du Pan (1864-1936) 
Diplomatist. Entered Foreign Office 18851 precis writer to Lansdowne, 
1903-1905; Private Secretary to Greys 1905-1907; Assistant Under Secretary, 
1907-19131 Ambassador at Constantinople, 1913-1914. 
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A. Reginald (1863-1943) 
Politician. Educated, Lingle College School and Trinity Colleges Cambridge; 
M"P. 1695; President of Board of Education, 1907; First Lord of 6dmiralty, 
1908-1911; 1911-1915; Home Secretary; 1915-1916, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. 
UMLIL, Edmund D. (1873-1924) 
Journalist, politici;:... rd Secretary of Union of Democratic Control. 
Educated, Eastbourne; founded Congo Reform Association, 1904; Secretary 
of U. D. C. 1914-19241 M"P" 1922-1924" 
YJRLEY. JohnI Ist Viscount Blackburn (1838-1923) 
Statesman and man of letters. Educated at Cheltenham College and Lincoln 
College, Oxford; M. P. 1883; " Secretary of State for Indias 1905-1910; 
Lord President of Councils 1910-1914; Resigned in August, 1914" 
4IILSON. Sir Arthur, let Baron Carnoak (1849-1928) 
Diplomatist. Educated, Rugby and Brasenose College, Oxford; entered 
Foreign Offices 1870; British Delegate to Algeciras Conference; Ambassador 
to Russia, 1906-1910; Permanent Under Secretary, 1910-1916. 
F 8UITON. Noel Edward_, Ist Baron Buxton (1869-1948) 
Politician. Educated, Harrow and Trinity Colleges Cambridge; M"P. 1905, 
lost seat 1906; M. P. 1910. 
Q'B E. Hugh James (1866-1916) 
Diplomatist. Educated, Beaumont and Balliol College, Oxford; Counsellor 
at St. Petersburg Embassy, 1906-1916. 
gJg NTa Sir Lancelot (1881-19651 
Diplomatist. Entered Foreign Offices 1903; Acting 3rd Secretary in 
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Diplomatic Service, 1905; Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office, 19201 
Assistant Under Secretary, 1927-19361 Deputy Under Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs; 1936-1939; Ambassador to Belgium, 1939. 
OPPF HEWRLSir Francis (1370-1961) 
Educated, Lycee Frankfurt, and. Balliol, Oacford. Consul-General at 
Frankfurt, 1900-1911; Commercial Attachä for Northern. and Central Europe 
(with acting rank of Counsellor in Diplomatic Service), 1911-1914. 
During the war sent to the Hague and to Switzerland to deal with the blockade 
question. 
RA§§& Walter H. (1855-1918) 
Journalist and diplomatist. American Ambassador in London, 1913-1918. 
i 
t920AU a Raymond (1860-1934) 
French Statesman. President, 1912-1920" 
WSNSQNBY. Arthu; Augustus William Henry; let Baron Ponsonby of Shulbrede riº=3ý 
(1871-1946) 
Politician and author. Educated, Eton 
. 
and Balliol College, Oxford. 
Entered Foreign Office, 1894; Brivate Secretary to Campbell-Bannerman, 
1906-1908; M. P., 1908.1918; Lost seat 1918; Joined Labour Party; M. P., 
1922-1930; Under Secretary of State for. Foreign Affairs, 1924; Under 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Parliamentary Secretary at 
Ministry of Transport, 1929-1931; raised to peerage, 1930; Chancellor 
of Duchy of Lancaster, 1931; Leader of Opposition. in the House of Lords, 
1931-1935. 
3o4 
9D2, JIGa s Rennall. ist Baron Renne l Rudd (1858-1941) 
Diplomatist. Educated at Haileybury and-Balliol College, Oxford. 
Ambassador at Rome, 1908-1919 
OLD. Sir Horace George Montan u, 9th Baronet (1869-1941) 
Diplomatist. Educated, Eton. Entered Diplomatic Service 1891; 1913-1914, 
Counsellor of Berlin Embassy; At Foreign Offices 191,4-19161 Minister it 
Berne, 1916-19191 Minister at Warsaw, 1919-201. Ambassador to Turkey, 
. 
1920; Deputy to Curzon at the Lausanne Conference, 1922-1923, and Chief 
delegate to second Lausanne Conference, 19231 Ambassador at Madrid, 
1924-19281 Ambassador at Berlin, 1928-1933. 
RI, C. Kalter, ist Viscount Runciman of Di%ford (1870-1949) 
Statesman. Educated, South Shield High School, privately, Trinity College, 
Cambridge; M. P. 1699; Parliamentary Secretary to Local Government Board, 
1905-19081 Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1908-1911; President of 
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1911-1914; President of the Board of 
Trade, 1914. 
,, MTJELL. Herbert Louis, 1st Viscount (1870--1963) 
Educated, University College School, Balliol College, Oxford; Postmaster- 
Generals 1910-1914, and 1915-1916; President of Local Government Board, 
1914-1915. 
SAZANOW. Sargei Dmitrieyich (1861-1927) 
Russian diplomatist and statesman. Foreign Minister, 1910-1916. 
§COTT. Charl9s. Prestwich(1846-1934) 
Journalist. Educated Clapham Grammar School and Corpus Christi, Oxford. 
Editor of Manchester Guardian,, 1872-1929. 
X05 
0 -WATSS0N1 Robert William (1879-1951) 
Educated, Winchester and New College. Devoted student of Central European 
and Balkan history and politics. 
§IMON. JQba Allsebrooko 1st Viscount (1873-1954) 
Educated,, Fettes College; Edinburgh, Wadham College, Oxford; M. P., 1906; 
Solicitor General, 1910-1913; Attorney-General with seat in Cabinets 
1913-1915; Home Secretary, 1915-1916; Foreign Secretary, 1931-1935; 
Home Secretary# 1935-1937; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1937-1940; Lord 
Chancellor, 1940-1945. 
PENDEL John Al ed (1862-1942) 
Journalist and author. Educated, Bath College and Balliol College, Oxford; 
Editor of Westminster Gasetter 1896-1922. 
SPERLIJG. Sir Reginald Arthur (1874-1965) 
Educated, Eton and New College; Clerk at the Foreign Office, 1899; Senior 
Clerk, 1913; Assistant Secretary, 1919; Minister at Berne, 1924-1927; 
Minister at Sofia, 1925-1928; Minister at Helcingfors, 1930-19350 
aRjNG-RICE'. Sir Cecil (1859-1918) 
Diplomatist. Educated, Eton and Balliol College, Oxford; entered Foreign 
Office, 1882; Ambassador at Washington, 1913-1918. 
IEED. Henry Wickham (1871-19561 
Journalist. Educated, Sudbury Grammar School and Jena, Berlin and Paris 
Universities. Acting Correspondent of the Times in Rome, 1696; Correspondent 
of the Times in Berlin, 1696-1902; at Viennas 1902-1913; Foreign Editor 
Times, 1914-1919; Editor of the Times.. 1919-1922; Lecturer in Central 
European History, King's College, London, 1925-1938. 
7, o L 
SBA HEY. John St. Loe (1860-1927) 
Journalist, Educated, privately and Balliol College, Oxford; Editor of 
the Spectators 1898-1925. 
CHEL Giles Lytton, (1880-1932) 
Critic and biographer. Educated at Leamington College, Liverpool University, 
and Trinity College, Cambridge. 
J ELL. William Geoysr6j 1st Baron Tyrrell of Avon (1866-1947) 
Diplomatist. Educated in Germany and at Balliol College, Oxford; entered 
Foreign Office# 1899; precis writer for Grey, 1905-1907; Grey*a Private 
Secretary, 1907-19151 Head of Political Intelligence Department of the 
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